Datasets:

tvergho

/

DebateCards

like 0

f0836a8bd4b2ff545f49af8c5c01b7857c45179d9d7fa504e8955f309222adba

Companies want ethical use—the Pentagon is scaring them away now.

Anwer 22 - (Ruqayya Anwer, researcher at Riphah International University; Ph.D. in media and communication studies; 1-18-2022, Daily Sabah, "China is winning the power battle in AI race with US," doa: 9-11-2022) url:

The Pentagon's chief software officer Chaillan claimed criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms to collaborate with the government on AI , and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation . One of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics . Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate whereas many American s are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google halted working with the Pentagon on AI after employees departed after the business assisted in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy

The Pentagon's first chief software officer , Nicolas Chaillan claimed that several government departments in the U.S. had " kindergarten-level " cyber defenses. Chaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms , such as Google , to collaborate with the government on AI , and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation . One of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics . Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesse s are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google , for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the D epartment o f D efense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy

chief software officer several government departments kindergarten-level reluctance of U.S. firms Google collaborate with the government AI extensive ethical disputes delayed innovation move more rapidly not mired enormous arguments AI ethics compelled to collaborate American businesse s wary halted working AI dozen employees D o D boost drone attack accuracy

['', "The Pentagon's first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan stressed that “in 15 to 20 years, we have no competing fighting chance against China.” It's already decided; “Whether it requires a war or not is kind of anecdotal right now.”", 'He also claimed that several government departments in the U.S. had "kindergarten-level" cyber defenses. Moreover, Chaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms, such as Google, to collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation. While China was destined to rule the world\'s future, everything from media narratives to geopolitics is under their control.', 'One of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics. But partly because Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesses are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google, for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the Department of Defense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy.', '', '', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaHe-Aff-Texas-Open-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

DaHe

265973b70a7274b6dd06a6d858d1423a0911a19d11435c58eaf2ae031687262a

Our list breaks down into a coherent set of themes that conveniently organize NEG prep.

Christopher L. Sagers 15, James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, “Chapter 1: Introduction,” Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 2015, pp. 1–12

The Constitution limits antitrust First interstate commerce Second constitutional rights Next the antitrust laws applies to “ trade or commerce and only to “ persons ,” Finally other federal statutes limit the scope approximately three dozen Statutory exemptions and courts held other laws limit antitrust

The Constitution limits antitrust in two ways First interstate commerce Second constitutional rights Prominently state action and Noerr-Pennington antitrust enforcement against “expressive” conduct and the conduct of religious organizations violate the First Amendment Next the language of the federal antitrust laws imposes scope limits applies only to “ trade or commerce ,” and that has been held to exclude gratuitous or charitable conduct Sherman likewise applies only to “ persons ,” Stricter limits appear in the Clayton Robinson-Patman and FTC A and these limits are quite complex . The Robinson-Patman Act and two of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions, the limit on tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in section 3 and the limit on interlocking directorates in section 8, apply only to persons “engaged in commerce.” The F T C A is subject to special scope limits of its own Finally the language of other federal statutes can limit the scope of the federal antitrust laws approximately three dozen statutes Statutory exemptions concern industries that are already regulated like insurers or ocean shipping or specific kinds of conduct that Congress has chose n to favor with special freedom to collaborate , like tech r and d the graduate medical resident program or production joint ventures among competing newspapers Second , courts have held other federal laws implicitly limit antitrust almost exclusively in two areas: federally regulated, exchange-listed securities , and labor union activities

Constitution two ways interstate commerce constitutional rights state action Noerr-Pennington Next language of the federal antitrust laws trade or commerce exclude gratuitous charitable likewise only persons Clayton Robinson-Patman FTC A complex persons “engaged in commerce.” F T C A special own Finally other federal statutes three dozen statutes Statutory exemptions already regulated insurers ocean shipping kinds of conduct Congress chose favor freedom to collaborate tech r and d graduate medical resident program production joint ventures competing newspapers courts other implicitly exchange-listed securities labor union activities

['B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law', 'The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities-: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.', 'The U.S. Constitution limits antitrust in two ways. First, the Constitution sets the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the power on which federal antitrust laws are predicated. Under current constitutional law, as explained in Chapter II.A.l, the issue of whether the application of federal antitrust law in a particular instance will violate the Commerce Clause is not raised particularly often. While in principle an antitrust claim might be dismissed because the challenged conduct is local, and while there have been some recent indications that Commercej Clause limits could become somewhat more demanding in antitrust,37 the conduct ordinarily must be highly isolated and economically insignificant to fall outside of Congress’s commerce power.', 'Second, antitrust can be limited where it would violate defendants’! constitutional rights. Prominently, a pair of related rules—the “state action” doctrine, or Parker immunity, and the Noerr-Pennington immunity—preclude antitrust enforcement against political activities. I The state action rule protects state governments from liability when they act in their sovereign capacities, and largely frees them to restrain trade within their own borders, so long as they do not indiscriminately authorize private trade restraints without government oversight. The Noerr doctrine protects private persons when they participate in the political process, even if the government action that they request would be anticompetitive.', 'As explained in Chapter. V.B, there is some-controversy among commentators as to whether the political immunities are themselves rules of constitutional law—limits without which antitrust would violate the Constitution—or merely judicial constructions, of the antitrust, statutes. 1 Still, even if the political immunities are not themselves constitutionally required, ^"substantive rulesl of constitutional law plainly ido limit antitrust directly. Notably, antitrust enforcement against “expressive” 1 conduct and the conduct of religious organizations can violate the First Amendment.38', 'Next, the language of the federal antitrust laws imposes several j scope limits. Each of the major antitrust statutes applies only to “trade or commerce,”39 and that phrase has been held to exclude gratuitous or j charitable conduct and other conduct not involving the exchange of goods or services for consideration.40 The Sherman Act likewise applies only to “persons,” and while that term is construed broadly under the Sherman Act, it has some exceptions, notably for the federal government and its instrumentalities.41 Stricter limits appear in the Clayton, i Robinson-Patman, and Federal Trade Commission Acts (FTC Act), and these limits are quite complex. The Robinson-Patman Act and two of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions, the limit on tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in section 3 and the limit on interlocking directorates in section 8, apply only to persons “engaged in commerce.”42 The Federal Trade Commission Act is subject to a few special peculiar scope limits of its own.43', 'Finally, in several distinct ways the language of other federal statutes can limit the scope of the federal antitrust laws. First, approximately three dozen statutes explicitly limit antitrust as it would otherwise apply in particular contexts. Statutory exemptions tend to concern either (1) industries that are already regulated by some agency, like insurers excepted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by virtue of their being regulated by state insurance commissioners,44 or ocean shipping firms regulated by the Federal Maritime Commission,45 or (2) specific kinds of conduct that Congress has chosen from time to time to favor with special freedom to collaborate, like technological research and development,46 the graduate medical resident program,47 or production joint ventures among competing newspapers.48', 'Second, the courts have sometimes held that other federal laws implicitly limit antitrust. This impulse is expressed in three different judge-made doctrines. Under the doctrine of “implied repeal,” the language of some federal statute may be so plainly inconsistent with the applicability of antitrust in a given case that courts will find that Congress implicitly stated an intent to repeal antitrust as to that case.49 (A closely related rule, called the “federal instrumentality” doctrine, holds that a defendant acting pursuant to a command or explicit approval of the federal government cannot violate antitrust law.) Traditionally, implied repeal was strongly disfavored, and though it has been applied somewhat more freely in recent decades, it still appears almost exclusively in two areas: federally regulated, exchange-listed securities, and labor union activities.50 Under the “filed rate” or Keogh doctrine, where Congress gives a regulatory agency authority to receive filed tariffs setting the rates that regulated firms may charge, courts hold that Congress intended to bar money damages for any harm caused by those rates.51 And under the rule of “primary jurisdiction,” antitrust courts will sometimes defer to the statutory authority of a federal agency to resolve matters entrusted to it by Congress, before proceeding to resolve antitrust issues.', '']

[(15, 24)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Texas-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Texas-Doubles.docx

7c512d418c01b468054b3d9d53564a462bb2b40e809762a3fe72169a4301681d

Xi isn’t feeling the heat.

Michael Cunningham 3-15, Research Fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, M.A. in International Affairs from American University, “China's Economy Is in Trouble: Is Xi Jinping?”, National Interest, 03-15-2024, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-economy-trouble-xi-jinping-210043

tumbling market threaten to derail Xi Party sees things differently doesn’t see crisis work report tone is triumphant Xi’s leadership lead China through economic challenges unprecedented New Era vision permeates every section Party is happy with Xi’s leadership Party more in control than ever Nothing matters more breakneck growth unsustainable party has long seen a need to restructure exactly what Xi is doing America shouldn’t bet on rapid collapse or sustained weakening in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times Party appears genuinely confident it will again

Sky-high youth unemployment, a tumbling stock market , and real-estate turmoil threaten to derail Xi The Communist Party sees things differently Judging from the NPC session, the party doesn’t see itself as a regime in crisis the work report is the most authoritative statement of high-level policy and is designed for internal government audiences The report acknowledges the year won’t be easy Nevertheless, its tone is triumphant , pointing out challenges didn’t prevent China from reporting solid 5.2% economic growth last year the party is confident enough that it set a target of around 5% growth for 2024 As for Xi’s leadership , the work report credits him with single-handedly lead ing China through the economic and political challenges of 2023 This is unprecedented language Rhetorical upgrades make a world of difference in an uber-formalistic system Xi’s New Era vision permeates nearly every section by all appearances, the Communist Party is happy with Xi’s leadership Western audiences seeking to gauge Xi’s political fortunes should take note Under Xi, the Communist Party is more firmly in control than ever thanks to complete control over government decision-making and surveillance Nothing matters more to the party than its political control . Investors aren’t Xi’s constituents His sole constituent is the Communist Party it is far more interested in preserving and strengthening its grip on power than overseeing a thriving economy breakneck growth was unsustainable and riddled with risks. The party has long seen a need to restructure its economy by addressing these and transitioning to a slower model. This is exactly what Xi is doing his ruthlessness and unprecedented consolidation of power helped him get past vested interests America shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening of the regime in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times before the Communist Party appears genuinely confident that it will do so again

sees things differently triumphant credits him lead unprecedented language nearly every section happy with Xi’s leadership more firmly in control than ever Nothing matters more to the party than its political control sole constituent is the Party exactly what Xi is doing shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening genuinely confident

['The Chinese Communist Party and its leader, Xi Jinping, aren’t doing so well. Sky-high youth unemployment, a tumbling stock market, and continuing real-estate turmoil threaten to derail his “China dream” and possibly drag Xi down with it. And a spate of purges of senior officials over the past year—some of them former Xi proteges—has fueled speculation that his position in the party isn’t as secure as it appears.', 'At least this is the narrative presented in much of the western media discourse. The Communist Party sees things differently.', 'This was obvious from the recently concluded annual session of China’s rubber-stamp National People’s Congress (NPC). The week-long session is the most important yearly gathering in China’s political calendar, establishing an official narrative of the past year’s performance and setting priorities for the year to come. Everything presented at the congress is first approved by the ruling Communist Party after a lengthy period of drafting and deliberation, making it one of the clearest windows into the party’s thinking.', 'Judging from the NPC session, the party doesn’t see itself as a regime in crisis. The Government Work Report, presented by Premier Li Qiang, portrayed a China facing “both strategic opportunities and challenges, with favorable conditions outweighing unfavorable ones.” This isn’t hollow propaganda—the work report is the most authoritative statement of high-level policy for the year ahead and is designed primarily for internal government audiences.', 'The report acknowledges the year won’t be easy, due to geopolitical pressure, weak external demand, and a host of domestic economic challenges and financial risks. Nevertheless, its tone is, if anything, triumphant, pointing out that these challenges didn’t prevent China from reporting solid 5.2% economic growth last year. The report neglects to mention the low baseline due to terrible economic performance in 2022 or the widespread questions around the accuracy of official figures—Rhodium Group places last year’s growth at closer to 1.5%. In any case, the party is confident enough that it set a target of “around 5%” growth for 2024 as well.', 'As for Xi’s leadership, the work report credits him with single-handedly leading China through the economic and political challenges of 2023. “We owe our achievements in 2023 to General Secretary Xi Jinping, who is at the helm charting the course,” it said. This is unprecedented language—previous work reports gave all credit to “the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.” Rhetorical upgrades like this make a world of difference in an uber-formalistic system in which every word matters.', 'And it’s more than just rhetoric. Xi’s “New Era” vision permeates nearly every section of the work report. Furthermore, the NPC on Monday passed new revisions to the Organic Law of the State Council, which further strengthened the Communist Party’s control over China’s cabinet and made the cabinet responsible for implementing Xi Jinping Thought. The entire PRC government was already answerable to Xi in practice, but now it’s more official.', 'Indeed, by all appearances, the Communist Party is happy with Xi’s leadership. But how can this be, given the economy is a mess and investor sentiment is at a multi-decade low? The answer is simple: These aren’t the metrics the party uses to measure his performance. Western audiences seeking to gauge Xi’s political fortunes should take note.', 'Under Xi, the Communist Party is more firmly in control than it has ever been, thanks to both its more complete control over government decision-making and the surveillance state that enables it to quickly detect and neutralize dissent. Nothing matters more to the party than its political control. Investors can moan, but they aren’t Xi’s constituents. The Chinese people aren’t even his constituents. His sole constituent is the Communist Party, and it is far more interested in preserving and strengthening its grip on power than overseeing a thriving economy.', 'This doesn’t mean the economy isn’t important. To the contrary, it’s one of the party’s most powerful tools for pursuing its political aims. But the breakneck growth of the reform era was unsustainable and riddled with long-term risks. The party has long seen a need to restructure its economy by addressing these risks and transitioning to a more sustainable—albeit slower—growth model. This is exactly what Xi is doing, and his ruthlessness and unprecedented consolidation of power have helped him get past the vested interests that prevented his predecessors from making significant progress in this endeavor.', 'Of course, the party can’t neglect economic growth. But it only needs enough growth to maintain stability as it pursues grander priorities such as a regulatory overhaul, technological self-reliance, and evening out the wealth gap through “common prosperity.”', 'The leadership are well aware that these efforts work in opposition to growth, but they see them as crucial to reducing the risk of crisis in the longer term. They could take their foot off the pedal if they feared the short-term damage to the economy was starting to risk precipitating the very crisis they seek to avert. Or they could unveil a major stimulus, as their predecessors did in previous periods of economic difficulty. So far, they’re doing neither, and the fact that they continue to press forward with their economic restructuring is one indication that they think they have things under control.', 'Are they correct? Only time will tell. For all anyone knows, Xi’s leadership could rest on a giant house of cards that will eventually come crashing down. But America shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening of the regime in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times before, and the Communist Party appears genuinely confident that it will do so again.']

[(8, 23)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-NDT-Octas.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

788453ed012e6fa30340e45c80ed6f8af1516841866da8de5dda3510077e95d9

6---Harbinger DA---formlessness becomes the “harbinger” of new forms of black sociality as “terrifying, beautiful monstrosity”---that is a) necessary to identify historically contingent violence [“index…the ‘spiritual ordeal’ of death that is settler modernity”] and b) generative of “alternative ways of being” in “representation’s colonializing ruin”---that was 1AC Carter here…

J. Kameron Carter 19. Professor of religious studies at Indiana University. He is author of Race: A Theological Account (2008).“Black Malpractice (A Poetics of the Sacred)” Social Text, vol. 37, issue 2. June 1, 2019. doi.org/10.1215/01642472-7370991

collective effervescence in “transgression” exceed without returning to the original condition the sacred in its excessive, - mode as harbinger of sociality without limit this is formulation of black sacral (non)position that aroused Charlottesville blackness as “symptom of the sacred as terrifying beautiful monstrosity the sacred otherwise obscure and formless Black sacrality indexes the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity black radical sacrality is poised to incite volatility within politicality as a malpracticed black (religious) study the sacred as a pathological threshold before which genres of life unplottable in representation’s colonializing ruins alternative ways of being come into view.

the left side of things where there is always heterogeneity or base energies exceeding the terms of order. Interpreted as mobs, they are outlaw or “[breakers] of the laws of social homogeneity.” As such, “these impoverished classes,” Bataille says, “are characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things” collective effervescence in dicates a “transgression” or a “negation [that] surpasses itself” in exceed ing every closed order “ without returning to the original condition or state it had negated.” Here we find the sacred in its excessive, left - hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture as harbinger of a sociality without limit or completion. to mobilize a discourse of the sacred for black studies, the ambiguity within the very notion of the sacred itself as both pure and the impure. The sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed in addition to being opposed in a binary relationship to the profane the sacred is itself comprised of two opposing binary poles the forces that maintain physical and moral purity and order, life, and health and those that contribute to impurity, evil, sacrilege, disease, and death [the accursed].” If Bataille associates this second sense of the sacred, whose relationship to the first is not dialectical but excessive or abyssal with destitute then Bataille’s more renegade formulation of sacred excess to that blackened or black sacral (non)position that aroused the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in the first place as a violent secondary, “right-hand” reaction This opens up a consideration of the sacred’s proximity to blackness following Spillers we might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred ,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity , that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called The monstrosity to be claimed here, this “unbounded sociality,” concerns “blackness as matter [that] signals [infinity] the sacred otherwise . Here the sacred is obscure and formless the sacred, in its adjacency to black ness or as itself symptomatically black, points to those hermetic energies or those forces of enchantment, to metamorphosis bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. Black sacrality indexes a certain liveliness and aliveness occasioned by, moving in relationship to, and yet irreducible to the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity . black radical sacrality which we might just as well think of as the sorcery of (black social) life itself, unsettles, is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality . the sacred, as I am given to thinking about it here as figuring a poetics of malpracticed black (religious) study , is neither transcendental, pure, nor beneficent but, rather, is base, stank, impure, low to the ground, underground, of and with the earth. I approach the sacred as a kind of pathological and ek-static threshold before which other, differential and unrepresentable presences, genres or forms of life , unplottable gatherings in representation’s colonializing ruins , alternative ways of being with the earth, come into view. 21

without returning to the original condition Here we find the sacred in its excessive, left - hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture as harbinger of sociality without limit The sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed we might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred ,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity , that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called . Here the sacred is obscure and formless bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. black radical sacrality is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality . representation’s colonializing ruins alternative ways of being

['But to stay with Bataille, in that same essay he keeps his eye trained on the left side of things where there is always heterogeneity or base energies exceeding the terms of order. He finds examples in this regard in the untouchables of India, on the one hand, and among the destitute in the economically and socially “less ritualistic” or “advanced civilizations” of the West, as he puts it, on the other. In the latter, “being destitute is all it takes . . . to create between the self and others—who consider themselves the expression of normal man—a nearly insurmountable gap” (144). Whether it be the hereditarily untouchables or the destitute in advanced countries, it is the “lowest strata of society,” Bataille contends, “[that] can . . . be described as heterogeneous . . . those who generally provoke repulsion and can in no case be assimilated to the whole of mankind” (144). In their untouchability or destitution, such groups are a heterogeneous element associated with useless expenditure, with “violence, excess, delirium, madness . . . [that] to varying degrees” has the capacity because occluded within but not fully subsumed by the juridical-economic order to unsettle the terms of order (142). Interpreted as mobs, they are outlaw or “[breakers] of the laws of social homogeneity.” As such, “these impoverished classes,” Bataille says, “are characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things” (144), particularly those tabooed things, those things, as Richman explains again elaborating Bataille, placed under “restricted contact” and whose collective effervescence indicates a “transgression” or a “negation [that] surpasses itself” in exceeding every closed order “without returning to the original condition or state it had negated.”14 Here we find the sacred in its excessive, left-hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture, as harbinger of a sociality without limit or completion.', 'This brings us to an absolutely vital point around which much of what I want to say in this article and, indeed, much of my effort to mobilize a discourse of the sacred for black studies, turns: the ambiguity within the very notion of the sacred itself as both pure and the impure. Alexander Riley succinctly clarifies the issues here: “The sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed.”15 That is to say, “in addition to being opposed in a binary relationship to the profane [this is Bataille’s sphere of homogeneity], [the sacred] is itself comprised of two opposing binary poles: the forces that maintain physical and moral purity and order, life, and health [the holy that upholds the holy], and those that contribute to impurity, evil, sacrilege, disease, and death [the accursed].”16 The former sphere of pure divinity depends on an accursed share, an excremental element, to constitute and secure itself, within the terms of a restricted economy of sacrificial exchange, as pure. As Giorgio Agamben understood and as Riley reiterates, this doubled, contradictory or ambiguous sense of the sacred is connected to the Latin word from which it derives: sacer. Riley goes on to explain how the idea of the sacred can trip us up: hewing close to the Latin sense of sacer, “the French sacré . . . can mean both, and is frequently used in both senses (la musique sacrée, holy or sacred music, and un sacré menteur, a damned or accursed liar), whereas the English ‘sacred’ has in practice lost the second meaning.”17', 'If Bataille associates this second sense of the sacred, whose relationship to the first is not dialectical but excessive or abyssal, with the untouchables and the destitute, then here I stretch the generally Durkheimian formulation of the right-and left-hand sacred, bending along with it even Bataille’s more renegade formulation of sacred excess to that blackened or black sacral (non)position that aroused the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in the first place as a violent secondary, “right-hand” reaction. This opens up a consideration of the sacred’s proximity to blackness wherein, following Hortense J. Spillers, we might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity, that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called.18 The monstrosity to be claimed here, this “unbounded sociality,” concerns “blackness as matter [that] signals [infinity], another world . . . that which exists without time and out of space, in the plenum”19—the sacred otherwise. Here the sacred is obscure and formless, even “oceanic,” to stay with Spillers’s Freudian-inflected formulation. More akin to that “raw prime matter” of which Denise Ferreira da Silva has recently spoken as part and parcel of the virtuality of a “black feminist poethics,” the sacred here is of the wild, of the wilderness. To continue to think under the force of Spillers’s thought, the sacred, in its adjacency to black ness or as itself symptomatically black, points to those hermetic energies or those forces of enchantment, to metamorphosis bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. Black sacrality indexes a certain liveliness and aliveness occasioned by, moving in relationship to, and yet irreducible to the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity.20 For this reason, black radical sacrality, which we might just as well think of as the sorcery of (black social) life itself, unsettles, is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality. That is to say, the sacred, as I am given to thinking about it here as figuring a poetics of malpracticed black (religious) study, is neither transcendental, pure, nor beneficent but, rather, is base, stank, impure, low to the ground, underground, of and with the earth. All this is to say, I approach the sacred as a kind of pathological and ek-static threshold before which other, differential and unrepresentable presences, genres or forms of life, unplottable gatherings in representation’s colonializing ruins, alternative ways of being with the earth, come into view.21', '']

[(11, 20)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Aff-3---Mukai-Debate-Tournament-Quarters.docx

Emory

PiWa

41d26dd51180766a7a1453f6c8305ed9a8fa232c8d7e7656549eafa3fca35e4b

It’s an advocate for the green new deal---proves the perm shields their K of nuclearism.

Red Nation 21 – We are a coalition of Native and non-Native activists, educators, students, and community organizers advocating Native liberation. We formed to address the marginalization and invisibility of Native struggles within mainstream social justice organizing, and to foreground the targeted destruction and violence towards Native life and land. “The Red Deal: Indigenous Action to Save our Earth”, Common Notions, 2021. pp. 13-24 // rose

The atomic bomb was tested on Native lands warning the world : fall in line, or else. The atomic age and climate change were made possible by Indigenous genocide. consumption of the Global North has to be curtailed resource extraction will come at the expense of other nations overco nsumption in the North is enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the South The Red Deal advocates propose a 70 percent tax hike to pay for changes We agree with these proposals Framing this as a panhuman problem misses the point Class hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the lives of the few We have to draw lines between us and them

The world-ending atomic bomb was created in secret atop a sacred Tewa Pueblo mesa at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. It was tested on Native lands , and the United States became the first and only nation to drop the bomb. The horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a warning to the r est of world : fall in line, or else. The atomic age and climate change were made possible by settler colonialism and Indigenous genocide. The energy consumption of the Global North —especially in the United States and Europe— has to be radically curtailed , not subsidized by more “green” energy. The amounts of resource extraction to facilitate this transition, such as the acquisition of lithium for rechargeable batteries, will come at the expense of other nations who have been historically denied the technology to develop their own resources for the benefit of their own people. In this era of catastrophic climate change, why is it easier for some to imagine the end of fossil fuels than settler colonialism? Some Western socialists seem to have abandoned that future in favor of technological pipe dreams like mining asteroids, gene editing, and synthetic meat, without addressing the real problem of overco nsumption in the Global North , which is directly enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the Global South . When looking to the left governments of the Global South, we have to understand that the extractivism of the North is fundamentally based on the imperialist domination of markets, people, and territory. any climate policy must also be anti-imperialist The Red Deal Some advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes . Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals , but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone. IEN called for a clear commitment to keep fossil fuels in the ground and stop abusive economic and political systems. Framing this as a panhuman problem or a problem of the species—such as the term “the Anthropocene,” the geological age of the fossil fuel economy— misses the point . Class hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the gilded lives of the few . We have to draw lines of separation between us and them , because they have already done so.

The Red Deal Some advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes . Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals , but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone. IEN

['The world-ending atomic bomb was created in secret atop a sacred Tewa Pueblo mesa at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. It was tested on Native lands, and the United States became the first and only nation to drop the bomb. The horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a warning to the rest of world: fall in line, or else. Scientists who maintain the Doomsday Clock set its hands at one minute and forty seconds to midnight in 2020, the closest humanity has been to global catastrophe since the clock’s creation in 1947. The two main factors contributing to this threat, experts warn, are global warming and nuclear risk. The atomic age and climate change were made possible by settler colonialism and Indigenous genocide.', 'The spirit of these times frequently gets forgotten: freedom for some is unfreedom for others. The legacy of the New Deal—which required the plundering of Indigenous lands to keep a settler economy afloat—cannot be the plan for the rest of the planet. Nations of the Global South cannot follow the same path of development as the North in their pursuit of climate equity because the atmosphere has become colonized, disallowing the path for industrialization and development the Global North has followed. The unequal distribution of power—and suffering—is literally in the molecules we breathe and drink. The burden of transition lies at the feet of those most responsible for carbon emission-driven climate change, not those most imperiled by it. The energy consumption of the Global North—especially in the United States and Europe—has to be radically curtailed, not subsidized by more “green” energy. The amounts of resource extraction to facilitate this transition, such as the acquisition of lithium for rechargeable batteries, will come at the expense of other nations who have been historically denied the technology to develop their own resources for the benefit of their own people. The United States, more than any other country, owes a huge share of the climate debt that should be paid—which should be taken from the massive surplus of resources used to militarize the planet and stockpile nuclear weapons—to help nations of the Global South develop sustainably and according to their own values and processes.', 'Decolonization', 'In this era of catastrophic climate change, why is it easier for some to imagine the end of fossil fuels than settler colonialism? To imagine green economies, carbon-free wind and solar energy, and electric, bullet-train utopias but not the return of Indigenous lands? Why is it easier to imagine the end of the world—a zombie apocalypse—than the end of capitalism? It’s not an either/or scenario. Ending settler colonialism and capitalism and returning Indigenous lands are all possible—and necessary.', 'The question of restoring Indigenous land to Indigenous people is thoroughly political, which means the theft of it was—and is—not inevitable or beyond our current capacities to resolve. The same goes for Black reparations, ending the hardening of the US border, defunding US imperialism, and stopping the continued exploitation of resources and labor in the Global South by countries up north. “The issue is that accumulation-based societies don’t like the answers we come up with because they are not quick technological fixes, they are not easy,” Michi Saagiig Nichnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson has said.4', 'Fifty years ago, decolonization—nations freeing themselves from colonial rule—and land reform inspired global visions for a socialist future, advancing the class struggle further than it has ever gone before by raising the living standards of billions in the Global South. Some Western socialists seem to have abandoned that future in favor of technological pipe dreams like mining asteroids, gene editing, and synthetic meat, without addressing the real problem of overconsumption in the Global North, which is directly enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the Global South. We need a revolution of values that recenters relationships to one another and the Earth over profits.', 'Anti-Imperialism', 'The geopolitical relationship countries like the United States have with the rest of the world is deeply intertwined with settler colonialism. Imperial projects build upon settler colonial ones. For the last twenty years, we’ve seen the United States destroy countries and communities in a quest for oil. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was for oil. Cultural treasures from one of the oldest civilizations on the planet were destroyed in the first days of the invasion, but the US military and its mercenary contractors chose to guard oil infrastructure. US oil companies secured contracts with the provisional government the US installed after it deposed Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. Those who recognized the US’ geopolitical motivation for the war soon called for “energy independence” in the United States instead of anti-imperialism. Consequently, Republicans and Democrats spent much of the 2000s promoting oil and gas expansion in the United States and Canada, and this has translated into new oil and gas production on stolen Indigenous lands.', 'Former US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama supported fossil fuels as the best path towards energy independence, which was also heralded as a means to achieve economic stability and improve homeland security. Both presidents cracked down on nations that strayed from the dictates of US hegemony. In 2002, Bush sponsored a coup d’état against Venezuela’s democratically elected president Hugo Chávez, who came to power on a promise to nationalize the corrupt oil sector to fund national infrastructure and poverty relief programs for the poor. When Obama assumed office in January 2009, he continued Bush’s sanctions against Venezuela and other nations deemed hostile to US interests. Obama considered natural gas fracking an alternative to coal and oil and he challenged China’s subsidies to its national solar industry that would lower the cost of solar production across the world. Like the dams that pulled the nation out of the Great Depression of the 1930s, fracking rigs pulled the nation out of the great recession of 2008. Obama was an imperialist first, a supporter of green energy second.', 'Increasingly, there is a direct link to the ongoing Venezuelan crisis and oil production in North America. When global oil prices began to fall due to the North American oil boom, a crisis ensued in Venezuela, and the money used to fund the social progress of the country’s poorest was all but halted. Around the time that Obamaera, pro-oil-and-gas energy policies began to take hold in 2008, during the Great Recession, global oil prices rapidly fell. This was partially due to the United States and Canada building new carbon infrastructure to drill and transport oil from production to market. This oil boom has wreaked havoc on Indigenous nations, with the creation of oil pipelines, the tar sands “dead zones,” fracking rigs, and refineries, locking in settler economies to drill at the expense of Indigenous lands and lives. Meanwhile, the boom weaned the US economy from oil imported from countries like Venezuela, whose major buyer was the United States. But the alternative source of oil is much worse.', 'Both the United States and Canada drilled their economies out of the gutter by producing the dirtiest oil in the world from tar sands and fracking rigs either on Indigenous treaty lands or next door to Indigenous communities. Each subsequent proposal for new carbon infrastructure, like oil pipelines, not only deepens the climate crisis and locks in carbon consumption, it aims to crush Venezuela. Why target Venezuela? It partially has to do with its oil reserves. But it also has to do with the threat it poses as an economic and social alternative to neoliberal capitalism. Venezuelans brought the Bolivarian Revolution into power, which, in turn, increased the participation in social, economic, and political life of Indigenous peoples, women, LGBTQ2+ people, Black communities, and poor people. The nation’s oil wealth was redistributed to the lowest sectors of society. And while, for a moment, the US-backed coup to oust the democratically elected president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, seemed imminent, people took to the streets and to the countryside to defend these hard-fought gains. The Bolivarian Revolution represents a possible alternative to neoliberal capitalism. That’s why from its inception it has drawn the ire of Washington, DC. And the most recent standoffs against the construction of oil pipelines at Standing Rock, Bayou Bridge, Line 3, and Unist’ot’en Camp show that the United States and Canada still need to plunder Indigenous lands to make a profit and to keep their economies afloat. Indigenous resistance in North America is at the forefront of combatting imperialist plunder, and our struggles are interconnected with our relatives of the Global South.', 'Venezuela’s solidarity has extended beyond its borders to Indigenous nations of Turtle Island, or North America. In 2007, Tim Giago, a preeminent Oglala Lakota journalist, applauded Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution for providing heating assistance to hard-hit Indian reservations, the poorest places in North America on the Northern Plains, during the harsh winter months.5 Citgo Petroleum, a Venezuelan state-owned oil company, had for years donated millions of dollars of heating oil not only to reservations’ communities in the United States, but also to low-income Black and Chicanx neighborhoods and homeless shelters.', 'Prominent Ojibwe activist from White Earth, Winona LaDuke, has also made the connection between the war on Indigenous nations in Turtle Island and the economic war waged against Venezuela. In 2016, during the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests, she told Democracy Now! that the construction of DAPL “has to do with crushing Venezuela, because Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world.”6 It also has to do with crushing one of Cuba’s major trading partners—Venezuela.', 'Cutting off Venezuelan oil to Cuba is part of a US-led blockade against the island nation that has lasted for more than six decades and which the UN General Assembly annually votes to end. The Mas family, an infamous billionaire Cuban-American clan, is responsible for many of the subversive and legislative attacks on Cuba, and much of its accumulated wealth comes from fossil fuels. The family patriarch, Jorge Mas Canosa, founded the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and MasTec, one of the largest self-described Latino businesses in the United States that specializes in energy, utilities, and communications infrastructure. In 2017, MasTec’s profits rose sharply by 90 percent, due to a high demand for oil pipelines and its role in building a major section of the DAPL, which trespassed through Oceti Sakowin treaty lands. The goal is not only to profit from the destruction of Indigenous lands but also to crush the political alternatives to neoliberal capitalism that Cuba and Venezuela represent.7', 'When looking to the left governments of the Global South, we have to understand that the extractivism of the North is fundamentally based on the imperialist domination of markets, people, and territory. US-backed economic sanctions impact nearly one-third of humanity in some thirty countries, causing untold death and devastation by denying people access to global markets. This restricts a country’s ability to generate wealth, stabilize currency, and provide basic human essentials for its people. Countries like Iran, Venezuela, and Bolivia have chosen the path of resource nationalism—that is, nationalizing and developing their own resources for the benefit of their own people and as a mechanism of protection and strength against the predation of the United States and Canada, whose notorious multination fossil fuel and mining companies salivate with each new coup attempt. The price these nations pay for choosing self-determination—delinking from the imperialist supply chain—is heavy sanctioning from the US that targets their civilian populations with hunger and deprivation.', 'Sanctions, which are war by other means, had already deprived nations of medical supplies, thus undermining their efforts to save lives from a global pandemic. In March 2020, the UN Secretary-General called for a “global ceasefire” because “the fury of the [Corona]virus illustrates the folly of war.”8 How can there be a ceasefire when sanctions continue to tear through one-third of humanity faster than the pandemic? Coronavirus has shown us that US imperialism holds the world back from responding to pandemics. And as we have seen with the targeting of nations who chart an alternative path, it also holds back the rest of the world from developing alternative forms of energy and sustainability. In other words, because of US intervention, economies of the Global South are not allowed to develop to a point where they can transition away from fossil fuels. Therefore, any climate policy must also be anti-imperialist, demanding an immediate end to genocidal sanctions and the payment of northern climate debt to the rest of the world.', 'The Red Deal', 'Some advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes. Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals, but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone.', 'In 2018, Winona LaDuke pushed for an Indigenous-led GND. The former Green Party vice-presidential candidate inspired us to think about how divesting from fossil fuel infrastructure—such as billion-dollar oil pipelines—could be reinvested into building wind and solar farms and sustainable agriculture on reservations. Indeed, the most radical appraisals of the GND come from Indigenous people. According to the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN), the GND, as is, “will leave incentives by industries and governments to continue causing harms to Indigenous communities.”10 Before endorsing the GND, IEN called for a clear commitment to keep fossil fuels in the ground; reject carbon pricing schemes; strengthen language on Indigenous peoples and uphold Indigenous rights; and stop, not prolong, our current exploitative and abusive economic and political systems.', 'A complete moratorium on all new fossil fuel extraction—a long-standing demand by Indigenous environmental organizations to “keep it in the ground”—would cause a ruling-class rebellion.11 Warming temperatures demonstrate how deeply entrenched CO2 emissions are within class society. Framing this as a panhuman problem or a problem of the species—such as the term “the Anthropocene,” the geological age of the fossil fuel economy—misses the point. A select few are hoarding the life rafts while also shooting holes in a sinking ship. Class hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the gilded lives of the few. The upper one-tenth of humanity is responsible for half of the carbon emissions from consumption. Half of humanity only accounts for one-tenth of emissions. The richest 1 percent similarly emit 175 times more CO2 than the poorest Hondurans, Mozambicans, or Rwandans. Twenty-six billionaires hoard half the world’s social wealth, and the world’s 2,153 billionaires possess more social wealth than the 4.6 billion people who make up 60 percent of planet’s population—numbers that appear to get more extreme as CO2 concentrations rise. We have to draw lines of separation between us and them, because they have already done so. The 100 companies responsible for 70 percent of global emissions—those relentlessly searching for new hydrocarbon frontiers, market-driven fixes that won’t cost as much, or green energy booms—aren’t going to put themselves out of business. Nor will the ruling elite put their own system up for debate.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Aff-Wake-Round-5.docx

Michigan

PiPh

b50fa62c6ac2efce17f0128de8b6c65c46b92594f65c7824c754f04b240914bf

No LoW accidents

Huessy 21 [Peter Huessy, Director of Strategic Deterrent Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, President of GeoStrategic Analysis, Graduated from the Columbia University School of International Affairs and School of Law, Degrees in Anthropology, International Relations and National Security Policy from Beloit College, “Deterrence Assurance: The True Value of the Nuclear Triad,” The National Interest, 06-27-21, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/deterrence-assurance-true-value-nuclear-triad-188543]

U S would not launch until it—at a minimum —has dual confirmations that country is under attack. There is not and has not been policy of “ launch on warning stringent procedural and technical safeguards guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and ensure safety , security and command-and-control leadership no U.S. weapons are aligned to adversary targets to consider launching a missile satellites must confirm missile radars must confirm missile track Only then will commanders and leaders convene two false missile attack occurrences did take place no danger of U S mistakenly launching

U S would not launch any ballistic missiles until it—at a very minimum —has dual confirmations that the country is under attack. There is not and has not been a policy of “ launch on warning multiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety , security , reliability , and command-and-control leadership no U.S. strategic weapons are aligned to potential adversary targets . ICBM missiles are targeted on broad ocean areas to even consider launching a missile , U.S. satellites must confirm that an adversary attacking missile launch has been detected radars must confirm that a missile track has been established. Only then will various commanders and civilian leaders convene what is known as a launch and/or threat conference No such conferences have ever been called in seventy-five years more importantly, no president has ever been consulted Senate Armed Services Committee report examined two false missile attack warning occurrences did take place report also concluded that there was no danger of the U S inadvertently or accidentally or mistakenly launching a missile. determined after officials examined the details of the two warnings

U S minimum dual confirmations not has not been launch on warning multiple stringent procedural technical accidental unauthorized safety security reliability command-and-control leadership consider satellites must confirm radars must confirm then launch and/or threat conference conferences seventy-five years two U S inadvertently accidentally mistakenly

['As numerous former heads of U.S. Strategic Command have explained, the United States would not launch any ballistic missiles until it—at a very minimum—has dual confirmations that the country is under attack. There is not and has not been a policy of “launch on warning.” ', 'In reality, multiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command-and-control leadership.\u202f ', 'In peacetime,\u202fno U.S. strategic weapons are aligned to potential adversary targets. ICBM missiles are targeted on broad ocean areas. Ballistic missiles aboard America’s at-sea ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are aligned to broad ocean-area targets similar to ICBMs. Since bombers have not been on peacetime alert since 1991, they do not have any nuclear targets assigned. Additionally, the policy of the United States is not to rely upon “launch on warning.”\u202f Thus, describing America’s missiles as on a “hair trigger” is a gross mischaracterization;\u202fthe United States’ so-called trigger is built so it can always wait. ', 'In addition, to even consider launching a missile, U.S. satellites must confirm that an adversary attacking missile launch has been detected. Second, radars must confirm that a missile track has been established. Only then will various commanders and civilian leaders convene what is known as a launch and/or threat conference to determine what launch has been undertaken and what the threat is. No such conferences have ever been called in all of the seventy-five years of the nuclear era. And more importantly, no president has ever been formally consulted regarding the launch of a nuclear weapon.', 'But what about von Hippel’s claims of a false warning possibly triggering a mistaken retaliatory launch? It is true that in 1980, a Senate Armed Services Committee report examined two such false missile attack warning occurrences that did take place. The report, however, also concluded that there was no danger of the United States inadvertently or accidentally or mistakenly launching a missile. This was determined after officials examined the details of the two warnings of a Soviet sea-launched ballistic missile and land-based ballistic missile launches in 1979 and 1980.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-JaSc-Neg-ADA-Round-2.docx

MichiganState

JaSc

a8f89b1887481f9564ccae66cf2223bdf7e3c001c3803cd6d864f753b37ce835

We should use the framework of challenge-driven political economy instead of a competitiveness framework. Using the power of the state to make and shape markets is key to direct policy to solve inequality and climate change.

Mariana MAZZUCATO Inst. for Innovation & Public Purpose @ University College (London) AND Rainer KATTEL Inst. for Innovation & Public Purpose @ University College (London) ’20 “Grand Challenges, Industrial Policy, and Public Value” Non-paginated

policymaking is defined by grand challenges’ Challenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to competitiveness frameworks competitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should fix market failures challenge-led growth requires a new framework that has at its core the idea of growth that is sustainable Both relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development this led to managing economies according to GDP growth policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction by making strategic investments, and nurturing new industrial landscapes It is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field nor about supporting competitive sectors

Twenty-first-century policymaking is increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges grand challenges’ include climate change, demographic, health, and well-being concerns as well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Ag Challenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to competitiveness frameworks competitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should first and foremost fix market failures the nature of our knowledge about socio-economic challenges differs from our perception of strictly technical challenges. challenge-led growth requires a new conceptual and analytical framework that has at its core the idea of confronting the direction of growth with growth that is sustainable Such a framework should focus on market shaping and market co-creating challenge-driven innovation policy questions both established neoclassical and evolutionary concepts Both neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to industrial policy have relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development , without specifying its nature this has led to managing economies according to GDP growth rates, competitiveness indices and rankings, or other macro indicators well-defined goals that are focused on solving important societal challenges, policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic investments, coordinating actions across many different sectors, and nurturing new industrial landscapes that the private sector can develop further The result would be an increase in cross-sectoral learning and macroeconomic stability It is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field nor about supporting more competitive sectors over less ( since the market does not always know best, but about tilting the playing field in the direction of the desired societal goals, to achieve this requires a new analytical framework based on the idea of public value and a policymaking framework aimed at shaping markets in addition to fixing various existing failures.

['', 'Twenty-first-century policymaking is increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges. Sometimes referred to as ‘grand challenges’, these include threats like climate change, demographic, health, and well-being concerns, as well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Against this background, policymakers are increasingly embracing the idea of using industrial and innovation policy to tackle these ‘grand challenges’. Examples of challenge-led policy frameworks include the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; Borras, 2019), the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and development programme (Mazzucato, 2018a), and the UK’s 2017 Industrial Strategy White Paper (HM Government, 2018).', 'Challenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to well-established modernization and competitiveness frameworks. While 1 2 modernization, and in particular competitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should first and foremost fix market failures,3 a challenge-driven agenda does not have such clearly defined theoretical origins and analytical lenses. As Richard Nelson argued in 1977 in his seminal book The Moon and the Ghetto, getting man to the moon and back is not the same as solving the problem of ghettos in American cities. Put differently, the nature of our knowledge about socio-economic challenges differs from our perception of strictly technical challenges. We can discover answers to technical puzzles; socio-economic issues do not have a single correct discoverable solution. Such issues require continuous discussion, experimentation, and learning.', 'We believe challenge-led growth requires a new conceptual and analytical framework that has at its core the idea of confronting the direction of growth with growth that is, for example, more inclusive and sustainable. Such a framework should focus on market shaping and market co-creating (Mazzucato, 2016). This is a question of both theory and policy practice. In theory, challenge-driven innovation policy questions both established neoclassical and evolutionary concepts (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). In policy practice, directed policies require rethinking what is meant by ‘vertical policies’.', 'Industrial policies have always been composed of both a horizontal and a vertical element. Horizontal policies have historically been focused on skills, infrastructure, and education, while vertical policies have focused on sectors like transport, health, energy, or technologies. These two traditional approaches roughly embody differing schools of economics: neoclassical economics-inspired horizontal policies focusing on supply-side factors and inputs; and evolutionary economics-inspired policies putting emphasis on demand-side factors and systemic interactions (Nelson and Winter, 1974; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006 for a synthesis). Although certain sectors might be more suited to sectorspecific vertical strategies, the ‘grand challenges’ expressed in SDGs are cross-sectoral by nature and hence we cannot simply apply a vertical approach to them. Both neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to industrial policy have relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development, without specifying its nature. In policy this has led to managing economies according to GDP growth rates, competitiveness indices and rankings, or other macro indicators (e.g. exports, patents) (Drechsler, 2019). Yet, many SDGs are only indirectly related to the economy and hence many of the key issues around SDGs have not been theorized in the context of innovation and industrial policy (see, e.g., Zehavi and Brenzitz, 2017).', 'In this chapter we argue that through well-defined goals, or more specifically ‘missions’, that are focused on solving important societal challenges, policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic investments, coordinating actions across many different sectors, and nurturing new industrial landscapes that the private sector can develop further (Mazzucato, 2017; Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). The result would be an increase in cross-sectoral learning and macroeconomic stability. This ‘mission-oriented’ approach to industrial policy is not about top-down planning by an overbearing state; it is about providing a direction for growth, increasing business expectations about future growth areas, and catalysing activity—self-discovery by firms (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003)—that otherwise would not happen (Mazzucato and Perez, 2015). It is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field, nor about supporting more competitive sectors over less (Aghion et al., 2015), since the market does not always know best, but about tilting the playing field in the direction of the desired societal goals, such as the SDGs. However, we argue, to achieve this requires a new analytical framework based on the idea of public value and a policymaking framework aimed at shaping markets in addition to fixing various existing failures. Indeed, we argue that if we want to take grand challenges such as the SDGs seriously as policy goals, market shaping should become the overarching approach followed in various policy fields.']

[(8, 17), (86, 89), (97, 103), (172, 175)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Fullertown-Round6.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/BaCh/Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Fullertown-Round6.docx

74f3dee5bfdeb3e3c8f2bd09988e61b54670676d08e701ff2f951b8309c887e6

Collapse causes disease, terrorism, and EMP attacks---extinction.

Helprin ’15 [Mark; January 15; Senior Fellow of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy; National Review, “Indefensible Defense,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/06/indefensible-defense/]

war in Middle East Ira n , e m p weapons pathogens terrorism on a scale lea d to world war strength of the military will determine existence Subtract the d i b and we will fail to deter wars that we will lose

war in the Middle East , a nuclear Ira n , e lectro m agnetic- p ulse weapons , emerging pathogens , and terrorism involving w m d threaten with catastrophe on a scale not experienced since the Civil War currents lea d to world war more than anything else the strength of the military will determine existence Subtract the d efense i ndustrial b ase, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose

war Middle East nuclear Ira n e m p pathogens terrorism w m d Civil War world war anything else strength of the military existence d i b fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose

['Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.']

[(0, 7), (8, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Dartmouth%20Round%20Robin-Round1.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Dartmouth%2520Round%2520Robin-Round1.docx

1bad5cc6853443fa908ab6f12459cd1f5e8f18aeb98f23961901495e7f6b5075

Political costs force federal compliance.

Heather Gerken 17, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law at Yale Law School, JD from the University of Michigan Law School, AB from Princeton University, “We’re About To See States’ Rights Used Defensively Against Trump”, Vox, 1/20/2017, https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism-trump-progressive-uncooperative

Federalism ’s a powerful weapon Congress depends on states to implement immigration drug laws or health care create opportunities for “uncooperative federalism.” state level influence policy they force issues onto the agenda defeating opposition costs resources and p c fed would rather employ elsewhere Republicans will be forced to compromise

Progressives have long been skeptical of federalism progressives shy away from invoking the language of federalism to change the policies they oppose That is a mistake . Federalism doesn’t have a political valence. These days it ’s a n extraordinarily powerful weapon It can be a source of progressive resistance — against Trump’s policies progressives can take a chapter from the conservatives’ playbook and use their control over state and local governments to influence the national agenda , shape policy results , and encourage political compromise People assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy The federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration , enforce its own drug laws , carry out its environmental policies , build its own infrastructure , or administer its health care system . Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements “cooperative federalism.” But they create opportunities for “uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state level can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government . By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda , foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state opposition costs fiscal resources and p olitical c apital the fed eral government would rather employ elsewhere The GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state officials to get its agenda through. If blue states refuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will be forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price

change the policies mistake ’s a extraordinarily powerful weapon source of progressive resistance influence the national agenda shape policy results encourage political compromise depends heavily on states implement federal policy immigration drug laws environmental policies infrastructure health care system “uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state level can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government force issues onto the national agenda costs fiscal resources p olitical c apital fed Republicans will be forced to compromise political fiscal

['Progressives have long been skeptical of federalism, with the role that “states’ rights” played in the resistance to the civil rights act and desegregation typically featuring prominently in their criticism. Its ugly history even led one 20th-century scholar to insist that “if one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.” Even now, with every national institution in the hands of the GOP, progressives associate federalism with conservatism and shy away from invoking the language of federalism to change the policies they oppose. That is a mistake. Federalism doesn’t have a political valence. These days it’s an extraordinarily powerful weapon in politics for the left and the right, and it doesn’t have to be your father’s (or grandfather’s) federalism. It can be a source of progressive resistance — against President’s Trump’s policies, for example — and, far more importantly, a source for compromise and change between the left and the right. It’s time liberals took notice. Here are three important ways progressives can take a chapter from the conservatives’ playbook and use their control over state and local governments to influence the national agenda, shape policy results, and encourage political compromise. If Jerry Brown or Andrew Cuomo or Eric Garcetti is looking for a “to do” list for the next four years, it’s here. Uncooperative federalism People assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy. The federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements between the states and federal government “cooperative federalism.” But we forget that they create many opportunities for what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have called “uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state and local level can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda, foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state or local opposition costs fiscal resources and political capital the federal government would rather employ elsewhere. The GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state and local officials to get its agenda through. If blue states and cities refuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will sometimes be forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price. ']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Wake%20Forest-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/BaCh/Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Wake%2520Forest-Round3.docx

d40c4a3ad607ba8af8f4aea49459b6a0b806243e16306b30887129d17abfb215

Even if, monopolies don’t drive misinformation—restrictions don’t drive traffic to real news.

Hurwitz 17 – (Justin “Gus” Hurwitz, Assistant Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Space, Cyber and Telecom law program at the University of Nebraska College of Law, 2017, “FAKE NEWS’S NOT-SO-REAL ANTITRUST PROBLEM: CONTENT REMAINS KING”)

Nor are there platform – concerns driving fake news in-app browsers make the mobile browsing experience better websites mobile versions do not work user experience may encourage them to discontinue use of the platform that sent them in-app browsers keep users engaged with Facebook the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms . The alternative is users getting frustrated with news mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend time to the extent publishers produce content Facebook users want publishers will demand a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny users access to content it has every incentive to get them seamless access

Nor are there vertical platform – concerns driving the problem of fake news . Facebook is a platform-based distributor of information, including news Hubbard suggests Facebook’s gatekeeper position allows it to harm the traditional media in an effort to keep people on Facebook’s own site in-app browsers have become common to address a technological problem – to make the mobile browsing experience better for users of each platform Even websites that do have mobile versions often do not work particularly well user experience is nonstandard, which inconveniences users and may encourage them to discontinue their use of both that website and the platform that sent them there . By using an in-app browser platforms can offer users a superior experience they will make more use of a platform, yes, benefitting Facebook – but also they will consume more content via that platform, benefitting media outlets mobile browsing is different from browsing in a desktop environment in-app browsers and Instant Articles are an effort to keep users engaged with the Facebook platform. But the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms . The alternative is users getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend their time Facebook knows if they can make articles quick and easy to access, more people will spend more time on their phones. This is why Facebook is willing to offer content providers a significant share of ad revenue to the extent that publishers of any sort continue to produce content that Facebook users want to engage with, those publishers will continue to be able to demand such a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny its users access to content linked to via Facebook it has every incentive to get them seamless access to that content

make the mobile browsing experience better both that website and the platform that sent them there benefitting media outlets not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences every incentive to get them seamless access to that content

['', 'Nor are there vertical – or to use the antitrust newspeak, platform – concerns driving the problem of fake news. Facebook is a platform-based distributor of information, including news. This means that news is (one of many) inputs into Facebook. Hubbard suggests that Facebook’s gatekeeper position allows it to harm the traditional media in an effort to keep people on Facebook’s own site. She points, in particular, to Facebook’s use of its proprietary in-app browser and Instant Articles feature, arguing that Facebook uses these to lock users in to Facebook’s platform, denying third-party news sites valuable analytics and advertising revenue, and making it more difficult for users to navigate away from Facebook.', 'As an initial matter, in-app browsers have become common. Facebook, Twitter, and Google News all use them. This suggests that they have been implemented to address a technological problem – to make the mobile browsing experience better for users of each platform. And, indeed, this is the case. Websites that have not been redesigned specifically for mobile platforms often do not work well. Even websites that do have mobile versions often do not work particularly well. The user experience between those websites is often nonstandard, which inconveniences users and may encourage them to discontinue their use of both that website and the platform that sent them there. By using an in-app browser – and especially by offering a standardized format for presenting news content across sites in that browser – platforms can (at least in principle – I will not defend the quality of many in-app browsers, with the recognition that they are a new and improving technology) offer users a superior experience. This means that they will make more use of a platform, yes, benefitting, for instance, Facebook – but it also means that they will consume more content via that platform, benefitting, for instance, media outlets.', 'Importantly, mobile browsing, where we see these in-app browsers, is different from browsing in a desktop environment. When a user is sent to a website for an article on a mobile device, they are unlikely to stay on that website once they are done with the article. Rather, they are likely to exit out of the browser, which sends them back to whatever source sent them to the website initially. This means that users are “locked in” to the Facebook platform no matter whether it uses an in-app or external browser.', 'Hubbard is exactly right that in-app browsers and Instant Articles are an effort to keep users engaged with the Facebook platform. But the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms. The alternative is users getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend their time than waiting for poorly-rendered webpages to load. Facebook knows that if they can make articles quick and easy to access, more people will spend more time on their phones. This is why Facebook is willing to offer content providers a significant share of ad revenue. And, to the extent that publishers of any sort continue to produce content that Facebook users want to engage with, those publishers will continue to be able to demand such a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny its users access to content linked to via Facebook. To the contrary, it has every incentive to get them seamless access to that content, and is willing to pay to do so.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx

d00d9dfce2630e0d027488fd48f2fa98b124b148f22378545c11db13e60a5057

4. Even with operational changes, no country will ever trust it. SLBMs make it too risky.

William A. Chambers et al., 21. Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, Headquarters U. S. Air Force, Washington D.C. BS in History from US Air Force Academy. MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the College of Naval Warfare. “No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Policy Assessment.” 2021. https://man.fas.org/eprint/ida-nfu.pdf

risk of miscalc can never be zero given adversary perceptions the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how adversaries perceive NFU NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive the U S IDA’s interviews suggests even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in readiness Russia and China will continue to doubt U.S. objectives have changed NFU policy is not likely to change planning, operations, or crisis due to speed accuracy , and survivability of SLBM NFU cannot have a significant impact on risk of miscalculation The historical record is mixed, at best a host of factors affect nationstate’s decisions one of which is state’s self interests outcome could produce the opposite effect

The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation cannot be captured precisely The risk of miscalc ulation can never be driven to zero given the closely held nature of adversary perceptions , an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU Applying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself. Moscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal a NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the U nited S tates will approach a crisis. Strikingly IDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces Russia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed . While material evidence of NFU might give adversaries pause,” other aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. an NFU policy is not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed , accuracy , and survivability of U.S. SLBM forces The barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe NFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis there are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy The historical record is mixed, at best regarding the effect of declaratory policy on operational behavior, Scholars point to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is state’s own self interests . there is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory, that make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons to achieve their objectives in a regional conflict a U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action Deterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus , and this outcome could produce the opposite effect .

cannot be captured precisely never be driven to zero closely held nature characterized by uncertainty authoritative and empirically driven foundation consider and assimilate unlikely to alter how they perceive attended by a downgrade probably continue to doubt ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. an NFU policy not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis speed accuracy survivability appear severe far more fundamental factors mixed, at best operational behavior, host of factors own self interests . theories of victory, their willingness to employ nuclear weapons raise perceived risk complicate the adversary’s decision calculus opposite effect .

['The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation—be it discouraging, conducive, or trivial—cannot be captured precisely. The risk of miscalculation can never be driven to zero, and only history will determine whether a decision-maker’s risk tolerance was correct. Furthermore, given the closely held nature of adversary perceptions on matters related to nuclear weapons, an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty.76 That said, the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU pronouncement by the United States. Their interpretation will go far in determining the policy’s ultimate impact, if any, on the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.77 From the vantage point of Moscow or Beijing, how clearly would NFU signal U.S. intent about the circumstances under which it would consider employing nuclear weapons? In other words, to what extent could they rely on an NFU policy as a predictor of U.S. behavior? Consider how CDRUSSTRATCOM describes his framework for posturing U.S. nuclear forces in light of China’s NFU policy: “It’s my responsibility to make sure that I have thought through what we have to do to deter what they’re capable of doing as opposed to what they say they’re going to do.”78 Applying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself.79 As a statement of intent, and a quickly reversible one at that, declaratory policy may not necessarily guide decision making in a crisis-to-conflict transition or during active hostilities. Perceptions of the credibility of an NFU pledge thus combine with a host of other factors, including U.S. capabilities, doctrine, and operational war plans, to be important.80 Our research concludes that as Moscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal about U.S. nuclear forces, a policy pronouncement of NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the United States will approach a crisis.81 Consistent with the NFU empirical record thus far, a concomitant change in U.S. posture or capability might help convince Russia and China that the pledge is genuine, but there is little guarantee. Strikingly, IDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces, Russia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed. While material evidence of NFU might “give adversaries pause,” according to one former official, the superiority of other aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. For example, an NFU policy complemented by an effort to dealert ICBMs is not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed, accuracy, and survivability and the targeting coverage implications of U.S. SLBM forces. The barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe, especially for a country like the United States, which would pursue the policy after developing and deploying a large, diverse nuclear arsenal structured to provide a flexible set of deterrent options. Assuming that the United States takes all necessary steps to ensure that an NFU policy is implemented and sufficiently messaged to adversaries and that, despite evidence to the contrary, the adversaries believe that pledge, will that belief alter the risk of miscalculation? Again, the available evidence suggests that NFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis. As one former senior leader said, there are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy that can be instantly changed. The historical record is mixed, at best, regarding the effect of declaratory policy on the decision making, operational behavior, and policy of other nation-states. Scholars of international relations and strategic thought point to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is that state’s determination of its own self interests. National decisions to act, including the use of force, are also driven by a state’s interpretation of the strategic setting at the time and its stakes and risks in the midst of a crisis. To this end, there is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory, operational doctrines, and fielded capabilities that make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons, at least in a limited way, to achieve their objectives in a regional conflict under certain circumstances.82 Indeed, U.S. policy and military leaders believe that this scenario is, among all the very unlikely uses of nuclear weapons, the more likely, and it is the scenario currently emphasized in planning and exercises. Given what is known about the adversary, a U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action, particularly action enabled by posture and planning that provide them the option to initiate nuclear use and thus achieve their objectives in a regional conflict. Creating such a perception might also lead adversaries to think that they can better control escalation. Deterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus, and this outcome could produce the opposite effect.', '']

[(11, 19), (20, 30), (274, 274)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoYa-Neg-nu-Round-4.docx

Emory

CoYa

0e920a391442d08ad3a82f190c1a705abc4312dfeb34eb16696fd1cc5087d744

They already have---AI DAOs act autonomously, learn based on new info AND replicate human intelligence---meets every part of their definition

Ngozi-Olehi Munachimso 22, medical student at Ivano-Frankivsk National Medical University, Ukraine, 1/30/22, “AI DAOs: The Future of DAOs & Blockchain? (II),” https://medium.com/@munaolehi/ai-daos-the-future-of-daos-blockchain-ii-d60796719d1e

AI implemented in DAOs autonomously make decisions AI DAOs are independent agents instead of token holders vote they relay preferences to AI , ceding control to AI which makes decisions with adaptive ML and AGI AI learns Adaptive ML is retraining AI to vary outputs based on info AGI interacts the way humans do, with capacity to execute huge range of tasks

there are different ways AI can be implemented in DAOs 1.AI at the edges of smart contract AI is able to autonomously make decisions without token holders AI triggers the smart contract to carry out protocols once the AI meets the predetermined conditions of the smart contract the AI in AI DAOs are independent agents that autonomously make decisions AI in AI DAOs are independent agents in the DAOs that meet conditions of the smart contract, thus triggering the smart contract to perform agreed functions without interference of humans With AI DAOs become autonomous, data-driven, and transparent organizations With a more complex AI entity at the core of smart contracts, it creates a control system that conti nues on its own, making decisions actuating outputs with the given resources instead of token holders vote on every decision, they relay preferences to the AI , ceding control to the running AI itself which makes decisions this can only be effectively done with adaptive ML and AGI whereby the AI learns from past actions and optimizes decisions made themselves Adaptive ML is the process of retraining the AI to vary its outputs based on the varying algorithms and available info rmation AGI interacts with the world the same way humans do, with the capacity to execute a huge range of tasks

implemented in DAOs autonomously make decisions are independent agents autonomously make decisions making decisions relay preferences to the AI AI itself which makes decisions adaptive ML AGI learns info

['However, there are different ways in which AI can interact and be implemented in DAOs:', '1.AI at the edges of smart contract: With AI at the edges of the smart contract of the DAO, the AI is able to autonomously make decisions without the token holders. This way, the AI triggers the smart contract to carry out protocols once the AI meets the predetermined conditions of the smart contract. The AI has the capability to run themselves if the token holders decide to cede control of the AI to the running AI itself.', 'The goal of AI DAOs is to automate the administration and management of organizations and firms, hence, the AI in AI DAOs are independent agents that autonomously make decisions.', 'Blockchain runs on smart contracts which automate the completion of transactions and functions when certain protocols have been met by humans (people interacting with the blockchain).', 'AI in AI DAOs are independent agents in the DAOs that meet the predetermined conditions of the smart contract, thus triggering the smart contract to perform agreed functions without the interference of humans (token holders of the DAOs).', 'With the influence of AI in DAOs, DAOs become autonomous, data-driven, and transparent organizations that run on smart contracts triggered by AI to distribute value amongst its token holders.', 'AI in DAOs also helps improve the relationship between users of the DAO and the organizers, moving the users from just customers to investors of the DAO, owning tokens (shares) of the DAO.', '2. AI at the center of smart contracts: With a more complex AI entity at the core of smart contracts, it creates a feedback loop, a sort of control system that continues on its own, making decisions, and actuating outputs with the given resources.', 'With this mechanism in the automation of decision-making, instead of having the token holders vote on every decision, they relay their preferences to the AI, ceding control to the running AI itself which then makes decisions based on established preferences.', 'However, this can only be effectively done with adaptive ML and AGI whereby the AI learns from past actions and optimizes decisions made themselves.', 'Adaptive ML (adaptive machine learning) is the process of retraining the AI to vary its outputs based on the varying algorithms and available information, as the information given to the AI varies with time.', 'AGI (artificial general intelligence)is a machine that interacts with the world the same way humans do, with the capacity to execute a huge range of tasks.']

[(12, 22), (23, 25)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

480f41fe4b31919e54e73b0f424a4a1a151ccc1b2a6d8147df8e6c4a898821b9

6. Food insecurity doesn’t cause war.

Vestby et al 18, *Jonas, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, **Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and ***Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography. (5/18/18, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, Climate & Conflict Blog, )

there is little merit in the notion a reduction in access to food increases conflict conflict requires people have the means and the will people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence there is misapprehension that social unrest relates to food shortages sources of discontent are more complex political structures land corruption desire for reforms and economic problems

there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence , whether against the government or other groups there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages In reality the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures , land ownership , corruption , the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

little scholarly merit increases conflict will break out means will brink of starvation not in the position to resort to violence social unrest food shortages In reality considerably more complex political structures land ownership corruption democratic reforms economic problems simple resource-related explanations more complex political relationships.

['It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.', 'Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.', '', '', '']

[(0, 6), (13, 15)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpBa-Neg-3---Gonzaga-Round-6.docx

Kansas

SpBa

b47729ff7a61b7ed492bf74e732f842259e5cba37cbe9af76a0ee8cd3fecd248

FTC can’t solve.

Forrest 20 - (Katherine Forrest, Partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York; 12-3-2020, The Global Antitrust Economics Conference @ NYU Law, "Panel 3: AI in Antitrust," doa: 1-11-2022) url: https://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/nyu_global_panel_3_12-9-2020.pdf?65038/3b7ea344477cfaf33af66ebbef90577914024e52

with algorithmic coordination we are going to be unable to understand trying to pinpoint collusion is going to be a fool’s errand We are trying to determine inferentially whether an algorithm has been result of coordination That is going to run into Twombly output under the case law is not going to be enough . You’ve got to show the “ who , what , when , where .” Twombly is going to run into complexity

with when we think about algorithmic coordination we are very quickly going to be unable to understand algorithms so trying to be able to pinpoint where an actual moment of collusion occurs within an algorithm is really going to be increasingly a fool’s errand . We are going to be looking instead at the output and trying to determine inferentially whether the output of an algorithm pricing determination has been the result of behind-the-scenes coordination That is going to run into the Twombly case law . Twombly says you have to show more than just the fact that there happens to be pricing similarity output of the algorithm under the U.S. case law is not going to be enough I don’t think . You’ve got to show the “ who , what , when , where .” That is increasingly difficult with complex algorithms where you cannot show the “who, what, when, where.” Twombly , the U.S. case law on parallel conduct , is going to run smack into the complexity of algorithms and the tendency to look at output as where we are going to get the evidence of some kind of coordination

when we think about algorithmic coordination unable to understand algorithms fool’s errand output determine inferentially output of an algorithm pricing determination behind-the-scenes coordination Twombly case law more than pricing similarity output of the algorithm not going to be enough who what when where increasingly difficult complex algorithms U.S. case law on parallel conduct smack into the complexity of algorithms

['', 'One thing I would say — and I agree with what Hal and Michal have said — is that when we think about algorithmic coordination, or however we are going to discuss it — and I have already mentioned the increasing complexity of algorithms — and talking about one of John’s points, which is that regulators often do not have the kind of high-tech sophistication that a lot of folks do — we are very quickly going to be unable to understand algorithms, so trying to be able to pinpoint where an actual moment of collusion occurs within an algorithm is really going to be increasingly a fool’s errand.', 'We are going to be looking instead at the output and trying to determine inferentially whether the output of an algorithm and the output of, say, a pricing determination has been the result of some kind of behind-the-scenes coordination. ', 'That is going to run directly into the body of case law in the United States that is the Twombly case law. The Twombly case law says you have to be able to show a little bit more than just the fact that there happens to be, for instance, pricing similarity. The output of the algorithm under the U.S. case law is not going to be enough I don’t think. You’ve got to show the “who, what, when, where.” That is increasingly difficult with complex algorithms where you cannot show the “who, what, when, where.” You cannot actually understand them enough if they are black-box to be able to do that.', 'So I think that there is a moment in time when Twombly, the U.S. case law on parallel conduct, is going to run smack into the complexity of algorithms and the tendency to look at output as where we are going to get the evidence of some kind of coordination.', '', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-7-Texas-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-7-Texas-Round2.docx

03af61d8bad598bc19872a2a3e783527f289f5e55404c1d27ed941637e198609

Extinction requires 12 degrees

Sebastian Farquhar 17, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

most likely levels of warming are very unlikely to cause extinction existential risks stem from tail risk the low probability of extreme warming 12°C would render the planet uninhabitable timescales mean humanity is able to adapt to avoid extinction in even extreme scenarios probability of 6°C is 10% and 10°C is 3% These are highly uncertain It is likely the world will take action once it begins to impose costs long before warming of 10°C

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction existential risks of climate change stem from tail risk the low probability of extreme levels of warming and interaction with other sources of risk warming of 11- 12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean humanity is able to adapt to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10% and 10°C is 3% These estimates are highly uncertain It is likely the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs long before there is warming of 10°C

most likely very unlikely to cause human extinction low probability warming of 11- 12°C humanity is able to adapt even very extreme scenarios 10% 3% highly uncertain likely long before there is warming of 10°C

['The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios.', 'The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain.', 'It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures. ', '']

[(10, 21)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Neg-Georgetown-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

468987d251df5c5c63ca3ea5844c7852547f25e473b1eb19efa73ca10cc8e7d9

Growth overshoots planetary bounds—causes existential disease and starvation from sea level rise, land use, fertilizer scarcity, and chemical pollution.

Butler 19—(Butler – PHD in public health and sustainability from the Australian National University, MS in Epidemiology from the University of London, former professor of health science at the University of Canberra; Higgs – PHD in geography and environment from and associate professor at the University of Tasmania; McFarlane – professor of health at the University of Canberra). Butler, Colin, Kerryn Higgs, and Rosemary McFarlane. 2019. “Environmental Health, Planetary Boundaries and Limits to Growth.” Encyclopedia of Environmental Health, September. .

from industrialization and growth ” depletion and pollution are inescapable. the erosion of life-support . Rates of extinction are 100 times the background . Bio d are in decline . under attack are forests with timber , or land for crops . Humans depend on other life for survival food , water , and drugs . nitrogen and phosphorous , fertilizer is in decline, with grim implications for ag . Even if Paris are honored temp s will be 1.5 by the 30s . catastrophic sea level rise will result. Novel entities from chemical pollution harm the ozone are carcinogenic , others endocrine disruptors . and contribute to disease While some have been banned thousands are released annually . warming is already affecting conflict . Genetic diversity is the source of pharmaceutical discovery from plants reductions increase zoonotic infectious disease . Without urgent change global survival is imperiled

The Limits to Growth (LTG) The MIT team concluded significant systemic problems were emerg ing from accelerating industrialization and . the “assumption of inevitable economic growth ” represents “the foundation ” of econ omics. Any “limit” challenged this foundation. Economics adopts a model where production and consumption exist in a circular flow, without a natural context. Ecological economists reject that human activity is independent of nature . Instead Physics matters; depletion and pollution are inescapable. The Ecological Footprint A related development is “planetary boundaries,” devised by Rockström The Relevance of LTG to Environmental Health The most serious potential consequence of global environmental change is the erosion of Earth’s life-support systems . the nature of this threat to survival of the world’s species—including our own—has received little attention . LTG did not address climate change as such, but modeled these factors as a complex system. Planetary Boundaries and Health planetary boundaries was first published in 2009. These were Earth System processes which will be modified by human actions. humans depend on the diversity of life on Earth . loss of insects could disrupt pollination, food supply loss of birds might trigger crop losses reduced complexity of the microbiome of cities caus diseases exceeding multiple planetary boundaries risks a steep decline towards a civilization-crippling condition. Planetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biosphere Integrity Rates of extinction are 100 times the background rate . Bio logical d iversit y of lower order organisms are similarly in decline . under deliberate attack are forests , especially species with timber , or growing on land for crops . Infestations of tree borers render life vulnerable to disease and fire. Humans depend on the fabric of other life on earth for their survival —for food , clean air and water , and numerous other ecosystem “services” as well as for drugs . reduction in ecosystem services will harm all civilization . Planetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biogeochemical Cycles pressing is disruption of biogeochemical cycles, particularly nitrogen and phosphorous. nitrogen is cascading through our rivers initiating algal blooms and dead zones. phosphorous , the other widely dispersed fertilizer , is in decline, with grim implications for ag . Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Land-System Change agricultural land-system change may result in land degradation giving rise to erosion, loss of topsoil, sedimentation of waterways and degradation of coastal zones. 1 billion people are at risk of desertification globally . Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Climate Change Also in the amber zone is climate change. Remaining below the 2 [degrees]°C target necessitates tech which do not yet exist for extracting carbon from the atmosphere. nascent carbon reducing tech require considerable energy Even if commitments at the 2015 Paris Conference are all honored , global temp s will be 2 [degrees]°C hotter than pre-industrial times by 2050 . the aspirational 1.5 °C target may be reached by the 20 30s . Even if temperature rise can be contained, crop yields will decline and places will become unliveable due to coastal inundation. Glaciers whose melt supplies electricity to billions in Asia and South America will shrink, coral reefs will disappear, and catastrophic sea level rise will result. Pollution Novel entities, novel behaviors, novel environments and health Novel entities from chemical pollution have potential for unwanted geophysical and/or biological effects Most novel entities have been generated in the human-dominated era such as CFCs DDT dieldrin and polyvinyl chloride . CFCs, by harm ing the ozone impinge on an Earth System function ; UV light lead to skin cancer . Humans are exposed to numerous other emerging environmental hazards since World War II 140,000 compounds have been synthesized since 1950, the pace of their introduction greatly exceeds that of epidemiological investigation and legal constraint. novel entities many are carcinogenic , while others act as endocrine disruptors . fewer than half have undergone any testing for safety or toxicity. immunological effects are barely explored and contribute to disease While some novel entities have been banned such as the “dirty dozen ” , thousands of others are released annually onto the market . humans provide opportunity for the amplification and spread of genes that convey antibiotic resistance . Identified mechanisms for this transfer include air-borne transport . Global Warming and Health emissions of greenhouse gases manifest in extreme weather events, including heatwaves, droughts, flooding, and major storms including cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes. Changes in vector-borne diseases, food security, and sea level rise have long been forecast . Global warming is already affecting conflict . Famines, wars and migration can all occur without climate change, but in some cases climate change can make these phenomena much worse. As temperatures rise, insect populations may too, but only to a point. Beyond that point, vector populations may in fact decline . Biodiversity Loss and Health Genetic diversity is the source of pharmaceutical discovery as well as traditional medicines . nature-derived pharmaceuticals come from plants ; . Nature produces an inspirational variety and complexity of molecules to further manipulate. a utilitarian appreciation extends to livelihoods dependent on biodiversity. biological diversity is required for soil health , pest control , pollination and the genetics of livestock and crops . The net effect of deforestation favors mosquitoes that serve as vector s of human disease s including previously obscure pathogens such as Zika and Chikungunya viruses . reductions in biodiversity have increase d zoonotic infectious disease due to intensive animal husbandry . Livestock create opportunity for viral amplification and mutations resulting in unrecognized animal diseases and zoonoses. Declining Energy Yield From Energy Expended the least understood limit to growth is declining energy return on energy investment (EROEI). fossil fuels have been crucial to human domination of the biosphere. great powers have frequently acted with violence or duplicity to acquire energy resources, from the Mid dle East to the Timor Sea . that EROEI is steadily declining is rarely mentioned in mainstream media ; . decline of EROEI may be disconcerting to a public ill-prepared for the future austerity which such a decline implies. Conclusion Without urgent change global survival is imperiled

The Limits to Growth (LTG) systemic problems emerg accelerating industrialization and inevitable economic growth foundation econ Instead depletion pollution The Ecological Footprint “planetary boundaries,” The Relevance of LTG to Environmental Health erosion life-support systems Planetary Boundaries and Health planetary boundaries depend on the diversity of life on Earth crop losses diseases Planetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biosphere Integrity 100 times Bio d in decline forests timber land crops other life food clean air water drugs all civilization Planetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biogeochemical Cycles nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizer ag Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Land-System Change Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Climate Change do not yet exist tech considerable energy Paris temp s 1.5 30s Even if temperature rise unliveable sea level rise Pollution Novel entities, novel behaviors, novel environments and health Novel entities chemical pollution human-dominated era CFCs DDT dieldrin polyvinyl chloride harm ozone skin cancer novel entities carcinogenic endocrine disruptors disease some thousands antibiotic resistance Global Warming and Health conflict insect populations decline Biodiversity Loss and Health Genetic diversity source of pharmaceutical discovery traditional medicines plants utilitarian appreciation soil health pest control pollination crops deforestation vector disease increase zoonotic infectious disease Declining Energy Yield From Energy Expended energy return on energy investment crucial violence or duplicity Mid East Timor Sea future austerity Conclusion urgent change global survival

['', 'The Limits to Growth (LTG) The Limits to Growth (1972) was commissioned by the Club of Rome and written by a research team led by Donella Meadows, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). It was not the first work to grapple with the idea that physical limits apply to the human economic and social system, but it drew extensive attention and remains the best-selling environmental book of all time. The book summarized outcomes of modeling work that explored the complex interactions between human civilization and the physical world in which it is inextricably embedded. The MIT team concluded that significant systemic problems were emerging from accelerating industrialization, population growth, under-nutrition, the depletion of non-renewable resources and environmental contamination and decline. Pollution was taken as the principal indicator of environmental decline. Specific pollutants that were well-measured at the time included carbon dioxide concentrations, nuclear wastes, dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) production, lead in the Greenland icecap and mercury consumption. Direct environmental decline was also seen in marine settings: diminishing dissolved oxygen in oceans, eutrophication of waterways and falling catches of wild fish in some regions. Land-use change (although a significant contributor to rising carbon dioxide (CO2) levels in the atmosphere then as now) and biodiversity loss were both less conspicuous problems in 1970 than they have since become; though a crisis in available arable land was then acknowledged. But the team stressed the general ignorance at that time of where the planetary limits would lie. The model (known as World3 and based on a version developed by the pioneering systems analyst Jay Forrester) was run with various combinations of the data, ranging from “business as usual,” through numerous partial improvements, to two final scenarios in which population was stabilized, the expansion of industrial production was halted, resources were conserved, and advanced, pollution-sparing technologies were extensively applied. These last runs, where all ameliorative options were adopted, were the only ones that allowed civilization to continue without crisis. If the human economy maintained business as usual, the team found, it would collide with the physical realities of a finite planet by the second half of the 21st century, triggering social collapse. Initially, the book received a positive response and some of the recommendations were adopted by several countries. Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and US President Jimmy Carter each commissioned studies of the impact of physical limits on the global future and their national prospects. Although these studies examined the outlook only as far as 2000, their conclusions to that date confirmed those of the original LTG study. Right from the start, however, economists were critical, even abusive, creating a negative impression that persists in some quarters, today—despite the rapidly accumulating evidence of the basic robustness of the LTG projections and assumptions. Robert Gillette, who attended the LTG launch for the journal Science, noted that the “assumption of inevitable economic growth” represents “the very foundation” of economics. Any “limit” to growth challenged this foundation. It is unsurprizing that most economists attacked the ideas vigorously, an assault that illustrates the conflict between the core assumptions of economists and those of the physical sciences. Economics adopts a standard model where production and consumption exist in a circular flow, without a natural context. It is a world of business and individual, producer and consumer, labor and goods. The physical world, which supplies resources and provides a site where wastes can be discharged, is not seen as essential and does not affect the equations, though, occasionally, the concept of “externalities” (which can be negative or positive) is mentioned. Ecological economists reject the argument that human activity is independent of nature, which they consider a conceit. Instead, nature is accepted as the indispensable foundation of human activities. Physics really matters; questions of depletion and pollution are inescapable. Several researchers have compared the MIT projections with what has actually happened since, establishing that the correlation between the standard run and real world trends over the intervening years is extremely close. One of these researchers, Graham Turner, compared the standard run’s modeled trajectory with 40 years of historical data (see Fig. 1 ). He concluded that the data for 1970–2010 approximated the standard run of the LTG model, although the figure shows a slight but favorable divergence for the trajectory of non-renewable resources, such as fossil fuels, phosphate and concentrated, rich sources of ores. Systems ecologists Charles Hall and John Day also compared the standard run with actual data to 2008. Despite the common perception that the LTG work had failed, the model’s performance was not invalidated, unlike models made by economists which are rarely, if ever, accurate over such a long time span. In 2018, Jørgen Randers, part of the original LTG team, using an updated model, compared the LTG projections with real world data up to 2017. He found that real world outcomes have approximated the second LTG scenario, the “standard run with extra resources,” or “pollution crisis.” Many resource analysts have identified declining “energy return on energy investment” as a key to understanding the slowing of the rate of improvement of living standards for most people in high-income countries. In turn, these indicators reflect the decline in easily accessible fossil fuels. This subject will be returned to. It is important to understand that the broad trends described in the figure and used in the LTG model do not capture the entire world. No model can. These trends were chosen because they captured many aspects of the material world, both human and natural, including feedback loops and potential crises that might threaten the human economy and thus wellbeing. Indicators of these trends were chosen for a number of reasons, including researchers’ attempts to choose representative indicators that would faithfully reflect the trends, the need for parsimony and, especially back in 1972, the difficulty of finding accurate data. The decline in population that is modeled is a logical consequence of the decline in resources per capita, whether non-renewable, or as food, industrial output and services. If these inputs decline, the modelers assume, so will human population, which depends on them. The Ecological Footprint The concept of the ecological footprint is among the most important developments in thinking related to the LTG. Devised in the 1990s by William Rees and Mathis Wackernagel, this measure enables ecological impacts (individual, national or global) to be quantified and compared. On one hand, it estimates the ecological assets required to produce the resources consumed by any discrete population; this includes food and fiber plants, livestock and fish, timber and other forest products, space for urban infrastructure and whatever “sinks” are needed to absorb the waste produced, especially carbon dioxide emissions. The unit of measurement adopted is the area of biologically productive land and water, usually expressed in hectares. On the other hand, the ecological footprint also estimates the productivity of a country’s actual ecological assets (cropland, grazing land, forest land, fishing grounds, and built-up land). Researchers using the ecological footprint methodology calculated that, while the world’s biocapacity averages 1.7 ha. per capita, high-income “developed” countries greatly exceed this average. Examples include the United States (8.8 ha. per capita) and the United Kingdom (5.1 ha. per capita). The US, which has far more productive land available than the United Kingdom, appropriates 1.27 times its own biocapacity through imports, and the United Kingdom almost three times. Many island nations and arid countries such as Saudi Arabia exceed their biocapacity by a factor of more than ten. The ecological footprint has the strengths and weaknesses of any aggregate indicator: the concepts and units are easy to understand by policy-makers and the public, but it does not encompass all aspects of human environmental impact (methane, e.g., is not integrated). This matrix needs to be used in conjunction with other indicators. Another related development is the framework called “planetary boundaries,” devised by a large team led by Johan Rockström (see following section). The Relevance of LTG to Environmental Health Although the environmental health literature has long identified links between health and indicators used in the LTG model, such as food, services, and pollution, there has been little recognition among the health community, including within public health, of the possibility of a reduction in population this century. Such reductions, as mentioned above, are forecast by most LTG scenarios, including the standard run (see Fig. 1). Such a reduction, were it to occur, will have impacts on public health. There are a few exceptions to this generalization. In 1972, the human ecologist Frederick Sargent, in an article in the American Journal of Public Health, warned that human “interventions in and manipulations of the processes of the planetary life support-system (ecosystem) have produced a set of complex problems” (page 629). In 1973, the visionary socialist economist Barbara Ward co-authored “Only One Earth” with the microbiologist, pioneering “Earth physician” and Pulitzer Prize winner, René Dubos. This book stated in part “the charge to the [1972 Stockholm] Conference was clearly to define what should be done to maintain the earth as a place suitable for human life not only now, but also for future generations” (emphasis added) (page xiii). Health is implicit in this statement, as is sustainable development. In 1993 McMichael, who was influenced by Dubos, echoed Sargent’s term, writing in the foreword to his influential book Planetary Overload, that “The most serious potential consequence of global environmental change is the erosion of Earth’s life-support systems. Yet, curiously, the nature of this threat to the health and survival of the world’s living species—including our own—has received little attention” (page xiii). A quarter of a century later, little has changed. Although keynote talks by McMichael and John Last at the 1993 conference of the International Epidemiological Association warned of the dangers to global public health of global environmental change, there has been barely any recognition or follow up, at the broad integrated dimension. LTG receives little recognition now. A literature search for the term “limits to growth” in association with “health” reveals little other than work involving the authors of this contribution and their close collaborators. This is unfortunate. The persistence of single-issue approaches to address complex problems retards our ability to act effectively. This is the case where there is singular focus on climate change. The impact on human health and wellbeing is modified by many interacting factors—including population, global demand and availability of resources and services and the waste and pollution we generate. Other than noting the exponential growth of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, LTG did not address climate change as such, but it modeled these factors as part of a complex system. Although infrequently, the issues of resource depletion and population pressure have featured in some medical curricula, from at least the 1950s, preceding publication of the LTG by over a decade. Pioneering writers and speakers have included Colin Bertram, Peter Parsons, and Roger Short. John Guillebaud, the world’s first clinician professor of family planning and reproductive health, has repeatedly spoken on the issue of both consumption and population, to diverse audiences including medical practitioners, nurses, medical students and others, since 1971. In 2011, a special issue of the American Journal of Public Health focussed on peak oil, an important aspect of LTG. A scattering of other articles in the health literature have mentioned peak oil, but LTG is far more than peak oil. It is also far more than global warming. The reasons for the general failure of the public health literature to engage with LTG are complex but include an incorrect belief that LTG was discredited, over-specialization within the public health community, political suppression of the core ideas, and a lack of funders. The issue has had very few champions. This lack of engagement is not from lack of evidence. Planetary Boundaries and Health The term planetary boundaries (PBs) was first published in 2009. These boundaries were defined, initially, as referring to nine Earth System processes (see Table 1 ), each of which had been, is and will be modified by human actions. The first planetary boundary paper (published in 2009 in Ecology and Society, subtitled “exploring the safe operating space for humanity”) explicitly acknowledges its debt to the LTG framework. A “safe operating space” implies the existence of multi-dimensional limits, just as does the word “boundaries”. Nonetheless, the links between PBs and the LTG are mostly implicit. Although the focus of the PB work is on identifying the criteria for a “safe operating space” for humanity, rather than that of other living species, the concept acknowledges that humans depend on the diversity of life on Earth. The first PB argued to be outside the safe operating space is biological diversity. Analogous to nine bodily systems (renal, hepatic, neurological and so on) the large multidisciplinary team (29 co-authors) that was responsible for the first PB articles argued that these Earth System processes can still provide useful services, even if functioning outside their optimal range. However, pushed too far, even one aberrant bodily function can cause death, and just one extremely disturbed Earth System process might trigger catastrophic consequences for humanity. Perhaps, for example, a precipitous loss of insects could disrupt pollination, food supply, and the survival of birds and other vertebrates. In turn, loss of birds might trigger additional crop losses, as their biological control of insects and other pests (i.e., of pests that do survive) is lost. Another example is the reduced complexity of the microbiome of those who live in cities and other modified environments. This in turn has been hypothesized to be a causal role in the emergence of auto-immune diseases such as Type 1 diabetes. Further, just as with bodily processes, Earth System components are linked to, interact with, and are influenced by common causes. Humans may live for decades with chronic illness, but die quickly if multi-organ failure develops. So too, Earth System processes interact, but exceeding multiple planetary boundaries, either simultaneously or in close proximity, risks precipitating a steep decline towards a civilization-crippling condition. Other writers have also commented on the similarities between the Earth and the human system, including James Lovelock, the originator of the Gaia hypothesis and an early user of the term “planetary medicine.” Table 1 shows links between planetary boundaries, LTG and human health. The exact extent to which we are breaching planetary boundaries is still being explored. The team’s 2015 paper argued that two problems are already extremely dangerous (red zone) and two others are well on the way (amber zone), also noting that the designated boundaries are inter-related and most have overlapping implications. Planetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biosphere Integrity The team considers loss of biosphere integrity as the most critical problem. Rates of extinction are reckoned to be at least 100 times the background rate, possibly as much as 10,000 times. Populations of vertebrate species declined by more than half between 1970 and 2012 and the biomass of wild mammals is now only about 2% of the total, which is dominated by humans and livestock. That remaining 2% is under siege, including for substances such as rhinoceros horns and pangolin scales, which have alleged therapeutic benefit, even though chiefly constituted of keratin, just as are fingernails. Biological diversity of lower order organisms (within soils, among pollinators, and in the species traditionally utilized for plant-origin food, resources and medicines) are similarly in decline. Also under deliberate attack are forests, especially species with valuable timber, or growing on land that can be used for crops, including oil palm. Many forests are also at unintended risk, due to roads and global warming, each of which also exacerbates the risk of fire. Global warming is also likely to further hasten biodiversity loss. In some cases biodiversity decline and climate change, acting together or independently, also promote the survival of new pests. Infestations of tree borers, able to survive warmer winters in large numbers, render trees, forests and their associated animal life more vulnerable to disease and fire. Humans, a form of life, depend on the fabric of other life on earth for their survival—for food, clean air and water, and numerous other ecosystem “services” (see glossary and below), as well as for novel substances, including drugs. At some level of bio-alteration the reduction in ecosystem services will reduce in a non-linear way that could cascade in a manner harmful to all civilization. Smaller scaled examples include the collapse of regional fisheries or the decimation of regional harvests by novel diseases or pests, such as in Ireland in the late 1840s. The Khapra beetle, a pest from South Asia that has evolved insecticide resistance threatens significant (up to 30%) loss of rice, post-harvest, in some regions. Devastating drought in the “dry corridor” of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras has been blamed for contributing to the influx of migrants attempting to enter the United States between 2014 and the present (2019). Planetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biogeochemical Cycles For Rockström, Steffen and colleagues the second most pressing danger is the radical disruption of the biogeochemical cycles, particularly nitrogen and phosphorous. In nature, most nitrogen was inert in the atmosphere, though some was mobilized by bacteria and leguminous plants. Applied as fertilizer, nitrogen has greatly expanded food production, but is now cascading through our rivers, groundwater and continental shelves, initiating algal blooms and dead zones. In the case of phosphorous, the other widely dispersed fertilizer, there is an added danger—phosphate rock is a resource in decline, with grim implications for future agriculture, especially where populations will lack the financial capacity to import it, as prices rise. Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Land-System Change Land-system change is argued to be in the “amber zone,” close to crossing the boundary into extreme danger, if it has not already crossed it. Millions of hectares of vegetation are still being cleared every year and wetlands continue to be drained. Stocks of “blue carbon,” stored in plants and trees associated with water, such as kelp and mangroves, are also under threat. Land-system changes enable more food, fiber and other financially valued products to be grown, but amplify the harm to several PBs: biological integrity, climate and biogeochemical cycles. Oil palm plantations are displacing tropical forests in Asia, Africa and, increasingly, Latin America, where clearing already provides cattle pasture, soybean and sugar cane. Such plantations involve the death of vast numbers of individual animals and the annihilation of immense tracts of tropical forest. This boundary is underpinned by the declining remainder of tropical, temperate and boreal forests. These forests have a major role in land surface-climate coupling. In addition, agricultural land-system change may ultimately result in land degradation giving rise to erosion, loss of topsoil, sedimentation of waterways and degradation of coastal zones. In dryland regions, degradation is referred to as desertification. Large areas are affected. The United Nations Organization considers that 1 billion people are at risk of desertification globally, half of whom live in Africa where they face major challenges to water and food security. Increasing urbanization also drives land-system change, typically in areas of high agricultural productivity. Vast urban regions impact surface energy (through the “heat island” effect), alter hydrological and biochemical cycles, net primary productivity and biological diversity. They are also major foci of pollutants. As humanity becomes predominantly urbanized it is with these land systems that most of us have most intimate contact. Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Climate Change Also in the amber zone is climate change. Remaining below the 2 [degrees]°C target, which is thought to provide a reasonable chance of avoiding catastrophic climate change, necessitates technologies which do not yet exist for extracting carbon from the atmosphere. Most nascent carbon reducing technologies require considerable energy, although new forms of cement may soon be feasible and affordable on a large scale. Research since 2015 suggests that the 2°C target may need to be adjusted downwards to provide a reasonable chance of avoiding calamitous warming, in which case climate change may already belong to the red zone. Even if the commitments made at the 2015 Paris Conference of the Parties are all honored, it currently seems likely to many analysts that global temperatures will be 2 [degrees]°C hotter than pre-industrial times by 2050 and nearly 3°C higher by 2100. These estimates depend on a number of variables: whether nations will adopt more ambitious pledges in the near term; whether technologies will emerge that can, at a low energetic cost, suck carbon back out of the atmosphere; whether unknown tipping points will be crossed, forcing a temperature surge. If these variables prove unfavorable, the aspirational 1.5°C maximum target may be reached by the early 2030s. There is no guarantee that the damage can be held to approximately 2°C, in particular due to the risk of amplifying feedbacks such as the release of carbon dioxide and methane from the Arctic, and/or the drying and burning of the Amazon forest. The capacity of the ocean to absorb CO2 is also declining. That will slow the rate of ocean acidification, but increase atmospheric heat trapping. Even if temperature rise and rainfall intensity can be contained, crop yields will decline and many places will become unliveable due to excessive heat and humidity or coastal inundation. Glaciers that act as a bank to store water and in some cases whose melt supplies electricity to billions in Asia and South America will shrink, coral reefs and many other species will disappear, and significant—even catastrophic—sea level rise will result. In Greenland and along the entire coast of West Antarctica ice shelves are already retreating or collapsing as warm seawater intrudes underneath, grounding lines retreat, and the glaciers behind them accelerate in their march to the sea. Climate scientist James Hansen and many glaciologists warn that the disintegration of the polar icesheets involves non-linear processes, and the timing, though still unknown, may be far quicker than assumed, and may include rapid, even unstoppable collapse of ice cliffs in series in parts of Antarctica and Greenland. The impact upon human wellbeing resulting from stress on biological diversity will be compounded by climate change and the fragmentation of society. For example, a complex economic and social fabric enables the importation of food and other resources to an increasing number of regions, some of which have been in this vulnerable situation for decades. Such mechanisms are fragile. Today, five countries are recognized as afflicted by famine: Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, N.E. Nigeria and two regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kasai and Tanganyika). In the long run, if climate change and other aspects of adverse ecological change intensify, then it is also possible that regions that are current net food exporters will also experience famine; if this evolves then conditions in food-importing regions will inevitably deteriorate. Pollution Alongside these four major crises, the researchers also identify the threat from various forms of pollution. Most of these are discussed elsewhere in this encyclopedia. However, we briefly discuss novel entities. Novel entities, novel behaviors, novel environments and health Novel entities is a recently introduced term, first identified as a planetary boundary by the PB team in 2015, evolving from chemical pollution in the earlier PB publications. The PB team defines novel entities as “forms of existing substances, and modified life forms that have the potential for unwanted geophysical and/or biological effects.” Most novel entities have been generated in the Anthropocene, the human-dominated era, defined roughly as the time since the start of the widespread combustion of fossil fuels, in the 18th century. They include synthetic molecules such as chlorinated fluorocarbons (CFCs), DDT, dieldrin and other organochlorines used as biocides and compounds used in industry such as polyvinyl chloride. CFCs, by harming the stratospheric ozone layer, clearly impinge on an Earth System function (and thus indirectly on human environmental health); the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer causes UV light to reach the earth’s surface to a greater extent than prior to the widespread use of CFCs, leading to the potential for an increased incidence of skin cancer, ocular problems and immunosuppression. Here, however, we focus mainly on the biological effects of novel entities. Novel entities are not confined to new chemical compounds, as the PB authors note. Genetically altered organisms can be conceptualized as novel entities, as are nanoparticles (such as in sunscreens and cosmetics), and blue light from computer and phone screens. Humans are also exposed to numerous other emerging environmental hazards, especially since World War II, and to human-generated ionizing radiation (X-rays were once routinely used to help fit shoes). Possible health risks of non-ionizing radiation, such as from mobile phones, are discussed briefly below, as are novel behaviors, foods and other novel environments. A 2017 Lancet Commission report estimates that 140,000 compounds have been synthesized since 1950, with perhaps 5000 widely disseminated in the global environment. Although some are regulated, and a few have been banned, the pace of their introduction greatly exceeds that of epidemiological investigation and legal constraint. For example, the International Agency for Research into Cancer (IARC), which is closely affiliated with the World Health Organization (WHO) has recently concluded that the widely applied herbicide glyphosate (commercially known as “Round Up”) may be carcinogenic. These findings have been resisted by some companies and their agents and supporters. Thousands of studies of novel entities have found or suggested that many are carcinogenic, while others act as endocrine disruptors or harm health in other ways. Some have been linked with massive ecosystem disruption, including colony collapse disorder (of bees) and “insectageddon.” The Lancet Commission on Pollution reported that fewer than half of the most widely dispersed chemicals have undergone any testing for safety or toxicity. Interactions between such chemicals have received even less examination. The immunological and allergenic effects of most novel entities are also barely explored, and could contribute to the changing pattern of allergic diseases, auto-immune conditions and autism. While some novel entities have been regulated (e.g., X-rays) and banned (such as the “dirty dozen,” including the organochlorine dieldrin, which was, as a rare exception, strongly linked with breast cancer), hundreds or thousands of others are released annually onto the market. In both industrial and rural societies, almost the entire population has been exposed to hundreds of chemicals whose concentrations can be measured in tissue samples, while for thousands more, no test exists. There is little support from policy decision makers around the world for precautionary approaches to many potential risks. For example, there are concerns that mobile phones can cause brain tissue to warm up, if the receiver is held close to the ear. However, there are also concerns about the effects of non-ionizing radiation on brain tissue, and claims of an increased risk of malignant brain tumors in heavy users of mobile phones. Cardiac and neurological disorders are also plausible consequences of the rapidly increasing use of wireless devices, including smart meters. Infrasound from wind turbines is another novel entity. Such sounds disturb the sleep of many people who live close to them, and there may also be other harmful effects including vertigo, as well as chronic diseases worsened by chronic poor sleep. Such concerns have often been dismissed as “nocebic” (i.e., through apprehension and negative thoughts) as high quality evidence for health impacts is lacking. The precautionary principle would place the onus on industry to prove safety. Novel behaviors, foods, organisms and environments are also emerging in the Anthropocene. Examples include reduced weight bearing exercise in childhood and adolescence (leading to a higher risk of early-onset osteoporosis), increased screen watching and the partial replacement of tangible, local friends and acquaintances for virtual social networks. Novel diets include the widespread consumption of sweetened drinks, a known factor in obesity and harmful to health, while the greater variety of foods out of season, especially of fruit, is beneficial. There are also novel microbial and parasitic environments and novel microbiomes, each of which is likely to be associated with health benefits and risks. For example, humans and livestock farming provide opportunity for the amplification and spread of genes that convey antibiotic resistance. These genes are favored wherever antibiotics are used by humans or fed to livestock to promote growth and limit infectious disease. Antibiotic resistance genes have been shown to spread to environmental microbes in soil and water systems, to wildlife and to human and livestock pathogens. Identified mechanisms for this transfer include air-borne transport of particulate matter and direct and indirect contact with waste products. The augmented “wild” population of antibiotic resistant genes is an added risk to human health and has poorly understood implications for other environmental microbial systems. Novel or increased contact with mammalian wildlife creates further potential for interspecies transfer of pathogens, particularly viruses. This is discussed below (in biodiversity and health). Global Warming and Health Since the 1980s, there has been increasing recognition of ways that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (manifest in phenomena including global warming, weather wilding, jetstream oscillations, sea level rise and ocean acidification) is likely to impact human health, both positively (e.g., fewer cold waves in some areas) and negatively. There are numerous mechanisms for this. One that is perhaps most obvious is an intensification of extreme weather events, including heatwaves, droughts, flooding, and major storms including cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes. Such events can have complex and delayed effects, such as from the savage 2017 hurricanes that flooded and devastated Houston, Texas and the US territory of Puerto Rico, as well as other regions. There is also speculation that the frequency, severity and locations of tornadoes may be affected. Very intense flooding events, where weather systems remain almost stationary, have generated the neologism “rainbomb.” Changes in vector-borne diseases, food security, and sea level rise have long been forecast to occur due to global warming. Global warming is already affecting migration, conflict and mental health, and these effects are likely to intensify. Over the longer timescale, of decades to centuries, adverse effects are forecast to exceed benefits, perhaps by orders of magnitude, especially if the ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica continue to melt. There are many ways health effects related to climate change can be categorized, such as through changes in temperature and humidity, vector ecology, water quality, water and food supply impacts, severe weather effects, air pollution, allergens, and migration, conflict and related mental health implications. A simpler classification has three main classes, conceptualized as “direct” (e.g., heatwaves), “indirect” (e.g., changes in vector ecology) and a third category, causally more displaced, with the potential for the largest burden of disease, through means such as large-scale conflict, migration and famine. In this classification, effects on mental health are regarded as “cross-cutting.” Dislocation from one’s home due to a storm surge or a prolonged blackout (some parts of Puerto Rico lacked power for months following 2017 Hurricane Irma) can lead to depression and even suicide. Such stress is also likely to exacerbate domestic violence, especially if associated with increased economic insecurity. Increased rates of post-traumatic stress and anxiety are also likely in survivors. Even worse than the mental trauma of a single extreme weather event are the health consequences, including to mental health, from conflict, famine and forced migration. Of course, such “tertiary” effects have multi-dimensional causes, from ancient rivalries to recent and emerging contests over scarce resources, often aggravated by “youth bulges” and brutal repression. All writers on these “tertiary” topics, publishing in the academic literature, recognize the complexity of this issue, and frequently try to convey this by using the term “risk multiplier” to indicate how changes in climate can worsen (or in some cases reduce) the co-factorial causal contributors to conflict. That is, climate change is conceptualized as similar to a catalyst or enzyme. Famines, wars and migration can all occur without climate change, but in some cases climate change can make these phenomena much worse. In some cases, such as sea level rise, climate change can be conceived as by far the dominant factor. However, even for vulnerable low-lying Pacific islands, co-factors such as high population growth have contributed to vulnerability and the risk of migration, for example by depleting fresh water lenses, leading to the salinization of garden soil. Many important diseases, including parasitic, vector-borne and zoonotic diseases are associated with invertebrates such as ticks, mosquitoes and blackflies, or higher order vertebrates. Ticks transmit diseases such as Lyme disease, mosquitoes transmit many illnesses such as malaria and yellow fever, while black flies transmit river blindness (onchocerciasis). The distribution of these insects and animals are shaped, not only by climate but by many other aspects of their ecology. Often, the identification of the precise attribution to climate change is elusive and possibly fruitless. Less intuitively, the epidemiology of many vector-borne diseases, including malaria, dengue fever and Zika virus is also influenced by the ambient temperature in another way, by determining the growth rate of the parasite or virus within the cold-blooded vector. More rapid growth of these pathogens (i.e., in slightly warmer vectors) can, in some cases, lead to additional cycles of transmission, leading to explosive increases in cases. Another way to think of these organisms is that their numbers and disease potential exist within a window or “sleeve” of climate and ecological suitability. It would be wrong to think that a warmer or wetter climate will inevitably increase the burden of these infectious diseases. As temperatures rise, insect populations may too, but only to a point. Beyond that point, vector populations may in fact decline. Similarly, excessive rain may reduce vector habitat (e.g., flushing the population away), as may unusually prolonged droughts (drying out the habitat). However, the epidemiology of vector-borne diseases is also influenced by human factors, such as insecticides (including impregnated bednets) and molluscicides, and by treatments such as vaccines (e.g., for yellow fever) and anti-malarial drugs such as quinine. Biodiversity Loss and Health The impact of biodiversity loss on human health is being realized slowly. The dimensions of biodiversity (the diversity of genes, species and ecosystems) are not experienced or understood by most individuals, or policy makers, and challenge health researchers. As such, the impacts are dispersed across multiple scales of biodiversity and multiple dimensions of health and wellbeing much of which is discussed elsewhere in this contribution. The PB team has examined the genetic diversity within and between species and ecosystems and its functional role within a global system, separately. They conclude that the loss of genetic diversity has exceeded a safe limit, with uncertainty remaining over how this impacts the function of ecosystems. The alarming rate and extent of loss of genetic biological diversity has been discussed earlier. The loss of genetic diversity undermines the resilience of ecosystems. Under relentless ecological change, biological diversity is replaced by ecosystems dominated by fewer, highly adaptive species, inadvertently or purposefully promoted by human activities. These include domestic species, pests and wild synanthropes, humans and the novel entities described above. Genetic diversity is also the source of pharmaceutical discovery as well as the storehouse of traditional medicines. Most nature-derived pharmaceuticals come from plants; some come from traditional medicine practice but much is the product of systematic searching, modification and trial. Nature produces an inspirational variety and complexity of molecules to further manipulate. The diverse origins of the pharmaceutical armory against HIV AIDS includes Betulinic acid, derived from the bark of the tree Betula pubescens; Bevirimat, extracted from a Chinese herb Syzygium claviflorum; and Ganoderic acid β, isolated from the fruiting bodies and spores of the fungi Ganoderma lucidum. Such a utilitarian appreciation likewise extends to livelihoods dependent on different aspects of biodiversity. For some, particularly vulnerable groups and those in remote locations, survival is dependent on the ability to harvest freely (or illegally) from the natural environment. Rich biological diversity is often helpful for the resilience of ecosystems functions, sometimes called “services.” In the early 2000s, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, a global collaboration of over 1000 scientists, grouped these into four kinds, which they called supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural. Food production is classified as a provisioning service. For such a service, biological diversity is required for (supporting or underpinning) soil health, pest control (a regulating service), pollination and the genetics of livestock and crops. Other products of provisioning services include clean water, bio-fuels and crop residues used to provide energy. Other regulating services include carbon sequestration, climate regulation and disaster risk reduction. Nutrient recycling is another example of a supporting ecosystem service. A sacred grove or an iconic species of deep significance to the beholder illustrate cultural services. Disease-regulation as an ecosystem service is contested, but some diseases, such as Lyme disease, are more prevalent in diminished and simplified ecosystems. The net effect of deforestation often favors mosquitoes that serve as vectors of human diseases including previously obscure pathogens such as Zika and Chikungunya viruses, or encourages urbanization or farm-foraging by fruit bat hosts of henipah viruses Nipah and Hendra. There is also a complex relationship between ecological change and malaria, which is, by far, the most important mosquito-transmitted disease. As discussed above, climate change also impacts these vector borne diseases. Changes (driven by reductions) in biodiversity have increased zoonotic infectious disease', '', '', '', ' risk especially due to intensive animal husbandry. Livestock, which now dominate global vertebrate biomass, and intensive production, create the opportunity for viral amplification and mutations resulting in new and previously unrecognized animal diseases and zoonoses. These include H5N1 (avian flu, via chickens), H1N1 (swine flu, via chickens and pigs), possibly Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS, via farmed civet cats and racoon dogs), Nipah virus in Malaysia (via pigs) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS, via camels). Novel or increased contact with mammalian wildlife creates further potential for interspecies transfer of pathogens, particularly viruses. Such contact is facilitated by accelerated land-use change and wildlife harvesting and sometimes aided by domestic animals acting as amplification hosts. Disease may transmit directly to humans or indirectly through domestic animals. Many opportunities for viruses to jump between species may be required before a significant disease emerges. Tropical areas of high biodiversity and under human pressure are considered “hotspots” for such diseases. Novel zoonoses of wildlife origin such as HIV AIDS, Ebola and SARS corona virus have been the subject of strong interest in the late 20th century and early 21st century. The examples above have resulted in pandemics. Many other smaller viral “spillover” events have occurred with localized impact only. Natural or wild areas also reduce stress, depression and anxiety in those who visit them. This effect appears to be dependent on cultural and socioeconomic characteristics of the visitor and has deeper, religious dimensions for many Indigenous people. As discussed earlier, the human microbiome links us to the external world. Personal microbiodiversity is enriched by environmental and dietary diversity and, through mechanisms of immune regulation and the gut-brain axis, has a significant impact on physical and mental health. The benefits of experiencing biodiversity within natural settings appear to be physiological as well as psychological. However, the living environs of most people is one of reduced biodiversity, and for many most time is spent indoors. It is the capacity of Earth’s natural systems, the aggregate of species and ecosystem biodiversity, to provide resilience despite changing environmental conditions that should be of the most fundamental concern to health and well-being. The biosphere must absorb our wastes, including carbon emissions; buffer coastlines from extreme weather events; provide clean air, water, a moderate climate, and the renewable resources humanity seeks to consume. It is therefore of great concern that the Global Ecological Footprint Network (see “The Ecological Footprint” section) estimates that 150% of [global] biocapacity is consumed per annum. Declining Energy Yield From Energy Expended Today, many determinants of health and wellbeing, including effective health services and their inputs, such as consumables and pharmaceuticals, are dependent on abundant and affordable energy. Millions of people living in poverty, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, suffer multi-system consequences of air pollution, both indoor and outdoor, from smoke generated by their own household and by other households. In many locations, this is aggravated by the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil. Many people, particularly women and children, undertake daily laborious effort to obtain fuel and water. Access to electrical power, and even gas for cooking would bring significant improvements in health to the 1.3 billion people living without electricity. Probably the least understood aspect of limits to growth is the concept and importance of declining energy return on energy investment (EROEI). The number given for EROEI is the ratio of useful energy obtained versus primary energy expended (see Box 1 ). There is a widespread understanding that fossil fuels have been crucial to the human colonization and domination of the biosphere. The importance of energy is explicit in the work of many environmental writers, and implicit in the military actions of many great powers, who have frequently acted with violence or duplicity to acquire or maintain energy resources, from the Middle East to the Timor Sea. Without fossil fuel, modern civilization could not have evolved in the way it did, whether to create highways, intensive agriculture, skyscrapers or the space age. Although, in the Middle Ages, the harnessing of water power for work from milling grain to sawing wood (“sawmilling”) was widespread, such industry was necessarily confined to suitable riversides. Ancient mariners crossed straits and sometimes oceans, powered by oars and blown by the wind, but the scale of maritime trade was miniscule compared with that made possible by steam, oil and nuclear-powered vessels. While this dependence on energy is well-known, though rarely highlighted in economic histories, the fact that EROEI is steadily declining is rarely mentioned in mainstream media or outside of specialist journals; it is claimed that fracking and shale oil now negate peak oil, though insufficient attention is paid to the instability of an industry reliant on proliferation of drilling sites and rising costs. The decline of EROEI may be disconcerting to a public ill-prepared for the future austerity which such a decline implies. Such consequences would not only affect health services, but the myriad other processes necessary for health which rely on affordable energy, including agriculture. Conclusion Concern about the impact of global ecological change on health is growing. So too is an understanding of the need for multi-sector collaborations. Few groups are yet addressing the deeper issues of PBs. However, many once disparate groups are converging as they seek to improve equity in health with a focus on global problems of biodiversity decline, environmental degradation and climate change. “Planetary Health,” promoted by the prestigious medical journal The Lancet, is currently prominent. Others include EcoHealth, One Health and the in Vivo Planetary Health group. Predicting future human health (or survival) under the status quo is difficult. Ecological systems typically demonstrate non-linear responses to perturbations and it is likely that current consumption patterns will precipitate dramatic shifts in biodiversity, ecological function and health-supporting services. Impacts of environmental change are disproportionately experienced by poor and rural communities. Advocacy and action to prevent these health risks is an essential role for those concerned with public health. This entry has reviewed the issue of Limits to Growth, its more modern formulation as Planetary Boundaries and the relevance of both concepts to global population health. It has used these frameworks to classify and extend some environmental health risks. These include novel entities and behaviors, and global risks including climate change, biodiversity loss, land-system change and biogeochemical cycles. These risks are escalating and we recognize the shortfall in assessing the health risk of new pollutants, entities and behaviors. When considered together with economic and population growth, and with ever-increasing resource and energy use, these environmental health risks may foreshadow significant population decline. By using the LTG and PB frameworks in this contribution, society can frame preventative measures on the scale at which this is required. Without urgent change, future global population health, and survival, is imperiled.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhHe-Neg-UMN-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PhHe

d984559e6f64a35613acfc5a9c9ea7226d5877a20da2963caa01c3ad7599f19d

2. Terrorism, accidents, and miscalc.

David Koplow 14. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Georgetown Journal of International Law. “What Would Zero Look Like? A Treaty for the Abolition of nuclear weapons,” vol. 45 no. 683.

getting to zero remains persistent endorsed by leaders public the risks of the nuclearized status quo terrorists accident , or miscalc remaining at our current base seem unsustainable

getting to zero remains persistent . It has been endorsed by world leaders and the general public ; it has been adopted by the U nited N ations stands as a binding legal obligation under N on- P roliferation T reaty its time is finally coming the risks of sustaining the nuclearized status quo beggar belief It cannot realistically be argued that a heavily-armed proliferating world can perpetually dodge the specter of the use of nuc s , by hostile forces or terrorists , by design , accident , or horrific miscalc ulation. No one can imagine world's current course will escape forever a cataclysm the option of an unprecedented exploration up the mountain and the option of nervously remaining at our current base camp seem implausibly hazardous and unsustainable

["Still, the goal of getting to zero remains persistent. It has been endorsed by world leaders and the general public; it has been adopted by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly; and it stands as a binding legal obligation under the essential Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps its time is finally coming. As the draft Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty indicate, there are a great many moving parts in this proposal, and several of them strain credulity. To conceptualize a world free of nuclear weapons, we have to presume a global readiness to effectuate the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and sequential deep cuts in nuclear arsenals by the nine states currently possessing them; we need a resolution or at least mitigation of seemingly perpetual regional tensions in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and we have to assume that revolutionary new technologies for air-tight verification and enforcement of compliance can be crafted and accepted by mutually suspicious sovereigns. That's asking a lot of the public imagination. On the other hand, the risks of sustaining the nuclearized status quo beggar belief, too. It cannot realistically be argued that a heavily-armed--and perhaps increasingly proliferating--world can perpetually dodge the specter of the use of nuclear weapons, by hostile forces or terrorists, by design, accident, or horrific miscalculation. No one can imagine that the world's current course will continue to escape forever a cataclysm beyond history. Alice in Wonderland's White Queen, who claimed to be able to believe six impossible things before breakfast, would therefore enjoy a rich smorgasbord of competing non-credible choices here: both the option of an unprecedented exploration up the mountain and the option of nervously remaining at our current base camp seem implausibly hazardous and unsustainable."]

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-NDT-Round-7.docx

Emory

KeRa

60ecc56c2277b507e82258ffdc024e0a79e49e6dd6404ebd7a7f7c4eb9e878bc

Policies of radioactive racism are inflected by carceral logics of public ‘safety,’ ‘protection,’ and strategic ‘stability’ that cage our imaginations through myths of ‘accountable’ or ‘reasonable’ violence. They also serve as instruments to punish other states for acting out.

Ray Acheson 22, (they/them), Director of Disarmament at the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Visiting Researcher at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, helped ICAN win the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research, BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto, 06-2022, “Notes on Nuclear Weapons & Intersectionality in Theory and Practice,” Published by the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, https://sgs.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2022-06/acheson-2022.pdf

nuclear weapon development , testing , and use are radioactive racism The ideology that explode bombs and bury waste on Indigenous lands and North Africa lies within carceral systems and border controls dismissal of survivor testimony is mirrored in exclusion of Black Latine Asian , Arab LGBTQ+ people the bomb is a prison Just as many find it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons many find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons In both we must ask whose security do they serve and whom do they offer protection nuclear bring order to warmongers Responses to violence are similar some suggest police can be reformed with accountability advocates for arms control call reductions to a “reasonable” level as with police the heart is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons are tools to oppress control and kill

policies and practices of nuclear weapon development , testing , and use are policies of radioactive racism The same racist ideology that enables governments to explode nuclear bombs dig radioactive materials and bury nuclear waste on Indigenous lands and North Africa n deserts lies within carceral systems and border controls The dismissal of survivor testimony as expert contributions to nuclear weapon discourse or policymaking is mirrored in exclusion of Black , Latinx [ Latine ] , Asian , Arab , as well as LGBTQ+ and other people Nuclear weapons and carceral systems As much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison . The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures Just as many find it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons , many also find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons Yet , as Angela Davis notes, there is widespread reluctance to face the realities hidden within [prisons], a fear of thinking about what happens inside them. Likewise, many acknowledge that nuclear weapons are horrible, yet claim they are a “necessary evil.” They accept the abstract notion that nuclear weapons “ keep us safe ” Thousands have been detonated , but on Black and brown bodies, near poor communities, on Indigenous lands. The persistence of the faith that nuclear weapons bring se curity is similar to the faith in carceral systems to keep people safe In both cases, we must ask , whose security do they serve , and against what or whom do they offer protection ? Much like police forces only bring stability and order to those with property and wealth that r equire “protecting” from the masses, nuclear weapons only bring stability and order to the warmongers who seek the capacity to destroy the world in order to preserve their dominance of it. Responses to violence and inequalities that are witnessed are also similar . In the face of police brutality, some politicians suggest that the police can be reformed with better training and accountability Likewise advocates for nuclear arms control , call for reductions of nuclear arsenals to a “reasonable” level , or for the cancellation of modernisation But as with police reforms, none of these adjustments get to the heart of the problem which is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons both are extremely violent tools to oppress , control , and kill human beings . The problem is not simply the budgets or the size or the policies of police forces, the prison system, o r nuclear arsenals the problem is that each is designed to cause harm You cannot reform away something w hen it is the fundamental nature of that thing.

development testing use radioactive racism same racist ideology carceral systems border controls survivor testimony expert contributions Black Latinx [ Latine ] Asian Arab LGBTQ+ Nuclear weapons and carceral systems As much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison . The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures security police or prisons security without nuclear weapons Angela Davis keep us safe detonated Black brown whose security do they serve and whom do they offer protection police stability property warmongers reformed accountability arms control heart of the problem oppress , control , and kill human beings designed

['The policies and practices of nuclear weapon development, testing, and use, described earlier, are policies of radioactive racism. The same racist ideology that enables certain governments to explode nuclear bombs, dig up radioactive materials, and bury nuclear waste on Indigenous lands, Pacific islands and North African deserts also lies within carceral systems and border controls.', 'The dismissal of survivor testimony as expert contributions to nuclear weapon discourse or policymaking is mirrored in the exclusion of Black, Latinx [Latine], Asian, Arab, as well as LGBTQ+ and other people with lived experience of police brutality, from decisions about policing and community safety. Similarly, patronising racism is on display when nuclear-armed states argue that countries of the “global south” have no legitimate security interests when it comes to nuclear weapons—that they should just be quiet and let the “adults” handle things.', 'Nuclear weapons and carceral systems', 'Beyond the embeddedness of white supremacy, nuclear weapon policy and activities also hold other similarities to carceral systems of policing and incarceration. As much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison. The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures.', 'Just as many people find it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons, many also find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons. Yet, as Angela Davis notes, there is widespread “reluctance to face the realities hidden within [prisons], a fear of thinking about what happens inside them. Thus, the prison is present in our lives and at the same time, it is absent from our lives.”75 Likewise, many people acknowledge that nuclear weapons are horrible, yet claim they are a “necessary evil.” They accept the abstract notion that nuclear weapons “keep us safe”—because the bomb is for them out of sight and out of mind, and not something that they have ever experienced themselves. They exist, but they are meant to never be used. Thousands have been detonated, but on Black and brown bodies, near poor communities, on Indigenous lands.', 'The persistence of the faith that nuclear weapons bring security, force fed to us by the state as dogmatic Truth, is also similar to the faith in carceral systems to keep people safe. In both cases, we must ask, whose security do they serve, and against what or whom do they offer protection? Much like police forces only bring stability and order to the capitalist class, to those with property and wealth that require “protecting” from the masses, nuclear weapons only bring stability and order to the warmongers who seek the capacity to destroy the world in order to preserve their dominance of it.', 'Responses to violence and inequalities that are witnessed are also similar. In the face of police brutality, some politicians or even activists suggest that the police can be reformed. With more body cameras, with better training, with more prosecutions and accountability, we can improve the operation of police. Whether these assertions are well intentioned or a deliberate tactic to defuse protest and demands for change, they rest on the notion that the structure itself is fine and its operation just needs to be tweaked. Likewise, there are plenty of advocates for nuclear arms control, calling for reductions of nuclear arsenals done to a “reasonable” level, or for the cancellation of modernisation programmes and development of new missiles or bombers, or for cutting some of the budget for nuclear weapons.', 'But as with police reforms, none of these adjustments get to the heart of the problem—which is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons both are extremely violent tools to oppress, control, and kill human beings. The problem is not simply the budgets or the size or the policies of police forces, the prison system, or nuclear arsenals— the problem is that each of these is designed to cause harm. You cannot reform away something when it is the fundamental nature of that thing.']

[(4, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AvLe-Aff-2---Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

AvLe

9913ee84e06bcc3fc298eb915eb6690a9ccdb8168928c91cd9f182756ad7240a

That usurps primacy—turns case

Blanchette et al 20 (Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies @ CSIS, Jonathan E. Hillman, senior fellow with the CSIS Economics Program and director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, one of the most extensive open-source databases tracking the BRI, Maesea McCalpin, associate director with the CSIS Economics Program’s Reconnecting Asia Project 7-8-2020, "Hidden Harbors: China’s State-backed Shipping Industry," Center for Strategic and International Studies – CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hidden-harbors-chinas-state-backed-shipping-industry, accessed 11-26-2021)

China’s rise has been driven by state support a buffer from volatile market forces helping companies expand by 15 percent China encouraged (SOEs) to consolidate China’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications U S has strategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities China could draw upon state-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce Commercial cannot be separated from military the greatest interest of the sea is commerce.

China’s maritime rise has been driven by focused state support Such provided Chinese firms with a strategic buffer from volatile market forces helping companies expand their global market share in shipbuilding and shipping finance by 10 and 15 percent , China encouraged (SOEs) to consolidate Made in China 2025 designates maritime equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing as priority sectors China’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications for the United States the U nited S tates has both commercial and strategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities China could draw upon superior numbers of state-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce COSCO SHIPPING provided support to the PLA Navy Commercial value cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest of the sea is commerce. The Chinese state provides support in numerous direct and indirect ways, including subsidies in cash payments, cheap financing and fundraising, tax incentives and concessions, barriers for foreign firms, state-directed industrial consolidation, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property theft

focused state support COSCO SHIPPING the greatest interest of the sea is commerce.

['', 'China’s maritime rise has been driven by focused state support beginning in the early 2000s after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The size and focus of Beijing’s efforts accelerated after the 2008 financial crisis when the global maritime industry suffered a collapse in demand. Such support has provided Chinese firms with a strategic buffer from volatile market forces, helping Chinese companies to expand their global market share in shipbuilding and shipping finance by 10 percent and 15 percent, respectively, from 2008 to 2018.3 China encouraged its already massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to consolidate, including support for a 2015 merger that made state-owned China Merchant Group the largest port and logistics company in the world and the 2016 merger of COSCO Group and China Shipping Group to create the world’s third largest shipping firm.4 China also pumped financial support into the sector and set ambitious domestic and global targets. The “Made in China 2025” strategic plan designates maritime equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing as one of ten priority sectors. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, has deepened preexisting market access and secured new beachheads for Chinese shipping companies abroad. Led by state-owned shipping operators China COSCO Shipping Corporation (COSCO SHIPPING) and China Merchant Group, Chinese companies have invested an estimated $11 billion into overseas ports between 2010 and 2019, including 25 projects across 18 countries.5', 'China’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications for the United States. With 90 percent of global trade traveling by sea, the United States has both commercial and strategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities. The stakes are highest in the event of a military contingency. Current and former U.S. officials have warned that the United States could face maritime logistics challenges during a major conflict given the shrinking size of the U.S. merchant marine fleet.6 China, in contrast, could draw upon superior numbers of state-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce. COSCO SHIPPING is widely recognized as the maritime supply arm of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and has provided logistical support to the PLA Navy’s escort operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. As the U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan famously observed, “Commercial value cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest of the sea is commerce.”7', 'In order for the United States to fashion a strategic response, it must first have an accurate assessment of the forces driving China’s shipping sector. Previous studies have attempted to quantify the direct subsidies that Chinese shipping companies receive, but they have provided a partial picture at best, owing to the significant gaps in available and reliable data.8 The Chinese state provides support in numerous direct and indirect ways, including subsidies in cash payments, cheap financing and fundraising, tax incentives and concessions, barriers for foreign firms, state-directed industrial consolidation, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property theft, among others.9 Some of these measures can be quantified from open sources, while others remain hidden behind China’s opaque lending and corporate reporting practices. Acknowledging these limitations, this brief explores the scale and scope of China’s state support for its shipping and shipbuilding industry.', '', 'Indict—']

[(0, 19)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-NJDDT-Semis.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-NJDDT-Semis.docx

2dd8d5d81f5f8d574f72b339843a561c07e5d6aca37aba845e922b1bf61b472e

Test ban treaty.

Matsuo 23 (Terrence Matsuo, Non-Resident Fellow @ the Korea Economic Institute of America, MA of public policy degree from the School of Public Policy @ Pepperdine University, Terrence enjoys playing League of Legends, 3-1-2023, Japanese Protestation and Pragmatism Towards a Nuclear South Korea," Korea Economic Institute of America, https://keia.org/the-peninsula/japanese-protestation-and-pragmatism-towards-a-nuclear-south-korea/, accessed 6-7-2023)

Japan has been a strong opponent of nuclear weapons it signed major non-proliferation treaties the PTBT NPT CTBT

Japan has been a strong opponent of nuclear weapons in the international system it signed most of the major international non-proliferation treaties the Partial Test Ban Treaty PTBT which prohibits testing of nuclear weapons the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT which sanctions development of nuclear tech the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty CTBT which prohibits nuclear explosions

strong opponent non-proliferation treaties PTBT NPT tech CTBT

['', 'As the only country to have come under a nuclear attack in wartime, Japan has officially been a strong opponent of nuclear weapons in the international system. In the postwar period, it signed most of the major international non-proliferation treaties. Japan signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in August 1963, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the air, space, and sea. It also signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in February 1970, which sanctions the peaceful development of nuclear technology and prohibits non-nuclear weapons states from developing such weapons. Japan also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, which prohibits nuclear explosions for any purpose. This treaty has not yet entered into force.', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaPa-Aff-2--Kentucky-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

96ccc9249206af72bcde9d8f1c2abf9c998ffa52c1bb9e239cd07ab3e1996a1b

It’s a misunderstanding of how wars escalates.

Kori Schake 23. Senior Fellow and Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute. “The Exculpating Myth of Accidental War.” https://sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/exculpating-myth-accidental-war

states on the losing side ought to become desperate that is not what happened not in Berlin the Cuban Missile Crisis or 1956 Hungari U S and Soviet Union accurately gauged strength and reached settlements or conceded states do know what they are doing choose to de-escalate there is no automatic ratchet upward Even Trump make risk calculations

Applied to i nternational r elations states on the losing side of wars or disadvantageous side of crises ought to become desperate and take increasing risks But that is not what happened among great powers not in Berlin crises the Cuban Missile Crisis or 1956 Hungari an uprising In cases billed as the most fraught superpower confrontations of the nuclear age both the U nited S t ates and Soviet Union accurately gauged relative strength and reached political settlements or conceded to avoid war states do know what they are doing States can and do choose to de-escalate there is no automatic ratchet to upward escalation Even the most reckless Trump was able to make reasonable risk calculations

i r losing side of wars disadvantageous side of crises increasing risks Berlin crises Cuban Missile Crisis 1956 Hungari an uprising most fraught superpower confrontations U S accurately gauged relative strength political settlements conceded to avoid war know what they are doing choose to de-escalate automatic ratchet upward escalation reasonable risk calculations

['Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s prospect theory gives some support to concern about war by miscalculation. Their idea, which explains lucky streaks and losing streaks is that people are willing to run greater risks to salvage a failing situation than to improve an already advantageous one.[72] Applied to international relations, states on the losing side of wars or the disadvantageous side of crises ought to become desperate and take increasing risks. But that is not what appears to have happened at least among the great powers — not in the Berlin crises, or in the Cuban Missile Crisis, or during the 1956 Hungarian uprising. In those cases, billed as the most fraught superpower confrontations of the nuclear age, both the United States and Soviet Union accurately gauged their relative strength and reached political settlements or conceded to avoid war. ', 'Moreover, manipulating risk is a strategy, not an accident. For example, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s elevation of nuclear alert levels during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war — something shockingly undertaken without presidential approval — was using the risk of nuclear war to prevent an adversary’s support to a fighting proxy. If that incident had produced war, it would taxonomically have qualified as a failed strategy, not an accidental war. As Trachtenberg has concluded, “the basic point here is that states, by and large, do know what they are doing; to a certain extent, they burn their bridges in the course of a crisis, but they do this with important political objectives in mind.”[73] ', 'States can and do choose to de-escalate; there is no automatic ratchet to upward', '', ' escalation. For example, president Barack Obama declined to honor the red line drawn against Syrian use of chemical weapons in 2012.[74] Even the most reckless of recent vintage American presidents, Donald Trump, was able to make reasonable risk calculations in crises, by backing away at great reputational cost from striking Iran to retaliate for Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.[75] ', '']

[(5, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Neg-5---ADA-Round-4.docx

Emory

RuSh

e69fb32371acf3a0ab39626f188e80a8536191a26ed65387101e9adf5cc5d52e

They agree with the importance of US defense---try or die. GREEN.

Campbell 23, dissertation submitted in fulfillment of Master of Defense and Strategic Studies (Logan Campbell, May 2023, “Nuclear Weapons in Japanese Strategic Culture,” Missouri State University, https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4895&context=theses)

No Ko have enough material for hundred weapons. It tested missiles and launched over Japan Japan relies on the U nited S tates for its security No Ko is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest asset , the U S failed to deter testing reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence

In 2022, No rth Ko rea was estimated to have enough material for more than one hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully tested missiles that could strike the U nited S tates with a nuclear warhead and launched ballistic missiles over Japan on multiple occasions Japan relies on the U nited S tates for its security . No rth Ko rea is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest security asset , the U nited S tates, failed to denuclearize and deter ballistic missile testing over Japan. There are amounting reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence

No Ko enough one hundred tested strike U S launched Japan relies on U S security serious threat asset U S failed deter testing amounting doubt deterrence

['North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Expansion and Modernization. The United States has attempted to denuclearize North Korea for decades to no avail. Despite sanctions and positive inducements, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and modernize its nuclear forces.239 In 2022, North Korea was estimated to have enough material for more than one hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead and launched ballistic missiles over Japan on multiple occasions. While the United States is not solely responsible for the denuclearization of North Korea, Japan relies on the United States for its security. North Korea is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest security asset, the United States, failed to denuclearize and deter ballistic missile testing over Japan. There are amounting reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-Northwestern-Round-3.docx

Michigan

DoPh

f95b29c2c0a284a8b46d0c5cb60130d4515635c03d05df5a7bba3c859477f23b

Timeframe is the opposite.

Einhorn 23, is a senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology. (Robert, May 2023, “South Korea’s Nuclear Option,” in Deterring A Nuclear-Armed North Korea)

So Ko doesn’t have uranium facilities or accessible uranium to separate only a l ab scale difficulty acquiring uranium Finding a technically and politically acceptable site be insurmountable capability take several years

So Ko doesn’t have the specialized facilities in place to produce a substantial nuclear arsenal It has no uranium enrichment facilities or readily accessible sources of uranium . It has done plenty of research on ways to separate plutonium from spent fuel but only on a l ab oratory scale and would need to build a much larger facility have difficulty acquiring uranium that it could irradiate to produce plutonium or identifying spent reactor Finding a technically and politically acceptable test site in densely populated South Korea could be an insurmountable challenge . Ac hieving capability could take several years

So Ko specialized facilities no uranium enrichment readily accessible uranium plenty separate only l ab scale difficulty irradiate technically politically test site densely populated insurmountable challenge several years

['No one doubts that South Korea has the technical capability and financial resources to produce nuclear weapons. But if it decided to go nuclear, South Korea would want a sizable, sophisticated, and publicly demonstrated nuclear capability, not a few primitive, untested bombs in the basement. That would be a major, costly, and time-consuming undertaking. South Korea has a large and worldclass civil nuclear energy program, but it doesn’t have the specialized facilities in place to produce a substantial nuclear arsenal. It has no uranium enrichment facilities or readily accessible sources of uranium. It has done plenty of research on ways to separate plutonium from spent fuel but only on a laboratory scale and would need to build a much larger facility. It would have difficulty acquiring uranium that it could irradiate to produce plutonium or identifying spent reactor fuel already in South Korea that could be reprocessed without violating contractual obligations with suppliers or that would provide the optimal grade of plutonium for weapons. It would have to develop a workable bomb design and test it, presumably more than once. Finding a technically suitable and politically acceptable test site in densely populated South Korea could be an insurmountable challenge. Achieving a secure retaliatory capability with survivable basing arrangements could take several years, and it would divert resources from other defense and national priorities', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Aff-Texas-Open-Round-6.docx

Emory

GaHe

c39b8355f9b4b41112817994618bc1757adb21d2cd7bd8347f48d28ef425c2ee

Nuclear threats to North Korea collapse crisis stability---nuclear war

Jungsup Kim & Chung-in Moon 23, Vice President of the Sejong Institute and former South Korean Deputy Defense Minister for Planning and Co-ordination; and Chung-in Moon, Vice Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, March 2023, “Coming to Terms with North Korea’s Nuclear Strength,” Global Asia, 18(1), https://www.globalasia.org/v18no1/cover/coming-to-terms-with-north-koreas-nuclear-strength_jungsup-kimchung-in-moon

Crisis stability is as important as deterrence deterrence may increase nuclear war effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fear misperception or miscalc it is necessary to refrain from such terms as pre-emptive strikes that unnecessarily provoke No Ko Otherwise minor conventional conflict could quickly escalate into nuclear war Washington need restraint

Crisis stability is just as important as strengthening deterrence preoccupation with extended deterrence may paradoxically increase possibility of nuclear war . While maintaining a deterrence posture that is decisive enough to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons, every effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fear s, misperception s or miscalc ulation it is necessary to refrain from using such terms as pre-emptive strikes and decapitation operations that may unnecessarily provoke No rth Ko rea Otherwise , a minor conventional armed conflict could quickly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war The ideal way forward is to restore diplomacy and resolve the conflict peacefully genuine realism is desperately needed crisis stability is urgent . Seoul and Washington need to show restraint Strategic empathy should be employed. Demonizing No rth Ko rea, adhering to the old habit of crime and punishment, and advocating unilateral attitudes could worsen the situation . It is essential to understand North Korea as it is, not as we think it is or hope it might become

Crisis stability paradoxically increase possibility of nuclear war not to raise unnecessary fear misperception miscalc pre-emptive strikes unnecessarily provoke No Ko quickly escalate crisis stability is urgent restraint Strategic empathy Demonizing No Ko unilateral attitudes worsen the situation

['Crisis stability is just as important as strengthening deterrence. Blind preoccupation with extended deterrence may paradoxically increase the possibility of nuclear war. While maintaining a deterrence posture that is decisive enough to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons, every effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fears, misperceptions or miscalculation on its part. Thus, it is necessary to refrain from using such terms as pre-emptive strikes and decapitation operations that may unnecessarily provoke North Korea. In the case of the deployment of US strategic assets or the transmission of deterrence messages in times of crisis, these should be carefully calibrated with crisis management. Otherwise, a minor conventional armed conflict could quickly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war. Thus, crisis stability through “intra-war deterrence” and “escalation control” is critical. There must be a prudent balance between the two.', 'FACING REALITY', 'Deterrence and crisis stability are useful but are still a second-best solution to the North Korean nuclear problem since they are predicated on a perpetual security dilemma. The ideal way forward is to restore diplomacy and resolve the conflict peacefully. We all know this is not easy. But a paradigmatic change in our way of thinking can open a new horizon.', 'In this regard, genuine realism is desperately needed. We should admit, if not formally recognize, North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state. We cannot make “complete, verifiable irreversible denuclearization” a precondition for any dialogue. The recent remark by Park Jin, South Korea’s Foreign Minister, that “peace without North Korea’s denuclearization is a false peace” is misleading and unhelpful. While full denuclearization should remain the ultimate goal, a more realistic approach should be sought in which some form of nuclear-arms control limits North Korea’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for the removal of hostile policies and a reduction of sanctions.10', 'As noted, crisis stability is urgent. Seoul and Washington need to show more restraint, with behavior such as downsizing or temporarily suspending South Korea-US joint military exercises, and the deployment of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. These measures could reduce tensions and build confidence that could bring the North back to dialogue and negotiation. “Denuclearization first, peace later” is not likely to work. Denuclearization and peace-making on the Korean Peninsula should be pursued simultaneously. That seems a more realistic approach.', 'Strategic empathy should also be employed. Demonizing North Korea, adhering to the old habit of crime and punishment, and advocating unilateral attitudes could just worsen the situation. It is essential to understand North Korea as it is, not as we think it is or hope it might become.']

[(8, 11), (12, 13), (23, 27), (28, 30)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-NDT-Round-3.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

e0906f0788a5d1a23d6f9850937ee2af8f05857585f7dab3cb4977525ed34947

Finishing

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, The Washington Quarterly, 43:4, 89-90)

China currently devotes a small share of wealth to military purposes a China that spends 4 percent of GDP on defense would present a larger problem efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing responses

Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence China currently devotes a small er share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the U S yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes if the U S feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense would present a still larger problem and place the U S in an even worse position ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses

military spending economic developments oppose neo-primacy reclaim untrammeled preeminence currently small er share military purposes still managed to reduce American military advantages quite a bit allocating more to international purposes 2 percent 3 4 still larger problem even worse position decouple self-sustaining additional economic efforts outpace Beijing generate countervailing Chinese responses

['Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55', 'Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.', '']

[(0, 10), (11, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Revare-Butler-Neg-1%20-%20Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Kansas

ReBu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/ReBu/Kansas-Revare-Butler-Neg-1%2520-%2520Northwestern-Doubles.docx

3143dd472475d0a71a9734ae9c5231a08cb1891a8dbc5a2b46293ddba07bf4aa

Tons of cartel conduct internationally is sponsored by state governments. That conduct is shielded under the FSIA.

Robert Kantner 13, Partner in the international law firm of Jones Day, specializes in trade secret and other intellectual property litigation and counseling, “Protecting Trade Secrets Internationally Through A Comprehensive Trade Secret Policy,” The Practical Lawyer, February 2013, http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/TPL1302_Kantner_thumb.pdf

Even if a plaintiff exerts jurisdiction if the defendant is a s o e it may be immune from suit under the F S I A particularly in China , many will seek immunity While there are exceptions briefing and arguing the matter will extend the case and involve significant expense

Even if a plaintiff successfully exerts jurisdiction over a foreign entity, if the defendant is a s tate - o wned e ntity, it may be able to claim that it is immune from suit under the F S I A Because economic espionage is being conducted more frequently by state-owned entities, particularly in China , many foreign defendants will likely seek immunity under this Act. While there are exceptions to the Act’s provision of immunity, briefing and arguing the matter will extend the case and involve significant expense

jurisdiction s o e immune from suit F S I A China likely seek immunity exceptions briefing arguing extend the case significant expense

['Foreign Defendants May Claim Foreign', 'Sovereign Immunity ', 'Even if a plaintiff successfully exerts jurisdiction over a foreign entity, if the defendant is a state-owned entity, it may be able to claim that it is immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Because economic espionage is being conducted more frequently by state-owned entities, particularly in China, many foreign defendants will likely seek immunity under this Act. While there are exceptions to the Act’s provision of immunity, briefing and arguing the matter will certainly extend the resolution of the case overall and possibly involve significant expense.']

[(7, 17)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Harvard-Round1.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Harvard-Round1.docx

38c8cd72d5122ba25fe7c4f2bfb973757e3e9148e80bcf80ab4e4ac6ddfa6b20

No NFU credibility. Lack of durability means no one would believe an NFU. It would undermine crisis-stability and ensure allied prolif.

John D. Maurer 22. Professor of strategy and security studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), PhD in US diplomatic history, an MA in history, and a BS in international politics from Georgetown University. Air University, non-resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). “MAINTAINING AMERICA’S NUCLEAR DETERRENT.” March 10th, 2022. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/maintaining-americas-nuclear-deterrent/

n f u not the “quick fix proponents claim policy would not solve crisis-stability Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise that could be reversed at any time. partners see reduction in commitment which drive them to seek independent nuclear forces shifting during the worst security crisis would be a terrible idea,

Declaratory policy is an important component of the review, since unlike force development or arms control (which take time to bring to fruition), the president could alter declaratory policy at any time. Over time, proponents argue, a no-first-use policy would also contribute to greater normative restraint on the use and perhaps even possession of nuclear weapons. All reasonable people share President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in world affairs, but unfortunately n o f irst u se is not the “quick fix ” that its proponents claim . Such a policy would not even solve the narrow crisis-stability problem it seeks to address. Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise to avoid nuclear use, especially one that could be reversed at any time. Nor does it contribute to America’s ability to deter Russian and Chinese aggression , a chall enge that is best met with the current policy of calculated ambiguity. Finally, far from advancing the cause of normative restraint, an American no-first-use policy could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Many American partners would see no first use as a reduction in America’s commitment to their security, which might drive them to seek independent nuclear forces . But shifting entirely to a no-first-use declaratory policy during the worst security crisis of the post-Cold War era would be a terrible idea, especially for an administration that hopes to rally American partners and create broad coalitions to contain adversaries .

not the “quick fix ” unlikely to be reassured verbal promise could be reversed at any time. Russian and Chinese aggression seek independent nuclear forces worst security crisis broad coalitions to contain adversaries .

['No First Use', 'One of the most anticipated elements of the Nuclear Posture Review is a possible modification to American nuclear “declaratory policy,” or the conditions under which the United States might employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. Declaratory policy is an important component of the review, since unlike force development or arms control (which take time to bring to fruition), the president could alter declaratory policy at any time. Currently, the United States has a policy of “calculated ambiguity,” in which it threatens to use nuclear weapons in response to “extreme circumstances” including both nuclear and large-scale non-nuclear attacks.', 'In recent years, the policy of calculated ambiguity has been criticized for being too broad. Then-candidate Biden campaigned on reducing the role of American nuclear weapons by adopting a declaratory policy of “sole use” or “no first use,” in which the United States would promise only to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an adversary nuclear strike. No first use would narrow the cases in which the United States would use nuclear weapons, foreswearing their employment in response to mass-casualty conventional attacks or chemical and biological weapons. Proponents of no first use argue that the current ambiguous declaratory policy poses escalation risks, since adversaries might become convinced that the United States would attack them in a crisis. A no-first-use pledge would reassure these adversaries and remove provocations that might drive them to violent behavior. Over time, proponents argue, a no-first-use policy would also contribute to greater normative restraint on the use and perhaps even possession of nuclear weapons.', 'All reasonable people share President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in world affairs, but unfortunately no first use is not the “quick fix” that its proponents claim. Such a policy would not even solve the narrow crisis-stability problem it seeks to address. Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise to avoid nuclear use, especially one that could be reversed at any time. Nor does it contribute to America’s ability to deter Russian and Chinese aggression, a challenge that is best met with the current policy of calculated ambiguity. Finally, far from advancing the cause of normative restraint, an American no-first-use policy could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Many American partners would see no first use as a reduction in America’s commitment to their security, which might drive them to seek independent nuclear forces.', 'There are other areas where current nuclear declaratory policy might be improved, especially as it pertains to the relationship of nuclear weapons to emerging capabilities like cyber attacks. But shifting entirely to a no-first-use declaratory policy during the worst security crisis of the post-Cold War era would be a terrible idea, especially for an administration that hopes to rally American partners and create broad coalitions to contain adversaries. Hopefully, the Biden administration has listened to American partners’ concerns and will avoid radically altering declaratory policy.']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Dartmouth-RR-Round-1.docx

Emory

KeRa

06e7918766ab630fa524d36eb51ee150dd564bdf1acd4de591f37d84e84e7ffc

We would never use a nuke first, especially against a weaker adversary.

T.V. Paul 16, Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles, “Self-Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons and the Enduring Credibility Challenge,” International Journal, Vol. 71, No. 1, March 2016, accessed via HeinOnline

tradition of non-use, moral concerns , and legal principles generate rep concerns for a potential user use condemned worldwide leader could suffer irreparable rep costs global power like the U S has considerable stake in its image attack on a smaller state would cause major reputation erosion self-deterrence occurs against a weak adversary the U S wants to rebuild disparity between the U S and adversaries increases self-deterrence use of unnecessary force would mean the larger purpose could fail toward non-nuclear states they are driven by a desire to signal non-use to project benign intent and prevent states seeking nuc s

three non-material considerations the tradition of non-use, moral concerns , and legal principles generate rep utation concerns for a potential user of nuclear weapons States worry about how they are perceived use of nuc lear weapon s would be condemned worldwide the leader who orders such use could suffer irreparable rep utational costs A global power like the U nited S tates has a considerable stake in maintaining its reputation and image A nuclear attack on a smaller state would cause major reputation erosion for the U nited S tates self-deterrence occurs against a weak adversary the U nited S tates wants to rebuild after the war the disparity in military power between the U nited S tates and its rogue adversaries increases self-deterrence because the U nited S tates may want to befriend or rebuild those it is currently coercing The use of unnecessary force would mean the U nited S tates would suffer reputation damage and the larger purpose of attack could fail nuclear weapons states are motivated by a reputation for resolve toward non-nuclear states , the reverse becomes the case; they are driven by a desire to signal non-use to project the image of benign intent and prevent these states from seeking nuc lear weapon s

tradition of non-use, moral concerns legal principles rep worry about how they are perceived nuc s condemned worldwide irreparable rep costs the U S considerable stake major reputation erosion U S U S U S increases self-deterrence U S U S reputation damage the larger purpose of attack could fail signal non-use nuc s

['The three non-material considerations-the tradition of non-use, moral concerns, and legal principles-all generate reputation concerns for a potential user of nuclear weapons. Reputation here is used in its straightforward meaning: the general esteem in which a country and its leader are held by domestic and international opinion. States, like firms, worry about how they are perceived. The chief concern here may be that the use of nuclear weapons would be condemned worldwide and that the leader who orders such use could suffer irreparable reputational costs. The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences can intermingle in these instances. 70', 'A global power like the United States has a considerable stake in maintaining its reputation and image. Although the Iraq invasion tarnished that image temporarily, much of the criticism has been on the decline of US reputation in the world as a result of the ill-conceived war. A nuclear attack on a smaller state, even if it were part of the so-called rogue group, would cause major reputation erosion for the United States. Robert Jervis argues that self-deterrence occurs against a very weak adversary that the United States wants to rebuild after the war. "Ironically, the disparity in military power between the United States and its rogue adversaries increases self-deterrence, especially because the United States may want to befriend or rebuild those it is currently coercing." 7 In other words, the United States wants to appeal to various publics\' opinions: its own, its allies\', its opponent\'s, and the world\'s. The use of unnecessary force would mean that the United States would suffer reputation damage and the larger purpose of attack could fail.', 'This discussion suggests that the nuclear weapons states have been driven by two types of reputation: deterrence reputation versus non-use reputation. First, they are motivated by a reputation for resolve to use their weapons in order to signal retaliatory threat for deterrence vis-a-vis other nuclear states. Second, toward non-nuclear states, the reverse becomes the case; they are driven by a desire to signal non-use in order to project the image of benign intent and thereby prevent these states from seeking nuclear weapons.']

[(5, 12)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-ADA-Octas.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

1e17b7e895fa99b1c7dc09ae5f2b4a59525fcfc7af61a9bea019227aa2c246aa

Escalation is mathematically inevitable.

Orlando Bell 23. Physicians for Social Responsibility Nuclear Weapons Abolition Program. “Human Fallibility: A Critical Hole in Global Faith in Nuclear Security.” https://inkstickmedia.com/human-fallibility-a-critical-hole-in-global-faith-in-nuclear-security/

overlooked flaw in certainty of nuclear deterrence humans are fallible acceptable margin of error zero misreading adversary’s intent failure of communication leak of information lead to crisis errors in warning weather faulty technology ignored signals Turkey loaded nuc s without authorization existence shatters perception occurrence impossible if you play game of chance likelihood occur becomes mathematical certainty only way to s urvive Russian Roulette is to stop playing system must work perfectly misread signals communications flaws corruptible commanders miswiring accidental detonations already in histori are we certain we wish to continue gambling Hair Trigger significantly increases chance mutual commitments to step back threat decrease significantly

regularly overlooked flaw in certainty of nuclear deterrence humans are inherently fallible acceptable margin of error zero misreading of adversary’s intent failure of internal communication leak of sensitive information lead to a nuclear crisis level of risk is unacceptable Studies show exchange of just 1% of world’s nuclear arsenal cause nuclear famine even a limited nuclear war is not survivable record scattered with terrifyingly close calls US military officials recommend aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on multiple occasions nuclear accidents are a very real possibility On multiple occasions signals misread nuclear launch protocols initiated until somebody detected errors in warning systems resulting from weather faulty technology ignored signals Unauthorized arming not impossibility Turkey loaded nuc lear missile s onto planes without authorization from the US president sheer existence shatters perception occurrence is impossible full nuclear detonation a very realistic possibility if you continue to play game of chance likelihood it occur becomes mathematical certainty the only way to s urvive Russian Roulette is to stop playing system must work perfectly to ensure continued safety against nuclear weapons morality and rationality of global leaders must hold commanders must not be tempted by corruption or glory electronic safety systems must not malfunction operators must not miscommunicate Each day humanity gambles based on precarious assumptions of rationality and misplaced faith in unimpeachability of security systems With misread signals communications flaws corruptible commanders miswiring accidental detonations already existing in histori cal record are we certain we wish to continue gambling commitment to reduce number of missiles on Hair Trigger Alert reduce risk of uncontrolled unintended unauthorized nuclear launch posture significantly increases chance of accidental or unauthorized launch or intentional launch owing to a false warning existing US launch posture decreases time in which errors can be corrected if actors made mutual commitments to step back threat level would decrease significantly

regularly overlooked certainty inherently fallible margin of error zero adversary’s intent internal communication sensitive information nuclear crisis level of risk 1% limited nuclear war terrifyingly close calls aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes multiple occasions nuclear accidents very real possibility multiple occasions weather faulty technology ignored signals authorization from the US president sheer existence very realistic continue to play game of chance mathematical certainty only way Russian Roulette perfectly continued safety morality rationality corruption electronic safety systems malfunction miscommunicate precarious assumptions misplaced faith unimpeachability misread signals communications flaws corruptible commanders miswiring accidental detonations histori cal record continue gambling Hair Trigger Alert significantly increases accidental unauthorized US launch posture errors mutual commitments decrease significantly

['Although this example is particular to China, the potential presence of corruption indicates a regularly overlooked flaw in the certainty of the rational choice nuclear deterrence argument: humans are inherently fallible. ', 'Typically, we accept such fallibility in our leaders; they are human, but the acceptable margin of error nears zero in the case of such incomparable power. A misreading of an adversary’s intent, a failure of internal communication, or a leak of sensitive information by a corrupt official could all lead to a nuclear crisis from which de-escalation cannot be assured. Such a level of risk is unacceptable. Studies show that an exchange of just 1% of the world’s nuclear arsenal would cause a nuclear famine that devastates two billion people’s lives. In other words, even a limited nuclear war is not survivable. ', 'Close Calls ', 'Proponents of nuclear deterrence would have you believe nuclear accidents and miscalculations are impossible. They argue our leaders would never consider such an inconceivable possibility and that layers of backstops, checks, and secret codes would prevent any possible unintended escalation. But the nuclear taboo has remained intact through luck, not skill. ', 'The record is scattered with terrifyingly close calls. Not only did US military officials recommend aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on multiple occasions during the Cold War, but nuclear accidents are a very real possibility. Take, for example, the 1966 “broken arrow” incident in which an American B-52 bomber collided with a refueling tanker and released four hydrogen bombs onto the town of Palomares, Spain. Fortunately, none of the four bombs experienced a nuclear chain reaction, but the conventional explosives blasted radioactive plutonium across the Spanish countryside, a dirty bomb dropped accidentally on a US ally. A Soviet official at the time commented: “Only a fortunate stroke of luck saved the Spanish population of the area from catastrophe.” The US government had to buy much of the farmland from the locals and burn or store the contaminated land. More than 50 years later, the cleanup is not complete. ', 'Even more extraordinary fortune saved the residents of North Carolina and much of the United States. A 1961 accident in which a fuel leak caused the mid-flight breakup of a B-52 created a tailspin. The centrifugal forces pulled a lanyard and a hydrogen bomb, approximately 1000 times more powerful than the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, released and tumbled toward the earth. Unaware of this accidental launch, the weapons system automatically and successfully completed all weapons arming stages. The firing signal was sent when the weapon hit the ground. The only thing preventing this catastrophe and the potential death of tens of thousands of Americans was a singular on/off safety switch, identical in design to that of a household light switch. Such switches have been miswired before, so “safe mode” armed the weapon instead of deactivating it. In short, the people of Palomares and North Carolina were little more than lucky. ', 'On multiple occasions, signals have been misread, and nuclear launch protocols have been initiated until somebody detected errors in warning systems resulting from weather, faulty technology, and ignored signals. Unauthorized arming is also not an impossibility. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, US personnel in Turkey loaded nuclear missiles onto planes without authorization from the US president or the secretary of defense. In 2007, in a remarkable lapse in nuclear security, six nuclear missiles were mistakenly loaded onto a US bomber readying for conventional operations. It took 36 hours for the US Air Force to realize the warheads were missing. Meanwhile, six nuclear weapons sat unguarded and armed on the tarmac. Eric Schlosser’s book, “Command and Control,” is scattered with similar close calls. ', 'We have survived these accidents without catastrophe, but their sheer existence shatters the perception that their occurrence is impossible. In each of Schlosser’s cases, a full nuclear detonation was a very realistic possibility. How long are we willing to gamble with these stakes? As Martin Hellman points out, if you continue to play a game of chance, so long as the possibility of the event is above zero, then the likelihood it will eventually occur becomes a mathematical certainty. In the nuclear case, “the only way to survive Russian Roulette is to stop playing.” ', 'Stepping Away ', 'The system must work perfectly to ensure our continued safety against nuclear weapons. The morality and rationality of global leaders must hold, commanders must not be tempted by corruption or glory, electronic safety systems must not malfunction, and operators must not miscommunicate. Each day, the present system remains, and humanity gambles it will not have to live through the horrors of a nuclear conflict, and we do so based on precarious assumptions of rationality and a misplaced faith in the unimpeachability of security systems. ', 'With the leaders of China and Russia possessing enormous nuclear arsenals, failing to control corruption and dissent within their armies, and seeking to establish dynastic legacies based on the unquestionable legitimacy of both their historical narratives and future ambitions, is their continued rationality and temperament so reliable as to bet the future of humanity on its continuation? With misread signals, communications flaws, corruptible commanders, miswiring, and accidental detonations already existing in the historical record, are we certain we wish to continue gambling on the security of nuclear safety systems? ', 'At the very least, a commitment to reduce the number of missiles on “Hair Trigger Alert” can reduce the risk of uncontrolled, unintended, or unauthorized nuclear launch. In short, American intercontinental ballistic missiles are kept ready to launch. It is possible for missiles on “Hair Trigger Alert” to be in the sky within ten minutes of initiation. Such rapid response is rationalized as necessary to retaliate against an oncoming strike against the US, but this rationale is no longer persuasive. Day-to-day, the posture significantly increases the chance of an accidental or unauthorized launch or an intentional launch owing to a false warning being carried through to completion. In an arena where the margin for error is already low, existing US launch posture decreases the time in which errors can be corrected without raising the level of US national security — the US nuclear-armed submarines ensure retaliatory capacity without the need for this level of alert. Instead, if the actors involved made mutual commitments to step back from this posture and store nuclear warheads separately from their launch missiles, the threat level posed by irrational or ill-informed decisions would decrease significantly.', '']

[(8, 12), (13, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-BeYa-Aff-texas-Round-2.docx

Emory

BeYa

2f92f69fecc65faf9312ae571ba949bbaad566412fa4548d451bb9a5d7a599ab

Mutual aid solidifies neoliberalism and state-centricity---instead of challenging structural forces, it fills gaps in the system, allowing it to run more smoothly without foundational change.

Rhiannon Firth 20, Senior Research Officer in Sociology at the University of Essex, “Mutual Aid, Anarchist Preparedness and COVID-19”, Coronavirus, Class and Mutual Aid in the United Kingdom, Ed. Reston and Firth, p. 74-79

Spade argues resistant movements model Mutual aid but this is not sufficient to end cap and create a society without hierarchies anarchists linked mutual aid to radical critique of the state , and capitalism It is argued anarchists have a role to play leading a radical counter-narrative of solidarity Radicals argue mutual aid are social recomposition . However controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against formations, rather than being complicit in supporting them , filling gaps and mitigating failures . Mutual aid is very convenient for governments and capitalists because it creates systems reliant on volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing labour reproduction in the midst of austerity, tax cuts and decimation of public services this was openly articulated as conservative policy and has become part of the neoliberal consensus mutual aid is not radical , but complicit with the state it has the function of restoring normal running of things —even if the author would rather have a more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state

Spade argues that resistant left movements model Mutual aid but as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end cap italism and create a society without hierarchies and borders mutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care contemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state , and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism It is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity In the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society Radicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital . The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid , ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish However , the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them , filling in gaps and mitigating failures . Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike , because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services this was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy and has become part of the neoliberal , decentralising consensus mutual aid is not radical , but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things —even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state

Spade Mutual aid not sufficient cap linked state capitalism repertoire of actions dealing with mutual aid securitised and militarised lockdown rules laissez-faire neoliberal approach economic stimulus benign complicit supporting them filling in gaps mitigating failures Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike openly articulated conservative policy part of the neoliberal , decentralising consensus mutual aid is not radical complicit with the state restoring the normal running of things

['Dean Spade (2020: 136) argues that resistant left movements model three kinds of action that directly change material conditions: ‘(a) work to dismantle harmful systems … (b) work to directly provide for people targeted by such systems … and (c) work to build an alternative infrastructure through which people can get their needs met’. Mutual aid addresses (b) but as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end capitalism and create a society without hierarchies and borders. In what follows, I will consider some of the actions that anarchists have undertaken during the COVID-19 crisis that address Spade’s criteria (a) and (c), whilst adding a fourth practice, which is not often covered under the rubric of action but ought to be: (d) publishing critique—in particular, I focus on anarchist critiques of securitisation and policing in the COVID-19 crisis, and anarchist critiques of capitalism. The publishing of propaganda and critique has a long and often hidden history in anarchist movement practice (Hoyt 2014; Ferretti 2017) and it is important because it helps to raise awareness of, and identify targets for, the other modes of action. Anarchist critiques during the COVID-19 crisis have largely been online, on blogs and social media, but also through word-of-mouth and exemplary actions while engaging in mutual aid with communities.', 'In London, the mutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care. There is a mutual aid group for each local borough, and these are divided by borough, zone and neighbourhood. There are also some London-wide networks and groups that co-ordinate or provide forums for people with specific interests, for example a Radical Assembly which provides a forum for radical left-wing and anarchist organisers, many of whom are dissatisfied with the lack of politicisation in their local ward. Local groups are composed of local community members helping others who are more vulnerable or who need to self-isolate to avoid spreading illness with tasks such as picking up and delivering groceries, medicines and other essentials, offering transportation to medical facilities, offering donations such as cleaning supplies, medical supplies and food for out-of-work people, offering home cooked meals, home/apartment cleaning, offering phonecalls, video chats and companionship, online entertainment such as yoga or dance classes, advice and advocacy navigating services, child care and pet care. Anarchists have also been involved in direct actions such as making masks, sewing scrubs and garnering donations of PPE for medical professionals. Similar to Occupy Sandy, these groups are utilising open source and internet technology, including Google docs with listing of groups, and being used by groups to organise resources, crowd-sourced lists of activities and initiatives, resource guides, webinars, slack channels, online meetups, peer-to-peer loan programmes and other forms of mutual aid emerging online and on-the-ground (Raymond 2020).', 'The mainstream perspective on disaster relief in general, and the coronavirus epidemic in particular, assumes that humans are selfish and competitive and are in need of a co-ordinating authority to tell them what to do. Mutual aid turns the conservative idea of the ‘disaster utopia’ on its head, positing that it is not a momentary suspension of division that leads communities to unite in mutual aid, but that this illustrates an alternative lifeworld that is normally hindered by the minorities in power and by media hegemonies (Solnit 2010: 8–9).', 'An interesting perspective on the current crisis is that Kropotkin’s original treatise on mutual aid was in large partly a critique of the then-fashionable ‘social Darwinism’ of the anarchist’s conservative contemporaries. Kropotkin’s idea that co-operation helps species thrive more than competition seems ever-more relevant as an alternative perspective in the current conjecture where our Conservative government have been accused of openly Darwinist ideas of ‘herd immunity’ (Malnick 2020) and pursuing policy lines based around ideas of ‘survival of the fittest’. Millstein defines mutual aid as ‘collective care’ involving ‘making sure everyone can take time off work, have a home and enough food, stay hydrated and wash their hands, not feel alone or abandoned, receive health and other care’ (Milstein 2020). Commentators have remarked how incredible it is that ‘basic bonds of solidarity, empathy and altruism’ have remained intact in the UK despite a decade of austerity and political polarisation (Quarshie 2020). Similar to Kropotkin, contemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state, and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism, for example an activist involved in co-operation Birmingham links the activities of their solidarity kitchen to a crisis of food poverty which has been ongoing since the 2008 crisis, resulting in the widespread use of foodbanks. The author-activist argues that food aid will become one of the most pressing concerns for the working class as we slip into recession again due to COVID-19. The food bank system is critiqued as a form of bureaucratic violence, since applicants are required to engage with a third-sector system who have a huge amount of control over the lives of the working class, who are required to explain their needs and justify themselves to paid professionals who act as gate-keepers for eligibility. This is seen to be part of a deliberate strategy of disempowerment of the working class enacted by both Tories and new Labour. It is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity, and they argue that the popularity of the solidarity kitchen, providing over 150 free vegan meals a day, with demand far in excess of this, pays testament to the need for a political project to combat food poverty, which should operate on multiple levels: ‘Both redistribution projects but also projects creating the conditions for autonomous production’. Such a project would involve not only direct provision through mutual aid, but also challenging land rights, completely re-thinking how farming and agriculture, and radically re-shaping supply chains (Yarrow Way 2020).', 'In the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society. As described in Chap. 1, in terms of the social/political principle, the very definition of the state for anarchists is that it is parasitic of the creative energies of society. COVID-19 is exposing the fragility of capital, at the same time as capitalists are attempting to mobilise the crisis in their interests, at least partially through the technologies of the state. Radicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital. The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid, ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish. From the anarchist view both stimulus and securitisation are two sides of the same coin designed to protect the needs of capital by stopping people from revolting in insurrection and/or engaging in exodus from the system by meeting their own needs though social recomposition. However, the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them, filling in gaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike, because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services. In the UK, this was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy, in the terms of David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ vision (Quarshie 2020) and has become part of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus. Assuming that authentic anti-authoritarian desire is possible, the political and discursive context has implications for how disaster anarchists and other radicals might seek to act during the COVID-19 pandemic.', 'This ‘social capital’ trope reappears in the liberal-Left media on COVID-19, for example Raymond (2020) rehearses phraseology of ‘vulnerability’ (the assumption that it is communities that are fragile, not capitalism) and ‘resilience’ (the idea that it is the responsibility of lower-level communities to recover from higher-level shocks, inflicted upon them by the policies of states and inequalities of capitalism—with emphasis on recovery rather than resistance or transformation). From this perspective, mutual aid is not radical, but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things—even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state. Rather than seeking resistance to a destructive and authoritarian complicity between state and capital, Raymond proclaims that ‘it’s unfortunate that those in power are unwilling to step up adequately’ (Raymond 2020). From the perspective of reformist social democratic and left-liberal approaches, local movements are lauded insofar as they embody flexible and responsive local knowledge—but at the same time there is a contradictory desire to control them. Associationalist views can often come across as quite critical— for example Naomi Klein is able to critique the dispossession of communities by disaster capitalists using shock doctrine neoliberalism; yet her alternatives rely on Keynesian economic stimulus and the co-optation of social movements into a state-led social democratic consensus (Klein 2007). Anarchists and other radicals might argue that all state responses are two sides to the same coin—the choice whether to co-opt through economic stimulus and capture movements or control/repress through securitisation is always there.', '']

[(9, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-Texas-Round2.docx

694b915154c3d05ba5d7e5313b55d5ede7ac551621dc2d0f63b71aee0a4083de

“Disarming” requires comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all US nuclear weapons

Koplow 14, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. (David A., “ARTICLE: WHAT WOULD ZERO LOOK LIKE? A TREATY FOR THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,” 45 Geo. J. Int'l L. 683, 684, Spring, 2014, Lexis accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 9/5/23)

Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons has long been the most urgent item on the agenda

Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons , has long been one of the most ambitious, controversial, and urgent item on the agenda for arms control.

comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition all

['Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons, pursuant to a verifiable, legally binding international agreement--has long been one of the most ambitious, controversial, and urgent items on the agenda for arms control. To date, however, most of the discussion of "getting to zero" has highlighted the political, military, technical and diplomatic dimensions of this complex problem, and there has been relatively little attention to the legal requirements for drafting such a novel treaty.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-1---Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Kansas

MaPa

61a233817b30cf0bf9037f643c8cfc91ffb658c5593649869794a014db0dfd43

Too far out – surprises inevitable.

Bernstein 9/13 – Jonathan Bernstein, Bloomberg columnist, former professor of political science at UTSA, “The Midterms Are Now Even Harder to Predict,” 9/13/22, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-13/the-midterm-elections-are-now-even-harder-to-predict

voters turn against the president there is a major exception abortion the ruling has mobilized supporters Add the margin of error A final wild card is Covid which still weighs on voters’ lives forecasts are based on previous similar situations this year we have little info

voters turn against the president ’s party during midterms public policy sometimes moves too far toward that party’s preferences there is a major exception in the form of abortion the ruling has mobilized supporters of abortion rights Add to the uncertainty the fairly wide margin of error that all polls always have, along with the possibility that we could get a larger polling error A final wild card is Covid which even in diminished form still weighs on many aspects of voters’ lives . All election forecasts are based on previous similar situations , which means that this year we have little info rmation to go on

major exception abortion mobilized supporters larger polling error Covid previous similar situations we have little info rmation to go on

['One reason voters turn against the president’s party during midterms is that public policy sometimes moves too far toward that party’s preferences. But this time, there is a major exception in the form of the Supreme Court’s decision on abortion. There is plenty of evidence that the ruling that overturned Roe v. Wade has mobilized supporters of abortion rights, though it’s hard to know just how meaningful that will be.', 'Add to the uncertainty the fairly wide margin of error that all polls always have, along with the possibility that we could get a larger polling error.', 'A final wild card is the Covid-19 pandemic, which even in diminished form still weighs on many aspects of voters’ lives. All election forecasts are based on previous similar situations, which means that this year we have little information to go on.']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-CaVa-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-2.docx

Dartmouth

CaVa

87434dac10d1f10c57648310fe0f9ccae721a61a47e385b88e8d8fac95d64b82

Aggressive nuclear posture escalates US-China tensions---eliminating first strike solves.

Johnson ’23 [James; February 2023; PhD, Assistant Professor in Strategic Studies in the Department of Politics & International Relations at the University of Aberdeen; AI and the Bomb: Nuclear Strategy and Risk in the Digital Age, “Strategic stability: A perfect storm of nuclear risk?” Ch. 1]

US and Chinese doctrines do not address escalatory behavior emphasis on the initiative to achieve dominance result in escalation to nuclear conflict both parties lack strategic stability the US does not maintain mutual vulnerability concern relates to first strikes against China’s deterrent lack confidence in willingness to stabilize relations nor incentivized to pursue unilateral restraint to enhance stability crisis in the S C S Korea or Taiwan spiral out of control US incentive to pre-emptively attack misperceive as a first strike AI cross vague thresholds combination of vulnerability and tech have significant implications

While US defense analysts and their Chinese counterparts are aware of the potential escalation risks their respective doctrines do not address how an adversary might respond to escalatory behavior these rival strategic communities generally assume that escalation can be effectively countered by establishing and sustaining escalation dominance. Chinese doctrinal emphasis on seizing the initiative in conventional warfare to achieve escalation dominance may result in triggering rapid and possibly uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear level of conflict A central challenge in defining strategic stability between the US and China is that both parties lack a common definition of strategic stability the US does not maintain an official policy of mutual vulnerability with China Beijing’s overarching concern relates to perceptions that the US seeks nuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct first strikes against China’s comparatively smaller and less diversified nuclear deterrent sides lack confidence in the other’s willingness to stabilize strategic relations ; nor are they incentivized to pursue measures arms control , build mutual trust, transparency, or display unilateral restraint to enhance strategic stability a US-China crisis operating under the assumption that they can effectively control escalation in the S C S Korea or Taiwan would likely increase the risks of inadvertent escalation because both sides underestimate their ability to prevent a situation spiral out of control in a future US-China conflict the US would have a strong incentive to pre-emptively attack China’s mobile missiles and attendant command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to achieve escalation dominance, which Beijing could misperceive as a precursor to a first nuclear strike Another complicating factor is that new escalation thresholds and operating norms for AI -augmented weapons have yet to emerge Without commonly held operational norms and an adversary’s strategic priorities and political objectives, militaries deploying military AI could inadvertently cross already vague escalation thresholds combination of first-strike vulnerability and opportunity enabled by a growing portfolio of tech such as AI for warfighting, coercion, and influence will have significant implications for escalation dynamics

US Chinese doctrines escalatory behavior effectively countered seizing the initiative uncontrollable escalation central challenge strategic stability mutual vulnerability overarching concern conduct first strikes lack confidence pursue measures unilateral restraint S C S Korea Taiwan inadvertent escalation spiral out of control pre-emptively attack precursor first nuclear strike complicating factor AI military AI escalation thresholds first-strike vulnerability growing tech

['While US defense analysts and their Chinese counterparts are aware of the potential escalation risks between nuclear-armed great powers, their respective doctrines do not address how an adversary might respond to escalatory behavior. Instead, these rival strategic communities generally assume that escalation in future conflict can be effectively countered and contained by establishing and sustaining escalation dominance. Chinese doctrinal emphasis on seizing the initiative early and pre-emptively in conventional warfare to achieve escalation dominance may result in the opposite outcome: triggering rapid and possibly uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear level of conflict.125 However, the evidence does not suggest that China intends to use nuclear missiles to achieve escalation dominance, or for deliberate escalation.', 'A central challenge in defining strategic stability between the US and China is that both parties lack a common definition of “strategic stability”—unlike Russia the US does not maintain an official policy of mutual vulnerability with China—and have mutually exclusive concerns about this strategic dyad. Beijing’s overarching concern relates to perceptions that the US seeks superior conventional (especially counterforce and missile defenses) and nuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct first strikes against China’s comparatively smaller and less diversified nuclear deterrent, thus undermining Chinese retaliatory capability.126 Washington’s principal concern is that Beijing will not eschew the use of its expansive conventional forces and power projection capacity to enforce its claims in regional territorial disputes with its neighbors (i.e., the East and South China Seas), several of whom are US treaty allies (South Korea and Japan), or strategic partners (Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines)—that is, China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities could be used to neutralize US operational conventional capacity to defend its allies and unilaterally alter the status quo in a future regional contingency.127 Further, these divergent threat perceptions and views on strategic stability are complicated by the significant disparities between the two states’ nuclear arsenals—the US and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s total stockpile of nuclear weapons.128', 'The broadening of US-China great-power strategic competition (i.e., trade relations, regional disputes, cyber espionage, and the coronavirus pandemic and general political confrontation) evinces classical “security dilemma” dynamics (see Chapter 4)—that is, both sides perceive the other’s behavior as threatening and respond to secure themselves in ways that can lead to action-reaction dynamics, spirals of mistrust and arms racing, and other destabilizing escalatory behavior.129 Consequently, both sides lack confidence in the other’s willingness to stabilize strategic relations; nor are they incentivized to pursue measures (arms control, build mutual trust, transparency, or display unilateral restraint) to enhance strategic stability.130 Absent commonly held escalation thresholds and a mutual framework to deter either side from violating them, a US-China crisis operating under the assumption that they can effectively control escalation (e.g., in the South China Seas, the Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Straits) would likely increase the risks of inadvertent escalation—because both sides underestimate their ability to prevent a situation spiraling out of control.131', 'According to Avery Goldstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania—who uses deterrence theory to analyze factors leading to first-strike instability in the US-China strategic dyad—Chinese overconfidence in its ability to prevent conventional military confrontation escalating to nuclear war might increase the risk of a conflict or crisis inadvertently or accidentally crossing the nuclear Rubicon.132 Moreover, divergent views of US-China attitudes about controlling escalation below and above the nuclear threshold could also be detrimental to crisis stability. The US defense community is generally more concerned that a low-level conventional conflict might escalate to a nuclear level but is, apparently, less concerned about the ability of the US to control escalation above the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, during a US-China crisis Washington may overstate the possibility that Beijing would use nuclear weapons, and simultaneously understate the scale of a Chinese retaliatory nuclear response.133', 'Furthermore, in a future US-China conflict the US would have a strong incentive to pre-emptively attack China’s mobile missiles and attendant (and likely dual-use) command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to achieve escalation dominance, which Beijing could misperceive as a conventional counterforce attack or, worse, as a precursor to a first nuclear strike.134 Chinese analysts generally assume that the US intends to undermine China’s relatively small nuclear deterrent and attendant support systems with advanced conventional weapons—especially US conventional prompt global strike and missile defenses.135 In short, divergent US-China attitudes about the ability to de-escalate a low-intensity conventional or nuclear conflict makes a conventional conflict more likely to escalate to a high level of intensity.136', 'Managing military (especially inadvertent) escalation risk has not been a traditional feature of Chinese strategic thinking.137 China’s strategic community is believed to share a high level of confidence in the ability of China’s long-standing no-first-use nuclear pledge to control escalation.138 Because Chinese analysts view China’s no-first-use commitment as a de facto firebreak between the use of its conventional and nuclear capabilities to de-escalate a situation, the resultant overconfidence might increase inadvertent escalation risks.139 This overconfidence could make it less likely that Chinese leaders recognize escalation risks caused by miscalculation or misperception of US intentions. China’s sanguine attitude to managing escalation can in part be attributed to the belief that once the nuclear Rubicon is crossed, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be easily controlled by either side. Because of this belief, Chinese analysts do not believe that a limited nuclear war would stay limited. Moreover, China’s operational doctrine does not contain plans to wage a limited nuclear war, which China might pursue if it believed nuclear escalation could be controlled.140', 'Another complicating factor is that new escalation thresholds and operating norms for AI-augmented weapons have yet to emerge. Today’s thresholds in the context of autonomous weapon systems are considered inappropriate and ambiguous.141 Without commonly held operational norms and an adversary’s strategic priorities and political objectives, militaries deploying military AI could inadvertently cross already vague escalation thresholds.142 In 2016, for example, China captured a US underwater drone, asserting that it posed a hazard to Chinese maritime navigation. Washington, in response, called China’s behavior “unlawful,” claiming the drone was a “sovereign immune vessel.”143 This episode ended with China returning the drone after days of diplomatic contention, and demonstrated the potential risk of inadvertent escalation caused by the ambiguities surrounding the deployment of new (and especially dual-use) technology in contested territory between strategic rivals that is considered in Chapter 4. In sum, the combination of first-strike vulnerability and opportunity enabled by a growing portfolio of technologies such as AI for warfighting, coercion, and influence will have significant implications for escalation dynamics in future warfare.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-BlSa-Aff-Northwestern-Round-1.docx

Michigan

BlSa

b9dacf89768fd8f15af64378f8e1cfa148e7dbbbc76b09a46a63a4398ee7100a

“Nuclear forces” refers to all weaponry and infrastructure supporting the use of nuclear weapons.

Brad Roberts et al. 23. Study group chair and Director, Center for Global Security Resarch, Ph.D., Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Prior to this position, he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, March 2023, “China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer,” CGSR Study Group Report, p. 34, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf

U S nuclear forces” refers to delivery platforms weapons support systems command and control assets , and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations

Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and defeating two peers simultaneously? Does the U S have sufficient weapons and will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes? what changes are needed? The term “ nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets , and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed The operationally-deployed component is readily available while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.

U S The term “ nuclear forces” refers to delivery platforms weapons support systems command and control assets military infrastructure

['Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and, if necessary, defeating two near peers simultaneously? ', 'Does the United States have sufficient weapons of the right types, and will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes? If not, what changes are needed? ', 'The term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations. The platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components: those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed. The operationally-deployed component is readily available (immediately or within a few days), while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.']

[(5, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Dartmouth-RR-Round-6.docx

Emory

KeRa

0583e42ce09b59926c0e8509b90f52e2b19d806f18eba1a4eb1f42f0fd804f4c

AND the plan would eliminate counterforce targeting, forcing a shift to retaliatory deterrence that targets enemy cities---extinction

Gavin Baumgart 20, writer on U.S. military strategy at the blog Substitute Materials, 1/27/20, “Countervalue and No-First-Use,” https://substitutematerials.blog/2020/01/27/countervalue-and-no-first-use/

NFU addresses when nuc s will be used, counterforce and countervalue address how counterforce plans to use nuc s against enemy’s nuclear force to prevent launching Countervalue targets citizens and economic base synonymous with city targeting such strategies cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional it involves a threat that isn’t credible under countervalue you lose all leverage by actually using weapons NFU requires countervalue and counterforce work best when they are first-strike Under NFU counterforce is useless enemy already launched weapons you would be trying to destroy only targets remaining are major cities The problem N F U comes packaged with countervalue NFU REQUIRES threat of slaughter of hundreds of millions nuclear winter ” that could destroy civilization is only possible through countervalue since cooling is caused by smoke in cities

force structure includes the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal yield of those weapons, delivery vehicles communications infrastructure, etc second aspect of a state’s nuclear strategy is its doctrine the set of rules that determines when and how its nuclear weapons will be used. NFU, if implemented , would be part of the U S nuclear doctrine that addresses the question of “when Unlike NFU , which addresses the question of when nuc lear weapon s will be used, counterforce and countervalue strategies are elements of doctrine that address how nuclear weapons will be used what their targets will be. A country with a counterforce strategy plans to use its strategic nuc lear weapon s against elements of the enemy’s nuclear force structure to prevent them from launching Countervalue targets what the enemy country values – primarily its citizens and its economic base countervalue targeting is synonymous with city targeting such strategies are inherently flawed, and cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional ones countervalue second-strike strategies have major strategic and moral issues that make them essentially useless for major powers it involves a threat that isn’t credible against either counterforce strategies or even other countervalue strategies. Countervalue strategies deter by making the enemy believe they will be destroyed if they attack unless the targeted country has handed its launch authority over to computers or accidentally allows launches by rogue officers, the attacking country has good reason to believe the targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons If, next Tuesday, the US decided to launch a strike against China’s ~300 nuclear weapons, and was 95% successful, what would the PRC do with its 15 remaining weapons? nothing . Once the attacker launches the logic of the countervalue targeting strategy is flipped on its head; why would the Chinese use their small remaining arsenal to retaliate against US cities if the Americans could rain down even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities? it never makes sense to use your weapons for their intended purpose, even AFTER you’ve been attacked! under a countervalue targeting scheme, you lose all coercive leverage by actually using your weapons . Countervalue targeting is theoretically effective because the enemy’s cities are “hostages” that you can threaten with destruction if you are attacked. If the Chinese used their 15 remaining weapons to destroy the 10-15 largest American cities, what would stop the Americans from telling China “if you don’t surrender and use your entire economy to rebuild the U S we’ll destroy 1 of your cities at random per week until you do”? Nothing the PRC killed its American “hostages ”. The Americans now have nothing to lose, and the Chinese everything! NFU requires a countervalue strategy , and counterforce strategies work best when they are first-strike Under NFU strategy, counterforce nuclear targeting is useless the enemy has already launched the weapons you would be trying to destroy or disable! The only targets remaining are the enemy’s major cities Even if the enemy had only launched a relatively limited counterforce strike, it’s very unlikely that they would have left you with the command/control infr astructure or intelligence/surveillance resources to land whatever warheads you still had on their remaining nuclear weapons counterforce targeting requires a first-use strategy NFU If paired with the current counterforce policy, we’ll be launching our weapons once it was far too late . If we switched to a countervalue policy, our arsenal will be nearly useless at deterring attack First strikes obviously escalate crises and create a lot of risk for millions of people The problem comes when considering that a N o F irst U se pledge comes packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy NFU REQUIRES the threat of indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of millions of innocent civilians Anyone who has seen examples of the ghastly Cold War charts estimating civilian war dead, or has read accounts of firebombing of German and Japanese cities should be immediately horrified by the prospect of aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities the much-feared “ nuclear winter ” that could destroy human civilization is only possible through countervalue targeting , since the cooling is caused by smoke and dust from firestorms in major cities hit by nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous devices ever created and should be treated with extreme caution regardless of how exactly you deploy them. This caution must not come in the form of reflexive decisions based on what appears at first glance to be “less aggressive

force structure doctrine NFU, if implemented U S when nuc s how targets nuc s prevent launching Countervalue citizens and its economic base city targeting cannot prevent nuclear conflicts threat that isn’t credible the targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons nothing even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities? U S killed its American “hostages NFU requires a countervalue strategy first-strike useless already launched the weapons only targets remaining major cities counterforce targeting requires a first-use strategy launching our weapons once it was far too late nearly useless at deterring attack N F U packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy NFU REQUIRES firebombing of German and Japanese cities aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities much-feared “ nuclear winter destroy human civilization only possible through countervalue targeting

['At the beginning of 2019, Democratic presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren introduced the No First Use Act to the Senate, which contained only one sentence: “It is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first”. That summer, she tweeted a similar sentiment, saying (in part), “The U.S. is not going to use nuclear weapons preemptively, and we need to say so to the entire world”. Since this is essentially the only time, at least in this race, that a presidential candidate has made a public statement about nuclear strategy, I think this is a good opportunity to discuss the basics of nuclear doctrine and to take a look at the policy of No First Use (NFU).', 'Broadly speaking, there are two related but distinct things that need to be looked at to understand a state’s nuclear strategy. The more tangible of the two is what I would describe as force structure, or the physical aspect of a country’s nuclear force. This includes the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the yield of those weapons, delivery vehicles (missiles, submarines, airplanes), communications infrastructure, etc. Since this post is not primarily about force structure, I won’t be going into detail about any of these things. Instead, I’ll simply note that force structure should be determined by doctrine.', 'The second aspect of a state’s nuclear strategy is its doctrine. A country’s nuclear doctrine is the set of rules that determines when and how its nuclear weapons will be used. NFU, if implemented, would be part of the United States’ nuclear doctrine that addresses the question of “when”. It’s an extremely simple rule – a nuclear version of “do not fire unless fired upon”. The US would not be the first country to implement such a rule; NFU is currently part of China’s and India’s nuclear doctrines, and was briefly part of the Soviet Union/Russia’s doctrine.', '===COUNTERFORCE VS COUNTERVALUE===', 'Unlike NFU, which addresses the question of when nuclear weapons will be used, counterforce and countervalue strategies are elements of doctrine that address how nuclear weapons will be used – specifically, what their targets will be. A country with a counterforce strategy plans to use its strategic nuclear weapons against elements of the enemy’s nuclear force structure to prevent them from launching their nuclear weapons. Countervalue, as the name suggests, targets what the enemy country values – primarily its citizens and its economic base. In practice, countervalue targeting is synonymous with city targeting.', 'The case for countervalue targeting is simple – the mere possibility of apocalyptic levels of destruction should be enough to stop an adversary from committing aggression that may lead to a nuclear war. If you were the USSR, for example, would you willingly attempt to conquer West Germany and France if it meant entering into a general nuclear war with the United States in which tens of millions of your own citizens would be killed over the course of a few hours, and the survivors were left to inhabit an impoverished and irradiated wasteland? Advocates for countervalue strategies would argue that the answer to this question is “obviously not” – in fact, Robert Jervis, a well-known advocate for a small nuclear force with a countervalue doctrine, wrote a book entitled “The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution” in which he argues that military competition between great powers is essentially over because of nuclear weapons.', 'While it would be great if the above picture was true, and we could do away with international conflict for the low, low price of a few hundred nuclear warheads per state, such strategies are inherently flawed, and cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional ones, but that’s the topic of a future post). In fact, countervalue second-strike strategies have major strategic and moral issues that make them essentially useless for major powers.', 'The primary strategic issue with a countervalue targeting strategy is that it involves a threat that isn’t credible against either counterforce strategies or even other countervalue strategies. Countervalue strategies deter by making the enemy believe that they will be destroyed if they attack. But unless the targeted country has handed its launch authority over to computers or accidentally allows launches by rogue officers, the attacking country has good reason to believe that the targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons.', 'It’s easy to see why this is the case, especially if the attacker has a counterforce strategy. Let’s take as an example the United States and China, who have counterforce and countervalue strategies, respectively. If, next Tuesday, the US decided to launch a strike against China’s ~300 nuclear weapons, and was 95% successful, what would the PRC do with its 15 remaining weapons? The answer is simple: nothing. Once the attacker launches its weapons, the logic of the countervalue targeting strategy is flipped on its head; why would the Chinese use their small remaining arsenal to retaliate against US cities if the Americans could rain down even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities? In my mind, this is the primary failure of countervalue targeting strategies; it never makes sense to use your weapons for their intended purpose, even AFTER you’ve been attacked!', 'A related problem is that under a countervalue targeting scheme, you lose all coercive leverage by actually using your weapons. Countervalue targeting is theoretically effective because the enemy’s cities are “hostages” that you can threaten with destruction if you are attacked. If, in the above scenario, the Chinese used their 15 remaining weapons to destroy the 10-15 largest American cities, what would stop the Americans from telling China “if you don’t surrender and use your entire economy to rebuild the United States, we’ll destroy 1 of your cities at random per week until you do”? Nothing – the PRC killed its American “hostages”. The Americans now have nothing to lose, and the Chinese everything!', 'Of course, this doesn’t mean that it’s sensible to attack nuclear weapons states with countervalue strategies willy-nilly – computer errors do occur, militaries could sometimes have rogue officers, and the intense stress created by crisis situations could lead political leaders to do things that are not in their country’s best interest. In that sense, having a countervalue strategy is probably better than having nothing at all, because it introduces risk into an attacker’s calculus. Keep in mind, however, that countries with these strategies are incentivized to both exaggerate how much these factors matter and to do everything in their power to stop them from actually mattering. China, for example, will try its hardest to convince US policymakers and academics that its officers in the strategic rocket forces would launch their missiles in a patriotic fervor, consequences be damned, if the US were to attack. Behind the scenes, however, there is little doubt that the PRC is trying very hard to ensure that that couldn’t happen. China has traditionally taken a very conservative approach to its nuclear weapons, and there could be no greater nightmare for Beijing than a situation in which they’ve lost control of their own forces in a way that could lead to the destruction of their own country.', '===NFU AND TARGETING DOCTRINES===', 'You likely noticed in the previous section that I mentioned NFU alongside countervalue targeting, and counterforce targeting alongside first-strike strategies. This wasn’t arbitrary – NFU requires a countervalue strategy, and counterforce strategies work best when they are first-strike. The reasons for both of these are simple.', 'Under a NFU strategy, counterforce nuclear targeting is useless – the enemy has already launched the weapons that you would be trying to destroy or disable! The only targets remaining are the enemy’s major cities, leaving you with a massive pile of useless ordinance for the reasons outlined above. Even if the enemy had only launched a relatively limited counterforce strike, it’s very unlikely that they would have left you with the command/control infrastructure or intelligence/surveillance resources to land whatever warheads you still had on their remaining nuclear weapons. A counterforce targeting strategy, therefore, requires a first-use strategy – you may save a few small-medium sized cities by destroying reserve weapons stockpiles and other infrastructure after an initial launch, but for the most part, once the enemy launches its weapons, the game is up.', 'It’s probably clear at this point why I think NFU is not a policy that the United States should adopt. If paired with the current counterforce policy, we’ll be launching our weapons once it was far too late. If we switched to a countervalue policy, our arsenal will be nearly useless at deterring attack. Strategic considerations are not the only reason, however, to reject countervalue targeting.', '===WORLD TARGETS IN MEGADEATHS===', 'For some, NFU isn’t about strategy at all. Rather, they believe that strategies that involve a first-strike are simply immoral. How could it be right for a country to attack another with little or no warning using the most powerful and terrifying weapons the world has ever seen? This argument has been around for a long time, and has become more popular alongside the growing movement to abolish nuclear weapons. In many ways, I’m sympathetic to this argument. First strikes obviously escalate crises and create a lot of risk for millions of people.', 'The problem, however, comes when considering that a No First Use pledge comes packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy for the reasons stated above. While I don’t think this terminology is as euphemistic as some others do, I think it’s worth being explicit about what that means: NFU REQUIRES the threat of indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of millions of innocent civilians. This is why I find it somewhat surprising that people on the left side of the political spectrum, such as Warren, are the primary cheerleaders for such a doctrine. How could people who believe that it is immoral and undemocratic to launch a surprise attack not believe that it is immoral and undemocratic to kill hundreds of millions of people? Perhaps they simply don’t understand the basics of nuclear strategy (reasonable for normal people, TERRIFYING for a presidential candidate), or maybe they are content with having an ineffective nuclear force if it means not compromising their principles (but if this was the case, why would they advocate for NFU rather than abolition?).', 'Anyone who has seen examples of the ghastly Cold War charts estimating civilian war dead, or has read accounts of Hiroshima, Chernobyl, or the firebombing of German and Japanese cities should be immediately horrified by the prospect of aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities. If you care about having a moral foreign policy, it’s hard to see how leaving half a billion Chinese citizens burned alive, irradiated, crushed by debris, or simply starving wouldn’t cancel out all of the good your policies would do before or after such an action.', '===CONCLUSION===', 'In terms of Warren’s endorsement of the policy, I’m conflicted. On one hand, I think NFU is one of the worst policies ever presented to the American people, and I’m fairly disturbed that a major presidential candidate has publicly declared it as her policy. On the other hand, I appreciate that Senator Warren has is at least discussing nuclear issues publicly. The issues pages for Biden, Sanders, and Buttigieg contain no references to nuclear weapons whatsoever. Given the fact that the primary job of the President is commanding the nation’s military to keep Americans safe from attack, and that nuclear weapons are the most important aspect of that military, it’s disappointing to see most of the candidates ignore the issue entirely. Despite producing a Nuclear Posture Review that included many good policies in 2018, the Trump administration doesn’t appear willing or able to follow through with most of those policies. It seems that the best we can hope for in this election cycle is for the security situation in the West Pacific not to decline fast enough that nuclear strategy becomes relevant in the next 4-5 years.', 'Looking back at this blog’s first post, it should be clear by now that a NFU pledge violates at least goals #1-4 of the nuclear force (more to come about #5!). It violates #2 and #4 through strategic impotence, and #1 and #3 due to the fact that it involves threatening to kill a LOT of people. In fact, the much-feared “nuclear winter” that could destroy human civilization is only possible through countervalue targeting, since the cooling is caused by smoke and dust from firestorms in major cities hit by nuclear weapons.', 'I don’t mean to say that all counterforce first-strike strategies are perfect. The details of any strategy matter almost as much as its broad outlines. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous devices ever created and should be treated with extreme caution regardless of how exactly you deploy them. This caution, however, must not come in the form of reflexive decisions based on what appears at first glance to be “less aggressive”. It must instead come as a set of policies crafted after a great deal of thought and considerations of goals, capabilities, known off-target effects, and uncertainty.', '']

[(6, 17)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Texas-Open-Octas.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

613dbdf479487adeb4dd9bb98e78c0ac8813da68e23cf48b6d1c871a58a348d1

Unilateral antitrust will be manipulated AND perceived as protectionist---that shatters co-op and is the nail in trade’s coffin---only prior harmonization avoids the link

Allison Murray 19, JD from the Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Law School, BS in Business Administration from the University of Redlands, Judicial Law Clerk at the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Former Corporate Paralegal at Boeing, Degree in Economics and Management from the University of Oxford, “Given Today's New Wave of Protectionism, is Antitrust Law the Last Hope for Preserving a Free Global Economy or Another Nail in Free Trade's Coffin?”, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Volume 42, Number 1, 42 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 117, Winter 2019, Lexis

compartmentalization breed protectionist views . Unless there is a paradigm shift antitrust will be wielded to affect trade countries use antitrust to meet protectionist aims risk to thwart trade is exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and divisive rhetoric antitrust has potential to weaken the delicate cooperative framework that exists likely manipulated making it a nail in trade's coffin

compartmentalization of states can breed protectionist political views . Unless there is a paradigm shift Some amount of protectionism is inevitable antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term individual countries may use domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims antitrust laws are at risk of being used to thwart free trade . That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade antitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints , making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade's coffin

compartmentalization protectionist political views Unless there is a paradigm shift Some amount inevitable can will wielded meet protectionist aims thwart free trade exacerbated perceptions unfair enforcement divisive rhetoric weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework manipulated serve protectionist viewpoints become a nail in free trade's coffin

['VI. CONCLUSION', 'There is a clear "conflict between the evolving economic and technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing compartmentalization of the world political system composed of sovereign states . . . ." 196 This conflict can breed protectionist political views. Unless and until there is a complete paradigm shift away from protectionism, which is impossible, the global economy will not meet the "rational" assumptions necessary to preserve free market efficiency.', 'Some amount of protectionism is inevitable. Although "inefficient" in economic and academic circles, protectionism preserves the sovereign powers enjoyed by certain countries. In this way, it is a necessity of free [*146] trade. This paper is not intended to be a commentary on whether protectionism is right or wrong, but rather a demonstration and prediction that antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term.', 'While attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of the web of international trade agreements currently in existence, individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims, especially given that an international authoritative body governing the use of antitrust does not exist. Countries serious about preserving free trade may cooperate with one another to adopt realistic economic policies that serve to dull the blade of antitrust law through regional agreements, but ought not to attempt to eliminate it altogether.', "Antitrust law, like medicine, must be used appropriately to be effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade, as promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders. In this way, antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade. Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric fueling the current political landscape, antitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade's coffin, instead of the key to its preservation. It may be a nail that nations are able to ignore for the sake of its benefit, or it may be the one that finally puts an end to the pursuit of truly international free trade. Only time will tell, but one thing is clear: anti-trust law is a field that will impact the international economic community significantly for years to come."]

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Harvard-Round5.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Harvard-Round5.docx

d3d4679a3d1054d2b414bca991689c3b9f418f9abf45ee1535d3bac2d516ea03

Permanent missions to disarmament fora ensure there’s sufficient capital already ready, waiting, and compartmentalized for the plan

Jaworek 8-2-23 [Patricia Jaworek, member of the Young Deep Cuts Commission, organized by the Arms Control Association, “A Call for Meaningful Disarmament Diplomacy as Required by Article VI of the NPT,” statement at the 10th NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, 8-2-2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/NGO-Statement-10th-NPT-PrepComm]

the U S is ready to engage in diplomacy with NPT including China n uclear disarm diplomacy “ compartmentalized ” and not hostage to other matters Biden supports “new multilat arms control efforts

Progress is not only necessary, but it is possible Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the U nited S tates is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with other nuclear-armed members of the NPT ), including China Sullivan suggested that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the U S is ready to engage now we agree that n uclear disarm ament diplomacy must be “ compartmentalized ” and not held hostage to demands on other matters Now is the time to begin a serious dialogue focused on a new arms control and disarmament framework there is scope for the White House Biden supports “new multilat eral arms control efforts ,” involving all five nuclear-armed members of the NPT So far, the P5 Process has been positive, but it has underperformed. If it is to make a serious contribution to the implementation of the NPT, all five participants must elevate their commitment to the dialogue and be prepared to take on significant commitments Nuclear risk reduction strategies are fundamental but they are not a substitute for progress on arms control and disarmament

Biden's National Security Advisor Sullivan Sullivan agree compartmentalized not other matters Biden

['Progress is not only necessary, but it is possible.', "On June 2, President Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including China France, and the U.K., “without preconditions.”", "Sullivan was critical of Russia's suspension of New START but also noted that “Russia has publicly committed to adhere to the treaty’s central limits.”", 'He said: “It is in neither [U.S. or Russian] interests to embark on an open-ended competition in strategic nuclear forces,” and the United States is “prepared to stick to the central limits as long as Russia does."', 'With New START due to expire in 2026, Sullivan suggested that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.” Given the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons, we agree that nuclear disarmament diplomacy must be “compartmentalized” and not held hostage to demands on other matters.', 'On June 5, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russia remains open to dialogue with the United States on arms control. He described Sullivan’s comments as “important and positive,” but said Russia wants to learn more about the proposal through formal diplomatic channels. To date, however, the two sides have not agreed to engage in such a dialogue. ', 'Now is the time for the two sides to begin a serious dialogue focused on a new arms control and disarmament framework before 2026, when New START will expire and when the next NPT Review Conference will be held.', "The negotiation of a complex, bilateral nuclear arms control framework to replace New START would be difficult in good times and extraordinarily difficult so long as Russia's war on Ukraine continues.", 'Nevertheless, there is scope for the White House and the Kremlin to reach a unilateral, reciprocal arrangement that neither will exceed the deployed strategic warhead limit set by New START until a more permanent arms control arrangement comes into effect. This would contribute to a more stable international security environment and improve conditions for overdue progress on multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament.', 'In the absence of such a U.S.-Russian arrangement before New START ends, each side could upload more warheads on their strategic delivery systems quickly, and China might decide to accelerate its ongoing strategic nuclear buildup. Avoiding such a scenario is in the national security interests of all nations.', 'Sullivan also said that U.S. President Joe Biden supports “new multilateral arms control efforts,” involving all five nuclear-armed members of the NPT. “We’re under no illusions that reaching risk reduction and arms control measures in that setting will be easy. But we do believe it is possible,” he said. Sullivan proposed that all five states agree on greater transparency on nuclear doctrines, more effective crisis communications channels, common rules for missile launch notification, and policies to keep “humans in the loop” for command, control, and use of nuclear weapons.', 'We believe that all five can and should immediately reaffirm and update the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which pledges they will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.” It requires that “if at any time there is the risk of a nuclear conflict [each side] shall immediately enter into urgent consultations…to avert this risk.”', 'So far, the P5 Process has been positive, but it has underperformed. If it is to make a serious contribution to the implementation of the NPT, all five participants must elevate their commitment to the dialogue and be prepared to take on significant commitments and refrain from making any and all kinds of threats of nuclear weapons use for any reason.', 'Nuclear risk reduction strategies are fundamental but they are not a substitute for progress on arms control and disarmament. Risk reduction measures cannot erase the tensions that can lead to nuclear war, they cannot remove the inherent dangers of nuclear deterrence policies, nor can they prevent dangerous forms of qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms racing. ', 'Now is the time for leaders of non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society groups to demand that all five NPT nuclear-armed states engage in good faith efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in keeping with their solemn NPT Article VI obligations.', '']

[(0, 7), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoLe-Aff-8---NDT-Round-1.docx

MichiganState

KoLe

eedc9fd03a743e36a77fd4fa21e02dbb77245944a9ee27ad31abe416b9967622

Filing data proves.

Joanna C. Schwartz 20, Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, “Qualified Immunity and Federalism All the Way Down”, Georgetown Law Journal, 109 Geo. L.J. 305, December 2020, Lexis

the "dominant perception was that "cases flood the courts." however Eisenberg and Schwab, after examining evidence , concluded "[ n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent litigation explosion

the "dominant articulated perception of constitutional tort litigation" was that "cases flood the federal courts." Note, however , that Eisenberg and Schwab, after examining the evidence , concluded that "[ n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent civil rights litigation explosion

flood examining the evidence n]ational filing data myth

['Concerns about increased government liability were in the air during the 1970s and 1980s. During that period, the "dominant articulated perception of constitutional tort litigation" was that § 1983 "cases flood the federal courts." The Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action against state and local government officials under § 1983 in 1961, and the number of civil rights filings increased from several hundred to tens of thousands in the years between 1961 and 1979. This expansion in federal civil rights filings and liability corresponded with a collapse of the insurance market for municipal liability coverage. As John Rappaport has described, municipal liability insurance was widely available from the 1960s to the mid-1970s. Then the market contracted, with [*323] premiums doubling between 1974 and 1976, and many jurisdictions were left uninsured by 1977. After a few years of improvement, there was another decline in the early 1980s.', '[FOOTNOTE] Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 645 (1987); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("There is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being appended to complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions where \'civil rights\' of any kind are at best an afterthought."); Federalism and the Federal Judiciary: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 5-13 (1984) (statement of John D. Ashcroft, Att\'y Gen. of Missouri) (explaining that § 1983 filings against police officers "skyrocket[ed]" from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, growing "in the thousands of percentage increase[s]"); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge\'s Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORD. 557, 563, 567 (arguing that the "deluge" of § 1983 cases from 1960 to 1971 and the Court\'s decisions that "substantially expand[ed] section 1983\'s subject matter jurisdiction" have "placed additional burdens on federal courts"). Note, however, that Eisenberg and Schwab, after examining the evidence, concluded that "[n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent civil rights litigation explosion." Eisenberg & Schwab, supra, at 695. [END FOOTNOTE]']

[(10, 21)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Texas-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

a86bbda569b14c5a06c3d79b1cc8189d01e774931e2e6a81948be7f16df877c6

Warming causes extinction—US is key.

Fuchs 18 - (Michael H Fuchs, Senior Fellow @ The Center For American Progress, A Former Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State For East Asian and Pacific Affairs And A Guardian Us Contributing Opinion Writer; 11-29-2018, Guardian, "The ticking bomb of climate change is America's biggest threat," 8-29-2021) url: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/29/ticking-bomb-climate-change-america-threat

Climate change threaten to end life on earth short term climate change make the world dangerous resource scarcity cause wars nuclear war is lower risk no other challenge matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause policymakers need every policy tool When the US leads by example emissions fall and diplomatic doors open

Imagine that US leaders were told that hundreds of nuclear weapons were set on a timer to detonate across the planet The lives of millions would be upended , if not made impossible to survive , by transformed weather patterns and resource scarcity . Tens of millions would become migrants as regions became uninhabitable . Millions would d ie , more and more as time went on. Climate change is a ticking time bomb, literally threaten ing to end human life on earth in the short er term , climate change will make the world far more dangerous . report estimates that climate change could drive 140 million people to move climate change could reduce the size of the US econ omy by 10% – more than twice as bad as the worst part of the Great Recession Growing resource scarcity could cause more wars . There is no greater national security threat than climate change . Even the specter of nuclear war between great powers is a much lower risk than climate change Every year we fail to act the problem grows , and the solution becomes more difficult . climate change is sparking a slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust . no other challenge – not the rise of China , Russian aggression , terrorism , nor some other future geopolitical peril – will matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause or suffer from them US policymakers will need to use every policy tool in their toolbox When the US leads by example , domestic emissions will fall , and new diplomatic doors to more ambitious climate action will open

hundreds of nuclear weapons detonate millions upended impossible to survive transformed weather patterns resource scarcity Tens of millions migrants uninhabitable Millions would d ie more more Climate change threaten to end human life on earth short term dangerous 140 million people move US econ 10% twice as bad Great Recession resource scarcity more wars There is no greater national security threat than climate change specter of nuclear war much lower risk fail to act problem grows solution more difficult slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust rise of China Russian aggression terrorism future geopolitical peril humans won’t survive cause suffer policymakers every policy tool leads by example domestic emissions will fall new diplomatic doors more ambitious

['', 'Imagine that US leaders were told that hundreds of nuclear weapons were set on a timer to detonate across the planet, progressively and in increasing numbers, over the coming years and decades. The lives of millions would be upended, if not made nearly impossible to survive, by transformed weather patterns and resource scarcity. Tens of millions would become migrants as regions became uninhabitable. Millions would die, more and more as time went on. If this science fiction were reality, US leaders would lead an international effort to immediately disarm and dismantle the weapons.', 'But this isn’t science fiction. Climate change is a ticking time bomb, literally threatening to end human life on earth over the coming centuries. As climate journalist Peter Brannen describes it, Earth faced a similar crisis hundreds of millions of years ago during the “Great Dying” when volcanoes spewed so much carbon dioxide into the air – including magma that blanketed an area as large as the lower 48 US states, 1km deep – that it almost killed all life. Today, Brannen says, “we’re shooting carbon dioxide up into the atmosphere 10 times faster than the ancient volcanoes”.', 'Even in the shorter term, climate change will make the world far more dangerous. A World Bank Group report estimates that climate change could drive 140 million people to move within their countries’ borders by 2050. A report by the Trump administration finds climate change could reduce the size of the US economy by 10% – more than twice as bad as the worst part of the Great Recession – by 2100. Growing resource scarcity could cause more wars. Deadly and destructive extreme weather events such as Hurricanes Harvey and Maria and California’s Camp fire are mild symptoms of the plague to come.', 'There is no greater national security threat than climate change. Even the specter of nuclear war between great powers – the only thing that could remotely mimic the effects of climate change over time – is a much lower risk than climate change, which is already happening.', 'Every year we fail to act the problem grows, and the solution becomes more difficult. As America dithers, climate change is sparking a slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust. If the world fails to urgently mitigate climate change, no other challenge – not the rise of China, Russian aggression, terrorism, nor some other future geopolitical peril – will matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause of these threats or suffer from them.', 'America’s failure is not for lack of capacity to safeguard against future threats – the US invests hundreds of billions of dollars every year in defense to deter adversaries such as Russia and China, and tens of billions more in intelligence capabilities to monitor threats. Instead, America is paralyzed by a lack of political will. Donald Trump and his allies in Congress – many of whom deny the existence of climate change – are making the problem worse. The president announced his intent to withdraw the US from the Paris climate agreement and is rolling back regulations that would have cut emissions.', 'Despite this dark reality, there is reason for hope. In 2015, the world came together to negotiate the Paris agreement, which set the goal of limiting global temperature increases to well below 2C. Despite a hostile Trump administration, many US governors, mayors, businesses and private citizens are already leading the way. So are other countries as they seize the economic and public health opportunity that comes with a clean energy future.', 'The path ahead, to say the least, is daunting. Even if the US were not to leave the Paris climate agreement, the action required to realize its potential is enormous. US policymakers will need to use every policy tool in their toolbox to drive unprecedented deployment of clean energy and build out zero-carbon transportation infrastructure. When the US leads by example, domestic emissions will fall, and new diplomatic doors to more ambitious climate action will open.', '', '', 'PIC—']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-FullerTown-Round6.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-FullerTown-Round6.docx

8ddffb0ab5a7d8d8043eeebe6a0bd4eca328d5bac5e0e513b3042fa4444a71b0

Failure spills over to great power conflict.

Dr. Jim Golby 21, Senior Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, PhD in Political Science from Stanford University, and Dr. Peter D. Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Director of the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University, “Biden Inherits a Challenging Civil-Military Legacy”, War on the Rocks, 1/1/2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/biden-inherits-a-challenging-civil-military-legacy/

geopolitical environment is not benign must navigate great-power conflict instability in the Middle East prolif terrorism , failed states , and ethnic rivalries He will navigate tricky waters early slate is welcome initial weeks will be of particular importance setting the tone neglect impose costs evident when a crisis takes stage

C m r exist to provide effective national security policies in a geopolitical environment Unfortunately, the environment is not benign Biden must navigate intensified great-power conflict , persistent instability in the broader Middle East , strained ties with key allies, and little progress on stubborn problems including: prolif of w m d terrorism , failed states , and ethnic rivalries . And Biden must lead the country out of the pandemic There will be no strategic holiday during which the team can sort through its civil-military affairs He will need all of that advantage — and learn from Obama-era missteps to navigate through tricky civil-military waters caution and humility rather unwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If Austin proves fully sensitive to c m r and savvy he may emerge as the successful sec def the D o D so desperately needs. The early slate is welcome The initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone neglect of the civil-military file would impose intolerable costs down the road — a price that would be vividly evident when a n urgent national security crisis takes center stage . The only prudent course is to attend to policy and process at the same time

C m r geopolitical environment not benign Biden great-power conflict instability in the broader Middle East prolif w m d terrorism failed states ethnic rivalries pandemic no strategic holiday learn missteps navigate through tricky civil-military waters c m r savvy successful sec def D o D welcome initial weeks particular importance setting the tone intolerable costs price vividly evident a urgent national security crisis policy process same time

['Civil-military relationships are not an end in themselves. These relationships exist only to provide effective national security policies in a given geopolitical environment in the context of democratic accountability. Unfortunately, the environment is not benign. As they sort through the civil-military and institutional baggage — the items they bring with them and the items they inherit — Biden’s team must also navigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on all of the other stubborn problems that have bedeviled leaders in the post-Cold War era, including: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational networks of terrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And, of course, Biden must still lead the country out of the worst pandemic in a century while recovering from all of the associated economic upheaval. There will be no strategic holiday during which the Biden team can painstakingly sort through its civil-military affairs.', 'The new commander-in-chief starts with the enormous advantage of being “not Trump.” He will need all of that advantage — and will need to have learned from Obama-era missteps — in order to navigate through the tricky civil-military waters we have described above. Members of the Biden team come in as seasoned professionals, but we hope that leads them to caution and humility rather than unwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If Lloyd Austin wins over the critics and proves himself to be both fully sensitive to these civil-military realities and savvy in how he seeks to overcome them, he may yet emerge as the successful and strong secretary of defense the Department of Defense so desperately needs. The early slate of civilian nominees named for key roles is a welcome sign. The initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone, especially after the tumultuous and stressful transition. Even so, the norm of civilian management of the Defense Department will be more difficult to reestablish, like so many other civil-military norms that have weakened in recent years, if Congress does grant another recently-retired general legal permission to serve as secretary of defense. Biden, and Austin, will need all the top civilian defense talent they can get.', 'Notwithstanding all of the other urgent priorities vying for his attention, neglect of the civil-military file would likely impose intolerable costs on Biden down the road — a price that would be vividly evident, sooner or later, when an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is for the Biden team to attend to both policy and process at the same time — to move out quickly on the pandemic and the economy, while also setting the national security establishment on the path to healthier civil-military relations. Problems in the civil-military foundations of an administration must be fixed before a crisis lays bare the rot that may lie just out of view.']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AvLe-Neg-2---Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-7.docx

Northwestern

AvLe

610cb538173c5890285e3c04fe9e63513701799a40f2ecb8c4b7f5945e69213d

“The USFG should” calls for debates over government action.

Ericson ‘3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

in “The United States should the agent is the subject The verb should urges action should means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur .

each topic contains certain key elements . 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should that urges action For example, should adopt means to put a policy into action though governmental means Propositions of policy deal with future action. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur .

['The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. ', '4 Impacts:']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GeSc-Neg-Wake-Round-1.docx

MichiganState

GeSc

f1382538c3f740eca398a2791dc0c81dc31d630bcc4a484639936af313b25053

Resonant foreign policy criticism causes vote-switching in battleground states

RWS 3-29, global polling and strategic consulting firm, founded in London in early 2020 by Bruno Rodrigues, R&WS Research Team (Redfield and Wilton Strategies, 3-29-2024, “Swing State Voters Reject Isolationism, Support Continued NATO Membership,” https://redfieldandwiltonstrategies.com/swing-state-voters-reject-isolationism-support-continued-nato-membership/)

20 was health and econ 24 is different national security and the role America should play will feature prominently in the coming election in crucial swing states 48% of voters say defense will be extremely important in determining how they vote swing state voters prefer increase spending on armed forces respondents in every swing state polled name China as threat Majorities believe the U S should be a global force overwhelmingly majorities believe the U S should engage in armed missions far from the U S Support is overwhelming policy on national security will receive great scrutiny and be of far more significance than four years ago

Four years ago national security issues were far from the forefront 20 20 was public health and econ omic In 20 24 the context is very different the global security situation has deteriorated appreciably Russia Middle East Taiwan national security and the role America should play in the world will feature prominently in the coming election campaign in crucial swing states 48% of voters say defense will be an ‘ extremely ’ important issue in determining how they will vote in the next Presidential Election swing state voters prefer the US to increase spending on the armed forces respondents in every swing state polled name China as threat Majorities in all six states believe the U nited S tates should be a global force Swing state voters express support for NATO overwhelmingly majorities believe the U nited S tates should be engage d in armed missions far from the U S these results point to an American electorate which is not as polarized on defense matters as some suggest nor as isolationist Support for the US acting as a global force for good is overwhelming voters support increases in defense spending This nuance is critical ahead of an election campaign in which policy on national security and will receive far great er scrutiny and be of far more significance than was the case four years ago

20 health econ 24 very different Russia Middle East Taiwan feature prominently election campaign crucial swing 48% extremely important determining vote swing state voters increase spending China threat all six U S global force NATO overwhelmingly majorities U S engage armed missions U S nor as isolationist overwhelming policy national security receive far great er scrutiny more significance four years ago

['Four years ago, when American voters last faced a decision about who should be their President, defense and national security issues were far from the forefront of their minds. Instead, the 2020 Presidential Election contest was fought amidst a public health crisis and an economic crisis', 'In 2024, the context in which the current election is being fought is very different. While the world still wrestles with the economic fallout from the pandemic, the global security situation has deteriorated appreciably. ', 'Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked the biggest land war in Europe since World War II, the Middle East is once again ablaze in conflict, and Taiwan continues to be menaced by the threat of invasion from an increasingly belligerent China. America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, meanwhile, invited questions about America’s willingness and ability to meet its commitments to its allies, questions which remain unresolved.', 'As a result, national security, the condition of America’s armed forces, and the role America should play in the world will all feature far more prominently in the coming election campaign than they did in 2020.', 'To see how Americans view these, and other, national security and defense-related issues, we at Redfield & Wilton Strategies, in partnership with The Telegraph, recently polled 5,010 voters in the crucial swing states of Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.', 'For a start, our poll finds that between 39% and 48% of voters in these six states say defense will be an ‘extremely’ important issue in determining how they will vote in the next Presidential Election. ', 'When responses for all issues are averaged for the number of respondents in all six states who rate the issue as ‘extremely’ important, that places defense eighth out of nineteen issues listed, behind the likes of abortion (44%-50%), taxation (38%-49%), and policing/crime (39%-50%), but ahead of issues such as the job market (37%-48%), the Supreme Court (37%-43%), and the housing market (38%-41%).', 'The Biden Administration earns net approval ratings for its performance on defense from as low as -16% in Arizona to as high as a neutral 0% in Florida. ', 'This range in approval ratings is higher than the range in the Administrations’ ratings on issues such as foreign policy (-20% to -4%) and immigration (-27% to -16%), but lower than its ratings on issues like the economy (-9% to +1%) and healthcare (+1% to +10%).', 'When asked who between Joe Biden and Donald Trump they trust more on defense, pluralities in all six states polled select Donald Trump. Between 42% and 49% select Trump, while only between 31% and 35% select Biden, suggesting a lead on this issue that is larger than Trump’s overall voting intention lead.', 'While the Republican Party also leads the Democratic Party in all six states when voters are asked which party voters trust more on national security and defense, the gap is narrower than is the case between the two party’s figureheads.', 'Between 40% and 45% most trust the Republican Party on national security and defense, against between 34% and 38% who most trust the Democratic Party.', 'Regarding spending on the armed forces, most swing state voters would prefer the US Government to increase defense spending, even at the cost of reducing spending elsewhere.', 'Between 48% and 56% would prefer the US to increase spending on the armed forces, at the cost of less spending on other programs. Conversely, between 25% to 30% would instead prefer the US to decrease spending on the armed forces, to the benefit of more spending on other programs.', 'Donald Trump’s 2020 voters are particularly more likely to prefer increased defense spending.', 'Pluralities of respondents in every swing state polled name China as the country which represents the greatest threat to the United States and its interests, with Russia the second most common choice. ', 'Notably, among 2020 Biden voters in all six swing states, Russia is the most common choice, though to a lesser extent to which China is the most common choice among 2020 Trump voters.', 'When it comes to identifying America’s closest ally, the United Kingdom is named by a majority of voters in Arizona (55%) and by pluralities in Florida (46%), Georgia (37%), North Carolina (46%), and Pennsylvania (46%).', 'Canada is the most frequent choice for voters in Michigan (44%) and is the second choice of voters in the other five states. Germany (16%-28%), France (17%-21%) and Israel (13%-20%) are also common choices.', 'Majorities in all six states believe the United States should seek to be a global force for good, while around a third (32%-36%) think the United States should only seek to defend itself from direct threats. ', 'While the view that the US should seek to be a global force for good is overwhelmingly held by Biden 2020 voters (57%-68%), it is also a view shared by a majority or plurality of Trump 2020 votes in five of the six states polled.', 'Swing state voters express overwhelming support for America’s continued membership of NATO, with support ranging from between 68% (Georgia) and 73% (North Carolina).', 'Fewer than 10% of voters in all six states polled oppose the United States being a member of the alliance.', 'Around two-thirds (61%-67%) of voters believe the United States should stay in NATO, while only between 12% and 16% think it should leave the alliance.', 'Since 2014, NATO members have agreed to commit 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense spending. This target was reaffirmed by alliance members in 2023.', 'Pluralities of voters in all six swing states believe the 2% target is ‘about right.’ Between a fifth and a quarter (21%-24%) think that target is too low, while 8%-14% think that it is too high.', 'In the wake of Donald Trump’s recent comments suggesting that he would not defend a NATO member state that did not meet its 2% commitment to defense spending, most swing state voters believe the US should be committed to NATO allies defense regardless of their defense spending. ', 'Majorities of voters in Florida (52%), Pennsylvania (51%), and Georgia (50%) think the US should be committed to the defense of NATO allies regardless of whether they have met the 2% target. Pluralities of voters in Arizona (46%), Michigan (48%), and North Carolina (48%) also agree with this position.', 'Conversely, around one-third (29%-36%) believe the US should not be committed to the defense of NATO allies who haven’t met the 2% target. This view is disproportionately held by Trump 2020 voters, including by a majority of Trump voters in Arizona (52%) and pluralities in Michigan (39%), North Carolina (44%), and Pennsylvania (43%).', 'However, there is general agreement with the proposition that Europe is too reliant on the United States for its military defense.', 'Majorities of voters in Arizona (51%) and Pennsylvania (50%) hold this view, as do pluralities in the other four states polled. Majorities of Trump 2020 voters in all six states agree, as do pluralities of Biden 2020 voters in five of the six states. Only between 11% and 18% disagree.', 'In response to the Houthi’s campaign to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, the US and her allies are currently waging a campaign of airstrikes against the group in Yemen, a campaign which attracts the support of between 53% and 58% of respondents, depending on the state.', 'More broadly, overwhelmingly majorities (68%-74%) believe the United States should be engaged in armed missions far from the United States to help preserve freedom of navigation at sea, a position which the United States has used to justify naval operations in the Taiwan strait.', 'Taken together, these results point to an American electorate which is not as polarized on defense matters as some commentary may suggest nor as isolationist. ', 'Support for the US acting as a global force for good is overwhelming, as is support for continued membership of NATO. In the global context of an increasingly troubled international situation, most voters also support increases in defense spending, even at a cost to other government programs.', 'This nuance is critical to understand ahead of an election campaign in which the candidates’ respective policy proposals on national security and defense matters will receive far greater scrutiny and be of far more significance than was the case four years ago. ', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-9---NDT-Round-2.docx

Kansas

MaPa

a5be148480a45e7d5418222ed03da6014b9605d030d93fbd4852435de8e99fab

Democrats are in agreement on the need for quick reform.

Chris Knight 1-11. Writer for Argus Media, a UK-based consulting firm specializing in energy and commodity markets. "US oil sector sees chance to overhaul permitting". Argus Media. 1-11-2023. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2408608-us-oil-sector-sees-chance-to-overhaul-permitting

divided government gives us a chance to build consensus around reform officials see support by Democrats including Biden as a promising sign for permitting advancing this year . Rogers applauded recognition by Democrats of the need There is a bipartisan recognition to actually get permitting reform done

divided government gives us a real chance to build consensus around meaningful reform , Democrats led by Manchin made some progress on permitting the bill was thwarted by a lack of Republican support officials see the support by Democrats including Biden as a promising sign for permitting advancing this year . Republicans intend to advance their own permitting bill out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee Rogers said although she had concerns she applauded the recognition by Democrats of the need for permitting legislation . There is a bipartisan recognition and now we'll go to work on the details to actually get permitting reform done ,"

divided government real chance build consensus meaningful reform support by Democrats including Biden promising sign permitting advancing this year Republicans Rogers applauded recognition Democrats of the need permitting legislation bipartisan recognition go to work actually get permitting reform done

['Oil and gas companies have spent years pushing for legislation to revise permitting laws they say are delaying needed energy infrastructure, without success. But pent up bipartisan demand for faster permitting and the makeup of Congress have given top industry officials optimism for legislative action on permitting in 2023.', '"It won\'t be easy, but divided government gives us a real chance to build consensus around meaningful reform," American Petroleum Institute president Mike Sommers said today at his group\'s annual State of American Energy event.', 'Pipelines, energy projects on public land, LNG export facilities, electric transmission lines and other energy projects often have to navigate a labyrinth of time-consuming permitting requirements. For larger projects, permitting can take years, particularly if there are challenges from residents and environmentalists.', 'Democrats led by US senator Joe Manchin (D-West Virginia) last year made some progress on permitting through a bill that focused on electric transmission lines for renewables and approving the delayed $6.6bn Mountain Valley natural gas pipeline. Although the bill was thwarted by a lack of Republican support, oil industry officials see the support by Democrats — including President Joe Biden — as a promising sign for permitting advancing this year.', "Republicans intend to advance their own permitting bill out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which is chaired by Cathy McMorris Rogers (D-Washington). Rogers said although she had concerns with Manchin's bill, including its handling of local input on electric transmission, she applauded the recognition by Democrats of the need for permitting legislation.", '"There is a bipartisan recognition and now we\'ll go to work on the details to actually get permitting reform done," Rogers said at the industry event.']

[(6, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi

ea7c3c4e403fdcb553dd18a78d85e5be07b06295654f7a937304efcf9a0fd9fa

Independently, moving away from the consumer welfare standard increases inflation

Bork 9/8 – Robert H. Bork, president of the Washington-based Antitrust Education Project, “Biden's antitrust demagoguery will drive inflation, not cure it,” 9/8/21, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/571009-bidens-antitrust-demagoguery-will-drive-inflation-not-cure-it

Biden blam inflation on market concentration to shift antitrust from consumer welfare back to bigness antitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs technology and economies of have been making food more affordable because of economies of scale the cost was taking less out of budgets breaking up Big Ag could rais food prices The abandonment of consumer welfare will lead to higher prices

Biden is neatly dovetailing its push for aggressive antitrust enforcement by blam i ng inflation on big business and market concentration It drives the policies to shift antitrust enforcement from the consumer welfare standard back to bigness a political diversionary tactic would perversely do the opposite of what he claims to do antitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs expensive technology and economies of scale have been making food steadily more affordable because of these economies of scale the cost of food was taking less out of household budgets . breaking up Big Ag could have the disastrous effect of rais ing food prices The abandonment of the consumer welfare standard will lead to higher prices

blam i ng inflation on big business and market concentration bigness raise the prices of basic needs more affordable disastrous effect of rais ing food prices higher prices

['The Biden administration, finally beginning to worry about the political impact of the rising cost of food, fuel and other basic consumer necessities, is neatly dovetailing its push for aggressive antitrust enforcement by blaming inflation on big business and market concentration.', 'Politically speaking, it is a neat fix. It drives one of the central policies of the Biden administration — to shift antitrust enforcement from the consumer welfare standard of the past 45 years back to an earlier era’s more nebulous standard against “bigness.” And it deflects blame for inflation.', 'President Biden lacks the theatrical flourish of a Huey Long, but he is nevertheless trying out his best version of the Kingfisher routine. “I’ve directed my administration to crack down on what some major players are doing in the economy that are keeping prices higher than they need be,” Biden said in August. The cause of higher prices, he argued, is greedy big business and its stranglehold on the American consumer.', 'It is clear what drives White House anxiety. Food prices have risen about 3.4 percent from last year. After years of low gasoline prices, Americans now pay above $3 a gallon in most parts of the country. Biden is tasking Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan with targeting Big Ag and Big Oil for antitrust action to drive down prices for consumers.', 'If left unchallenged, the Biden administration may succeed in diverting some heat over rising inflation. Large corporations are not in good order with voters on both the left and right. The president cannot be allowed, however, to use a political diversionary tactic that would perversely do the opposite of what he claims to do: Biden’s antitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs for consumers. ', 'Let’s start with food prices and Big Ag. ', 'Two University of Idaho economics professors, Philip Watson and Jason Winfree, wrote in The Idaho Statesman that larger farms and agricultural companies, which have the capital to invest in expensive technology and economies of scale, actually have been making food steadily more affordable. It is precisely because of these economies of scale that the cost of food, until the disruption of the pandemic, was taking less out of household budgets. The professors conclude that “breaking up Big Ag could have the disastrous effect of raising food prices, which would likely have a disproportionate impact on poorer households.” ', 'If the Biden approach to agriculture and food is demagogic, its approach to oil and gas is risible. The current increase in gasoline prices results from the supply chain disruption caused by the pandemic, exacerbated by recent hurricanes and storms. It also may be partly because of the unrelenting hostility of the Biden administration to American energy, putting public lands off limits, killing the Keystone XL pipeline and using regulation to harass the fracking industry, despite the fact that cleaner-burning natural gas has helped reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions. Technological advances led the United States to surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia in 2018 to become the world’s leading producer of oil. Biden’s antitrust policy also may be contributing to the sudden reversal of this energy glut. It was out of antitrust concerns that Berkshire Hathaway pulled out of a major natural gas pipeline deal earlier this year.', 'What has been the Biden administration’s response to recent shortages? It has not been to stimulate production at home or to help clear pipeline bottlenecks. Instead, national security adviser Jake Sullivan issued a statement pleading with OPEC and Russia to come to our rescue. OPEC demurred and Russian President Vladimir Putin used Sullivan’s entreaty to issue a humiliating “nyet.”', 'The real cause of inflation, of course, is recovery from a pandemic and the temporary economic depression it caused. It also might be driven by the reckless spending by presidents and Congresses of both parties. Our national debt is now 125 percent of our gross domestic product — higher than the previous high in 1946, when we won a victory over Germany and Japan rather than losing a war to the Taliban.', 'Blaming Big Ag and Big Oil for high prices will be popular. It also will be perverse. The abandonment of the consumer welfare standard will, if anything, lead to higher prices in both food and fuel for those least able to pay for it.']

[(0, 4), (5, 8)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Gutierrez-Gonzalez-Neg-Harvard-Round3.docx

Dartmouth

GuGo

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/GuGo/Dartmouth-Gutierrez-Gonzalez-Neg-Harvard-Round3.docx

8e2af23e1d5609db07886ca00144102c5f7c417efe65bb12a308e4b09bd3cbbf

Growing FDI protectionism also thumps.

Davis ’21 [Naomi; February 2; FDI consultant at Investment Monitor, with expertise in location benchmarking and cross-border investment; Investment Monitor, “The rise of protectionist FDI regulations,” ; KP]

global rise of FDI protectionism governments establishing screening offers protectionist policies US protectionist strengthened CFIUS EU toughened investment regimes FIL ushering new era for foreign investment protectionist trend exacerbated following Covid

global rise of foreign direct investment FDI protectionism growing number of countries are reconsidering what constitutes a threat to their national security or public interest an increasing number of governments are establishing FDI screening mechanisms database offers overview of these protectionist policies US is leading protectionist FDI regulations FIRRMA was signed into law by Trump and became fully effective in February 2020 act strengthened and modernised CFIUS to handle national security concerns EU’s protectionist path the EU had been outlining protectionist measures pre-pandemic . Regulation (EU) 2019/452 became fully operational in October 2020 regulation raise concerns related to specific investments EU countries toughened investment regimes following the adoption of the regulation China’s Foreign Investment Law ( FIL ) came into force on 2020, ushering in a new era for its foreign investment regime FIL expanded the scope of China’s national security review to include transactions between two foreign entities if there is a Chinese company involved protectionist trend has been exacerbated following Covid with a raft of temporary amendments introduced by countries worldwide to protect companies from foreign takeovers

global rise FDI protectionism growing screening mechanisms protectionist policies US leading protectionist FIRRMA strengthened CFIUS protectionist path pre-pandemic raise concerns EU countries toughened FIL new era foreign investment expanded scope protectionist trend exacerbated Covid protect foreign takeovers

['A country establishing foreign investment laws to protect its national security is nothing new. However, in line with the global rise of foreign direct investment (FDI) protectionism, an ever-growing number of countries are reconsidering what constitutes a threat to their national security or public interest. As a result, an increasing number of governments are establishing FDI screening mechanisms, expanding the range of sectors subject to them, and lowering the thresholds for investments that require prior approval. Investment Monitor’s FDI regulations database offers a general overview of these protectionist policies from country to country as well as the restrictions that have been implemented in relation to Covid-19.', 'The US’s anti-China policies', 'The US is one of the leading proponents of protectionist FDI regulations. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) was signed into law by then-president Donald Trump in August 2018 and became fully effective in February 2020. The act strengthened and modernised the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to handle national security concerns more effectively. Although no explicit reference about China is made in FIRRMA’s provisions, the primary objective of the act is to give the CFIUS greater visibility into Chinese investment in the US.', 'The EU’s protectionist path', 'Similarly, the EU had already been outlining protectionist measures pre-pandemic. Regulation (EU) 2019/452, the first set of EU-level rules aimed explicitly at FDI, was first adopted in March 2019, and became fully operational in October 2020. The regulation created a cooperation mechanism for member states and the European Commission to exchange information and, if necessary, raise concerns related to specific investments. While the regulation does not replace FDI screening measures within the member states, it aims to encourage cooperation, information sharing and transparency regarding FDI control. Several EU countries, among them Germany, Austria and France, have already toughened their investment regimes following the adoption of the regulation, while others including the Czech Republic, Denmark and Ireland are preparing draft bills that will soon be enacted into law.', 'New era for Chinese FDI regulations', 'China’s Foreign Investment Law (FIL) came into force on 1 January 2020, ushering in a new era for its foreign investment regime. The FIL expanded the scope of China’s national security review to include transactions between two foreign entities if there is a Chinese company or Chinese interests involved. As per rules published in December 2020, a body for security reviews will also be established and headed by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce. In addition, in December 2020, the Market Access Negative List was released, which outlines the industries that are either restricted or prohibited from both foreign and domestic investment. While the 2020 list features eight fewer restricted sectors than in 2019 (123 down from 131 in the previous edition), investors in industries such as agriculture, mining and financial services will still face restrictive measures.', 'The impact of Covid-19', 'This protectionist trend has been exacerbated following the Covid-19 outbreak, with a raft of temporary amendments introduced by countries worldwide to protect vulnerable companies from opportunistic foreign takeovers. Numerous countries, including the UK and Japan, implemented measures to protect domestic life sciences companies while Australia made all foreign takeover proposals, regardless of sector or monetary value, subject to up to six months’ scrutiny. As the pandemic rages on in many parts of the world and economic recession looms, it remains to be seen which countries will loosen, extend or make permanent these changes.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Neg-texas-Round3.docx

Michigan

AgHs

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgHs/Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Neg-texas-Round3.docx

02572567c1d1f8d10740893ee59e206347b5d7fae7c66078e6e6707e8666b9f6

Startups are doing fine---the pandemic created fertile ground for innovation.

Greg Rosalsky 21, Reporter at NPR, M.A. in Economics and Public Policy from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, “What America's Startup Boom Could Mean For The Economy,” NPR, 06-29-2021, https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/06/29/1010229557/what-americas-startup-boom-could-mean-for-the-economy

despite pandemic and recession America seeing a boom in startups reshuffling how and where we work created opportunities undeniably good news a rocket ship to a better economy forced the business world to embrace tech

despite a deadly pandemic and an ugly recession America was seeing a boom in the creation of new startups this wasn't just a blip." applications for new businesses snapped forward like a slingshot we have been reshuffling how and where we work that created all sorts of opportunities for entrepreneurs It's brought a bounty to businesses you interact with on a screen the boom is undeniably good news this is about way more than just a pendulum swing : it's a rocket ship to a better economy the pandemic forced the business world to drop outdated ways of doing things and embrace tech nology in a new way.

America was seeing a boom in the creation of startups this wasn't just a blip." the boom is undeniably good news : it's a rocket ship to a better economy tech

['Back in November, the Planet Money newsletter reported that — despite a deadly pandemic and an ugly recession — America was seeing a boom in the creation of new startups. We spoke with University of Maryland economist John Haltiwanger, one of the leading scholars of business formation. Now Haltiwanger has a new study out, and the trend is clear: "The surge continues," Haltiwanger says. "We\'re now convinced this wasn\'t just a blip."', 'Like so many other areas of the economy, applications for new businesses pulled back in the first half of 2020 but then snapped forward again like a slingshot. Not only was 2020 the best year on record for new business creation since the Census Bureau began tracking it in 2004, but applications for new businesses have continued to soar, through at least last month. In May, there were a half a million applications for new businesses; the second highest month on record, below only last July. In total, there have been more than six million filings for new businesses since the pandemic began. The boom can be seen in both businesses composed of only one self-employed person and businesses that the Census expects will employ multiple people.', "Over the last year and half, we have been reshuffling how and where we work and shop; and that shift has created all sorts of opportunities for entrepreneurs. With the pandemic, it's like someone ripped out an irrigation pipe for brick-and-mortar commerce and plugged it into virtual commerce. It's brought a drought to face-to-face businesses, and a bounty to businesses you interact with on a digital screen. The retail sector alone, driven by e-commerce, accounts for about a third of all the new startup growth. In addition, trucking, warehousing, and delivery services are all seeing surges — which makes sense, as we've seen a massive shift of spending on in-person services to tangible goods that are bought online.", 'We\'ve also seen the rise of remote work and a reshuffling of the population, from city centers to suburbs, and from traditional job centers to "Zoom Towns." Where people go, they bring their dollars. It may help explain why the food and accommodation sector is the greatest area of growth. We\'ve also seen huge growth in the types of businesses that can provide remote services.', "There are at least two potential theories for what's going on. First, while the boom is undeniably good news, there is a slightly negative take: we've seen a surge in new businesses mainly because the pandemic forced two painful restructurings to the economy. It began by ravaging the face-to-face economy and creating an awkward marketplace where we could only do stuff six feet apart. This suffocated many existing businesses while providing oxygen for others, such as online retailers, video conferencing apps, drive-thrus, delivery services, mask and sanitizer companies, and the like. Yet, many of these new opportunities for pandemic-friendly businesses may prove to be only temporary. Many of them could die as we head back to normal.", "Now that most of us are vaccinated, we're releasing the pressure cooker of our pent-up demand for going out. It's leading to the second major restructuring: new businesses — restaurants, bars, salons and so on — are growing out of the ashes of the businesses scorched by the pandemic. This is great news! It's better than no new businesses. But it's possible that we're now just heading back to normal, as opposed to something new and better. Think of it like the economy doing a pendulum swing from a normal economy to a pandemic economy and back to a normal economy again.", "It's hard to completely rule out this Negative Nancy take. We don't have many details about what exactly the new businesses created during the pandemic are doing, or how big they're gonna get. More importantly, we still don't have great data on how many and what kinds of businesses died over the last year, and whether these new businesses are merely just filling the massive hole created at the beginning of the pandemic. The data suggests the biggest surges occurred at the beginning and tail ends of the pandemic, which is consistent with the idea that this was a pendulum swing.", 'But Haltiwanger offers a second, more optimistic theory, which says this is about way more than just a pendulum swing: it\'s a rocket ship to a better economy. As painful as the pandemic has been, he believes it has forced the business world to drop outdated ways of doing things and embrace technology in a new way. "I don\'t think any of us had a clue that we could do so much business activity remotely," Haltiwanger says. "That sparks all kinds of new ideas."']

[(5, 13), (14, 16)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Stockstill-Weinhardt-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx

Kentucky

StWe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/StWe/Kentucky-Stockstill-Weinhardt-Neg-Texas-Round5.docx

05ef2a78ba186f159bd1ff2c3248bce32e6a332f851202966fb77d4abe4e9be2

Nuclear assurance is incredible for Seoul.

Jennifer Lind & Daryl G. Press 23, Associate Professor, Government, Dartmouth College. Faculty Associate, Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University; Director, Initiative for Global Security, Dickey Center for International Understanding. Professor, Government, Dartmouth College, "South Korea’s Nuclear Options," Foreign Affairs, 04/19/2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/south-koreas-nuclear-options-north-korea-deterrence.

nuc balance on the Peninsula U.S. cities in the cross hairs at risk New York and L A U.S. nuc commitment is increasingly founded on promises unlikely to be kept Mere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul

observation was fundamentally correct The nuc lear balance on the Korean Peninsula is changing in profound way U.S. cities will be in the cross hairs during any war In the past Washington could use the threat of a U.S. nuclear response to deter North Korea because it would be Seoul and Busan at risk rather than New York and L os A ngeles the U.S. nuc lear commitment to South Korea is increasingly founded on promises that are unlikely to be kept Mere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul

fundamentally nuc lear balance Korean Peninsula profound cross hairs past U.S. nuclear response North Korea Seoul Busan New York L os A ngeles South Korea increasingly unlikely Mere reassurance Seoul

['The problem is that Yoon’s observation was fundamentally correct. The nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula is changing in a profound way. Thanks to North Korea’s development of long-range nuclear capabilities, U.S. cities will soon be in the cross hairs during any war on the peninsula. In the past, Washington could use the threat of a U.S. nuclear response to deter North Korea from using nuclear weapons against the South, because in a worst-case scenario, it would be Seoul and Busan at risk rather than New York and Los Angeles. But North Korean missiles will soon be able to reach the entire United States—forcing U.S. policymakers to consider how much they wish to wager on behalf of their ally. As a result, the U.S. nuclear commitment to South Korea is increasingly founded on promises that are unlikely to be kept in the case of a crisis. Mere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul, and the United States and South Korea need to update their strategy for nuclear deterrence on the peninsula.']

[(9, 15), (25, 33)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-BiGa-Aff-Mukai-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

BiGa

55e9707043744e44a3425efd572b6800b104e58e2b98afcc9c3290b48b4a96ed

Whereas NFU policies are against a specific country.

Takahara 20, Communications Officer, Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Satoko Takahara, June 17, 2020, “Policy Recommendation: Japan's Contribution to Global Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, https://www.spf.org/en/spfnews/information/20220729.html)

No First Use is a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country However leaves open option of retaliating in the event the other uses first

Terminology (1) No First Use ( NFU ) No First Use is a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country in an armed conflict. However , it leaves open the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event that the other country uses nuclear weapons first

NFU a policy not using another country leaves open retaliating event the other first

['Terminology', '(1) No First Use (NFU)', 'No First Use is a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country in an armed conflict. However, it leaves open the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event that the other country uses nuclear weapons first. The concept of NFU encourages nuclear disarmament, and if all nuclear-weapon states, including the nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) agree to it and establish a global NFU regime, the role of nuclear weapons would be limited to deterring other nuclear-weapon states from using them as well. China has declared an unconditional NFU since its successful nuclear test in October 1964 that it will not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-7---Texas-Round-6.docx

Kansas

MaPa

702aace6a0fc3da9a7371128a520b1db19e89eee92e83b48809e43a5fac285ff

Stimulating innovation through companies isn’t enough---AI leadership requires government support.

Lee ’18 [Kai-Fu; 2018; Venture capitalist, technology executive, writer, and artificial intelligence expert, Ph.D. from Carnegie Melon University; AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order, “A Tale of Two Countries,” Ch. 4]

bringing AI to the economy can’t be companies alone it requires policy accelerated by government support China’s is growth through a flood of funding subsidies startups and contracts The plan incent s innovation China’s utilitarian approach will accelerat deployment and plant seeds of growth . It’s self-perpetuating

But bringing AI ’s power to bear on the broader economy can’t be done by private companies alone it requires an accommodating policy environment and can be accelerated by direct government support the Chinese central government released a sweeping blueprint for Chinese leadership in AI China’s AI plan is turbocharging growth through a flood of new funding , including subsidies for AI startups and generous government contracts to accelerate adoption The plan has shifted incent ive s for policy innovation Behind these efforts lies a core difference in American and Chinese culture: while America’s combative system aggressively punishes missteps in funding technological upgrades, China’s techno- utilitarian approach rewards proactive investment and adoption the Chinese approach will have the impact of accelerat ing deployment , generating more data, and plant ing the seeds of further growth . It’s a self-perpetuating cycle that runs on digital data, entrepreneurial grit and political will

bringing AI ’s power can’t be done private companies accommodating accelerated direct government support central government sweeping blueprint turbocharging growth new funding subsidies startups government contracts shifted incent ive s policy innovation core difference combative missteps techno- utilitarian investment adoption accelerat ing deployment plant ing the seeds further growth self-perpetuating cycle

['But bringing AI’s power to bear on the broader economy can’t be done by private companies alone—it requires an accommodating policy environment and can be accelerated by direct government support. As you recall, soon after Ke Jie’s loss to AlphaGo, the Chinese central government released a sweeping blueprint for Chinese leadership in AI. Like the “mass innovation and mass entrepreneurship” campaign, China’s AI plan is turbocharging growth through a flood of new funding, including subsidies for AI startups and generous government contracts to accelerate adoption. ', 'The plan has also shifted incentives for policy innovation around AI. Ambitious mayors across China are scrambling to turn their cities into showcases for new AI applications. They’re plotting driverless trucking routes, installing facial recognition systems on public transportation, and hooking traffic grids into “city brains” that optimize flows. ', 'Behind these efforts lies a core difference in American and Chinese political culture: while America’s combative political system aggressively punishes missteps or waste in funding technological upgrades, China’s techno-utilitarian approach rewards proactive investment and adoption. Neither system can claim objective moral superiority, and the United States’ long track record of both personal freedom and technological achievement is unparalleled in the modern era. But I believe that in the age of AI implementation the Chinese approach will have the impact of accelerating deployment, generating more data, and planting the seeds of further growth. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle, one that runs on a peculiar alchemy of digital data, entrepreneurial grit, hard-earned expertise, and political will. To see where the two AI superpowers stand, we must first understand the source of that expertise.', '', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Rutgers%20RR-Round3.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Rutgers%2520RR-Round3.docx

e849702f030382d782fe1d07e977a4cef1a06b4d5ba1dd1ec97adc7e6f74de42

And undermines democracy.

David Gindis and Abraham A. Singer 22. David Gindis, a senior lecturer in economics at Hertfordshire Business School, University of Hertfordshire, and Abraham A. Singer, an assistant professor of management at Loyola University Chicago. "Why the Campaign Against Corporate Personhood Is Misguided". https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2022/02/08/why-the-campaign-against-corporate-personhood-is-misguided/

we doubt the remedies are appropriate despite intuitive appeal the abolitionist cause is misguided personhood is a feature of nonbusiness organizations including small companies coop s nonprofits worship municipalities and states that enable society to function all of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets contract or access courts if corporate personhood were abolished personhood is vital for collective action providing democratic empowerment seeking to abolish corporate personhood is ill-conceived The debate should focus on which rights not corporations as rights-bearing persons

Critics argue that giving business corporations unwarranted constitutional protections entrenches corporate power at the expense of democracy corporate abolitionism While we agree that ex cessive corporate power poses a danger we doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate despite intuitive appeal the abolitionist cause is misguided corporate abolitionism is motivated by three concerns: a concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; and a concern for the priority of humans These Arguments Are Misguided The Plutocracy Rationale conjures up images of big business abusing rights corporate personhood is a feature of a large array of business and nonbusiness organizations including small companies coop erative s nonprofits places of worship municipalities and states that enable a modern society to function all of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets contract or access the courts if corporate personhood were abolished It ignores the societal and political benefits of corporate personhood which is vital for collective action providing an indispensable vector for democratic empowerment corporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and nothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same complement of rights as humans. the strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived The debate should focus on which rights The problem is not that corporations are seen as rights-bearing persons . The problem is that the extension of rights to corporations is easily taken too far.

corporate abolitionism we doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate the abolitionist cause is misguided Misguided including small companies coop erative s nonprofits places of worship municipalities states modern society to function abolished societal political benefits of corporate personhood vital for collective action democratic empowerment the strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived which rights

['Considerable controversy has surrounded the Supreme Court’s sharply divided decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Critics argue that giving business corporations unwarranted constitutional protections entrenches corporate power at the expense of democracy by putting legal fictions on the same political plane as human beings. The powerful intuitions and normative concerns underpinning these objections are captured in familiar slogans, such as “End Corporate Rule,” “Corporations Are Not People,” and “We the People, Not We the Corporations.”', 'Rallying around such catchphrases is a broad social movement demanding that rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood be abolished (see here). Support for these proposals – that Susanna Ripken appositely labels “corporate abolitionism” (see here), because, like the abolitionists of the 19th century, the movement frames its cause as an issue of human rights – has spread among local governments, state legislatures, and federal lawmakers.', 'While we agree that excessive corporate power poses a danger to the the functioning of modern democracies, like Kent Greenfield (see here) and others, we doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate. To explain why, our new paper identifies and reconstructs three partially overlapping but analytically distinct justifications for corporate abolitionism, which we express in general terms, independently of specific Supreme Court decisions or policy debates.', 'By showcasing the implicit philosophical logic underlying the three arguments against corporate personhood, we give them their strongest articulation and render them more scrutable to normative critique. We conclude that, despite their intuitive appeal, their various limitations show why the abolitionist cause is misguided. We offer a different way of thinking about the problem of corporate power, one that does not rely on abolishing the corporate person.', 'Three Arguments Against Corporate Personhood', 'We call the three basic arguments against corporate personhood the Plutocracy Rationale, the Absurdity Rationale, and the Distinctiveness Rationale. The Plutocracy Rationale stems from the fear that conceiving of corporations as bearers of constitutional rights reinforces the immense economic advantages they already derive from their legal personhood, thereby facilitating intolerable and ever-growing inequality in social and political power. The normative underpinning here is broadly speaking egalitarian in orientation. Corporate personhood ought to be abolished because the consequences are offensive to the egalitarian commitments inherent to a democratic society.', 'The Absurdity Rationale expresses the view that, because corporations are not conscious, living agents, corporate personhood must involve a category mistake. Since even lawyers and judges acknowledge that it is a legal fiction, to base our political understandings of rights on such sophistry is to invite inanity into society. The underlying objection here is that law ought to be scrutable and understandable to those subject to it. Because corporate personhood is nonsensical, it is illegitimate and therefore must be eliminated.', 'The Distinctiveness Rationale derives from the concern that if corporate personhood remains, we will be forced to put corporations on the same constitutional footing as us. By treating corporations the same as we do humans, we dilute the political and moral value of our own humanity. The objection here has a Kantian flavor. Since corporations are merely means to human ends, not ends in themselves, they are not, and should not, be considered as equal in normative standing.', 'In sum, corporate abolitionism is motivated by three concerns: a concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; and a concern for the priority of humans in our schemes of normative justification. Abolitionists argue that corporate personhood offends one or more of these values and, consequently, that some aspect of social justice or morality requires that we abandon this legal institution. We critically evaluate and respond to each objection in turn.', 'Why These Arguments Are Misguided', 'The Plutocracy Rationale conjures up images of big business abusing the rights intended for individuals. The focus on large business corporations downplays the fact that corporate personhood is a feature of a large array of business and nonbusiness organizations (including small private companies, cooperatives, nonprofits, political parties, universities, places of worship, municipalities, and states) that enable a modern society to function, all of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets, contract with one another, or access the courts if corporate personhood were abolished. It also ignores the societal and political benefits of corporate personhood, which we argue is a vital tool for collective action, providing an indispensable vector for democratic empowerment.', 'In assuming that person and human being are synonymous, the Absurdity Rationale misunderstands the legal notion of personhood. We demonstrate that law’s “person” is abstract and disconnected from biological, metaphysical, or moral considerations (see also here). The distinction between the legal personhood of human beings and that of corporations cannot be that the former is natural and therefore legitimate, while the latter is artificial and hence illegitimate. Both are artificial in the same sense that other legal institutions are. To refer to “corporate persons” may seem counterintuitive, but it is not incoherent or absurd.', 'The problem with the Distinctiveness Rationale is that it lumps all kinds of constitutional rights together and fails to acknowledge that the assignment of some rights (for example, those meant to limit government overreach) does not need to rest on the presence or absence of human qualities. As we show, corporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and, importantly, nothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same complement of rights as humans.', 'In sum, the strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived. The debate should instead focus on which rights corporations should or should not be granted. The problem is not that corporations are seen as rights-bearing persons. The problem is that the extension of rights to corporations is easily taken too far.', '']

[(6, 16), (28, 37)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeLo-Aff-Georgetown-Round-7.docx

Emory

HeLo

edeb3d78c7df36299d12a7c219367451085b0e6f4a5e785032f425dc31a0f7f2

1. Only warming kills everyone.

McDonald ‘19 (Samuel Miller McDonald is a writer and geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition; 1/4/19; “Deathly Salvation”; The Trouble; https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation)

nuclear exchange does not result in apocalyptic loss of life . Nuclear winter is based on shaky science . There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would make humans extinct . Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuc s . humans can survive and recover from war, even a nuclear one . Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change . Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event ; warming is.

nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life . Nuclear winter is based on shaky science . There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct . Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuc lear device s . humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one . Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change . Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event ; six degrees of warming is.

apocalyptic loss of life Nuclear winter shaky science no reliable model how many megatons decimate agriculture extinct 2,476 nuc lear device s survive recover from nuclear one cannot recover runaway climate change not inevitable extinction event six degrees of warming is.

['A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Lee-Woodcock-Aff-wayne%20state-Round4.docx

Kansas

LeWo

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/LeWo/Kansas-Lee-Woodcock-Aff-wayne%2520state-Round4.docx

2a4076cf904a35581b59e4892d5535dd321673f7fe3a0a217b8a9fcf642cf67b

Their intersectional analysis fails to explain the global contours of capitalism – spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial, but coming to this conclusion requires understanding the spatial organization of capital.

Ferguson & McNally 15 – Susan Ferguson, Assistant Professor of Journalism at Wilfrid Laurier University; David McNally, political science lecturer at York University Toronto [“Social Reproduction Beyond Intersectionality: An Interview,” Viewpoint Magazine, October 31, http://tinyurl.com/gt7ecy4]

theoretical analysis is always connected to movements to grapple with race sexuality and ability we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting oppressions “intersected” intersectionality tends to flounder at explaining why oppressions exist and are reproduced accounting for the how of their interaction emphasizing spatial organization of capitalist reproduction the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial to consider reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon

we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground Part of our experience has to do with our involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s Participation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women to grapple much more seriously with race and racialization and sexuality and ability – as constitutive dimensions of class and gender Our support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly important And we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society While intersectionality theory has raised important questions tends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction By emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction , Sue has attempted to take up this challenge by showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones our contribution represents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature this is an especially exciting time for historical materialist work

connected to social movements dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” flounder at explaining why exist and are reproduced the how interaction spatial organization always racialized and colonial take this farther global phenomenon

['\t', 'VP: To conclude: we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground. What were the sites of struggle that prompted you to investigate social reproduction and class formation in the recent past and today? Are there specific experiences you can speak to here?', 'DM and SF: Part of our experience simply has to do with the complex ways in which the left of the 1970s and 1980s struggled in practice and theory to integrate class and gender. Particularly significant for both of us was our involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s. Participation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women. And this raises all kinds of interesting theoretical and strategic questions in which we have both been interested. But especially since the mid-1990s, when we began to work politically in a less dogmatic Marxist environment (especially in the New Socialist network), we increasingly felt the need to grapple much more seriously with race and racialization – and ultimately with sexuality and ability – as constitutive dimensions of class and gender. Our support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly an important part of this story. And we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society.', 'While intersectionality theory has raised important questions, and generated important insights, it tends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction. Because its approach is holistic and unitary, social reproduction theory is, we think, potentially better equipped in these areas. But this requires a lot of work, and a real commitment to learning from the best of anti-racist and anti-colonial theory and practice, in order to overcome some significant shortcomings of early social reproduction theory. By emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction, Sue has attempted to take up this challenge in a couple of essays by showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones. And our joint contribution in the latest Socialist Register represents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature. We think this is an especially exciting and challenging time for historical materialist work in these areas. And the living pulse of real social struggles is likely to keep pushing work in these areas for many years to come.']

[(0, 21)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoSh-Neg-Sunflower-Swing-1-Round-1.docx

Emory

CoSh

499008512ad54a0884ea73c77a1b8d40fc3745c0824c68350083324711fc5077

No LIO impact: China supports it, is a structurally constrained power, and the US is just as bad.

Swaine 21, Director, Quincy Institute East Asia Program, Ph.D., Government, Harvard University (Michael Swaine, April 21, 2021, “China Doesn’t Pose an Existential Threat for America,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/china-existential-threat-america/)

Beijing’s overturning the l i o greatly exaggerated and not existential has little interest in exporting governance Even if Beijing were to the attractiveness would prove limited features are not replicable for countries include high savings state banking and industries party control over sectors and all information such is not sustainable given China’s aging population corruption inequality social safety China’s system been around since the 1980s, no nation adopted U S does not support I C J not ratified U N C L o S many regimes regarding w m d trade climate and pandemics have no connection to liberal values and are supported by Beijing

Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global l iberal i nternational o rder are greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat Beijing has little interest in exporting its governance system Even if Beijing were to attempt to export its approach the actual attractiveness would prove to be highly limited . The features are not replicable for any) countries . These include a high savings rate state -owned banking and state-owned industries party control over key sectors and strong controls over virtually all information such a model is almost certainly not sustainable given China’s aging population , extensive corruption income inequality , inadequate social safety net China’s authoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, no t a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion China’s challenge to the so-called global l iberal i nternational o rder is also exaggerated The U nited S tates does not support the I nternational C ourt of J ustice has not ratified U nited N ational C onvention on the L aw o f the S ea. And many regimes regarding w eapons of m ass d estruction, trade climate change, and pandemics ) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing

overturning l i o greatly exaggerated not existential interest governance Beijing export attractiveness highly limited not replicable savings banking industries sectors virtually all not sustainable aging corruption inequality safety net system around no single nation system challenge l i o U S not I C J U N C L o S w m d trade climate pandemics no liberal per se supported Beijing

['Finally, the latter set of supposedly existential normative or ideological threats consists of many elements, including Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order, Chinese influence operations aimed at U.S. society, the export of China’s political values and state-directed economic approach, and its sale of surveillance technologies and other items that facilitate the rise or strengthening of authoritarian states. These threats all seem hair-raising at first glance. But while significant, they are greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat.', 'Beijing has little interest in exporting its governance system, and where it does, it is almost entirely directed at developing countries, not industrial democracies such as the United States. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese are actually engaged in compelling or actively persuading countries to follow their experience. Rather, they want developing nations to study from and copy China’s approach because doing so would help to legitimize the Chinese system both internationally and more importantly to Beijing’s domestic audience.', 'In addition, the notion that Beijing is deliberately attempting to control other countries and make them more authoritarian by entrapping them in debt and selling them “Big Brother” hardware such as surveillance systems is unsupported by the facts. Chinese banks show little desire to extend loans that will fail, and the failures that do occur are mostly due to poor feasibility studies and the incompetence and excessive zeal of lenders and/or borrowers. Moreover, in both loan-giving and surveillance equipment sales, China has shown no specific preference for nondemocratic over democratic states.', 'Even if Beijing were to attempt to export its development approach to other states, the actual attractiveness of that approach would prove to be highly limited. The features undergirding China’s developmental success are not replicable for most (if any) countries. These include a high savings rate; a highly acquisitive and entrepreneurial cultural environment; a state-owned banking system and nonconvertible currency; many massive state-owned industries that exist to provide employment, facilitate party control over key sectors, and drive huge infrastructure construction; and strong controls over virtually all information flows. Moreover, such a model (if you can call it that) is almost certainly not sustainable in its present form, given China’s aging population, extensive corruption, very large levels of income inequality, inadequate social safety net, and the fact that free information flows are required to drive global innovation.', 'Although China’s combination of economic reform policies and authoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion. There are certainly many authoritarian states and fragile democracies on China’s periphery, but none of them were made that way by China. China’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated. In the first place, it is highly debatable whether in fact a single coherent global order even exists. What observers usually refer to as the “liberal international order” (a relatively recent term) actually consists of an amalgam of disparate regimes with different origins, including international human rights pacts, multilateral economic arrangements, and an international court.', 'The United States certainly plays an important or leading role in many of these regimes. But it did not create and does not drive all global regimes—and in fact does not support some of them, such as the International Court of Justice, and has not ratified some critical pacts such as the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many very important global regimes (e.g., regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trade and investment, climate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing, albeit sometimes more in letter than in spirit.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-4---Wake-Doubles.docx

Kansas

MaPa

62d97f5971d806daac2ad8793ce45a450ecf42ada352e2eeced2a25b8b9931ec

China’s already enforced their side of a mutual NFU---lack of US reciprocation forces them to backslide.

Zhao 22, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Nuclear Program, Ph.D., Science, Technology, and International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology (Tong Zhao, 2022, “China and the International Debate on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Asian Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 205-213, University of Kansas Libraries, Routledge)

For Beijing a NFU conveys an acknowledgment of mutual vulnerability , which China believes is the foundation for stability mutual NFU would reduce their concerns about first strike and allow a more relaxed posture and modest nuclear forces when both sides are confident no one intends to use first neither would worry about occurrence of conflict mutual NFU would amount to mutual no use Under such missile defense should become less of a concern a driving force behind modernization China cares mostly about whether U S among all other states may adopt bilateral NFU with China

China has sought to promote NFU internationally For Beijing , a NFU promise to China conveys an acknowledgment of and commitment to mutual vulnerability , which China believes is the foundation for strategic stability credible mutual NFU commitments would reduce their concerns about nuclear first strike and allow them to adopt a more relaxed nuclear posture and maintain more modest nuclear forces . Furthermore, when both sides are confident that no one intends to use nuclear weapons first , at least in theory neither side would need to seriously worry about the occurrence of nuclear conflict anymore. credible mutual NFU policies would amount to mutual no use policies. Under such missile defense capabilities should become much less of a concern to one’s rival concerns over the other side’s a significant driving force behind current nuclear modernization efforts, including the development of dangerous exotic nuclear weapon platforms In the near-term, China cares mostly about whether the U nited S tates – among all the other nuclear-armed states – may be willing to move toward adopt ing a general NFU policy or a bilateral NFU agreement with China . Washington has been reluctant to do so

sought NFU NFU China commitment vulnerability foundation stability mutual NFU concerns first strike more relaxed posture more modest forces both sides no one use first neither side worry occurrence conflict mutual NFU no use missile defense less concern concerns driving modernization exotic platforms mostly U S willing adopt bilateral China

['Create the Conditions for the International Adoption of NFU', 'China has sought to promote NFU internationally, as a key step to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in more countries and to reduce the risk of nuclear use. For Beijing, if another NWS extends a NFU promise to China, it also conveys an acknowledgment of and commitment to mutual vulnerability, which China believes is the foundation for maintaining strategic stability.23', 'Indeed, if more countries adopt credible NFU policies, it would generate significant international security benefits. Among the major nuclear powers, for example, credible mutual NFU commitments would reduce their concerns about nuclear first strike and allow them to adopt a more relaxed nuclear posture and maintain more modest nuclear forces. Furthermore, when both sides are confident that no one intends to use nuclear weapons first, at least in theory neither side would need to seriously worry about the occurrence of nuclear conflict anymore. In other words, credible mutual NFU policies would amount to mutual no use policies. Under such circumstances, one’s strategic missile defense capabilities should become much less of a concern to one’s rival. Such concerns over the other side’s strategic missile defense capabilities have been a major source of insecurity among these countries and a significant driving force behind current nuclear modernization efforts, including the development of dangerous exotic nuclear weapon platforms.24', 'As discussed above, demonstrating a credible NFU policy is challenging. A key issue is how a country should make this declaratory policy consistent with its actual military capability and posture. In recent decades, China’s nuclear capabilities have expanded considerably with some traditional nuclear postures changed.25 It is publicly pursuing a nuclear triad capability, has developed much more diversified and technologically sophisticated nuclear forces through a comprehensive modernization program, has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technologies to its strategic missiles, has presumably started operating nuclear weapons outside its territory, has invested in advanced theater-range nuclear forces, and has significantly improved the rapid response capabilities of its nuclear forces and reportedly achieved some LOW capacity.26 In March 2021, Mr. Xi instructed the Chinese military to “accelerate the building of advanced strategic deterrent and joint warfare systems,”27 which probably indicates an even stronger wave of nuclear modernization is on the horizon.', 'When China’s nuclear capability was much weaker, there were fewer questions about the credibility of its NFU policy. But as China’s nuclear capabilities become stronger and stronger, the credibility of this policy will be under greater scrutiny. It will increasingly find itself in a similar position to the other nuclear powers as it asks them to adopt NFU: how do they prove their NFU commitment if their rivals suspect their military capabilities provide them with options of (limited) first use? Indeed, if China invites the other NWS to forge a multilateral NFU agreement, what assurances would Beijing seek from these other countries to demonstrate the credibility of their promises?', 'To meet this challenge, China and the other NWS should jointly explore if they can agree on a set of observable indicators as a measure of a credible NFU commitment. These indicators would seek to capture key technical, institutional, organizational, and operational features of a country’s nuclear force that can help reveal how a country seeks to maintain its nuclear capabilities and employ its nuclear forces. If it can be done, this set of indicators would be used to evaluate whether a country’s NFU policy meets the minimal standard of being credible. Even if it turns out to be impossible to agree on a common set of indicators, a joint study and dialogue on this topic would be a good opportunity to build better understandings about each other’s views on NFU, which would be a helpful and necessary step if China, or any other country, wishes to promote the international adoption of NFU.', 'In the near-term, China cares mostly about whether the United States – among all the other nuclear-armed states – may be willing to move toward adopting a general NFU policy or a bilateral NFU agreement with China. Washington has been reluctant to do so, not least due to the concerns of allies like Japan. American regional allies worry that a U.S. NFU policy could embolden Chinese conventional aggression against them. And as China’s conventional military capabilities have rapidly advanced in the Asia Pacific region, these concerns have increased.', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-1---Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Kansas

MaPa

021078fb4a06994636a9f9f87b3b90d5cfad99b1b8e4ed75b441d01402e232e9

“Restrict” isn’t certain---it includes both direct and indirect restraints like the CP.

Robert K. Puglia 92, Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, 3/30/1992, “Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc.,” 2 Cal. 4th 342, 826 P.2d 710, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1088, 92 Daily Journal DAR 4311, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2777

" r estrict may be viewed narrowly to include provisions expressly eliminating or curtailing the term may encompass any provision which has the practical effect of impairing This distinction has been characterized as between direct and indirect restraints A direct restraint by express terms purports to prohibit exercise An indirect restraint arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than restraint but with the incidental result the instrument would restrain

Whether a provision restricts depends upon the breadth of the term " r estrict ." That term may be viewed narrowly to include only provisions expressly eliminating or curtailing At the other extreme, the term may encompass any provision of an instrument which has the practical effect of impairing This distinction has been characterized as one between direct and indirect restraints (restrictions). " A direct restraint is a provision in a deed, will, contract or instrument which, by express terms purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise An indirect restraint arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than restraint but with the incidental result that the instrument would restrain An example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction . Alienation is restricted because the interest, bei ng limited in possible uses , is less marketable than a lease permitting unlimited use

restricts " r estrict ." narrowly expressly eliminating curtailing term may encompass any provision practical effect impairing direct indirect restraints direct restraint express terms prohibit penalize other than restraint incidental result restrain An example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction restricted bei ng limited possible uses

['Whether a given lease provision restricts transfer of a lessee\'s interest within the meaning of the new chapter depends upon the breadth of the term [*369] "restrict." That term may be viewed narrowly to include only those provisions expressly eliminating or curtailing the legal power of transfer. At the other extreme, the term may be viewed to encompass any provision of an instrument which has the practical effect of impairing marketability. (Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests, supra, Restraints on Alienation, § 1111, at pp. 3-4.) This distinction has been characterized as one between direct and indirect restraints (restrictions). CA(13) (13) "A direct restraint on alienation is a provision in a deed, will, contract or other instrument which, by its express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise [****45] of the power of alienation. These provisions may assume a variety of forms. Thus, the conveyance or devise may contain a direction to the effect that the grantee or devisee shall not alienate, or a condition to the effect that if he attempts [**725] [***482] to alienate, his estate shall be subject to forfeiture, or there may be a contract binding on the grantee to refrain from alienation. … An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability …. Ordinarily an indirect restraint does not restrict the power of alienation but only the fact of alienability." (Id. § 1112, at pp. 4-5.) An example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction. Alienation is restricted because the leasehold interest, being limited in possible uses, is less marketable than a lease permitting unlimited use. (See, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing a 13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century Perspective (1988) 40 Baylor L.Rev. 413, 427.)']

[(10, 19)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Aff-78th-National-Debate-Tournament-Octas.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

3497df62ce5ab4f1e8a784ca897988a0afb338403f732715068e3195552ef95a

Surge pricing key to supply chain innovations – aff causes shortages

By Ryan Bourne Evan Scharf Chair for the Public Understanding of Economics at Cato Abolish Price and Wage Controls¶ Economists tend to oppose price controls at the best of times, but the public’s willingness to allow market‐​set prices appears to diminish when emergencies hit.¶ SEPTEMBER 15, 2020 • PANDEMICS AND POLICY¶ https://www.cato.org/publications/pandemics-policy/abolish-price-wage-controls

allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future If suppliers know demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would invest in option ‐ ​ ready supply to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again Allowing prices to adjust makes future shortages less likely . prolonged elevation of demand would have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti ‐ ​ price ‐ ​ gouging laws. Economists have found surge pricing enhances consumer welfare When demand spikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly surging fares not only encourage drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in the future

allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future If suppliers know that demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would be more likely to invest in option ‐ ​ ready supply capacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again Allowing prices to adjust makes future shortages less likely . prolonged elevation of demand for hand sanitizer would have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti ‐ ​ price ‐ ​ gouging laws. Economists have found that surge pricing enhances consumer welfare . When demand spikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly The surging fares not only encourage more drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times when or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in those same conditions in the future .

spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future option ‐ ​ ready supply capacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again less likely would have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti ‐ ​ price ‐ ​ gouging laws. surge pricing enhances consumer welfare . When demand spikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly

['In fact, allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future. If suppliers know that demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would be more likely to invest in so‐\u200bcalled option‐\u200bready supply—capacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again. Allowing prices to adjust today therefore makes future shortages less likely. As it happens, the prolonged elevation of demand for hand sanitizer in particular eventually brought in a host of new suppliers, leading to replenished shelves. But this would have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐\u200bprice‐\u200bgouging laws.', 'We understand this in normal times. Economists have found that surge pricing for companies such as Uber enhances consumer welfare. When demand for drivers spikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly in those particular circumstances from using it. The surging fares not only encourage more drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times when or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in those same conditions in the future.', '', '']

[(8, 14), (295, 297)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeMi-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Emory

HeMi

905f5ded83ed25e2bf06bd2e42d16b149e5090fb5af5a657e0dbcd245112cbd1

They’ll eliminate backlog by 2023---it hinges on a sustained period without new influx.

Robbins ’22 [Becca; March 22; Staff writer, citing statistics on judicial backlogs and quotations from prosecutor Tony Golik; The Columbian, “Clark County court case backlog continues to grow,” https://www.columbian.com/news/2022/mar/22/clark-county-court-case-backlog-continues-to-grow/]

Low crimes were sent to back burner office received funding to hire staff to handle backlog s filings dropped by 40 percent filed 10,000 fewer charges “I’m hopeful that it lasts because what we need is a sustained time back to a normal process ,” court s continue hearings over Zoom Assuming the rollback lasts by 2023 , the backlog will be minuscule , and timely

Low er-level crimes were sent to the back burner while prosecutors focused resources Both the prosecutor’s office and defense received pandemic funding from the A merican R escue P lan Act to hire additional staff to handle the backlog ged filing s Statewide, annual case filings dropped by 40 percent compared with 2017, when 44,734 criminal cases were filed Despite the drop there was only a 14 percent decrease in annual homicide filings and a 28 percent reduction in annual sex crimes One notable drop in case filings was for drug charge s . Prosecutors filed nearly 10,000 fewer drug charges “I’m so hopeful that it lasts this time, because what we really need in the system is a sustained period of time where we can get back to a more normal court process ,” court s continue holding more basic hearings over Zoom Assuming the rollback of COVID precautions lasts by 2023 , the backlog will be minuscule , and justice can be served in a timely manner “I’m optimistic ,”

Low back burner focused pandemic funding A R P additional staff backlog s dropped 40 percent 14 percent 28 percent notable drop drug s 10,000 fewer so hopeful lasts what we really need sustained period normal court process court s basic hearings Zoom rollback COVID by 2023 backlog minuscule timely manner optimistic

['Focusing resources', 'Golik said his office has had to triage the cases referred for charges. Lower-level crimes, such as property crimes, were sent to the back burner while prosecutors focused resources on violent crimes.', 'Both the prosecutor’s office and the indigent defense office received pandemic funding from the American Rescue Plan Act to hire additional staff to handle the backlogged filings. Golik said he hired six new deputy prosecutors focused solely on filing the stale cases. Because of this, he anticipates a spike in those lower-level cases working through the courts.', 'Kimball said he’s seen more people taking plea deals in order to get their cases resolved and serve their prison sentences instead of languishing in the county jail while attorneys prep for trial.', 'Golik said he doesn’t feel there’s been an increase in people taking plea deals because those who have been held in jail during the pandemic are accused of high-level crimes and are facing large prison sentences if convicted. Those accused of lower-level crimes have mostly been released from jail while their case is pending because of federal guidance to limit the spread of COVID-19.', 'Case filings down', 'Statewide, annual case filings dropped by 40 percent compared with 2017, when 44,734 criminal cases were filed in Washington Superior Courts. In 2021, just 26,526 cases were filed statewide. In that time, Clark County saw a 15 percent reduction in annual case filings.', 'Despite the drop in case filings statewide, there was only a 14 percent decrease in annual homicide filings and a 28 percent reduction in annual sex crimes. Both of those are areas Kimball and Golik said they’ve seen a spike in locally.', 'Fairgrieve noted those cases usually take longer to resolve and have many more hearings than lower-level crimes because of the severe consequences of conviction.', 'One notable drop in case filings was for drug charges. Prosecutors filed nearly 10,000 fewer drug charges annually across the state compared with five years ago. Where Washington courts saw 11,085 drug cases in 2017, that number was down to 6,239 in 2020 and dropped to 1,680 in 2021.', 'Drug cases resentenced', 'That drop was partly due to the Washington Supreme Court’s February 2021 ruling that the state’s felony drug possession law was unconstitutional. Local law enforcement officials said after the ruling that they’d no longer take enforcement action for simple possession of controlled substances. But Vancouver police spokeswoman Kim Kapp said the agency would still investigate cases with intent to deliver.', 'Golik said possession of a controlled substance charges accounted for about 700 cases his office would prosecute each year. However, they were usually the fastest cases resolved and were typically fairly simple. Golik said those cases either quickly went to drug court, the person pleaded guilty or any trial would usually last one day.', 'Although they’re no longer charging people with that crime, the court ruling also meant old possession convictions would be vacated and often result in people being resentenced. Golik said that made for a “heavy resource lift,” but he’s hoping to finish reworking those old cases by the end of the year.', 'What now?', 'Local officials find themselves in an all-too-familiar position this month: discussing what pandemic alterations to courthouse operations should remain with the end of the statewide mask mandate and which pieces should go back to how they were before.', '“I’m so hopeful that it lasts this time, because what we really need in the system is a sustained period of time where we can get back to a more normal court process,” Golik said.', 'As COVID-19 mandates come to an end nationwide, Fairgrieve doesn’t anticipate eliminating the remote hearing system. He’s heard strong support from courthouse stakeholders to continue holding more basic hearings, such as first appearances and arraignments, over Zoom. However, he expects changes of plea and sentencing hearings to shift back to in-person so that people can get a more personal sense of closure from cases.', 'Kimball said he hopes those accused of crimes get more face time soon.', '“I feel like defendants would prefer to be in person more so they don’t feel just like another number, just lost behind a screen, never really seeing that face-to-face,” he said. “God forbid, if I ever went in there, I would want to be able to talk to my attorney face-to-face, see the judge face-to-face, just want to really feel like I’m getting the help that I need and not just shoved in jail in a corner.”', 'Assuming the rollback of COVID precautions lasts, Golik hopes that by 2023, the backlog will be minuscule, and justice can be served in a timely manner, again.', 'In the meantime, officials are holding their breath.', '“I’m optimistic,” Kimball said. “I’ve been hopeful for two years now, so I really don’t know what to expect. I’m just taking it one day at a time.”']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Neg-ADA-Round-1.docx

Michigan

McSk

40625813bc1900a38f706112f7f2ad7be716a28872aa95d37a5f242abfde7a7a

There’s a ton of literature that criticizes any measure short of disarm. That generates solvency deficits based on overconfidence, miscalc, and deterrence orthodoxy.

Benoît Pelopidas & Kjølv Egeland 24. (PhD) founded the program Nuclear Knowledges and holds the chair of excellence in security studies at CERI (Sciences Po). He is also an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University and has been a frequent visiting fellow at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security at Sciences Po, CERI. “The false promise of nuclear risk reduction.” https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/100/1/345/7506700.

nuclear risk reduction straightforward framework We disagree offers false promise for those seeking durable solutions accurate risk analysis requires knowledge foresight not achievable in nuclear weapons politics invites managerial control plays down luck contingency fosters overconfidence normalize vulnerabilities risk reduction too indeterminate to offer direction stockpile reductions poor frame for diplomatic action policy dialogue grow too narrow narrowing gamut of policy options Deterrence necessarily risky

The nuclear risk reduction framework has received renewed attention in recent years According to its proponents, nuclear risk reduction offers a straightforward , apolitical framework for addressing nuclear dangers We disagree maintaining instead that the nuclear risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable shared solutions to the nuclear predicament and, by extension, actual risk reduction over the long term We have offered three arguments to substantiate this claim accurate risk analysis requires a level of knowledge and foresight that is not achievable in nuclear weapons politics risk analysis invites a faith in managerial control that invariably plays down luck and contingency fosters potentially dangerous overconfidence , and helps normalize civilizational vulnerabilities the risk reduction agenda is too indeterminate to offer political guidance or direction While some argue that risk reduction demands stockpile reductions or the adoption of n o f irst u se nuclear policies, others argue that risk reduction is best achieved through nuclear modernization programmes and brinksmanship. Risk taking in the short term can often be argued to reduce risks in the longer term risk reduction efforts in one area can frequently increase risks in others the nuclear world renders ‘risk reduction’ a poor frame for diplomatic action those involved in the debate should be wary of allowing policy dialogue to grow too narrow Confining discussions to modest managerial adjustments risks narrowing the gamut of policy options deemed feasible by future policy-makers the risk reduction agenda is severely circumscribed by the putative requirements of nuclear deterrence Deterrence practices are necessarily risky notion that ‘all States—irrespective of their stances on nuclear weapons—share an interest in the urgent pursuit and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of use’ is not particularly meaningful that have based their security on nuclear deterrence have an interest in maintaining the risk of use

renewed attention straightforward apolitical framework We disagree false promise durable actual risk reduction not achievable luck contingency dangerous overconfidence civilizational vulnerabilities too indeterminate stockpile reductions n f u poor frame grow too narrow narrowing the gamut policy options nuclear deterrence risky not particularly meaningful

['The nuclear risk reduction framework has received renewed attention in recent years. According to its proponents, nuclear risk reduction offers a straightforward, apolitical framework for addressing nuclear dangers. We disagree, maintaining instead that the nuclear risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable, shared solutions to the nuclear predicament and, by extension, actual risk reduction over the long term. We have offered three arguments to substantiate this claim. First, accurate risk analysis requires a level of knowledge and foresight that is not achievable in nuclear weapons politics. Second, risk analysis invites a faith in managerial control that invariably plays down luck and contingency, fosters potentially dangerous overconfidence, and helps normalize civilizational vulnerabilities. Third, the risk reduction agenda is too indeterminate to offer political guidance or direction. While some argue that risk reduction demands stockpile reductions or the adoption of no first use nuclear policies, others argue that risk reduction is best achieved through nuclear modernization programmes and brinksmanship. Risk taking in the short term can often be argued to reduce risks in the longer term, and risk reduction efforts in one area can frequently increase risks in others. In the absence of better information, risk analysis offers no tools to adjudicate these competing claims. Proponents of the nuclear risk reduction agenda would be right to point out that the current international security environment does not look particularly conducive to radical nuclear policy changes. Implementing common-sense measures of restraint would be better than doing nothing, they might argue. We do not disagree. Our objection is that the radical uncertainty that defines the nuclear world renders ‘risk reduction’ a poor frame for diplomatic action. If what proponents of ‘nuclear risk reduction’ really want to do is to promote nuclear de-alerting, new or improved communication hotlines, ‘deterrence only’ postures, or the adoption of no first use policies, they should just do that and not invite a discussion about unmeasurable risks that can easily be co-opted by those eager to renew nuclear testing programmes, resist doctrinal changes or advance nuclear modernization efforts. It should also be noted that some of the most significant nuclear arms control and disarmament measures that have ever been reached, such as the 1987 Intermediate Range-Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, came about on the back of periods of acute hostility and tension.85 Finally, those involved in the debate should be wary of allowing policy dialogue to grow too narrow. Confining discussions to modest managerial adjustments risks narrowing the gamut of policy options deemed feasible by future policy-makers. Contrary to what its proponents often claim, the risk reduction agenda is severely circumscribed by the putative requirements of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence practices, after all, are necessarily ‘risky’, as the credibility of nuclear deterrence, in particular extended nuclear deterrence, depends on ‘threats that leave something to chance’, i.e. the deliberate maintenance of nuclear risk. Accordingly, the notion that ‘all States—irrespective of their stances on nuclear weapons—share an interest in the urgent pursuit and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of use’ is not particularly meaningful.86 States that have based their security on nuclear deterrence have an interest in maintaining the risk of use. The underlying bet, of course, is that the risk of retaliation and ensuing nuclear escalation helps suppress the risk of straightforward (nuclear) aggression.']

[(7, 18), (25, 35)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-NDT-Round-7.docx

Emory

KeRa

18fcc2e779794c25740644df849be5d1c6eb49fbc58396210afffa0a16c35747

Ukraine proves deterrence works. Russia has not attacked a NATO ally, largely due to ambiguous posture.

D’Ambruoso 23 (*William D’ambruoso: Visiting assistant professor, Government and Legal Studies Department, Bowdoin College; PhD, Political Science, University of Washington, 6-16-2023, "The restraining effect of nuclear deterrence," Defense Priorities, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-restraining-effect-of-nuclear-deterrence)

Ukraine serves the conclusion how mass destruction prevents escalation . nuclear use has haunted the invasion Russia’s invasion is not a failure of deterrence Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power the war has not tested the nuclear revolution . there is possibility the situation could escalate signs are encouraging adversaries eye each other warily both avoided red lines chances of direct conflict are low . there is no evidence Putin believes a limited war is safe . Russia has been careful not to target NATO Russia thinks risk is too high to deter with threats difficult to make credible , without provoking the target calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance .” Any guarantee would lack cred Russia has more at stake NATO could threaten an escalatory process neither side could control Russia might decide risks are too high . ambiguity help overcome cred allows for strategic flex leaders “made threats vague enough they avoid being boxed into escalation Biden used threats wisely . potential for out-of-control escalation may deter Russia

Many analysts see the war in Ukraine as a sign that core aspects of the nuclear revolution, like deterrence and extended deterrence , are failing. the case serves the opposite conclusion , showing how the prospect of mass destruction limits both sides’ options and prevents escalation . The possibility of nuclear use has haunted the Russian invasion of Ukraine since the renewal of hostilities in 2022. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Putin and Russian officials have issued a series of nuclear threats While few experts have called the use of nuclear weapons likely, many expressed concern chances are higher than they have been since the Cold War. Russia’s initial invasion is not a failure of nuclear deterrence by the United States and allies. Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power the war has not tested the nuclear revolution . there is still a possibility that the situation could escalate The signs are encouraging thus far. Russia and nuclear adversaries eye each other warily and issue threats, but both sides avoided crossing each other’s red lines , and the chances of direct conflict are low . observers have expressed concern that because nuclear war at the highest levels of intensity is unthinkable , Putin would conclude fighting against NATO countries at lower escalation levels would be permissible . there is no evidence that Putin believes a limited NATO-Russia war is safe . he suggested the opposite, claiming if Ukraine joined NATO, NATO countries would “ automatically ” be at war with Russia, and such a war could not be limited . Russia has been careful not to target any NATO country openly and directly Extended deterrence is supposed to be more challenging than this. Russia thinks that the risk is too high : it has been wary of attacking NATO supply lines to Ukraine at their sources, despite support being instrumental in slowing and sometimes rolling back the Russian invasion. NATO’s most challenging deterrence task has involved convincing Russia that using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be too costly. The United States and allies have strong reasons for deterring Russian use of nuclear weapons. The challenge would be Trying to deter with threats that are difficult to make credible , without provoking the deterrence target to establish credibility. The problem calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance .” Any NATO guarantee to meet nuclear use with nuclear use would lack cred ibility because Russia has more at stake in Ukraine and NATO would be opening itself to devastating retaliation which Russia, despite conventional limitations, could deliver . NATO could credibly threaten to put in motion an escalatory process that neither side could control in response to Russian nuclear use. Russia might decide that risks of such a development are too high . Not only does ambiguity help the threatener overcome questions of cred ibility, but it allows for strategic flex ibility. past American leaders “made threats vague enough that they avoid ed being boxed into a stark choice between escalation or being exposed as bluffers .” the Biden administration has used ambiguous threats wisely . one official said “ all bets are off ” if Russia starts using nuclear weapons. Biden said Russian nuclear use might be the first step to “ Armageddon .” The potential for out-of-control escalation may be enough to deter Russia while keeping the United States’ strategic options open.

deterrence extended deterrence mass destruction options escalation haunted higher not formal military alliance nuclear power not tested the nuclear revolution escalate encouraging warily red lines direct conflict low unthinkable permissible no evidence limited NATO-Russia war safe automatically limited NATO openly and directly too high NATO supply lines instrumental credible provoking the target chance cred more at stake deliver escalatory process that neither side could control too high ambiguity cred strategic flex avoid escalation bluffers wisely all bets are off Armageddon out-of-control escalation deter Russia

['', 'RUSSIA, UKRAINE, NATO, AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE', 'Many analysts see the war in Ukraine as a sign that core aspects of the nuclear revolution, like nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence,16 are failing. In fact, the case serves just about the opposite conclusion, showing how the prospect of mass destruction limits both sides’ options and prevents escalation.', 'The possibility of nuclear use has haunted the Russian invasion of Ukraine since the renewal of hostilities in early 2022. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.17 Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have issued a series of nuclear threats, only some of which can be described as veiled. While few experts have called the use of nuclear weapons likely, many have expressed concern that the chances are higher than they have been since the Cold War.18 Can the nuclear revolution and all that it entails—deterrence and nonuse—endure this challenge?', 'At the risk of stating the obvious, Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine is not a failure of nuclear deterrence by the United States and its allies. Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power ahead of the war. It does not have nuclear weapons itself. In this narrow sense, the war has not tested the nuclear revolution. However, there is still a possibility that the situation could escalate to a war between NATO and Russia. How is the nuclear revolution holding up? Are both sides acting as if they have escaped a state of mutual vulnerability and the caution that this condition entails?', 'The signs are actually encouraging thus far.19 Russia and its nuclear adversaries eye each other warily and issue threats, but both sides have avoided crossing each other’s red lines, and the chances of direct conflict are low. Some observers have expressed concern that because nuclear war at the highest levels of intensity is unthinkable, President Putin would conclude that fighting against NATO countries at lower escalation levels would be permissible.20 But there is no evidence that President Putin believes a limited NATO-Russia war is safe. In fact, he has suggested the opposite, claiming that if Ukraine joined NATO, then NATO countries would “automatically” be at war with Russia, and such a war could not be limited. In early February 2022, he told a French journalist, “Russia is a military superpower and a nuclear superpower . . . There will be no winners and you will be drawn into this conflict against your own will.”21', 'Russia has been careful not to target any NATO country openly and directly, whether that country has its own nuclear arsenal or not. Extended deterrence is supposed to be more challenging than this. Doubts that the United States would retaliate against a Soviet strike on Western Europe, thereby opening itself up to attack, inspired the French to secure independent nuclear capabilities in the late 1950s and early 1960s. French leader Charles de Gaulle was worried that the United States would not “trade New York for Paris.”22 It is not unreasonable to assume Eastern European countries today share similar concerns. Would the nuclear-armed NATO countries be willing to escalate against Russia for the sake of Poland or Lithuania? Apparently, Russia thinks that the risk is too high: it has been wary of attacking NATO supply lines to Ukraine at their sources, despite the support being instrumental in slowing and sometimes rolling back the Russian invasion.23', 'At the same time, deterrence has limited NATO’s ability to push back against Russia directly. While being deterred can be frustrating, the alternative—a great power war with no clear ceiling of escalation—would be worse.', 'NATO’s most challenging deterrence task has involved convincing Russia that using one or more of its approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be too costly. Tactical nuclear weapons are primarily designed for battlefield use and have a limited range and yield but are still much more powerful than conventional arms.24 The United States and its allies have strong reasons for deterring Russian use of all nuclear weapons. While the nuclear taboo might not evaporate due to a single violation, we cannot predict the potential effects.25 The world is better off not learning.', 'The challenge would be familiar to students of the nuclear revolution: Trying to deter with threats that are difficult to make credible, without provoking the deterrence target to establish credibility. The problem calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance.”26 Any NATO guarantee to meet nuclear use with nuclear use would lack credibility because Russia has more at stake in Ukraine and NATO would be opening itself up to devastating retaliation which Russia, despite its conventional fighting limitations, could deliver. But NATO could credibly threaten to put in motion an escalatory process that neither side could fully control in response to Russian nuclear use. Russia might decide that the risks of such a development are too high.', 'Not only does the ambiguity of a threat that leaves something to chance help the threatener overcome questions of credibility, but it also allows for strategic flexibility. As international relations scholar Richard Betts explains, past American leaders “made their threats vague enough that they avoided being boxed into a stark choice between going ahead with escalation or being exposed as bluffers.”27', 'In general, the Biden administration has used ambiguous threats wisely. While saying that the United States would work to prevent “World War III,” one administration official also said that “all bets are off” if Russia starts using nuclear weapons.28 President Joe Biden himself said that Russian nuclear use might be the first step to “Armageddon.”29 The potential for out-of-control escalation may be enough to deter Russia while keeping the United States’ strategic options open.', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-BeWe-Neg-2--MAC-Quarters.docx

Minnesota

BeWe

68b6550e7b321fa2433a79a9736fcab6e07551a8003a1cbf7864635691a4f043

North Korea’s posture is defensive

Denny Roy 23 senior fellow at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawai’i. “North Korea’s Nuclear Buildup Means Mutually Assured Destruction, Not Coercion,” The Diplomat, 11/6/2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/north-koreas-nuclear-buildup-means-mutually-assured-destruction-not-coercion/

attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for No Ko attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening nuc s have been unsuccessful target states don’t take the threat seriously No Ko wants recognition as a responsible nuclear power Nuclear coercion immediately puncture that aspiration In practice the government appears risk-averse Pyongyang have reasons to believe a large and survivable arsenal is necessary to deter the U S No Ko suffered extensive carpet bombing during the Korean War Washington has maintained nuclear threats including basing t n w s in So Ko regularly flying aircraft near Korean territory and making official statements that could “totally destroy North Korea development of t n w s could be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy might see a t n w against a target rather than city as a battlefield equalizer No Ko has no defense against U.S. nuclear missiles No Ko will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter attack

It would make sense for Pyongyang to threaten using nuclear weapons if an enemy appears to be winning a war aimed at overthrowing the regime. Facing such an existential threat, the regime would believe it had nothing to lose by playing its last and most fearsome card. Short of that scenario, however, attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the No rth Ko rean government . countries attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening the use of nuc lear weapon s have been unsuccessful target states don’t take the threat seriously , believing the threatening state is not prepared to suffer the political consequences of nuclear aggression. No rth Ko rea wants global recognition as a “ responsible nuclear power This gives Pyongyang an incentive to demonstrate good international nuclear weapons citizenship. Nuclear coercion against South Korea during peacetime would immediately puncture that aspiration . Initiating a conventional war against the South while using nuclear weapons as a shield would be a losing strategy for Pyongyang the South’s conventional forces are stronger than North Korea’s Pyongyang’s modus operandi is to intimidate adversaries by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and belligerence In practice , however, the North Korean government appears rather risk-averse . Pyongyang has backed down when confronted with a resolute response from its adversaries North Koreans have reasons to believe a large and highly survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter the U nited S tates from attacking their country. No rth Ko rea suffered extensive U.S. carpet bombing during the Korean War Since then, Washington has maintained nuclear threats against North Korea in various ways, including basing t actical n uclear w eapon s in So uth Ko rea from 1958 to 1991, regularly flying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons near North Korean territory , and making official statements such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 comment that he could “totally destroy North Korea .” The United States has massive conventional and nuclear forces and is hard at work trying to improve its ability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The South Korean government is seeking to build a capability to destroy North Korean ballistic missiles before they launch. With such formidable potential enemies, it is not unreasonable for Pyongyang to believe it needs a large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal to convince Americans and South Koreans that it has a second strike capability, meaning it could absorb a nuclear attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker While North Korea’s development of t actical n uclear w eapon s might suggest a plan to use nukes for warfighting or coercion rather than insurance, they could also be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy He might see the use of a t actical n uclear w eapon against a n enemy military target – rather than an enemy city – as a battlefield equalizer that would not necessarily draw massive U.S. retaliation, and might even frighten South Korean or U.S. forces into halting their advance. As a result of the North Korean nuclear buildup, U.S. and South Korean anti-missile defenses are currently losing the battle of capabilities against North Korean missiles. Rather than maintaining a minimal arsenal that enemy systems could possibly cancel out, he is building a larger and more robust arsenal that can overwhelm enemy defenses. For its part, No rth Ko rea has no defense against incoming U.S. nuclear missiles . Thus, for the foreseeable future, barring a dramatic new breakthrough in anti-missile defense technology, No rth Ko rea and its potential adversaries will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter the other side from attack ing. It will be a tense stability that reinforces the status quo rather than opening opportunities to redress it.

attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the No rth Ko rean government nuc s unsuccessful No Ko responsible nuclear power puncture risk-averse U S No Ko carpet bombing nuclear threats basing t n w s So Ko t n w s fundamentally defensive strategy t n w battlefield equalizer No Ko No Ko attack

['It would make sense for Pyongyang to threaten using nuclear weapons if an enemy appears to be winning a war aimed at overthrowing the regime. Facing such an existential threat, the regime would believe it had nothing to lose by playing its last and most fearsome card. Short of that scenario, however, attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the North Korean government. In general, countries attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening the use of nuclear weapons have been unsuccessful. The target states don’t take the threat seriously, believing the threatening state is not prepared to suffer the political consequences of nuclear aggression. Multiple official government statements indicate North Korea wants global recognition as a “responsible nuclear power.” This gives Pyongyang an incentive to demonstrate good international nuclear weapons citizenship. Nuclear coercion against South Korea during peacetime would immediately puncture that aspiration. Initiating a conventional war against the South while using nuclear weapons as a shield would be a losing strategy for Pyongyang. It would be sheer folly to expect that South Korea would not fight back against North Korean aggression. Moreover, the South’s conventional forces are stronger than North Korea’s. Since 2010, South Korean governments have vowed to retaliate militarily against any lethal North Korean attacks. This has not changed as a result of Pyongyang acquiring of nuclear weapons. If North Korea is the attacker, a threat by Pyongyang to initiate the escalation from the conventional level to the nuclear level is not credible because the United States is vastly superior to North Korea at the nuclear level. Threatening the first use of nuclear weapons against either the United States or South Korea would be an extremely risky move for Pyongyang because it might invite a devastating pre-emptive attack. Pyongyang’s modus operandi is to intimidate adversaries by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and belligerence. In practice, however, the North Korean government appears rather risk-averse. Pyongyang has backed down when confronted with a resolute response from its adversaries, as in the aftermath of the tree-trimming incident in 1976 and the tensions over South Korea’s border loudspeakers in 2015. North Korea’s nuclear expansion does not necessarily indicate intent to practice nuclear blackmail. North Koreans have reasons to believe a large and highly survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter the United States from attacking their country. North Korea suffered extensive U.S. carpet bombing during the Korean War. Since then, Washington has maintained nuclear threats against North Korea in various ways, including basing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991, regularly flying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons near North Korean territory, and making official statements such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 comment that he could “totally destroy North Korea.” The United States has massive conventional and nuclear forces and is hard at work trying to improve its ability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The South Korean government is seeking to build a capability to destroy North Korean ballistic missiles before they launch. With such formidable potential enemies, it is not unreasonable for Pyongyang to believe it needs a large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal to convince Americans and South Koreans that it has a second strike capability, meaning it could absorb a nuclear attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. While North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons might suggest a plan to use nukes for warfighting or coercion rather than insurance, they could also be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy. Kim must account for the scenario in which his armies are losing a conventional war to superior South Korean-U.S. forces but he cannot nuke a major U.S. or South Korean city without bringing upon himself U.S. nuclear retaliation that would extinguish his regime and state. He might see the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy military target – rather than an enemy city – as a battlefield equalizer that would not necessarily draw massive U.S. retaliation, and might even frighten South Korean or U.S. forces into halting their advance. Henceforth, the prominent feature of the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis will not be nuclear coercion, but rather mutual assured destruction (MAD). As a result of the North Korean nuclear buildup, U.S. and South Korean anti-missile defenses are currently losing the battle of capabilities against North Korean missiles. This is no doubt what Kim intended. Rather than maintaining a minimal arsenal that enemy systems could possibly cancel out, he is building a larger and more robust arsenal that can overwhelm enemy defenses. South Korea’s “kill chain” missile defense concept requires Seoul to know when and from where Pyongyang plans to launch a missile. Already difficult, this will become even harder as North Korea deploys missiles on submarines and transitions to solid fuel, which requires far less preparation time than liquid fuel. The U.S. ground based interceptor (GBI) system has 44 missile-killing missiles based in Alaska and California, along the presumed path of enemy missiles incoming from Northeast Asia. This system would be hard pressed to shoot down even a small number of ordinary ballistic missiles. Kim may already have enough missiles to defeat the system, and he plans to mass produce nuclear bombs and their delivery vehicles. North Korea has apparently successfully tested a hypersonic glide vehicle, which can maneuver to avoid missile defenses such as the GBI system. For its part, North Korea has no defense against incoming U.S. nuclear missiles. Thus, for the foreseeable future, barring a dramatic new breakthrough in anti-missile defense technology, North Korea and its potential adversaries will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter the other side from attacking. It will be a tense stability that reinforces the status quo rather than opening opportunities to redress it.', '', '']

[(6, 12)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Aff-Indiana-Round-6.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

9acbd38086e98ec88eb047b65b87ff0683a9c1bcba9e4db9748f8047db55b586

8No impact---attacks will be small, no dispersion, and countermeasures solve

Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626

bioterror as an imminent concern , with mass-casualty attacks is a myth leading biological disarmament and non prolif experts believe risk of large-scale bioterror to be quite small. This is backed by historical evidence attempts were small-scale knowledge and resources necessary for scaling storage, and dissemination. present significant barriers medical countermeasures significantly blunt the impact

Those who have overemphasized bioterror portray it as an imminent concern , with emphasis on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks This is a myth assumption is that terrorists would seek mass-casualty weapons leading biological disarmament and non - prolif eration experts believe the risk of large-scale bioterror ism attacks to be quite small. This is backed by historical evidence attempts in the past were small-scale assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These present significant barriers Even if a weapon were disseminated successfully medical countermeasures , such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack .

overemphasized imminent concern high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks mass-casualty weapons leading biological disarmament and non - prolif eration experts large-scale bioterror ism attacks to be quite small. historical evidence small-scale It does not. scaling up, storage, and dissemination. significant barriers Even if medical countermeasures , significantly blunt the impact of an attack

['The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.', ' The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. ', ' The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers.', ' Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.', '']

[(8, 15), (16, 18)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-6.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

18b70230632f11767f2998a1a4b4980c36c40dd007b1fd3e0f4ef236ddfce762

No terrorist resurgence — COVID checks.

Davis 20, president of Insight Threat Intelligence, an international consultant on counterterrorism and intelligence, a former senior strategic analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. (Jessica, 4/28/20, "Terrorism During a Pandemic: Assessing the Threat and Balancing the Hype", Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/69895/terrorism-during-a-pandemic-assessing-the-threat-and-balancing-the-hype/)

COVID creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat physical distancing remov a significant target: crowds distancing make tactics far less effective Terrorists get sick economic devastation left terrorists without income They may be struggling with subsistence devoting time and money to planning may take a back seat intense media focus on COVID may dissuade terrorists terrorists seek recognition This is difficult if no one is paying attention

COVID creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat people are implementing physical distancing measures and remov ing a significant terrorist target: crowds . Physical distancing measures make tactics such as bombings far less effective Terrorists , like everybody else, can and do get sick , as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care. economic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a source of income . They may be struggling with daily subsistence , meaning devoting additional resources both in time and money to attack planning and weapons procurements may take a back seat to more immediate needs intense media focus on COVID may also dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear This is difficult to do if no one is paying attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating. determining responsibility would be difficult and far from instantaneous , minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear This fear would also likely be mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the pandemic

mitigating conditions terrorist threat physical distancing measures remov crowds far less effective can and do get sick burden on care. economic devastation without a source of income struggling with daily subsistence time money attack planning weapons procurements back seat intense media focus COVID dissuade terrorists engaging in attacks recognition no one is paying attention to you. little media attention difficult far from instantaneous minimizing instilling fear already pervasive

['The COVID-19 pandemic also creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat in much of the world. Around the globe, people are implementing physical distancing measures and, therefore, removing a significant terrorist target: crowds. Physical distancing measures make tactics such as vehicle rammings, stabbings, and bombings far less effective. Without the crowds that usually allow these relatively simple attacks to generate casualties, terrorists may determine that their plans are best perpetrated once physical distancing measures are no longer in place.', 'While it may be convenient to think of terrorists as relatively omnipotent, my work in counter-terrorism has demonstrated that this is far from the case. Terrorists, like everybody else, can and do get sick, as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care. At the same time, the economic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a source of income. They may be struggling with daily subsistence, meaning devoting additional resources (both in time and money) to attack planning and weapons/component procurements may take a back seat to more immediate needs.', 'The intense media focus on COVID-19 may also dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear in a population. This is difficult to do if no one is paying attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating. Even for a COVID-19 attack (involving an infected individual), this tactic also does not guarantee media attention. The reality is that anyone we come into contact with could be a virus carrier – determining responsibility would be difficult and far from instantaneous, minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear. This fear would also likely be mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the global pandemic.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Soper-Mansoor-Neg-Northwestern-Round6.docx

Kansas

SoMa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SoMa/Kansas-Soper-Mansoor-Neg-Northwestern-Round6.docx

d70f8afbaae3cad4dc19d5995742227816884596e5072d82032078312b7bd90a

It's an empirical question, answered by statistical methods---failing to code based on exogenous variables corrupts their evidence

Chiba 21, *Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University; **Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, (*Dr. Daina Chiba, **Dr. Erik Gartzke, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/)

this has not been pursued in the past a daunting challenge is finding a instrument for regime type correlated with regime type but unrelated to war . This plagued researchers instruments are unlikely valid due to spill-over , interdependence , and simultaneity a demographic variable fertility as variation is exogenous

this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past what makes our effort different from other projects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework or multi-equation models to the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems . First, previous studies have typically used a dyad as the unit which requires summary measure(s) for a pair rather than the (monadic) democracy measure Use of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level). We avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute . This allows us to connect the first stage equations and the outcome stage equation seamlessly This allows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.” Second, a more daunting challenge is the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war . This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study uses a diffusion-based measure However instruments are unlikely to be valid due to spatial spill-over , interdependence , and simultaneity We turn to a demographic variable fertility rate as a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict a lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization also fertility does not influence international conflict

not successfully different previous attempts major problems dyad unit summary measure(s) (monadic) discrepancy first stage regression outcome stage regression avoid this directed dyad unit distinguishing seamlessly “forbidden regression.” plausible instrument regime type strongly correlated regime type unrelated to war plagued diffusion-based valid spatial spill-over interdependence simultaneity demographic fertility rate variation in regime type exogenous strong driver fertility not conflict

['Before we review our approach in detail, it may be useful to explain why this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past and what makes our effort different from other, broadly related projects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework (more specifically) or multi-equation models (more broadly) to the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad (country pair) as the unit of observation in analyzing conflict, which requires some summary measure(s) of democracy for a pair of countries rather than the state-level (monadic) democracy measure. 6 Use of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level). 7 We avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations (predicting the challenger’s and target’s regime types) and the outcome stage equation seamlessly. Doing so has several benefits: the outcome stage model could directly include country-level covariates (such as challenger’s and target’s democracy) without having to convert them to a dyadic summary. This also allows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.” 8', 'Second, a more daunting challenge in applying an IV approach to democratic peace research is the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study of the effect of regime type on economic growth uses a diffusion-based measure of democracy (i.e., average value of democracies in a given region) as an instrument for democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2019). However, diffusion-based instruments such as this are unlikely to be a valid instrument, due to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and, most importantly, simultaneity (Betz, Cook, and Hollenbach 2018). Recognizing problems with spatial instruments, McDonald (2015) seeks to exploit the very discrepancy between country-level and dyad-level designs as the source of identification. His discussion, however, lacks a clear explanation as to why some determinants of regime type do not influence conflict. 9', 'We turn to a demographic variable — average female fertility rate in a given country — as a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict. As we will argue below, a lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization. We will also present theoretical arguments and a series of falsification tests that support the claim that average national fertility rate does not directly influence international conflict.', 'It outweighs and turns the case', '1---Democracies are ineffective at global governance---can never achieve meaningful arms control']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiMc-Neg-4---MAC-Semis.docx

Kansas

WiMc

c8f2b0ed47cc9ce9a230f9423e33cc9f28300ac447fd40c244f67f28268e53dd

It resolved all South Korea’s fears. It spurs greater role in decision-making and integrated deterrence.

Widakuswara ’23 [Patsy; April 26; White House Bureau Chief at Voice of America News, M.A. in Journalism from Goldsmith College, “No South Korean Nuclear Weapons; US Will Increase Deterrence,” Voice of America News, ]

Korea agreed not to pursue nuc s in return for decision-making role in contingency planning and more muscular U.S. presence defense treaty is ironclad Biden repeated nuclear attack against allies will result in end of regime Yoon called Declaration unprecedented expansion of extended deterrence U S will respond across spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios countries agreed to bilateral consultations in the event of North Korea's attack and promised to respond swiftly using full force including nuclear weapons consultation mechanism will focus on planning issues and give ROK insight Seoul will have a greater voice needed to address sense of vulnerability there has been doubt among South whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul the deal mean enhanced integration of conventional weapons into strategic planning through war games and military assets

South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuc lear weapon s program, in return for a greater decision-making role in U.S. contingency planning in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack and a more muscular U.S. presence in the region part of the Washington Declaration mutual defense treaty is ironclad that includes commitment to extended deterrence said Biden He repeated that a nuclear attack against the U S or its allies is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime Yoon called the Washington Declaration “an unprecedented expansion and strengthening ” of the extended deterrence strategy the U S will respond to attacks on allies across the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios countries agreed to bilateral consultations in the event of North Korea's nuclear attack and promised to respond swiftly , overwhelmingly and decisively using the full force of the alliance, including the U S nuclear weapons The two countries will also establish the NCG a regular bilateral consultation mechanism that will focus on nuclear and strategic planning issues and will give our ROK allies additional insight in how we think about planning for major contingencies Beyond greater information sharing, Seoul will have a greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment Giving South Korea a greater say in nuclear planning is needed to address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability from North Korea As Pyongyang moves rapidly with its nuclear weapons program there has been growing doubt among South Koreans on whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul and whether Seoul should continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence the deal would mean enhanced integration of South Korean conventional weapons into U.S. strategic planning , and a more muscular approach to deterrence through increased war games and deployments of military assets , including U.S. nuclear ballistic submarine visits to South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s

greater decision-making role contingency planning more muscular U.S. presence ironclad end of that regime unprecedented expansion and strengthening extended deterrence across the spectrum bilateral consultations swiftly overwhelmingly decisively including nuclear weapons consultation mechanism planning issues additional insight greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment greater say address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability growing doubt risk its own safety enhanced integration conventional weapons more muscular approach increased war games deployments of military assets

['WHITE HOUSE — South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuclear weapons program, in return for a greater decision-making role in U.S. contingency planning in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack and a more muscular U.S. presence in the region.', 'The deal is part of the so-called Washington Declaration, announced Wednesday, as President Joe Biden hosts South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in a state visit to celebrate the two countries’ 70th year of bilateral relations and discuss the allies’ future relationship.', '“Our mutual defense treaty is ironclad, and that includes our commitment to extended deterrence,” said Biden during his joint White House press conference with Yoon, referring to the 1953 agreement signed at the end of the Korean War that commits Washington to help South Korea defend itself, particularly from North Korea.', 'He repeated a line from his administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review that a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.', 'Speaking through an interpreter, Yoon called the Washington Declaration “an unprecedented expansion and strengthening” of the extended deterrence strategy — a term also known as the American nuclear umbrella. It says the United States will respond to attacks on its allies and partners “across the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios.”', "“Our two countries have agreed to immediate bilateral presidential consultations in the event of North Korea's nuclear attack and promised to respond swiftly, overwhelmingly and decisively using the full force of the alliance, including the United States’ nuclear weapons,” Yoon said.", 'In a briefing to reporters Tuesday, senior administration officials said that under the Washington Declaration, Seoul will “maintain its nonnuclear status and continue to abide by all the conditions of its signatory status to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” The NPT, which South Korea ratified in 1975, prohibits signatories from developing nuclear weapons.', 'The two countries will also establish the U.S.–Republic of Korea Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a “regular bilateral consultation mechanism that will focus on nuclear and strategic planning issues and will give our ROK allies additional insight in how we think about planning for major contingencies,” the official added.', 'Beyond greater information sharing, Seoul will have a greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment, he said.', 'Growing doubt', 'Biden is trying to demonstrate that his pledge to defend South Korea is “credible and rock-solid,” said Scott Snyder, director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Giving South Korea a greater say in nuclear planning is needed to address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability from North Korea, Snyder told VOA.', 'As Pyongyang moves rapidly with its nuclear weapons program, including developing missiles that can target American cities, there has been growing doubt among South Koreans on whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul and whether Seoul should continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence.', 'In January, Yoon told his defense and foreign ministry officials that if the threat posed by North Korea “gets worse,” his country may “introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own.”', 'Seoul walked back Yoon’s comments following an international backlash. However, the narrative of South Korea having its own nuclear deterrence capability has become more mainstream in the country’s national security discourse.', 'A 2022 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed that 71% of South Koreans say their country should build its own nuclear weapons.', 'More muscular deterrence', 'The U.S. official said the deal would mean enhanced integration of South Korean conventional weapons into U.S. strategic planning, and a more muscular approach to deterrence through increased war games and deployments of military assets, including U.S. nuclear ballistic submarine visits to South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s.']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Kentucky-Round-3.docx

Michigan

ShGa

c9c0cdbdd6243f300c37dc1f1a88dcedad73e0dfc4f52f73ab2855cf6b15c483

Western man is only breaking from its contradiction with the normative roots of liberalism---using politics to redress those externalities voids unsustainability.

Kamola 17, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Trinity College (Isaac Kamola, 2017, “A time for anticolonial theory,” Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2, University of Kansas Libraries, EBSCO) [Language ed.]

the world seems broken financial crisis inequality conflicts climate racist , alt-right fascist movements when governments seem ill-equipped to begin engaging issues central to human survival struggles against colonialism seem once again instructive These writings avoid abstract musing refusal of the modern colonial project short-circuits the assumption the anticolonial project is failed readers often miss political projects engaged in a rebuilding of modern humanity engaged in pragmatic orientation inseparable from commitment to political imagination and politics to remake the world requires a future that might have been the refusal to ‘ retreat from humanity ’ makes it possible to maintain possibility o reparation , and justice’ remains ‘how to belong fully in this world common to all of us

Today the world seems profoundly broken financial crisis and stagnant real wages planetary inequality armed conflicts global climate change racist , alt-right , and fascist movements at a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival the academic workbench of theories , and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us The twentieth-century struggles against colonialism around the world, seem to once again speak in instructive ways These writings on colonialism , race, class, violence , and governance avoid abstract musing the refusal of the Western modern and colonial project contextualize their specific conjuncture , while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts . This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project contemporary readers often miss the fact that political projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state. engaged in a ‘ pragmatic orientation ’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to remake the world thinking requires us to ‘ engag [e] a future that might have been ’ the problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking , at once concrete and world- historical , still resonates’ the awesome refusal to ‘ retreat from humanity ’ makes it possible to maintain the ‘ possibility o f restitution, reparation , and justice’ whatever our own ‘ horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us

world broken financial crisis wages inequality conflicts climate change racist fascist governments ill-equipped begin engaging human survival workbench theories woefully inadequate stare into struggles colonialism once again writings colonialism violence avoid abstract refusal colonial project taking care arguments temporal contexts short-circuits assumption anticolonial failed miss projects rebuilding humanity pragmatic orientation inseparable utopian anticipatory politics requires future problems realist thinking concrete historical resonates’ retreat humanity possible possibility reparation horizons fundamental struggle belong fully common

['Today the world seems profoundly broken. Decades of endemic financial crisis and stagnant real wages have produced planetary inequality of such magnitude that eight white men now own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (Oxfam, 2017). Seemingly nihilistic armed conflicts engulf many regions of world, contributing to a reality in which one in every hundred people on the planet lives as a refugee (Connor and Krogstad, 2016). It is now ninety-five percent likely that temperatures will rise above the two-degree Celsius threshold, making the most dangerous effects of global climate change largely inevitable (Raftery et al., 2017). And this does not even include the success of racist, alt-right, and fascist movements across the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. All this at a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival.', 'This brave new world is not only profoundly dispiriting, it poses very serious challenges to those whose academic and political practice involves critically engaging the world with the aim of crafting the theoretical tools – or, as Amı´lcar Cabral (1979) might suggest, weapons – needed to change it. Today, the academic workbench of concepts, theories, and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us, much less provide meaningful guidance for systemic transformation. One reason for the considerable gulf between available theories and present political realities stems from the fact that much of the intellectual tradition structuring the academy today was built alongside imperial or liberal political and historical trajectories. Many of the cherished thinkers we draw upon to construct the contemporary political imaginaries were often coconspirators in the solidification of the European state system and Western imperialism. During the twentieth century, theorists engaged in celebrating a politics of mass demonstration and deliberation, social movements, democratization, and post-Cold War cosmopolitan civil society. The theoretical lessons learned from these historical moments now seem either complicit in, or overly stressed by, the weight of the current pressures. Similarly, many of the political and theoretical apparatuses used to critique this history pale in the face of a historical moment that seems to demand a renewed militancy of purpose, a willingness to take risks for justice, and the urgent need for even more vibrant and vital networks of human solidarity.', 'It is not surprising, therefore, that within the current conjuncture political thinkers in the Western academy have begun returning to the shelves of the African anticolonial archive (for example: el-Malik and Kamola, 2017; Pha˙ m and Shilliam, 2016; el-Malik, 2016). The twentieth-century struggles against colonialism in Africa, the African diaspora, and around the world, seem to once again speak in instructive and unexpected ways. There is good reason for this return. These voices are poetic yet strident, theoretical but immediately practical to the particularities of struggle. These writings on colonialism, race, class, violence, and governance avoid abstract musing – and the polish and perfection of argument that goes along with it. Instead, they are timely statements made with great urgency. The assumed audience of African anticolonial thought was often not scholars, but rather one’s immediate and intimate comrades. The horizons of these texts and arguments often contain futures filled with possibility, even if the specific outlines are not entirely discernable in the present moment.', 'Several recent books have argued, in different ways, that returning to thinkers of African anticolonial struggle greatly enriches the theoretical understandings and political struggles of the present. Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (2015), Robbie Shilliam’s The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections (2015), and Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason (2017) all make the compelling argument that the ideas, concepts, and modes of argument developed during anticolonial struggles in Africa and by the African diaspora are uniquely suited to help make sense of – and intervene into – the present. Unlike previous debates about ‘African philosophy’ or the popular turn towards ‘comparative’ or ‘global’ political theory, these three authors neither seek to ‘bring’ black and African voices ‘into’ an academic field; nor do they take anticolonial thought as confined to a location, limited to specific set of ‘problems’, or focused exclusively on the aim of national independence. Instead, Wilder, Shilliam, and Mbembe treat the work of anticolonialism as a human inheritance, one that transcends time and space. Wilder, for example, clearly states that he is less interested in ‘provincializ[ing] Europe’ than in working to ‘deprovincialize Africa and the Antilles’ (p. 10). To do so, he tackles the political and intellectual work of Aime´ Ce´saire and Le´opold Se´dar Senghor in ways that force attention to their broader commitment to articulating a postnational (and post-continental) human politics, as a radical critique of Western modernity rather than the limited plotting of national independence or a black political identity. Similarly, Shilliam foregrounds the epistemic and manifest networks through which the liberatory desires embedded within black power movements and RasTafari spiritual practices circulated among religious, activist, and youth communities in Aotearoa (New Zealand) and beyond. Mbembe also rejects the compartmentalization of ‘Africa’ from the world, demonstrating that the racialized practices and knowledges once used to justify the colonization of Africa have become widely generalized beyond race. The political and epistemic practices that used ‘Black’ and ‘Africa’ as references to concoct racialized categories have become universalized beyond race.', 'These authors share a commitment to rereading African peoples, practices, and thought – especially as they relate to the refusal of the Western modern and colonial project – as central to understanding the contemporary condition. They contextualize anticolonial thinkers within their specific conjuncture, while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts. This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project. However, rather than rebutting such accusations, Wilder’s Freedom Time gracefully argues that such claims are only relevant if one assumes that Ce´saire and Senghor, the two protagonists of his book, were primarily concerned with ending colonial rule within particular geographical spaces. Wilder argues that contemporary readers often miss the fact that these two thinkers understood their complex intellectual and political projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state. As such, the work of Ce´saire and Senghor should not be understood through the lens of national independence, but rather read for the not-yet-realized political visions they contain. Wilder writes: ‘Scholarship long promoted one-sided understandings of Ce´saire and Senghor as either essentialist nativists or naive humanists…Negritude, whether embraced or criticized, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity’ (p. 8). Wilder argues instead that Ce´saire and Senghor actually reject ‘the doxa that self-determination required state sovereignty’ and instead proceeded from a position that ‘colonial peoples cannot presume to know a priori which political arrangements would best allow them to pursue substantive freedom’ (p. 2). In this way, Ce´saire and Senghor were intellectuals who lived as complex and fluid thinkers engaged in a ‘pragmatic orientation’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to transcend the very idea of France, remake the world, and inaugurate a new epoch of human history’ (p. 2). This requires understanding Ce´saire and Senghor as practicing a form of thinking that is simultaneously ‘strategic and principled, gradualist and revolutionary, realist and vision, timely and untimely’ (p. 2).', 'Wilder’s book alternates chapters between Ce´saire and Senghor, tracing the evolution, exchange, and collaboration between these two intellectuals, as well as tracing how their ideas evolved over the course of their engagement with party and state politics. Reading these texts as already instantiated within a political terrain makes it possible to grasp their full nuance. For example, in a chapter on Senghor’s African socialism, Wilder writes that Senghor ‘called neither for France to decolonize Africa nor for Africa to liberate itself, but for Africans to decolonize France’ (p. 214). To this end, African socialism was not simply a political platform, or an effort to remake Marxist theory, but rather a way of imagining the world that left open the possibility that Africans were the agents of ‘planetary salvation’ and ‘human emancipation’ (p. 215). This approach helps explain the seemingly quixotic political commitment that Senghor held concerning regional federalism and his insistence on maintaining a fraternal relationship between Senegal and France (two political positions often cited as evidence of his inability to uphold the true promise of national independence). Instead, Wilder suggests that thinking ‘with Ce´saire and Senghor’ requires us to ‘engag[e] a future that might have been’. While the specific conclusions Ce´saire and Senghor arrive at might not necessarily ‘be applied to our times’, ‘the problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking, at once concrete and world-historical, still resonates’ (p. 256).', 'Shilliam’s book, The Black Pacific, similarly traces connections among anticolonial activists and intellectuals across space and time. However, rather than examining the exchange between Francophone Africa, France, and the Caribbean, Shilliam locates his study in the dense relationships between the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand) and the ‘children of Legba’. Legba is a reoccurring figure from African cosmology that mediates the spiritual and physical worlds. Shilliam opens with the story of a 1979 exchange between Ma¯ori elders and their guests, a black theater troupe and a RasTafari band visiting Aotearoa NZ from England. The elder, or kaumātua, greeted the visitors, saying: ‘everyone being one people’ to which the theater director replied: ‘the ancestors are meeting because we have met’ here today (p. 1). This exchange reflects Shilliam’s larger argument about the already existing ‘deep, global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity’ (p. 3). He contrasts these lived and meaningful connections with the colonial ethnographic mapping practices that sought – and still seek – to firmly establish separation between colonial subjects, with a gaze remained firmly trained on Europe. Shilliam counters by offering a ‘decolonial science of “deep relation”’ (p. 13) that draws out the moments of connectivity between the spiritually synchronistic descendants of Legba, the Pacific Island figure of Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes within the Western philosophical tradition. In doing so, Shilliam provides evidence of the profound spiritual bonds that ground relations of strength and connectivity. He argues that, while the ‘manifest world is a broadly (post)colonial one, structured through imperial hierarchies that encourage the oneway transmission of political authority, social relations and knowledge’, there also exists alongside this world vast ‘hinterlands of the spiritual domains’ (p. 20). Legba, Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes continually assist in that translation and binding of the manifest and spiritual worlds and, in doing so, they eschew a ‘developmentalist understanding of time’ in favor of one that can account for ‘the reparation of ancestral ties’ (p. 21). Re-grounding anticolonialism in this shared spiritual inheritance emphasizes the dense human connections that, through their cultivation, might inform the healing of colonial wounds. Shilliam demonstrates the durability of these deep relations in chapters examining the movement and adaptation of Black Power in Aotearoa NZ, the embrace of the political concept of blackness among the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples, the spiritual and cultural circulation between liberation, RasTafari, and indigenous Ra¯tana theologies, and the movement of Ma¯ori and Pasifika activists between Ethiopia, South Africa, the Caribbean, and the African diaspora in England.', 'Unlike Wilder and Shilliam, who locate anticolonial thinking and practice within the expansive spatial, temporal, and spiritual realities of specific individuals, Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason engages in nothing less than a rewriting of the history of modernity as the ‘mobiliz[ation]’ of ‘Africa and Blackness’ with the goal of ‘the fabrication of racial subjects’ (p. 129). As a ‘river with many tributaries’, Mbembe’s book examines the evolving nature of race and Blackness within a world in which ‘Europe is no longer the center of gravity’ (p. 1). The book moves rapidly and expansively between theoretical engagements – with Fanon, Ce´saire, Foucault, Arendt, and others – and the historical events that created both modernity and racialized partition (the slave trade, the Haitian and American Revolutions, the AlgerianWar, and others). He re-casts ‘the biography’ of the ‘assemblage that is Blackness and race’ into ‘three critical moments’: the Atlantic slave trade, the ‘birth of writing’ marked by [black people] Blacks demanding ‘the status of full subjects in the world of the living’ (spanning from the Haitian Revolution, abolition, African decolonization, American civil right movement, to the dismantling of apartheid), and concluding with the current period of ‘neoliberalism’ (p. 3). In this latest period, we now inhabit an economic and racial order defined by the ‘industries of the Silicon Valley and digital technology’, in which ‘time passes quickly’, where workers have been replaced by ‘laboring nomads’, and ‘the tragedy of the multitude’ – comprising ‘superfluous humanity’ – has become ‘that they are unable to be exploited at all’ (p. 3). Within this new epoch, race and Blackness have taken on new forms such that the colonial technologies once developed to separate and manage human beings according to racialized categories have now become replaced by a universalized Blackness that extends beyond race: ‘for the first time in human history, the term “Black” has been generalized. This new fungiblity, this solubility, institutionalized as a new norm of existence and expanded to the entire planet, is what I call the Becoming Black of the world’ (p. 6). Islamophobia, for example, operates according to the traditional logics of racism; however, the characteristics once used to describe supposedly biological races has now been applied to ‘“culture” and “religion”’ (p. 7). While Blackness has become universalized beyond race, Mbembe argues that the ‘Western consciousness of Blackness’ – which reduces humans to ‘a racial subject and site of savage exteriority’ – has always existed alongside the ‘Black consciousness of Blackness’, namely the articulation of Blackness within ‘a long history of radicalism, nourished by struggles for abolition and against capitalism’ (pp. 28, 30). Blackness therefore exists within a ‘manifest dualism’, both ‘the living crypt of capital’ through which ‘skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise’, but simultaneously ‘the symbol of a conscious desire for life, a force springing forth, buoyant and plastic, fully engaged in the act of creation and capable of living in the midst of several times and several histories at once’ (p. 6). Drawing from these ‘reserves of life’, and the awesome refusal to ‘retreat from humanity’ that defines Black life, makes it possible to maintain the ‘possibility of restitution, reparation, and justice’ (p. 179). For Mbembe, whatever our own ‘horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us, how to pass from the status of the excluded to the status of the right-holder, how to participate in the construction and the distribution of the world’ – that is, the creation of a ‘world in common’ (p. 176).']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Aff-8---Texas-Round-5.docx

Kansas

SpHa

7d05e6e01eebce0b3159a09390e1494a004485decae6ce34eb60498d33d761ad

DAOs are AI.

Zekos ’22 [Georgios; 5/17/2022; Professor of Computer Law and head of Internship and Career Department at the International Hellenic University, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Peloponnese, J.D. from Democritus University of Thrace, ; "From AI Towards Advanced AI," in Advanced Artificial Intelligence and Robo-Justice, p. 203–259]

a DAO run by AI will be attributed personhood with rights and duties systems generated by AI run by robots out of control of humans

a n AAI DAO run by A AI technology will be attributed an AAI legal personhood alike a conventional corporation with rights and duties . AAI DAO will appoint its own director having its own shareholders etc. comprehended on an AAI dimension not be influenced by humans which could be seen as a model of running AAI systems in AAI society present technology DAO is an elementary model of autonomous systems in comparison to AAI DAO systems generated by A AI technology run by robots and being out of any control of humans functioning in an AAI society

AAI run by A AI attributed legal personhood rights duties own director own shareholders AAI dimension AAI DAO A AI technology robots out of any control

['Could a DAO be deemed as an entity separate from the human entities that run it? It is argued that the “autonomous” character of a DAO is incompatible with the notion of legal personhood, as legal personhood is recognized if there is one or more identified players responsible for the actions of a particular entity. Besides, it could be said that the formation of a DAO functioning via AI technology and run by an e-director can be attributed a legal personhood alike a conventional corporation. Thus, DAO can be deemed as a separate legal entity from its human actors and so these actors can be protected from the liabilities of the DAO. On the other hand, an AAI DAO run by AAI technology will be attributed an AAI legal personhood alike a conventional corporation with rights and duties. AAI DAO will appoint its own director having its own shareholders etc. comprehended on an AAI dimension not be influenced by humans which could be seen as a model of running AAI systems in AAI society such as robo-justice, robo-administration, robo-health system etc.', 'It has to be taken into consideration that control of the blockchain through identifiable players and practices translates into control of the code, of the network, and/or of the decision-making course. Hence, present technology DAO is an elementary model of autonomous systems programmed and controlled in a way by humans in comparison to AAI DAO systems generated by AAI technology run by humanoid robots and being out of any control of humans functioning in an AAI society in which robo-justice can be implemented.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Aff-Kentucky-Finals.docx

Michigan

PiPh

f919d2caf63a243306fed01237d0d7ce2cab4f9115b57dcbdb1925e1b1f1162d

US heg is possible and preferable—collapse of long-term dominance causes WW3 through miscalc.

Kagan 21 - (Robert Kagan, Stephen and Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow @ the Brookings Institution and the author of The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World; published March/April 2021 Edition, Foreign Affairs, "A Superpower, Like It or Not: Why Americans Must Accept Their Global Role," 7-28-2021) url: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-16/superpower-it-or-not

the U S is capable of pursuing a world-order strategy the U S sits isolated the other powers live in regions crowded with other powers and still look to the U S for help Russia is an “ Upper Volta with rockets Asia is crowded with powers including three militaries among the top ten all allies of the U S Trump years were a stress test and the order passed hostilities can be avoided , powers can be encouraged to pursue aims peacefully and spare the world from the next great war The alternative is power vacuums chaos conflict and miscalc

if the U nited S tates were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint . It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not. the basic configuration of international power has not changed much the U nited S tates still sits on its vast , isolated continent , surrounded by oceans and weaker powers ; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers ; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant U nited S tates for help . Russia is even more an “ Upper Volta with rockets ” today than when that wisecrack was coined The Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position . imperial Japan it faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied Today, Asia is crowded with other great powers , including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world— India , Japan , and So uth Ko rea— all of which are either allies or partners of the U nited S tates. The Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order , passed , U.S. allies appeased and cajoled Adversaries also trod carefully . The Chinese suffered through a long tariff war but they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship when Trump went ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur . Trump’s policies did show how much excess , unused power the United States has GREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY In the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas , out of a total American population of 170 million . Today when the United States is said to be dangerously overextended , there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas , out of a population of 330 million . At the height of the late Cold War the United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up . The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament . They might “ run wild for the first six months or a year,” But in the long run against a provoked America and its allies , they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals. The real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided , whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully , to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war The U nited S tates cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce periods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic , fear , and sudden mobilization . Realists , liberal internationalists , conservative nationalists , and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine , and U.S. interests will be just as well protected . But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism . The alternative to the American world order is will be a world of power vacuums , chaos , conflict , and miscalc ulation—a shabby place indeed

U S weak wouldn’t have to practice restraint still capable world-order strategy basic configuration international power U S vast isolated continent oceans weaker powers crowded other great powers too strong balance U S help Upper Volta with rockets China wealth population unproven military capabilities less favorable strategic position preoccupied crowded great powers militaries top ten India Japan So Ko allies partners U S Trump years stress test passed appeased cajoled carefully complete breakdown acquiesced barely a murmur excess unused power GREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY admirable restraint one million overseas 170 million dangerously overextended 200,000 overseas 330 million could not keep up Chinese similar predicament run wild long run provoked America allies hostilities can be avoided confine economic political realms horrors next great war U S nineteenth-century view panic fear sudden mobilization Realists internationalists nationalists progressives just fine protected recent history present circumstances idealism alternative power vacuums chaos conflict miscalc

['', 'Yet if the United States were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint. It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not. The fact is that the basic configuration of international power has not changed as much as many imagine. The earth is still round; the United States still sits on its vast, isolated continent, surrounded by oceans and weaker powers; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant United States for help.', 'Although Russia possesses a huge nuclear arsenal, it is even more an “Upper Volta with rockets” today than when that wisecrack was coined, in the early Cold War. The Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position. When imperial Japan expanded in the 1930s, it faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied with the German threat. Today, Asia is crowded with other great powers, including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world—India, Japan, and South Korea—all of which are either allies or partners of the United States. Should Beijing, believing in Washington’s weakness, use its own growing power to try to alter the East Asian strategic situation, it might have to cope not only with the United States but also with a global coalition of advanced industrial nations, much as the Soviets discovered.', 'The Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order, remarkably, passed. Confronted by the nightmare of a rogue superpower tearing up trade and other agreements, U.S. allies appeased and cajoled, bringing offerings to the angry volcano and waiting hopefully for better times. Adversaries also trod carefully. When Trump ordered the killing of the Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, it was reasonable to expect Iran to retaliate, and it may still, but not with Trump as president. The Chinese suffered through a long tariff war that hurt them more than it hurt the United States, but they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship on which they depend. Obama worried that providing offensive weapons to Ukraine could lead to war with Russia, but when the Trump administration went ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur. Many of Trump’s policies were erratic and ill conceived, but they did show how much excess, unused power the United States has, if a president chooses to deploy it. In the Obama years, officials measured 50 times before deciding not to cut, ever fearful that other powers would escalate a confrontation. In the Trump years, it was other countries that worried about where a confrontation with the United States might lead.', 'GREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY', 'The United States is “lazily playing with a fraction of her immeasurable strength”—so the British historian Arnold Toynbee commented somewhat ruefully in the early 1930s. At the time, U.S. defense spending was between two and three percent of GDP. Today, it is a little over three percent. In the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas, out of a total American population of 170 million. Today, in an era when the United States is said to be dangerously overextended, there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas, out of a population of 330 million. Setting aside whether this constitutes “lazily playing with a fraction” of American strength, it is important to recognize that the United States is now in peace mode. Were Americans to shift to a war footing, or even a Cold War–type footing, in response to some Chinese action—for instance, an attack on Taiwan—the United States would look like a very different animal.', 'At the height of the late Cold War, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up. The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament. They might “run wild for the first six months or a year,” as Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese fleet during World War II, predicted about his own forces. But in the long run, as he also warned, against a provoked America and its allies, they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals.', 'The question is not whether the United States is still capable of prevailing in a global confrontation, either hot or cold, with China or any other revisionist power. It is. The real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war.', 'The United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce what it produced in the past: periods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic, fear, and sudden mobilization. Already, Americans are torn between these two impulses. On the one hand, China now occupies that place in the American mind that Germany and the Soviet Union once held: an ideological opponent that has the ability to strike at American society directly and that has power and ambitions that threaten the United States’ position in a key region and perhaps everywhere else, too. On the other hand, many Americans believe that the United States is in decline and that China will inevitably come to dominate Asia. Indeed, the self-perceptions of the Americans and the Chinese are perfectly symmetrical. The Chinese think that the United States’ role in their region for the past 75 years has been unnatural and is therefore transient, and so do the Americans. The Chinese believe that the United States is in decline, and so do many Americans. The danger is that as Beijing ramps up efforts to fulfill what it has taken to calling “the Chinese dream,” Americans will start to panic. It is in times like this that miscalculations are made.', 'Perhaps the Chinese, careful students of history that they are, will not make the mistake that others have made in misjudging the United States. Whether Americans have learned the lessons of their own history, however, remains to be seen. A century-long pattern of oscillation will be difficult to change. It will be especially so when foreign policy experts of all stripes regard support for a liberal world order as impossible and immoral. Among other problems, their prescriptions suffer from an unwarranted optimism about the likely alternatives to a U.S.-led order. Realists, liberal internationalists, conservative nationalists, and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine, and U.S. interests will be just as well protected. But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism. The alternative to the American world order is not a Swedish world order. It will not be a world of law and international institutions or the triumph of Enlightenment ideals or the end of history. It will be a world of power vacuums, chaos, conflict, and miscalculation—a shabby place indeed.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-3-Wayne-Round3.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-3-Wayne-Round3.docx

8ce90af4dae44ce3dc795e5186a0331ad058e2df815bcc78736bf8479c6245a7

2 – Growth turns environment – empirical data.

Zitelmann ’21 [Rainer; August 23; Ph.D.s in History and Sociology, former lecturer in history at Freie Universität Berlin; Institute of Economic Affairs, “Capitalism is good for the environment,” ]

numerous studies show economically “ free ” registered the highest EPI a correlation between the EPI and how capitalist an economy is EPI countries account for 90 percent of trade Another study if openness raises output by 1% , pollution fall by 1% In non-capitalist s degradation has been serious On the basis of data growth decoupled from raw materials of 72 raw materials, only six have not reached consumption maximum all point in the same direction : capitalism is the solution

people believe capitalism is to blame for climate change and environmental degradation numerous scientific studies have arrived at a surprising conclusion Analysis has show n that the world’s most economically “ free ” countries also registered the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index Researchers found a correlation between the EPI and the world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business a measure of how capitalist an economy is researchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI these countries account for more than 90 percent of international trade and investment countries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance the level of the openness of an economy is associated with a country’s environmental protection Another study finds if openness to international markets raises both output and income by 1% , pollution concentrations fall by 1% freer trade is good for the environment it can be argued that capitalism leads to an increase in resource consumption analyses show that after a critical point of economic growth a gradual decline in environmental degradation is reported real-world observations disprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution In non-capitalist countrie s , environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem The correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization On the basis of numerous data series shown how economic growth has decoupled from the consumption of raw materials of 72 raw materials, only six have not yet reached their consumption maximum consumption of many commodities is actually in decline the results of all these studies point in the same direction : capitalism is not the problem it is the solution

capitalism climate change environmental degradation numerous scientific studies free highest scores EPI correlation most comprehensive reliable gauge how capitalist high degree of overlap more than 90 percent higher openness of an economy environmental protection study openness to international markets 1% fall 1% good resource consumption analyses critical point gradual decline real-world observations disprove automatically non-capitalist far more serious ever weaker dematerialization numerous data series decoupled 72 six decline all same direction not the problem solution

['Most people believe that capitalism is to blame for climate change and environmental degradation. But numerous scientific studies have arrived at a surprising conclusion.', 'Every year, the Heritage Foundation ranks countries around the world based on economic freedom in a kind of capitalism index. Analysis has shown that the world’s most economically “free” countries also registered the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index, averaging 76.1 (on a scale from 0 to 100), while the “mostly free” countries averaged 70.2. These two groups have a significant lead over the “moderately free” countries, which received much lower ratings (59.6 points) for their environmental performance. The countries rated by the Heritage Foundation as either “mostly unfree” or “repressed” received by far the worst Environmental Performance Index scores (46.7 and 50.3, respectively).', 'Researchers at Yale University found that there is not only a correlation between the Heritage Foundation’s index and their own EPI, but also between the EPI and the “Ease of Doing Business Index” which is published each year as part of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and is generally regarded as the world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business, with higher ratings indicating better, usually simpler, regulations for businesses and stronger protections of property rights. According to the researchers at Yale University, the correlation between the “Ease of Doing Business Index,” which they refer to as a measure of “economic liberalism” (i.e., an indicator of how capitalist an economy is), and the EPI is 0.72.', 'In 2016, researchers published a study in the journal Sustainability that included an evaluation of the correlation between the EPI and the “Open Market Index” (OMI) compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The OMI measures a country’s openness to free trade and is thus an important indicator of economic freedom. The researchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI: 19 of the OMI’s 27 highest-scoring countries also appear in the top 27 of the EPI. The survey covered a total of 75 countries, including all G20 and EU members. Together, these countries account for more than 90 percent of international trade and investment. The researchers conclude: “It is evident that there is a strong connection between OMI and EPI scores, supporting our hypothesis that countries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance. Overall, our evidence shows that the level of the openness of an economy is associated with a country’s environmental protection.”', 'Another study, “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, uses sophisticated mathematical modeling to explore the correlation between free trade – a key feature of capitalism – and environmental pollution. The study finds: “Our estimates of the scale and technique elasticities indicate that if openness to international markets raises both output and income by 1%, pollution concentrations fall by approximately 1%. Putting this calculation together with our earlier evidence on composition effects yields a somewhat surprising conclusion: freer trade is good for the environment.”', 'Of course, it can be argued that capitalism leads to stronger economic growth, which in turn leads to an increase in resource consumption. However, the analyses show that, at an early stage of a country’s economic growth, a high level of environmental degradation is observed, while, after a critical point of economic growth, a gradual decline in environmental degradation is reported.', 'In addition, there are two real-world observations that also disprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution:', 'In non-capitalist countries, environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem than in capitalist countries.', 'The correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization.', 'On the basis of numerous data series, Andrew McAfee has shown how economic growth has decoupled from the consumption of raw materials. Data for the USA show that of 72 raw materials, only six have not yet reached their consumption maximum. Although the US economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually in decline. And the results of all these studies point in the same direction: capitalism is not the problem, it is the solution – both economically and environmentally.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-IpMc-Aff-01----Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Michigan

IpMc

7a2f87f45a33b75d2bb10b591bdb07979b25b688b0bf8af95986b7375bee30d0

Biden’s PC is key—we’re only this close because it.

Crisp 10—11—(Washington Correspondent for Newsweek). Elizabeth Crisp. 10/11/21. Newsweek. “5 Key Factors as Congress Works to Pass Biden's Infrastructure, Social Spending Agenda”. . Accessed 10/14/21.

Biden's economic agenda is currently at a standstill Progressive Democrats have blocked efforts Manchin of Sinema have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement voiced criticism over the price tag Biden who was in the U.S. Senate for four decades has been touted as a "dealmaker" and "Senate whisperer." In recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions to hash out his agenda . Biden is a long-time friend of Manchin , and he has embraced his one-time foe Sanders as key to getting his agenda through

Biden's economic agenda —largely built around two key pieces of legislation— is currently at a standstill in Congress, hanging by a thread nearly nine months into his time in office. crats control the U.S. House, Senate and White House but have so far been unable to pass legislation Here are five key factors Progressive Democrats have so far blocked efforts in the House to pass the infrastructure bill that received bipartisan support in the Senate. Pelosi recently told reporters at the Capitol that she won't bring up legislation that won't pass. Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement on the package. Manchin has argued that he would rather see a number closer to $1.5 trillion, rather than the $3.5 trillion that Biden and Democratic leaders have proposed for the package. Sinema also has voiced criticism over the price tag of the sweeping plan. Biden who was in the U.S. Senate for nearly four decades before becoming vice president to Barack Obama for two terms starting in 2009, has been touted as a "dealmaker" and "Senate whisperer." In recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions of his party to try to hash out agreements on his agenda pieces . Biden is a long-time friend of Manchin , and he has embraced his one-time foe for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sanders , as key to getting his agenda through

unable to pass legislation five key factors blocked efforts Joe Manchin Kyrsten Sinema key moderates price tag nearly four decades "dealmaker" and "Senate whisperer." taken countless calls all factions hash out agreements long-time friend of Manchin one-time foe Sanders key to getting his agenda through

['', "President Joe Biden's economic agenda—largely built around two key pieces of legislation—is currently at a standstill in Congress, hanging by a thread nearly nine months into his time in office.", "Democrats control the U.S. House, Senate and White House but have so far been unable to pass legislation that was key to Biden's successful 2020 presidential campaign, and the clock is ticking.", 'After a brief recess, the U.S. House and Senate will fully return next week and try to pass a $1 trillion infrastructure package and up to $3.5 trillion package to massively expand the social safety net to include universal pre-kindergarten, paid family leave, expanded health care benefits and other progressive measures that Biden campaigned on.', "Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have both set October 31 as their deadline for getting the Democrats' crucial legislation through, as they face threats to their razor-thin majority margins heading into the 2022 election cycle.", 'Here are five key factors as Biden hopes to loosen the logjam and hold to his campaign promises:', 'Progressives flex', 'Progressive Democrats have so far blocked efforts in the House to pass the infrastructure bill that received bipartisan support in the Senate. The proposal, which would dole out millions to states for improvements to highways, bridges, broadband expansions and more priorities backed by both parties, has been linked to a separate expansion of the social safety net that is backed only by Democrats.', 'Senator Bernie Sanders, a Vermont Independent who caucuses with Democrats and chairs the influential Budget Committee, has applauded House progressives who have blocked any vote on the infrastructure bill until the Senate outlines its plans for the larger social spending plan.', 'Earlier this month, he told Democrats they should vote against the infrastructure vote if it came up, arguing in a statement that it would "end all leverage that we have to pass a major [social safety net expansion] bill."', "Representative Pramila Jayapal, a Washington Democrat who chairs the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said in a statement that progressives are holding to Biden's campaign promises.", '"This agenda is not some fringe wish list: it is the President\'s agenda, the Democratic agenda, and what we all promised voters when they delivered us the House, Senate and White House," she said.', "House Republican leaders have instructed all members to vote against the bill so Democrats have little room for defections in their 220 majority to the GOP's 212 minority, giving progressives room to hold off bills as they push their priorities.", "Pelosi recently told reporters at the Capitol that she won't bring up legislation that won't pass.", 'Moderates stand firm', 'Democrats hold an advantage in the Senate only if all 50 senators vote together, backed with a tie-breaker from Vice President Kamala Harris, so the pathway to passing the larger spending proposal to advance social programs is narrow.', 'Senators Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement on the package.', 'Manchin has argued that he would rather see a number closer to $1.5 trillion, rather than the $3.5 trillion that Biden and Democratic leaders have proposed for the package.', '"Let me make it very clear: There\'s a lot of speculation about what number on reconciliation—my number has been 1.5," Manchin told reporters at the Capitol last week. "This is going to take time to get this done. Getting it done quickly is not going to benefit anybody."', "Meanwhile, Sinema, who has faced backlash from Democrats over her decision to block the bill, also has voiced criticism over the price tag of the sweeping plan. She's had multiple meetings with the Biden administration in recent weeks.", '"Senator Sinema said publicly more than two months ago, before Senate passage of the bipartisan infrastructure bill, that she would not support a bill costing $3.5 trillion," Sinema spokesman John LaBombard said in a statement. "While we do not negotiate through the press, because Senator Sinema respects the integrity of those direct negotiations, she continues to engage directly in good-faith discussions with both President Biden and Senator Schumer to find common ground."', "Biden's political prowess", 'Biden, who was in the U.S. Senate for nearly four decades before becoming vice president to Barack Obama for two terms starting in 2009, has been touted as a "dealmaker" and "Senate whisperer."', "In recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions of his party to try to hash out agreements on his agenda pieces.", "During a pre-recorded video message to the Democratic National Committee's fall convention over the weekend, he stressed that Democrats can only pass his agenda through unity.", '"My message is simple, we need to stay together," he told the Democrats. "We won 2020 as a unified party."', 'CNN reported that in a private phone video call with progressive Democrats last week, Representative Ro Khanna, a California Democrat, suggested that Biden should get Sanders and Manchin to meet in person to try and hash out their differences after publicly feuding. But Biden quipped it would be like "homicide" to get the two on the same page.', "Sanders had come out swinging in a hastily-called press conference at the Capitol directly responding to Manchin's claims that progressives were seeking entitlements.", '"First, let\'s be clear—poll after poll, including polls in West Virginia, shows us that what we are trying to do in this legislation is enormously popular," Sanders told reporters. "Senator Manchin has been critical of the $3.5 trillion proposal that many of us support, but the time is long overdue for him to tell us with specificity what he wants and does not want and explain that to the American people."', 'Biden is a long-time friend of Manchin, and he has embraced his one-time foe for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sanders, as key to getting his agenda through.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Rudd-Neg-Harvard-Round4.docx

Minnesota

DaRu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaRu/Minnesota-Davis-Rudd-Neg-Harvard-Round4.docx

80023b02bd707d0e5f40d91c590199ac6dfbd05d89fb214267b277273e095383

Synthetic food production is the only way to solve in time

Gronvall 15 (Gigi Kwik Gronvall, PhD, Senior Associate, UPMC Center for Health Security, “US Competitiveness in Synthetic Biology,” Health Security, 13(6), 12-1-2015, pp.378–389, DOI: 10.1089/hs.2015.0046)

GMO presents no hazards substantial benefits lower prices less pesticide less water increased yields more stable prices also necessity Maximizing food through GMOs only avenue to provide enough food

evidence on the safety of “ GMO ” foods is in are clear Genetic engineering presents no unique hazards In addition to the lack of harm found in GMO use, there are substantial benefits to using GMOs: lower food prices ; less pesticide use , which is safer for farmers; less water needed ; increased crop yields ; and more stable prices . There is also necessity Maximizing food production through GMOs may be the only avenue to provide people with enough food .

lower food prices less pesticide use less water needed increased crop yields more stable prices only avenue to provide people with enough food .

['It should be stated that the evidence on the safety of “GMO” foods is in, and the results are clear. Genetic engineering presents no unique hazards compared to other methods that create genetic modification, such as traditional breeding or hybridization. Major scientific organizations, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the National Academies of Science, and the American Medical Association (AMA) all back GMOs as being safe. In a meta-review of the safety of genetically engineered crop research that evaluated 1,783 research papers and reports from the years 2002 to 2012, no significant hazards were identified.70,71 The European Commission funded 1,340 research projects from 500 independent teams looking at GMO safety and none found risks.69 In addition to the lack of harm found in GMO use, there are substantial benefits to using GMOs: lower food prices; less pesticide use, which is safer for farmers; less water needed; increased crop yields; and more stable prices.69 There is also necessity: The UN FAO estimates that the world will need to grow 70% more food by 2050 just to keep up with population growth. There may be 10 billion people on earth, requiring more food to be grown in the next 75 years than has been produced in all of human history.72 Climate change, with the loss of arable land, will worsen this problem. Maximizing food production through GMOs may be the only avenue to provide people with enough food.', 'States CP']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Emory-BePa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

Emory

BePa

6e640baee8a9b424867eec7bb8b9bf147f9ec13d2999ffe7e3436ce7ab756bed

No SCS war – China will avoid confrontation.

Yuan 20 - author of “Panda Not Dragon: Why The Rise of China is not a Threat”. Yuan’s works have appeared on multiple scholarly journals and conferences, with topics including the conflict between China and Japan over the Senkaku islands, South Korea’s cultural influence on Modern China, and others. He is currently completing his doctoral degree at Rutgers University. Yuan received his B.A. from Centre College and his M.S. from Northeastern University.

China will avoid confronting the U S in the S C S for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective This imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications when it comes to decision-making areas in which army officers have no experience. the “peace disease” continues to hamper China’s military modernization China’s military poses little threat to the U S and allies China’s stockpile of weapons is substantially inferior deterring a full-fledged war China currently lacks any dependable military allies in the region the U S can depend on So Ko Japan Taiwan Australia the Philippines ASEAN the country has many systemic problems within its military institutional change takes a long time

while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region. the world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers China will continue to avoid directly confronting the U nited S tates in the S outh C hina S ea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective . China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness. If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable China only recently created their first and only joint command system This imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications , such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs― areas in which army officers have no experience. the “peace disease” ―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability― continues to hamper China’s military modernization , as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat If the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so, China’s military poses little threat to the U nited S tates and its allies the country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety (ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017 China’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea. China’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation China currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region , North Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast the international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the U nited S tates can easily depend on So uth Ko rea, Japan , Taiwan , Australia , and the Philippines to provide naval support the increasing cooperation between the United States and ASEAN ) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region US allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence. Chinese ships are around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement. China is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers China may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature. the country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military institutional change ―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system― takes a long time China does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea

China will continue to avoid directly confronting the U nited S tates in the S outh C hina S ea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective . China’s military poses little threat to the U nited S tates and its allies China does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea

['Shaoyu, 2-20-2020, South China Sea Threat Assessment: Is China a Threat or a Paper Tiger?, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/02/20/south-china-sea-threat-assessment/', '', 'Tensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s Rear Admiral Lou Yuan, regarded as a hawkish military commentator, recently proclaimed that the continuing dispute over the ownership of the South China Sea could be resolved by sinking two US aircraft carriers. Statements like these result in a legitimate fear that China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea might spark a kinetic military conflict with the United States. However, while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region. Despite China’s constant verbal objections and rising tensions with the United States in the last century, the world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers. China will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective. China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness. If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable. However, even as it boasts the second largest defense spending figures worldwide, China only recently created their first and only joint command system, the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), under President Xi Jinping’s new national defense and military reform. In addition, around 70 percent of the PLA soldiers belong to the PLA Army, and almost all senior officers on the CMC are army officers. This imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications, such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs―areas in which army officers have no experience. The Chinese are certainly attempting to resolve this problem by establishing departments like the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force, which handles logistical operations and oversees the military supplies, infirmaries, and barracks of the PLA. However, the “peace disease”―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability―continues to hamper China’s military modernization, as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat. If the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so, China’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies. Sea power is crucial for taking control of the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy is divided into the North, East, and South Fleets. Among the four divisions, the PLAN’s South Fleets poses the most immediate threat because it is currently active in the South China Sea. Together, the fleets possess only one aircraft carrier in operation: the Liaoning, an abandoned Soviet-era vessel that was purchased from Ukraine as a training ship, but reportedly had to return to port immediately due to an engine failure during a sea trial. The country’s one and only domestically built aircraft carrier, the Type 001A, is under scrutiny, as it is believed that the carrier manager might have leaked classified information of Liaoning to the CIA. In contrast, the United States possesses nineteen aircraft carriers, far outnumbering the Chinese. Although the number and strength of aircraft carriers do not necessarily determine the victor of a confrontation, the tonnage of a country’s navy might. Larger tonnage provides more space for fuel, weapons, and ammunition, and a vessel with bigger hull not only has more rounds to fire but also the capability to endure longer voyages. The United States Navy has a total tonnage at least two times greater than that of PLAN’s. China also lags in its ballistic missiles. For instance, China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) only began to field its Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) DF-26 in 2016, and the country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017. In reality, China’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea. Alone, China’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation and would therefore be forced to turn to its allies. China currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region,', '', '', ' North Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast. Although China and North Korea maintained strong relations during the Cold War era, the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship has gradually declined since the beginning of the twenty-first century and the start of North Korea’s nuclear program. China has joined the United Nations in implementing sanctions against North Korea because of its unauthorized nuclear testing. Although China remains North Korea’s closest friend, an alliance is rather far-fetched. Moreover, the international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the United States can easily depend on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines to provide naval support. In addition, although the United States is not allied with most of the Southeast Asian nations, the increasing cooperation between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region. In contrast, China and ASEAN only had their first joint maritime exercise last year, which mostly focused on the code for unplanned encounters at sea, search and rescue operations, and communication exercises. In addition, US allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence. Although China’s navy has recently commissioned the Nanchang guided-missile destroyer (the biggest surface warship ever made), the vessel is only powerful in relation to other Chinese ships, which are around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement. Consequently, China is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers for each of its regional fleets to build the Nanchang. China may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature. China is undoubtedly on the rise, yet the country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military. Perhaps some of these problems could be resolved with China’s continued growth, but institutional change―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system―takes a long time. Based on what defense analysts currently observe, China does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea; therefore, there is no need to invest more resources and capital into the Pacific for the time being. However, the United States should maintain its presence in the area by continuing to foster relationships with its allies while keeping a close eye on China’s movements. Sacrificing resources for the sake of military proliferation in a region where such action is unneeded is a wasteful move that the United States should avoid.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-BaCh-Aff-kentucky-Round-4.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

1afabf52bb1cd9031c1960b3c0a15ffb4f1b14332d5aebe98a94ccd2e6e5edbf

Risks global food scarcity and war

Castellaw 17—(National Security Lecturer at the University of Tennessee, Retired Lieutenant General in the United States Marine Corps). John Castellaw. “Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security”. Agri-Pulse. 5/1/2017. . Accessed 6/28/21.

threats include ISIS North Korea nuclear Iran Russia China history has shown stable prices produce secure countries. Food insecurity drives mass migration destabilizing populations and threatening diplomatic relationships . Emerging markets purchase 20 percent of U.S. exports to grow as populations boom. insecure countries deteriorate into shooting wars Our active support for ag development stabilize key regions contribut to the world’s security

threats include extremist elements such as ISIS and wars with North Korea or nuclear Iran heated competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges te incubators for extremist factions response must be including Food Security Recent history has shown that stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely , food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability , unrest , and violence . Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations , generating conflicts , and threatening security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships . Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlate with protests and riots Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings Emerging markets purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries these situations deteriorate into shooting wars Our active support for food security, including ag riculture development , has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and ag ricultural prosperity while materially contribut ing to our Nation’s and the world’s security

ISIS North Korea Iran Russia China stable prices instability unrest violence mass migration destabilizing neighboring populations diplomatic relationships shocks correlate Haiti Madagascar Arab Spring 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports grow deteriorate into shooting wars active support ag stabilize key regions ag contribut world’s security

['', 'The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.', 'An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.', 'Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability.', 'The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.', 'Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs.', 'This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. ', 'Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. ', 'Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being.', 'Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.', '', '', 'Fetus DA—', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaHe-Neg-ADA-Fall-Championship-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

HaHe

254d858447791a1b100973c9703451a758f23208eebdb2cce3ea1dcfcd2621ac

It's the most appealing option for species conservation

Damiano 14, Duke University School of Law, J.D./M.A. in Environmental Science and Policy expected 2014; Princeton University, A.B. 2009 (Devon Lea, “LICENSED TO KILL: A DEFENSE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT,” Duke Law Journal, 63)

Vicarious liability of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists to hold local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species vicarious liability that focuses on governments’ misfeasance is likely to persuade a court vicarious liability would be a desirable and reasonable tool for conservation

Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species there is binding precedent upholding it in only a few jurisdictions A limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or local governments’ misfeasance is likely to persuade a court vicarious liability would be a desirable and reasonable practical tool for conservation

appealing option state or local governments’ misfeasance vicarious liability practical tool for conservation

['Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species. As described in Part III.B., under the vicarious liability doctrine, Louisiana could be liable for licensing shrimp trawling vessels and gear that do not have TEDs installed. This theory, however, has faced almost unanimous disapproval in the academic literature, and there is binding precedent upholding it in only a few jurisdictions.235 The doctrine may be on thin ice. A limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or local governments’ misfeasance (that is, affirmative actions that cause others to commit a take) is much more likely to persuade a court than a broader theory encompassing nonfeasance.236 The narrower version of vicarious liability proposed in this Note is consistent with the text and general purpose of the ESA, would be a desirable and reasonable practical tool for conservation, and could form the basis for a successful challenge to Louisiana’s regulatory program. ', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Neg-Texas-Open-Doubles.docx

Kansas

PaSe

aba2061a14f06c248c04512f3458d3bbb969962797f05d51593ab75c21a52d2a

Prefer us on disease 1. COVID thumps – standard healthcare sufficient to head of pandemics 2. Pandemics cant cause extinction 3. COVID proves healthcare is resilient AND innovation has only improved

Jansen et al ’20 — Leigh Jansen (Associate Partner, McKinsey & Company); “Industry innovation: How has COVID-19 changed global healthcare?;” World Economic Forum; November 25th, 2020;

COVID-19 changed healthcare COVID placed unparalleled demands on healthcare vividly demonstrated resilience and ability to bring innovations quickly leaders meet the innovation imperative a crisis can create urgency that rallies collaborative effort the healthcare industry has produced inspiring innovation in products services and business models Sheba working with TytoCare to keep patients in homes Zipline distribute supplies via drones telehealth has exploded to

COVID-19 changed healthcare While the COVID -19 has placed unparalleled demands on healthcare the industry’s response has vividly demonstrated resilience and ability to bring innovations quickly leaders of healthcare organizations meet the innovation imperative a crisis can create urgency that rallies collaborative effort breaks organizational silos and overcomes inertia During this year the healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products services processes and business and delivery models Sheba is working with TytoCare to keep COVID patients in their homes Zipline quickly formed a partnership to distribute supplies to hospitals via drones The adoption of telehealth has exploded from 11 percent using to

COVID-19 changed healthcare the COVID -19 unparalleled demands healthcare vividly demonstrated resilience ability to bring innovations quickly meet the innovation imperative urgency rallies collaborative effort breaks organizational silos overcomes inertia inspiring examples innovation COVID patients in their homes via drones telehealth has exploded

['[TITLE]: Industry Innovation: How has COVID-19 changed global healthcare?', 'While the COVID-19 pandemic has placed unparalleled demands on modern healthcare systems, the industry’s response has vividly demonstrated its resilience and ability to bring innovations to market quickly.', 'The effects of the pandemic on the industry continue to be profound. The shifts in consumer behavior, an\xa0, and the likely deep and lasting economic impact will potentially affect healthcare companies no less—and quite possibly more—than those in other sectors. Around the world, more than\xa0\xa0we polled believe COVID-19 will fundamentally change their businesses, and 85 percent predict lasting changes in customers’ preferences. Among healthcare leaders, two-thirds expect this period to be the most challenging in their careers.1', 'To meet both the humanitarian challenge and the obligation to their stakeholders, leaders of healthcare organizations need to meet the innovation imperative. History tells us that organizations that invest in innovation during a crisis\xa0\xa0(exhibit). What’s more, a crisis can create an urgency that rallies collaborative effort, breaks through organizational silos, and overcomes institutional inertia.', '', 'During the course of this year, the healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products, services, processes, and business and delivery models, often in partnership with other sectors. For example, Sheba Medical Center in Israel is working with TytoCare to keep COVID-19 patients in their homes by supplying them with special stethoscopes that both listen to their hearts and transmit images of their lungs to a care team that can intervene as appropriate.2\xa0In the United States, Zipline, which specializes in delivering medical supplies to remote areas, quickly formed a partnership with Novant Health in North Carolina to distribute supplies to hospitals via drones.3\xa0The adoption of telehealth has exploded, from 11 percent of consumers using it in 2019 to\xa0, and well more than half of healthcare providers polled indicate higher comfort with this care-delivery method than before.']

[(0, 16)]

ndtceda

KansasState-SuRo-Neg-77th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-6.docx

KansasState

SuRo

2bef2f92d67df7ffe36314d290c0ac30f4bcaf9c8401d0e1af7a216010f835d1

The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of organizing towards the Party---that’s the best way to create accountability mechanisms, educate and mobilize, and connect local struggles towards international liberation

Escalante 18, Alyson---Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist (“Party Organizing In The 21st Century,” Forge News, September 21, 2018, accessed November 20, 2019, https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/)

base building and dual power can be best forwarded through party organizing to solidify a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency By building institutions we concretely demonstrate that communists can offer relief Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed We must refuse covert front organizing and have a public face as a communist party party organizing adopts the party model whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making . The party creates internal methods for holding members accountable , unifying action and educating members our struggle functions not only at the national but at the international level party organizing allows organizations and organizers to be held accountable criticism function as comrades working to sharpen each others strategies and correct ideas and actions imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these allows us to address problems The party model creates a means for sustained growth that allows for skills , strategies , and ideas to be shared It is important to explore unification as a long term goal Serving the people means meeting material needs while educating radicalizing , and organizing . The party model remains the most useful base building is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism , but pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy fighting capitalism

base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible . There exists very little popular support for socialist politics The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next to mobilize the base we need to have already done the work of building a communist party we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party . When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing By “ party organizing ” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model . Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making . The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable , unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions . It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group , but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs , but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves . The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills , strategies , and ideas to be shared with newer organizers . It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy . It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification , and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror . Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing . It means radicalizing , recruiting , and organizing . The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism , but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed

solidify powerful revolutionary socialist tendency current state of the left one in which revolution is not currently possible dual power concretely demonstrate Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed we need to have already done the work of building a communist party public face as a communist party adopts the party model formally unified party line determined by democratic centralist decision making internal methods holding party members accountable unifying party member action educating formal organization tied to and informed by unified national and international strategy. only at the national held accountable for their actions not as one independent group criticizing another independent group as comrades with a formal organizational unity sharpen each others strategies help correct chauvinist ideas and actions Creating formal unity party procedure dealing with and correcting not simply meet peoples needs pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves skills strategies ideas active role becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy alongside aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth explore the possibility of unification long term goal building dual power recruitment education establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror unified openly and transparently meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing radicalizing recruiting organizing most useful method for achieving these ends make it clear is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism best path open a conversation

['', 'I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement.', 'My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States.', 'One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them.', 'The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed.', 'The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base?', 'Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing.', 'By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism.', 'Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus.', 'Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing.', 'Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions.', 'We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring.', 'What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal.', 'In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends.', 'The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself.', 'It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.', 'Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism.', 'The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion.', 'I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-8---Indiana-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

9fd3e58fbf0b2e8cee5a4006fa1cf504a18981b3494d940d57b1a7c14f981ee4

The plan is nature—that includes any man-made object and is divisible.

Brady 18 - (Amy Brady interviewing Menno Schilthuizen permanent research scientist at Naturalis Biodiversity Center and professor of evolution and biodiversity at Leiden University; 3-28-2018, Chicago Review of Books, "Why Cities Are Natural Habitats, Too," doa: 11-3-2022) url: https://chireviewofbooks.com/2018/03/28/when-darwin-comes-to-town-menno-schilthuizen-interview/

We often define nature as without people But I don’t see nature that way . Humans are animal species Anything these animal species do is natural

We often define nature as anything that goes on in the world without the intervention of people . But I don’t see any reason to define nature that way . Humans are one of the many animal species that inhabit Earth. Anything that these animal species do is natural , and the same applies to humans .

nature without the intervention of people I don’t see any reason to define nature that way many animal species animal species natural same applies to humans

['', 'It depends on how you define nature, of course. We often define nature as anything that goes on in the world without the intervention of people. In that sense, cities are divorced from nature by definition. But I don’t see any reason to define nature that way. Humans are one of the many animal species that inhabit Earth. Anything that these animal species do is natural, and the same applies to humans. If it is in our nature to build structures that house millions of individuals, then that makes cities just as natural a phenomenon as, say, coral reefs or ant nests.', '', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-8---Indiana-Octas.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

f5b6b72af3a7addc593bf50e4bf1a018cfc40b52b01843bcdc9b861fcb3807a4

Alt’s paradigm crushes resistance to material aspects of colonialism by reducing all movements to a binary.

Corey Snelgrove et al. 14, University of British Columbia; Rita Kaur Dhamoon, University of Victoria; and Jeff Corntassel, University of Victoria, 2014, “Unsettling settler colonialism: The discourse and politics of settlers, and solidarity with Indigenous nations,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 1-32, http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/21166/17970

Settlers need to be challeng ing institutions that further colonization. settlers continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act we run the risk of represent ing settlers as transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices we renaturalize it lines of affinity between decolonization and struggles relationships are essential

Corey: This interdependent focus is important amongst settlers ourselves as a way to counter the flattening of differences that occurs amongst settlers, particularly in solidarity work. Settlers obviously need to be challeng ing ‘our’ institutions and practices that further colonization. But we can’t do this if we flatten the differences and ignore the inequalities and power relationships that exist within settler society. Not only does such flattening prevent much needed alliances but flattening can protect elements of settler colonialism the substantive recognition of Indigenous governance and legal orders also requires a dismantling of other, related forms of domination sites and spaces of domination and resistance are distinct, but connected dialectically. This seems to be something that settlers, white settlers specifically, have yet to articulate and take up, critique and act against this is most evident in how settlers seem to be continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act Rita If we’re thinking about settler colonialism as a structure, how is it related to other modalities of gendered and sexualized white supremacy? If we’re thinking about it, as non-Indigenous peoples being ‘in solidarity’, part of that is locating, attacking the whole structure of imperialism that is deeply gendered and homonationalist, that depends on neo-liberal projects of prioritizing able-bodied workers who can serve capitalism Corey: Part of this relates to the framing of ‘settler’ as event, rather than structure – where we are perhaps overly focused on the question of ‘who’ at the expense of the ‘how’. If we don’t understand how settlers are produced we run the risk of represent ing settlers as some sort of transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices while in one moment the term ‘settler’ denaturalizes all non-Indigenous peoples presence on Indigenous lands through this construction of the ‘settler’ as transhistorical, we renaturalize it we go from a disavowal of colonization, to its representation as inevitable . Here is where a historical materialist approach to the production of settler subjects may be useful in show ing how this production is conditioned by but also contingent on a number of factors – white supremacy, hetero-patriarchy, capitalism , colonization, the eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders, environmental degradation, etc. it is important to recognize that there are individuals or collectives that might be referred to as something other than settlers by Indigenous peoples, perhaps as cousins there have been and are practices by settlers that aren’t colonial and here is where centering Indigenous peoples’ accounts of Indigenous-settler relations, as well as their own governance, legal and diplomatic orders is crucial it’s just as important to recognize that these relations have and do not occur despite settler colonial and imperial logics, and outside of the binary such relations occur in the face of it Corey recognizing that settlers are (re)produced, the change demanded is not just an individual transformation , but one connected to broader social, economic, and political justice. There are lines of affinity between decolonization and others struggles in order to sustain this compatibility relationships are essential to maintain accountability and to resist repeating colonial and other relations of domination, as well as in supporting each other’s resistance

flattening of differences can’t do this prevent alliances can serve capitalism run the risk transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices renaturalize it representation as inevitable historical materialist approach capitalism aren’t colonial outside of the binary not just an individual transformation connected lines of affinity relationships are essential

['Corey: This relational, interdependent focus is also important amongst settlers ourselves – perhaps as a way to counter the flattening of differences that occurs amongst settlers, particularly in solidarity work. Settlers obviously need to be doing our own work and challenging ‘our’ institutions and practices that serve to protect or further colonization. But we can’t do this if we flatten the differences and ignore the inequalities and power relationships that exist within settler society. Not only does such flattening prevent much needed alliances but flattening itself can actually work to protect certain elements of settler colonialism. For instance, white supremacy works to naturalize white settler presence. In terms of solidarity then, I find it problematic for myself, as a white, class privileged, cis-hetero, and able bodied male (as well as people like me) to demand other peoples to act in solidarity, while also not holding myself (and others like me) responsible and accountable to other forms of violence that may be a contributing factor to the further reification of structures that support settler colonialism, like the State. Now I’m not arguing for the continued eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders because others experience violence, but rather, that the substantive recognition of Indigenous governance and legal orders also requires a dismantling of other, related forms of domination. This latter dismantling I see as necessary but also insufficient for the dismantling of settler colonialism. These sites and spaces of domination and resistance are distinct, but also connected dialectically. This seems to be something that settlers, white settlers specifically, have yet to articulate and take up, critique and act against. And this is perhaps most evident in how settlers seem to be continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act. Rita: I wonder if this relational approach is a more useful direction for settler colonial studies, not unlike the kind of work you do Jeff, in thinking about colonialism in a global, comparative context. Jeff: And I think, the more you can make those links, the British occupation of Maori territory is directly related to HBC’s strategy to begin treaty making here... All those things are interrelated. They are shared, and they are seen as shared strategies. The other thing I see is this impulse to delocalize it... it’s always that kind of Free Tibet Syndrome... the further away acts of genocide are from your location, the more outrage expressed at these injustices. It’s a way of avoiding complicity, but it’s also a way of recasting the gaze. It’s like, ‘We’re not going to look right here, because this appears to be fairly peaceful’ And so it’s always that sort of re-directing away from localized responsibility, and almost magnifying impacts farther away. Rita: So what settler colonial studies does do, is help us relocate to locality, which is helpful. You mention the HBC. I wonder what was the relationship between the Hudson Bay Company in Canada and the East India Company or the East Africa Company? If we’re thinking about settler colonialism as a structure, how is it related to other modalities of gendered and sexualized white supremacy? How are the logics of State sovereignty and authority over nonwhite bodies connected? If we’re thinking about it, as non-Indigenous peoples being ‘in solidarity’, part of that is locating, attacking the whole structure of imperialism that is deeply gendered and homonationalist, that depends on neo-liberal projects of prioritizing able-bodied workers who can serve capitalism. Corey: Part of this, I think, what we’ve been discussing here, relates to what I sometimes see as the framing of ‘settler’ as event, rather than structure – where we are perhaps overly focused on the question of ‘who’ at the expense of the ‘how’. If we don’t understand how settlers are produced we run the risk of representing settlers as some sort of transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices. So I’m worried that while in one moment the term ‘settler’ denaturalizes our – that is all non-Indigenous peoples – presence on Indigenous lands, in the next, and through this construction of the ‘settler’ as transhistorical, we renaturalize it. In short, we go from a disavowal of colonization, to its representation as inevitable. Here is where I think a historical materialist or genealogical approach to the production of settler subjects may be useful in showing how this production is conditioned by but also contingent on a number of factors – white supremacy, hetero-patriarchy, capitalism, colonization, the eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders, environmental degradation, etc. Now this is also not to say that the binary of Indigenous/Settler isn’t accurate. I think its fundamental. Rather, I think it is possible and important to recognize that there have been, and are, individuals (or even collectives) that might be referred to as something other than settlers by Indigenous peoples, perhaps as cousins. Or in a similar vein, that there have been and are practices by settlers that aren’t colonial (and here is where centering Indigenous peoples’ accounts of Indigenous-settler relations, as well as their own governance, legal and diplomatic orders is crucial). But I think it’s just as important to recognize that these relations have and do not occur despite settler colonial and imperial logics, and thus outside of the binary. Rather, such relations occur in the face of it. The binary then is fundamental as the logics that uphold the binary cannot be ignored due to the existence of possiblly good relations as the logics that uphold the binary threaten those relations through the pursuit of the elimination of Indigenous peoples. Rita: Yet, how do we act in light of these entanglements, and with, rather than overcoming differences? Corey: Tuck and Yang (2012) had this really great article, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor.” In it, they talk about the importance of an ethics of incommensurability – a recognition of how anti-racist and anti-capitalist struggles are incommensurable with decolonization. But what I’ve been thinking about recently is whether these struggles are incompatible. For example, in the Indigenous resurgence literature, there is a turn away, but it’s also not an outright rejection. It also demands settlers to change. Yet recognizing that settlers are (re)produced, the change demanded is not just an individual transformation, but one connected to broader social, economic, and political justice. There are then, it seems, potential lines of affinity between decolonization and others, though incommensurable, struggles. And in order to sustain this compatibility in the face of incommensurability, relationships are essential in order to maintain accountability and to resist repeating colonial and other relations of domination, as well as, in very strategic terms, in supporting each other’s resistance. ', '']

[(6, 25)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

a146958625c50e813ed9c259d3e2c858c1e401927279594a8aaa4951b420a735

‘Nuclear norms’ are resilient.

Lyon 20 – Rod Lyon is a senior fellow at ASPI. [Will the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Survive the 2020s? 2-21-2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/02/21/will_the_nuclear_non-proliferation_treaty_survive_the_2020s_115059.html]

every conference seems to precipitate unease Yet NPT will survive this conference, too , because treaty members believe uncontrolled nuc s make for more dangerous environment than one we have few states want NPT collapse P N W hasn’t been ratified

every review conference seems to precipitate a sense of unease over the treaty Yet the NPT will survive this conference, too , because most treaty members believe that an uncontrolled spread of nuc lear weapon s would make for a more dangerous environment than the one we already have few states want the NPT to collapse and leave the Treaty on the P rohibition of N uclear W eapons (which still hasn’t been ratified by enough states to enter into force) in sole possession of the field

every review conference precipitate a sense of unease this conference, too most treaty members P N W

['Still, every review conference seems to precipitate a sense of unease over the future of the treaty. This year’s no different. Yet the NPT will survive this conference, too, because most treaty members continue to believe that an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would make for a more dangerous international security environment than the one we already have. Moreover, few states would want the NPT to collapse and leave the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (which still hasn’t been ratified by enough states to enter into force) in sole possession of the field.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-Kentucky-Round-1.docx

Michigan

DoPh

357763810496e9885f622be3f96fb944f16c0bc61956903b347877567cf44b8d

Prophesies have been disproven. They’re Kremlin talking points.

Cristian Campeanu 22. Revista 22 columnist. "Meeting in Bucharest: will Nato remain united?” Eurotopics. November 30, 2022. https://www.eurotopics.net/en/292593/meeting-in-bucharest-will-nato-remain-united

Nato's unity has never been stronger the consensus on Ukraine is indisputable Since last spring , there have been discussions about a rift over fabricated reasons But this rupture, long prophesied by the Kremlin never happened

Nato's unity has never been stronger , and the consensus on the moral and political duty to support Ukraine is indisputable Since last spring , there have been discussions about a possible rift between Europeans and Americans over various more or less fabricated reasons But this rupture, long expected and prophesied by the Kremlin , never happened

unity never been stronger consensus moral political duty Ukraine indisputable last spring discussions possible rift fabricated long expected prophesied Kremlin

['Revista 22 sees no signs of a rupture in the Alliance:', "“On the contrary, Nato's unity has never been stronger, and the consensus on the moral and political duty to support Ukraine is indisputable. One purpose of the foreign ministers' meeting is to reaffirm this unity at the diplomatic level and consolidate support for the Alliance's shared foreign policy objectives in Ukraine and vis-à-vis Russia. Since last spring, there have been discussions about a possible rift between Europeans and Americans over various more or less fabricated reasons. But this rupture, long expected and prophesied by the Kremlin, never happened.”"]

[(8, 8), (9, 20)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Kentucky-Round-6.docx

Emory

KeRa

f3a0bb1a9f4f9d4ad64a1b5278fff1893188e019461d769b260719d23c544653

Uncertainty guts innovation.

Fraser ’16 [Erica; December; LL.M. Graduate, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom; Scripted, A Journal of Law, Technology & Society, “Computers as Inventors – Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law,” https://script-ed.org/article/computers-as-inventors-legal-and-policy-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-on-patent-law/]

principle of patent to encourage (R&D) by providing certainty Uncertainty regarding patent can weaken market value influences holders’ costs outweigh benefits Beyond chilling R&D uncertainty within patent system negate economic benefits undermine innovation

Legal Uncertainty A principle of the patent system is to encourage (R&D) by providing innovators with certainty Uncertainty regarding validity of a patent can weaken its market value and affect ability to extract value through licensing uncertainty influences rights holders’ behaviour ; costs of searching could outweigh the benefits gained from patenting Beyond this chilling effect on R&D legal uncertainty within the patent system may negate economic benefits from other patent uses financing or deterring competitors from enforcement high levels of uncertainty undermine ability to deliver rewards that incentivise research, innovation , and knowledge the very incentives patent system is intended to provide

principle (R&D) certainty Uncertainty weaken holders’ behaviour outweigh chilling effect uncertainty patent system innovation

['2.2.2 Legal Uncertainty', 'A principle aim of the patent system is to encourage research and development (R&D) investment by providing innovators with a reasonable certainty of a return on the resulting inventions.47 If the computer generation of texts describing inventions exponentially expands the state of the art, it would put the patentability of inventions into question and increase the likelihood of issued patents being invalidated on the grounds of anticipation or lack of inventive step.48 Uncertainty regarding validity and enforceability of a patent can weaken its market value and affect a rights holder’s ability to extract value through licensing or litigation.49 Further, uncertainty influences rights holders’ behaviour; for example, the costs of searching and the risk of later discovering a piece of prior art that invalidates a patent could outweigh the benefits otherwise gained from patenting an invention, thereby reducing the motivation to conduct R&D, to attempt to obtain patent protection, and to litigate.50 Beyond this chilling effect on R&D and patenting, legal uncertainty within the patent system may also negate some economic benefits from other patent uses such as obtaining financing or deterring competitors from patent enforcement.51 Patents cannot unconditionally protect the applicants’ investments or guarantee the validity of a patent if challenged; however, high levels of uncertainty undermine their ability to deliver the rewards that incentivise research, innovation, and knowledge diffusion – the very incentives that the patent system is intended to provide.52']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Aff-Georgetown-Round-3.docx

Michigan

McSk

1a9dd0d8453c48c1f512c76f758cd5c2779daec31df09adeb78167df6e0f3684

No offset

Reynolds 10 – PhD in Atmospheric Sciences (Michael, “Report from the On-board Scientist: Aerosols, Volcanoes and Global Dimming,” 2010, http://www.aroundtheamericas.org/log/report-from-the-on-board-scientist-aerosols-volcanoes-and-global-dimming/)

aerosols can have a heating effect on global climate Does this mean we should all drive our cars? No, because the offset that aerosols make on all of all these activities is smaller than the impact those activities make on global warming aerosols slow the process but do not stop it

aerosols can have a heating effect on global climate the net effect of aerosols is to reduce the rate of global warming Does this mean we should all go build fires and drive our cars? No, because the offset that aerosols make on all of all these activities is smaller than the impact those activities make on global warming aerosols slow down the process but do not stop it

offset smaller than the impact those activities make on global warming do not stop

['On the other hand, aerosols can add heat to the atmosphere which partially offsets the cooling effect. As the Earth heats up from the sun, it radiates heat back to space. Aerosols absorb some of the heat radiation and reduce the amount of heat radiation escaping out to space. This is the same heat-blocking effect attributed to greenhouse gasses, and in this way aerosols can have a heating effect on global climate. Nevertheless, the net effect of aerosols is to reduce the rate of global warming from greenhouse gasses. Does this mean we should all go build fires and drive our cars? No, because the offset that aerosols make on all of all these activities is smaller than the impact those activities make on global warming. Models and data now show that aerosols reduce the increase in global temperature by a factor of approximately 50% (there is uncertainty in the actual amount). So, they slow down the process but do not stop it. And they create pollution and effect health at the same time.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-77th-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-8.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

78c881e5ab9ff836b1dd95911d57644583dd46f09020abec3f427c328ca57032

‘Increase’

Dr. Howard Newby 4, BA and PhD from the University of Essex, Chair of the Higher Education Funding Council for England, Former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Liverpool, “Joint Committee on the Draft Charities Bill - Written Evidence”, Memorandum from the Higher Education Funding Council for England, 9/30/2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtchar/167/167we98.htm

"increase" used in the exercise of a function , rather than an objective itself an obligation to "increase" is unworkable as it does not adequately define the limits of duty

the word "increase" used in relation to considerations to be taken into account in the exercise of a function , rather than an objective in itself an obligation on principal regulators to "increase" is unworkable as it does not adequately define the limits of the statutory duty

in the exercise of a function objective unworkable adequately define the limits

['9.1 The Draft Bill creates an obligation on the principal regulator to do all that it "reasonably can to meet the compliance objective in relation to the charity".[ 45] The Draft Bill defines the compliance objective as "to increase compliance by the charity trustees with their legal obligations in exercising control and management of the administration of the charity".[ 46] ', '9.2 Although the word "increase" is used in relation to the functions of a number of statutory bodies,[47] such examples demonstrate that "increase" is used in relation to considerations to be taken into account in the exercise of a function, rather than an objective in itself. ', '9.3 HEFCE is concerned that an obligation on principal regulators to "increase" compliance per se is unworkable, in so far as it does not adequately define the limits or nature of the statutory duty. Indeed, the obligation could be considered to be ever-increasing.']

[(11, 18)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Northwestern-Round3.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-Northwestern-Round3.docx

213b385ee1b1e75f87dc64b4f78060c7be952a94e83c26e825b4b6690bd63596

Can’t solve the link, even if the DoD consults the FTC has to expend a ton of resources

Macy & Lee 17, *Creighton J., Attorney, Baker McKenzie. Formerly served as chief of staff and senior counsel in the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, working as a senior advisor to the acting assistant attorney general on civil and criminal antitrust enforcement and policy matters, as well as budget and personnel issues. **Craig Y., Attorney, Baker McKenzie. Leads the Firm’s global cartel task force (12-14-2017, "When Merger Review Turns Criminal", American Bar Association, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/12/07_lee/)

separation of criminal and civil enforcement sections does not create silos different offices work together many civil investigations pull resources from various sections Cross ‑ pollination occurs as attorneys are detailed to other sections hand ‑ in ‑ hand coordination between civil and criminal sections will continue Once documents fall into the FTC’s hands they will be closely reviewed with an eye toward criminal actions the FTC and A D share a close working relationship

separation of criminal and civil enforcement sections at the Antitrust Division does not create walls or silos different offices work together on large investigations the size of many civil investigations requires pull i ng resources from the various civil sections Coordination between the civil and criminal sections is the norm Section managers meet regularly to discuss matters and often consult Cross ‑ pollination occurs at the trial attorney level as attorneys are detailed to other sections for specific matters or periods of time The matter is not the first criminal case to stem from a civil investigation and will not be the last The hand ‑ in ‑ hand coordination between the civil and criminal sections will continue Merger review does not exist in a vacuum . Once documents fall into the Antitrust Division’s or FTC’s hands , parties can expect that they will be closely reviewed with an eye toward both civil and criminal actions attorneys need to be sure that the story told is one to support a proposed deal and not a criminal investigation . the FTC and A ntitrust D ivision share a close working relationship

separation does not create walls or silos work together on large investigations pull i ng resources from the various civil sections norm Cross ‑ pollination detailed to other sections specific matters periods of time not the first criminal case will not be the last hand ‑ in ‑ hand coordination will continue does not exist in a vacuum or FTC’s both civil and criminal actions need to be sure not a criminal investigation close working relationship

['But that separation of criminal and civil enforcement sections at the Antitrust Division does not create walls or silos. The different criminal offices often work together on large investigations and trials. Similarly, the size of many civil investigations requires pulling resources from the various civil sections, as well as from the Antitrust Division’s Appellate, International, and Competition Policy and Advocacy sections. But the collaboration does not end there. Coordination between the civil and criminal sections is the norm. Section managers meet regularly to discuss matters and often consult on an informal basis. Cross‑pollination occurs at the trial attorney level as attorneys are detailed to other sections for specific matters or periods of time. And understanding this collaboration between the civil and criminal sections is vital to attorneys and their clients subject to the merger review process. A recent case not only shows how in sync the Antitrust Division’s criminal and civil sections are, but also highlights the implications of that collaboration.', 'In December 2014, two packaged seafood companies announced their proposed merger. As is customary to the review process, the parties submitted documents to one of the Antitrust Division’s civil sections. What followed was anything but routine. However, based on the level of collaboration within the Antitrust Division, it should not have been unexpected.', 'From document review to charges for price-fixing', 'The Antitrust Division’s civil attorneys reviewed the documents submitted by the parties and uncovered information that raised concerns of price‑fixing. When the parties walked away from the deal on December 3, 2015, then-Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer’s statement in the press release made a veiled reference to their problematic documents. He said, “Our investigation convinced us—and the parties knew or should have known from the get-go—that the market is not functioning competitively today, and further consolidation would only make things worse.”', 'The parties’ abandonment of the deal did not end the Antitrust Division’s investigation. Instead, the civil attorneys conducting the merger review shared their findings with their criminal counterparts. A criminal section proceeded to open a price‑fixing investigation based on the shared materials. That investigation has borne fruit and is ongoing. To date, three individuals and one company have been charged for participation in a price‑fixing conspiracy. Criminal antitrust violations, such as price-fixing, have serious implications. Not only are the criminal penalties substantial, but companies can be subject to civil suits with treble damages (15 U.S.C. § 15.).', 'For individuals, the maximum penalties are 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine. For corporations, the maximum fine is $100 million. Fines for both individuals and corporations can exceed the statutory maximum amount by up to twice the gain derived or twice the loss by victims. See, e.g., Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market Allocation: An Antitrust Primer, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/priceifxing-bid-rigging-and-market-al location-schemes (discussing the Sherman Act).', 'While it is not public what specific information was contained in the documents that raised the attention of the reviewing attorneys, or exactly how the process happened, the Antitrust Division did state that the criminal investigation was triggered by “information and party materials produced in the ordinary course of business.” Until more information is revealed, several questions remain, including whether similar criminal investigations based on documents submitted for merger review could be waiting to surface.', 'The packaged seafood matter is not the first criminal case to stem from a civil investigation and likely will not be the last. The hand‑in‑hand coordination between the civil and criminal sections of the Antitrust Division will continue. Companies need to be increasingly aware of the risks that ordinary course documents present, not just in impacting merger approval but also in criminal implications. Merger review does not exist in a vacuum. Once documents fall into the Antitrust Division’s (or FTC’s) hands, parties can expect that they will be closely reviewed with an eye toward both civil and criminal actions. Documents always tell a story—and attorneys need to be sure that the story told is one to support a proposed deal and not a criminal investigation.', 'Similarly, the FTC and Antitrust Division share a close working relationship. We will continue to explore and monitor the collaboration between those two agencies as well as with state attorneys general. We also plan to address the collaboration among competition agencies around the world. Stay tuned.', '']

[(0, 4), (11, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-2%20-%20Kentucky-Round5.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Neg-2%2520-%2520Kentucky-Round5.docx

b3bd38ae7a74e4611c69d20f71e51c49650db2d9199f54590afc0d241e82b61d

Here’s a specific study—predictive ‘models’ cited by AFF scholars inflate royalty prices 20-fold!

Haber 17—(Political Science Professor at Stanford University). Stephen Haber and Alexander Galetovic. March 2, 2017. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, “The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory,” Vol. 13, No. 1. .

patent-holdup facts contradicted the theory Researchers parameterized royalty-stacking using actual price data , and discovered the royalty by models is twenty times higher than the actual They found no licensor earns a royalty consistent with a monopolist Despite fifteen years empirical studies have not shown holdup or royalty stacking theory conflates holdup and market power The conflation of holdup and market power leads to fallacies firms adap to prevent holdup, thereby sustaining equilibrium holdup can be extracted only once . Any more would cause the firm to shut down . when an innovation is “ drastic ” a monopoly will charge less than the tech 's value

Like the theory of the peaceful Maya , patent-holdup theory had its own set of facts that contradicted the theory The data show that the rate of innovation in SEP-intensive products was faster Researchers parameterized royalty-stacking models from the patent-holdup literature using actual price and quantity data , and discovered the royalty yield predicted by the models is more than twenty times higher than the actual royalty yield and about four-fifths of the price of a smartphone. They found no individual patent licensor earns a individual royalty consistent with the hypothesis that it operated as a monopolist there is no positive evidence in support of its core predictions All studies reach the same general conclusion Despite fifteen years proponents of the theories have had to amass evidence, the empirical studies have not shown that holdup or royalty stacking is a common problem in practice Patent-holdup theory conflates holdup and market power and The conflation of holdup and market power leads to fallacies that underpin patent-holdup theory. firms will make str uctural , contractual , and behavioral adap tations to prevent holdup, thereby sustaining trade and investment in equilibrium holdup cannot occur many times over to the same firm. A firm's quasi rents can be extracted only once . Any attempt to extract more revenues would cause the firm to shut down . a third fallacy: patented technologies add no value to The theoretical problem is, as Nobel Prize winner Arrow showed in 1962, that when an innovation is “ drastic ” (that is, much better than the alternatives on offer) a profit-maximizing monopoly will charge less than the tech nology 's incremental value . The empirical problem is that the whole point is to make large technological jumps at a fast pace They are not in the business of small incremental improvements ; they are in the business of creating drastic innovations

the theory of the peaceful Maya its own set of facts contradicted the theory SEP-intensive products faster parameterized royalty-stacking models actual price and quantity data the royalty yield more than twenty times higher actual royalty yield no individual patent licensor individual royalty consistent no positive evidence its core predictions All studies same general conclusion fifteen years the empirical studies common problem in practice conflates holdup market power holdup and market power fallacies str uctural contractual behavioral adap trade and investment in equilibrium cannot occur many times only once more revenues shut down theoretical problem drastic much better profit-maximizing monopoly charge less incremental value empirical problem whole point large technological jumps fast pace small incremental improvements drastic innovations

['', 'Like the theory of the peaceful Maya, patent-holdup theory had its own set of facts—stelae, as it were—that contradicted the theory. Patent-holdup theorists asserted that innovation in SEP-intensive IT products was under threat: excessive royalties were discouraging new firm entry and reinvestment by existing firms. They called particular attention to the threat to innovation in mobile telephones and personal computers, as well as in extensions of those products in the IoT.15', 'Economists measure rates of innovation by examining relative rates of change of quality-adjusted prices,16 and one can download the publicly available, product-by-product, quality-adjusted price data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to carry out an analysis of innovation rates across products and within products over time.17 An analysis of that data shows that from 1997 to 2013, rates of innovation in phone equipment (which includes low-tech items such as fax machines and landline phones, as well as wireless phones) was 10 percent per annum faster than the economy-wide average. The data show that the rate of innovation in portable and laptop computers was faster still—31 percent per annum faster than the economy-wide average. Similar rates of innovation are observed in other SEP-intensive IT products such as video equipment, audio equipment, desktop computers, and televisions. Furthermore, rates of innovation in SEP-intensive IT products have not slowed over time relative to the rates of innovation in similar, non-SEP-intensive IT products.18 For example, the rate of innovation in SEP-intensive laptop computers compared with non-SEP-intensive mainframe computers shows that SEP intensity was associated with faster innovation.19', 'There are other hallmarks of innovation beyond falling quality-adjusted relative prices: one would expect to see rapidly increasing output even in the face of falling prices; and, because innovation is typically characterized by Schumpeterian creative destruction, one would also expect to see high levels of firm entry and exit. This is precisely what researchers do see when they examine data on the canonical case of the mobile phone industry. Between 1994 and 2013, the number of SEP holders increased from 2 to 128. Patent-holdup theory would predict that this increase should have dramatically slowed the rate of innovation. That prediction did not obtain in reality, however. Prices of mobile devices dropped very fast, while output grew sixty-two-fold. During this same period, there was rapid entry of new firms into the manufacture of phones and tablets—so much so that industrial concentration, measured with the number of devices sold, actually fell in this industry over time.20', "According to patent-holdup theory, excessive patent royalties cause slow rates of innovation. As an empirical matter, the aggregate royalties paid by licensees in any industry can be estimated on the basis of the SEC 10-K and 40-F filings of the patent-licensing firms.21 The data on the canonical case of mobile phones shows that the cumulative royalty yield from the twenty-one largest patent licensors in the mobile phone value chain was only 3.3 percent of a mobile phone's average sales price in 2015. That ratio has been fairly stable since at least far back as 2007.22 Researchers have parameterized royalty-stacking models from the patent-holdup literature using actual price and quantity data, and have discovered that the royalty yield predicted by the models is more than twenty times higher than the actual royalty yield and about four-fifths of the price of a smartphone. They have also found that no individual patent licensor earns an individual royalty consistent with the hypothesis that it operated as a monopolist.23", 'The facts of fast and continuous innovation in the mobile phone industry—one of the stelae of patent-holdup theory—are evident to anyone with a smartphone in their pocket. Three decades ago, a mobile phone cost the current equivalent of $10,000, was the size of a brick, weighed a kilo, and enabled its user to make a half-hour call before going dead. Today, a smartphone has more computational power than the supercomputers that guided the Apollo missions to the moon, allows a user to produce and share data, video, and audio files with anyone on the planet, costs an average of $300—and also happens to make a phone call.', 'At the same time that there are self-evident stelae contradicting patent-holdup theory, there is no positive evidence in support of its core predictions. Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato,24 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Jorge Padilla,25 Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, and Jorge Padilla,26 Richard Epstein, F. Scott Kieff, and Daniel Spulber,27 Kirti Gupta,28 Anne Layne-Farrar,29 J. Gregory Sidak,30 and Edward Egan and David Teece31 review the literature on patent holdup, patent thickets, and royalty stacking.32 All of these studies reach the same general conclusion, which is perhaps best summed up by Layne-Farrar: “Certainly the theories have been developed, but the empirical support is still lacking. Despite the fifteen years that proponents of the theories have had to amass evidence, the empirical studies conducted thus far have not shown that holdup or royalty stacking is a common problem in practice.”33', 'C. Three Fundamental Fallacies and Their Origin', 'When theory and evidence disagree, there is either something wrong with the theory or something wrong with the evidence. We think that there is something wrong with the theory.', "Patent-holdup theory conflates two different economic mechanisms: holdup and market power. Holdup means that one firm appropriates another firm's quasi rent—its revenues minus its short-run costs—through opportunistic behavior. A firm that is being held up, by definition, does not generate enough revenue to cover its long-run costs. Therefore, the firm will not reinvest once its capital wears out. This is not a long-run equilibrium. Market power, by contrast, means that a firm can set prices such that it appropriates a monopoly rent from a market. The exercise of market power can be a long-run equilibrium, because the downstream firms will cover their long-run costs and continue to reinvest as their capital equipment wears out.34 Thus, holdup and the exercise of market power are two different, mutually inconsistent economic mechanisms. One cannot simultaneously have a long-run equilibrium and not have a long-run equilibrium.", 'The conflation of holdup and market power leads to three fallacies that underpin patent-holdup theory. Once the mechanics of holdup are loosened from their moorings in economic theory, it becomes possible to simultaneously claim that patent holdup is a variant of holdup as it is understood in mainstream economics and define it in ways that are inconsistent with the meaning of holdup as it is understood in mainstream economics. Patent holdup elides key assumptions of the standard theory and transforms necessary conditions for holdup into sufficient conditions for holdup. The implications are fundamental. In the established theory, firms—working together—will make structural, contractual, and behavioral adaptations in order to prevent holdup, thereby sustaining trade and investment in equilibrium. In patent-holdup theory, by contrast, firms cannot adapt and solve the problem wrought by opportunistic renegotiation of a contract, because the game begins after the R&D is completed and manufacturers invest. Adaptations to prevent holdup are ruled out by construction, and market failure is inevitable.', "The conflation of holdup and market power leads to a second fallacy. Patent-holdup theory claims that the same manufacturing firms can be held up many times over, resulting in a phenomenon called royalty stacking. In point of fact, however, holdup cannot occur many times over to the same firm. A firm's quasi rents (the difference between its revenues and its short-run costs) can be extracted only once. Any attempt to extract more revenues would cause the firm to shut down. Royalty stacking, by contrast, is about the exercise of market power by multiple input suppliers to downstream firms. Although this multiplicity of input suppliers might be an inefficient organization of a market, it nonetheless can be a long-run equilibrium, unlike holdup.", "To claim that market power is being exercised, one needs to identify its source. In royalty stacking, the source is the patents themselves. A patent confers a temporary, limited property right that might confer some market power—and does so by design. Thus, in order to claim that there is a public policy problem, one needs to claim that the patents in question confer market power in excess of that which is conferred by the patent grants themselves. What could the source of that excess market power be? According to the theory, patent-holding firms are able to appropriate more than their incremental contribution to a product's value by virtue of the fact that their technologies have been made part of a standard. The users of the technology are locked into that standard and consequently can be subjected to patent holdup.", "The conflation of holdup and market power leads to a third fallacy: patented technologies that are part of an industry standard add little or no value to the markets that they help to create. There are two problems with this fallacy—one theoretical and the other empirical. The theoretical problem is, as Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow showed in 1962, that when an innovation is “drastic” (that is, much better than the alternatives on offer) a profit-maximizing monopoly will charge less than the technology's incremental value. The empirical problem is that the whole point of standard development organizations (SDOs) in IT industries is to make large technological jumps at a fast pace, so that manufacturers may produce superior products that consumers will adopt enthusiastically, thereby increasing the revenues of all the industry stakeholders.35 They are not in the business of small incremental improvements; they are in the business of creating drastic innovations.", '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Harvard-Round2.docx

Minnesota

FrPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/FrPa/Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Harvard-Round2.docx

d64496fbf3ec27d7c8c4cac1b14f4b853c0593733e4a7e8bc6105c655c7e91de

3. Politics. Fiating a doctrine change without allowing Congressional input causes a backlash against the plan

Joe Cirincione & Andrew Grotto 8. President of the Ploughshares Fund; Center for American Progress. “Orienting the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review”, November, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/11/pdf/nuclear_posture.pdf

Consult and engage with Congress The administration could count on support provided key members of Congress are consulted at the onset of the review and given an interim report . Conservative legislators can be rebuffed if there is consistent communication

Consult and engage with Congress The administration could count on the support of a progressive Congress provided key members of Congress are consulted at the onset of the review and given an interim report . Conservative legislators may attempt to can be rebuffed if there is consistent close communication between the White House and the Congress

Consult engage Congress provided key members of Congress are consulted onset of the review interim report Conservative legislators can be rebuffed close communication Congress

['Consult and engage with Congress. The Obama administration could count on the support of a progressive Congress, provided key members of Congress are consulted at the onset of the review and given an interim report. Conservative legislators may attempt to challenge the Obama administration’s nuclear weapons policies, but they can be rebuffed if there is consistent, close communication between the White House and the Congress, accompanied by a concerted effort to reach out to moderate conservative legislators.', '']

[(4, 16), (24, 32)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoYa-Neg-nu-Round-6.docx

Emory

CoYa

d1f44c0389e517b2221fac35b812d95b6a1e7151430e637d9b675c0af7df6f81

Countering fraud is central to every element of terror operations

Perri 10, J.D., CFE, CPA(Frank, “The Fraud-Terror Link: Terrorists are Committing Fraud to Fund Their Activities,” Fraud Magazine, )

Terrorists derive funding from fraud identity theft laundering and tax evasion fund terrorist cells Financing is required to fund operations to meet organizational costs of maintaining a terrorist organization create an enabling environment Terrorist groups require significant funds to sustain terrorism the nexus between fraud and terrorism is undisputed Fraud analysis must be central in understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior

Some might perceive that fraud isn’t linked to terrorism but that perception is misguided Terrorists derive funding from Credit card fraud , wire fraud, mortgage fraud, charitable donation fraud, insurance fraud, identity theft , money laundering , immigration fraud, and tax evasion fund terrorist cells Financing is required not just to fund specific terrorist operations but to meet the broader organizational costs of developing and maintaining a terrorist organization and to create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their activities Terrorist groups require significant funds to create and maintain an infrastructure of organizational support, sustain an ideology of terrorism through propaganda, and finance the ostensibly legitimate activities needed to provide a veil of legitimacy for their shell companie the nexus between fraud and terrorism is undisputed Fraud analysis must be central in understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior

fund terrorist cells specific maintaining a terrorist organization enabling environment sustain terrorism the nexus between fraud and terrorism is undisputed Fraud analysis must be central in understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior

['The threat of terrorism has become the principal security concern in the United States since 9/11. Some might perceive that fraud isn’t linked to terrorism because white-collar crime issues are more the province of organized crime, but that perception is misguided. Terrorists derive funding from a variety of criminal activities ranging in scale and sophistication – from low-level crime to organized narcotics smuggling and fraud. CFEs need to know the latest links between fraud and terror. Credit card fraud, wire fraud, mortgage fraud, charitable donation fraud, insurance fraud, identity theft, money laundering, immigration fraud, and tax evasion are just some of the types of fraud commonly used to fund terrorist cells. Such groups will also use shell companies to receive and distribute illicit funds. On the surface, these companies might engage in legitimate activities to establish a positive reputation in the business community. Financing is required not just to fund specific terrorist operations but to meet the broader organizational costs of developing and maintaining a terrorist organization and to create an enabling environment necessary to sustain their activities. The direct costs of mounting individual attacks have been relatively low considering the damage they can yield. “Part of the problem is that it takes so little to finance an operation,” said Gary LaFree, director of the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.2 For example, the 2005 London bombings cost about $15,600.3 The 2000 bombing of the USS Cole is estimated to have cost between $5,000 and $10,000.4 Al-Qaida’s entire 9/11 operation cost between $400,000 and $500,000, according to the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.5 Terrorist groups require significant funds to create and maintain an infrastructure of organizational support, sustain an ideology of terrorism through propaganda, and finance the ostensibly legitimate activities needed to provide a veil of legitimacy for their shell companies.6 However, don’t think that only large operations are needed for terrorists to carry out attacks; small semi-autonomous cells in many countries are often just as capable of conducting disruptive activities without extensive outside financial help – they just conduct smaller-scale frauds.7 Even though the nexus between fraud and terrorism is undisputed, there’s concern at state and local levels that law enforcement professionals lack specialized knowledge on how to detect the fraud-terror link because they’re more apt to investigate and prosecute violent crimes.8 A critical lack of awareness about terrorists’ links to fraud schemes is undermining the fight against terrorism. Fraud analysis must be central, not peripheral, in understanding the patterns of terrorist behavior.9 ']

[(0, 8), (56, 95), (96, 101), (102, 112)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-10%20-%20NJDDT-Round6.docx

Kansas

HaWi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaWi/Kansas-Harris-Wilkus-Neg-10%2520-%2520NJDDT-Round6.docx

951523c4780debc5356048ea637061c9a68168c32028161f603de199394109dd

Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

Afropessimism is a metatheory: that interrogates unspoken, logic through rigorous theoretical consideration of properties foundations, methods, form, and utility; It is pessimistic about claims of liberation when these try to explain Black suffering or analogize with the suffering of other oppressed beings. Blacks are not Human at a higher level of abstraction, claims of universal humanity are [constricted] by a meta-aporia A Black radical agenda is terrifying to the Left because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of redemption a story of Palestinian redemption would culminate in the return of the land a story of class redemption would culminate in the restoration of the working day redemption, fed upon me for its coherence the difference between Humans who suffer through disposability” and Blacks who suffer by social death,” is made possible by the regime of violence that bars Black people from redemption How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?

, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Afropessimism is a metatheory: a critical project that , by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates. It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true. Blacks are not Human subjects implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are hobbled [constricted] by a meta-aporia : a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land , a spatial, cartographic redemption if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence . Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.” . My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “ social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence

['For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). Afropessimism, then, is less of a theory and more of a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates. Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true. If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are hobbled [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left—think Bernie Sanders—because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.” The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”? Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?']

[(0, 12), (13, 156)]

ndtceda

Michigan-HaRa-Neg-2-Kentucky-Round-6.docx

Michigan

HaRa

91446659c86fc6bc40e60e68b3da10bc8079f2b15465066d369a6bbdd23e82b0

2. PREDICTIVE ACCURACY – they’ve repeatedly demonstrated revisionist tactics across the board AND consistently match expected behavior.

Denmark ’20 [Abraham; August 18; Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow at the Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century, “Empowering U.S. Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific,” Ch. 3]

China with ambitions to dominate the order undermine the Indo-Pacific crosses domains and locations the theme is consistent rewrite the order , and challenge any country This can be seen in expansionist claims with no i law the S C S Taiwan , Vietnam , Philippines , Malaysia , and Brunei artificial islands accounting for 95 percent of all land incapable of generating basis in i law

A rising China with ambitions to dominate Asia and reconfigure the regional order to accord with the CCP threatens to undermine the liberal character of the Indo-Pacific order This is a challenge that crosses multiple domains and geographic locations , yet the theme is consistent : Beijing seeks to rewrite the existing order , and will challenge any country it perceives to be unsupportive of its ambitions. This can be seen in coercive tactics that assert expansionist territorial and maritime claims with no basis in i nternational law , and by its efforts to weaken the bonds between the U S and its allies, which underpinned this order in terms of power and legitimacy In the E C S recent years have seen the dispute grow strident a Chinese rammed Japanese ships Chinese vessels routinely operate within proximity and suggest ambitions from Beijing to bring the islands under its administration the S C S has been a locus for regional tensions wrought by Chinese ambitions. Although China, Taiwan , Vietnam , the Philippines , Malaysia , and Brunei all claim features in the Spratly Islands, the most geopolitically significant claim is that of China, which has drawn a “ nine-dash line ” across the sea itself, cutting across every other nation involved China’s position is incompatible with established international law China began reclaiming land to build up features under its the PRC had constructed over 2,900 acres of artificial islands in the Spratlys seventeen times more land in twenty months than other claimants combined over the past forty years , accounting for 95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands the tribunal ruled that China’s claimed features were incapable of generating e e z its nine-dash line had no basis in i nternational law

rising China dominate reconfigure regional order undermine liberal character multiple domains geographic locations consistent rewrite existing order any country coercive tactics expansionist i nternational law weaken the bonds U S E C S routinely operate ambitions S C S regional tensions Taiwan Vietnam Philippines Malaysia Brunei geopolitically significant nine-dash line every other nation incompatible reclaiming 2,900 acres artificial islands combined forty years 95 percent incapable e e z no basis i nternational law

['A rising China with ambitions to dominate Asia and reconfigure the regional order to better accord with the interests of the CCP threatens to undermine the liberal character of the Indo-Pacific order and the stability and prosperity it has achieved. This is a challenge that crosses multiple domains and geographic locations, yet the theme is consistent: Beijing seeks to rewrite the existing order, and will challenge any country it perceives to be unsupportive of its ambitions. This can be seen in its coercive tactics that seek to assert expansionist territorial and maritime claims with no basis in international law, and by its efforts to weaken the bonds between the United States and its allies, which have underpinned this order in terms of both power and legitimacy. ', 'In the East China Sea, a dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands continues to fester, even though Japan has administered the islands since 1895 as a result of its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War. Although tensions between China and Japan over the islands have ebbed and flowed, particularly since the early 2000s, recent years have seen the dispute grow ever more strident. In 2010, a Chinese fishing vessel rammed two Japanese Coast Guard ships. Japan held the captain for seventeen days, prompting demonstrations in both countries. In 2012, as a result of burgeoning nationalism across sectors of Japan’s politics, the mayor of Tokyo announced a plan to purchase three of the islands. To prevent this, the Japanese government purchased them instead. Large protests erupted in major cities across China,66 and Chinese incursions into the islands’ territorial waters spiked dramatically,67 raising the odds of a collision or other military incident in the vicinity. Chinese vessels routinely operate within close proximity of these vessels, and suggest ambitions from Beijing to eventually bring the islands under its administration.', 'Similarly, the South China Sea has been a locus for regional tensions wrought by Chinese ambitions. Although China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim features in the Spratly and/or Paracel Islands, the most geopolitically significant claim is that of China, which has drawn a large “nine-dash line” across most of the sea itself, cutting across the claims of every other nation involved. And though Beijing has not clarified the specific nature of its claims (e.g., whether it claims all the waters or just the land features within the line), the US State Department has argued that China’s position is incompatible with established international law.68 ', 'Nevertheless, in December 2013, China began reclaiming land to build up the features under its control. By June 2015, the PRC had constructed over 2,900 acres of artificial islands in the Spratlys—seventeen times more land in twenty months than the other claimants combined over the past forty years, accounting for about 95 percent of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.69 The Philippines filed a 2013 case against China with an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In the tribunal’s 2016 decision, it ruled that China’s claimed features in the Spratlys were incapable of generating exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and that its nine-dash line had no basis in international law. The tribunal also declared illegal Chinese fishing and other activities in the Philippines’ EEZ and around other land features, along with Chinese military installations on seven Spratly formations. Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte has softened his country’s position on China since taking office in 2016, just before the tribunal’s decision, though there have been instances since when Duterte has taken a less conciliatory approach to Beijing. Meanwhile, ASEAN has likewise omitted references to Chinese land reclamation in its official statements.70 ']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-GiSa-Neg-Wake-Round-3.docx

Michigan

GiSa

7dcfe3061d05b1f46d8cf1879c1c757799f55b04f93b5bba8977ef2bafcbe107

2. NOR impact.

Robert Kelly 22; July 15; professor of political science at Pusan National University; Foreign Policy, “The U.S. Should Get Out of the Way in East Asia’s Nuclear Debates,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/15/us-south-korea-japan-east-asia-nuclear-debates-nonproliferation/

advocates worry democracies with state capacities and nuc energy they will be responsible No one believes out-of-the-blue strike prolif sell WMDs dictatorships been cautious democracies would be good local cascade already occurred China Russia and No Ko have no intention of complying

advocates worry about theft , loss , rogue scientists , and so as liberal democracies with robust state capacities and preexisting, well-managed nuc lear energy programs, they will likely be quite responsible No one believes Seoul or Tokyo will launch an out-of-the-blue , nuclear-first strike set up prolif eration network; sell WMDs put Homer Simpson in charge of safety; or be sloppy dictatorships have been cautious about these issues democracies with a history of foreign-policy restraint suggests they would be good stewards generalized anxiety about a regional arms race there is no local cascade to be sparked because it has already occurred . China , Russia , and No Ko have all moved first and no intention of complying with the build-down imperative. Russia’s rhetorical invocation is a disturbing evolution. No Ko exit the NPT and keep building

theft loss rogue scientists democracies robust state capacities nuc lear energy responsible out-of-the-blue prolif eration sell WMDs Simpson sloppy cautious democracies foreign-policy restraint good stewards arms race no local cascade China Russia No Ko no intention invocation exit NPT

['Global Zero advocates, such as political scientist Scott Sagan, worry about the transactional issues of WMD possession because they are uniquely dangerous weapons. Indeed, theft, loss, rogue scientists, and so on are legitimate fears. But they are no more resonant with South Korea or Japan than with any other nuclear weapons state. Indeed, as liberal democracies with robust state capacities and preexisting, well-managed nuclear energy programs, they will likely be quite responsible, as Britain and France have been.', 'No one seriously believes Seoul or Tokyo will launch an out-of-the-blue, nuclear-first strike on an opponent; set up something like the A.Q. Khan proliferation network; sell WMDs to terrorists or other rogues; put Homer Simpson in charge of nuclear safety; or be so sloppy as to require something like the Nunn-Lugar program. Even Pakistan and India have been better with their arsenals than the panic of the late 1990s suggested. Even dictatorships have been cautious about these issues. And as democracies with a history of foreign-policy restraint, democratic peace theory suggests they would be good stewards, certainly better than East Asia’s autocratic nuclear powers.', 'MARKED', 'There is generalized anxiety about a regional arms race, which South Korean/Japanese nuclearization might exacerbate. Perhaps, but as noted above, there is no local cascade to be sparked because it has already occurred. China, Russia, and North Korea have all moved first. China and Russia have established nuclear arsenals and no intention of complying with the build-down imperative. Russia’s growing rhetorical invocation of its nuclear weapons is a disturbing evolution. North Korea repeatedly agreed, non-bindingly since 1992, to avoid nuclear weapons—only to exit the NPT and keep building. It now has intercontinental ballistic missiles and several dozen nuclear warheads.', '']

[(7, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-Texas-Doubles.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

dae9a1640c9bdf423172a4e7863d7b529bd493490dcb227aa7d3886a1f4c7697

Nuclear war causes extinction---nuclear winter.

Steven Starr 14. Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri, has published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “There Can be No Winners in a Nuclear War.” 6/11/14.

even small nuclear war catastrophic disruptions of global climate massive destruction of Earth’s ozone layer analyzed by the best scientists leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life attack by either side could be self-assured destruction nuclear firestorms produce smoke remain for at least a decade Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown uninhabitable the survivors of the nuclear war Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy even a “successful” nuclear first-strike cause the citizens to perish from nuclear famine

Nuclear war has no winner the world’s leading climatologists published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war They concluded that the consequences of even a “ small ” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer These peer-reviewed studies which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error predict that a war fought with nuclear weapons would destroy the human race create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life A nuclear war could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke , which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade , and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions temperatures would fall below freezing every day ; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown ; every nuclear spent fuel pool would boil off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout uninhabitable the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Chinese nuclear forces and completely destroy them Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy Primacy used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions even a “successful” nuclear first-strike , which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine , just as would the rest of humanity.

even a “ small ” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy even a “successful” nuclear first-strike perish from nuclear famine

['Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. ', 'These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race. In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. ', 'A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” ', 'In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The article summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. ', 'Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. ', 'Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. ', 'Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads, which can be launched with only a few minutes warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,” which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. ', 'Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” ', 'More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. ', 'Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. ', 'Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy.” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of humanity.', '']

[(7, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeLo-Neg-ADA-Round-6.docx

Emory

HeLo

7b1c630ca12aa5d47ed2f23c354cd16c27cdf56d73ecf76cd62a85ad26d8db19

Those concerns are secondary.

Roberts ’19 [Brad Roberts, Director, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, “Debating Nuclear No-First-Use, Again,” SURVIVAL v. 61 n. 3, June-July 2019, p. 51]

allies want to rest easy U S understands this requirement For anxious allies , NFU is troublesome in every way It signals clearly US will not be prepared to use all means available NFU sends a message of restraint to dangerous neighbours, encouraging provocation It signals U S doesn’t understand the unique value of first use preference to deter by non-nuclear means reinforces xiety

the positive case is that NFU assures allies that U S remains committed to reducing nuclear dangers But for many allies, this argument misses the point Yes, they seek assurance that a cavalier president will not generate new nuclear dangers But for a significant number of allies, the deeper assurance they seek is that U S will be prepared to use all means available when their vital interests are at risk. They want to be convinced that a neighbour understands there would be a terrible price to be paid. They also want to rest easy that U S understands this requirement and is proceeding, in partnership with them, to strengthen the means of their common defence For anxious allies , NFU is troublesome in every way . It signals clearly that the US will not be prepared to use all means available to it when their vital interests are at risk, NFU sends a message of restraint to dangerous neighbours, encouraging conventional provocation s and risk-taking. It signals U S doesn’t understand the unique value for their defence of the US threat of first use preference to deter by non-nuclear means reinforces their a n xiety that they will be left to die in large numbers while the US masses its conventional forces rather than issuing threats of nuclear first use US flirtation with NFU is sign U States no longer has the will to do what is necessary for their security, which could portend significant shifts in the political allegiance of US allies

U S U S U S anxious allies troublesome every way U S U

['', 'On the impact of NFU adoption on the assurance of allies, the positive case is that NFU assures allies that the United States remains committed to reducing nuclear dangers and to restraining its own nuclear policies and posture. But for many allies, this argument misses the point. Yes, they seek assurance that a cavalier and sometimes reckless president will not generate new nuclear dangers for them. But for a significant number of allies, the deeper assurance they seek is that the United States will be prepared to use all means available when their vital interests are at risk. They want to be convinced that a neighbour who might contemplate putting those interests at risk understands that there would be a terrible price to be paid. They also want to rest easy that the United States understands this requirement and is proceeding, in partnership with them, to strengthen the means of their common defence.21', 'For these anxious allies, NFU is troublesome in every way. It signals clearly that the US will not be prepared to use all means available to it when their vital interests are at risk, declining to do so unless the enemy is foolish enough to cross the nuclear red line. NFU thus sends a message of restraint to dangerous neighbours, encouraging conventional provocations and risk-taking. It signals that the United States doesn’t understand the unique value for their defence of the US threat of the first use of its nuclear weapons. The preference of some Americans to deter by non-nuclear means reinforces their anxiety that they will be left to die in large numbers while the US masses, dispatches and assembles its conventional forces rather than issuing threats of nuclear first use. For some allied experts, the US flirtation with NFU is one more sign that the United States no longer has the will to do what is necessary for their security, which could portend significant shifts in the political allegiance of US allies', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-1---NU-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

58a9bf834816a1e2b5b915bcf60f3fe73c49e300b7adbba5f992d15a45eda598

B. Threats aren’t credible---keeping the nuclear option on the table causes miscalc.

Christine Parthemore & Andy Weber 21. Chief Executive Officer of the Council on Strategic Risks, Director of CSR's Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons, Adjunct professor in the Global Security Studies program at Johns Hopkins University, BA from The Ohio State University and an MA from Georgetown University in unconventional threats and nonproliferation. Senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, BA from Cornell University and MA from Georgetown University in Foreign Service “The US must separate nuclear deterrence from biological weapons.” https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/10/18/the-us-must-separate-nuclear-deterrence-from-biological-weapons/

using nuc s to deter bio threats. rais miscalc risks challenge of understanding whether outbreak arises naturally or from deliberate attack. Consider confusion regarding COVID community still cannot determine deterring bio weapons with nuc s ineffective requires threats be credible This is not the case several chemical attacks carried out at targeted scales

the technologies and capabilities now being deployed for pandemic respon ses are giving rise to an historical opportunity for the nation: It is time to end the U.S. policy of using nuc lear weapon s to deter bio logical weapon threats. the U.S. nuclear posture positions nuclear weapons as a leading means of deterring strategic-level biological weapons activities This creates several problems. One is rais ing miscalc ulation risks in complex security environments, in particular because of the challenge of understanding whether a disease outbreak arises naturally , by accident or from a deliberate attack. Consider the continuing confusion regarding COVID nearly two years after its emergence. The U.S. intelligence community still cannot determine with high certainty whether it emerged naturally or via a lab accident. China, Iran, Russia and others have a ccused the United States of creating the culprit virus as a biological weapon. The ambiguity of application of this nuclear weapons policy is seen as a tool to maintain flexibility during a crisis and avoid driving escalatory behavior. Yet it brings serious risks as well. Further, deterring bio logical weapons with nuc lear weapon s may be ineffective . Deterrence by punishment requires that threats be credible and that the targeted entity believes the threatened action (in this case a nuclear strike) would be carried out. This is not likely to be the case . As the United States has continued this nuclear policy, several chemical weapons attacks have been carried out at targeted scales . Numerous significant cyber attacks and intrusions have been undertaken as well.

end the U.S. policy of using nuc lear weapon s to deter bio logical weapon threats. rais ing miscalc ulation risks challenge of understanding confusion regarding COVID cannot determine brings serious risks ineffective not likely to be the case several chemical weapons attacks

['Though much work remains to be done, the technologies and capabilities now being deployed for pandemic responses are giving rise to an historical opportunity for the nation: It is time to end the U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons to deter biological weapon threats. Today, the U.S. nuclear posture positions nuclear weapons as a leading means of deterring strategic-level biological weapons activities. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review described, the roles of U.S. nuclear forces currently include acting as a “hedge against the potential rapid growth or emergence of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats, including chemical, biological, cyber, and large-scale conventional aggression.” This creates several problems. One is raising miscalculation risks in complex security environments, in particular because of the challenge of understanding whether a disease outbreak arises naturally, by accident or from a deliberate attack. Consider the continuing confusion regarding COVID-19 nearly two years after its emergence. The U.S. intelligence community still cannot determine with high certainty whether it emerged naturally or via a lab accident. China, Iran, Russia and others have accused the United States of creating the culprit virus as a biological weapon. How would this nuclear policy be applied if such confusion and disinformation occurred regarding a severe disease outbreak in a conflict setting or in highly tense circumstances? And would restraint regarding such a step contribute to the nation’s leaders not taking seriously enough the question of whether a biological weapon was used? The ambiguity of application of this nuclear weapons policy is seen as a tool to maintain flexibility during a crisis and avoid driving escalatory behavior. Yet it brings serious risks as well. Further, deterring biological weapons with nuclear weapons may be ineffective. Deterrence by punishment requires that threats be credible and that the targeted entity believes the threatened action (in this case a nuclear strike) would be carried out. This is not likely to be the case. As the United States has continued this nuclear policy, several chemical weapons attacks have been carried out at targeted scales. Numerous significant cyber attacks and intrusions have been undertaken as well. For biological weapons, the Department of State’s 2021 arms control treaty compliance report determined North Korea and Russia already have offensive biological weapons programs. It also registered continuing concerns that China and Iran have engaged in dual-use activities that extend beyond what is allowed by the Biological Weapons Convention.']

[(10, 22), (28, 36)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-7---Texas-Round-6.docx

Emory

MiPi

16e591f026c0a92e5ef7d9734a0f1b432fe7e906888f0c1307fa85e746dbdda1

Economic crisis causes war.

Tania Lațici & Elena Lazarou 21. Tania Lațici is a Non-resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Elena Lazarou is the Head of the External Policies Unit of the European Parliamentary Research Service. “Peace and Security in 2021”. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/690669/EPRS_STU(2021)690669_EN.pdf

link between financial crises and deterioration in peace highlighted by studies data reveals correlation between crises and wars Milanović stressed link between financial crisis and collapse Liu warned economic crisis could cause a 'global conflict' tensions raised concerns regarding a repetition of the 30s led to World War II The dangerous link between the economy and peace has come to the fore

The link between financial crises and a deterioration in peace and security has been highlighted by several studies more and more data has become available which reveals a correlation between debt crises and civil wars Piketty and Milanović stressed the link between financial crisis , inequality and social collapse Liu has warned that the next economic crisis could cause a 'global conflict' This is concerning in the context of a new 'cold war' brewing between the US and China global social risks, increased tensions raised concerns regarding the risk of a repetition of the 19 30s scenario which led to World War II . high rates of unemployment have been cited as causes for concern The dangerous link between the state of the global economy and peace has come to the fore

financial crises deterioration in peace and security several studies more and more data debt crises and civil wars financial crisis , inequality and social collapse economic crisis cause a 'global conflict' repetition of the 19 30s scenario The dangerous link state of the global economy and peace

["The link between financial crises and a deterioration in democracy, peace and security has been highlighted by several studies. As noted by Matthias Goldmann, 'in recent years, more and more data has become available which reveals a correlation between sovereign debt crises and the outbreak of civil wars. 225 Thomas Piketty and Branko Milanović have stressed the link between financial crisis, inequality and social collapse. 226 In addition to economic recession and falling trade volumes, global economies are strongly affected by chronic deflation. Historically, there is a correlation between inflation-deflation cycles and the debt cycles: deflationary pressure increases during peace years, and inflationary, during war years. 227 Writing for The Economist, Qian Liu has warned that the next economic crisis could cause a 'global conflict'.228 This is concerning, particularly in the context of the current debate on a new 'cold war' brewing between the US and China, in the paradigm of a 'Thucydides's trap'.229 The combination of global social risks, increased international tensions due to rising protectionism and the Covid-19 pandemic, has raised some concerns regarding the risk of a repetition of the 1930s scenario, which eventually led to World War II. 230 The US 'America first' protectionist trade policy developed under former president Donald Trump could reignite under Joe Biden's stimulus package. Under the Biden administration, protectionism may be more targeted and subtle, but it is not going to disappear. Furthermore, high rates of unemployment, and unconventional monetary policy measures, including possible 'modernisation' of the main central banks' legal mandates and their impact on debt cycles and inequality, have all been cited as causes for concern. 231 The dangerous link between the state of the global economy and peace has, once more, come to the fore – this time as a result of the 21st century's gravest health crisis. Massive stimuli by central banks and governments, such as US$120billion in monthly bond purchases by the US Federal Reserve, or the $1.9 trillion stimulus bill adopted by US Congress (American Rescue Plan Act of 2021) awoke, in January 2021, not only hope of economic growth but also fears of rising inflation. The US Treasury yield curve has steepened to four-year high and, as noted by Standard & Poor's Global Market Intelligence Unit, 'A steep yield curve – when there is a large spread in interest rates between shorter-term Treasury bonds to longer-term bonds – often precedes a period of economic expansion, as investors bet that a central bank will be forced to raise rates in the future to tamp down higher inflation'. ", '']

[(6, 14), (21, 31)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-NDT-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi