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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Collapse causes disease, terrorism, and EMP attacks---extinction.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "war\nin the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving w\nm\nd\nthreaten\nwith catastrophe on a scale\nnot experienced since the Civil War\ncurrents\nlead to world war\nmore than anything else\nthe strength of the\nmilitary\nwill determine\nexistence\nSubtract the\ndefense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Collapse causes disease, terrorism, and EMP attacks---extinction.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "war\nMiddle East\nnuclear Iran\ne\nm\np\npathogens\nterrorism\nw\nm\nd\nCivil War\nworld war\nanything else\nstrength of the\nmilitary\nexistence\nd\ni\nb\nfail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Collapse causes disease, terrorism, and EMP attacks---extinction.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States, some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so. But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world war. In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests. Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations, cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "war\nin\nMiddle East\nIran, e\nm\np\nweapons\npathogens\nterrorism\non a scale\nlead to world war\nstrength of the\nmilitary\nwill determine\nexistence\nSubtract the\nd\ni\nb\nand we will fail to deter wars that we will\nlose", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Political costs force federal compliance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Progressives have long been skeptical of federalism, with the role that “states’ rights” played in the resistance to the civil rights act and desegregation typically featuring prominently in their criticism. Its ugly history even led one 20th-century scholar to insist that “if one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.” Even now, with every national institution in the hands of the GOP, progressives associate federalism with conservatism and shy away from invoking the language of federalism to change the policies they oppose. That is a mistake. Federalism doesn’t have a political valence. These days it’s an extraordinarily powerful weapon in politics for the left and the right, and it doesn’t have to be your father’s (or grandfather’s) federalism. It can be a source of progressive resistance — against President’s Trump’s policies, for example — and, far more importantly, a source for compromise and change between the left and the right. It’s time liberals took notice. Here are three important ways progressives can take a chapter from the conservatives’ playbook and use their control over state and local governments to influence the national agenda, shape policy results, and encourage political compromise. If Jerry Brown or Andrew Cuomo or Eric Garcetti is looking for a “to do” list for the next four years, it’s here. Uncooperative federalism People assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy. The federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements between the states and federal government “cooperative federalism.” But we forget that they create many opportunities for what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have called “uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state and local level can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda, foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state or local opposition costs fiscal resources and political capital the federal government would rather employ elsewhere. The GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state and local officials to get its agenda through. If blue states and cities refuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will sometimes be forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Progressives have long been skeptical of federalism\nprogressives\nshy away from invoking the language of federalism to change the policies they oppose\nThat is a mistake. Federalism doesn’t have a political valence. These days it’s an extraordinarily powerful weapon\nIt can be a source of progressive resistance — against\nTrump’s policies\nprogressives can take a chapter from the conservatives’ playbook and use their control over state and local governments to influence the national agenda, shape policy results, and encourage political compromise\nPeople assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy\nThe federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements\n“cooperative federalism.” But\nthey create\nopportunities for\n“uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state\nlevel can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda, foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state\nopposition costs fiscal resources and political capital the federal government would rather employ elsewhere\nThe GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state\nofficials to get its agenda through. If blue states\nrefuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will\nbe forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Political costs force federal compliance.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Progressives have long been skeptical of federalism\nprogressives\nshy away from invoking the language of federalism to change the policies they oppose\nThat is a mistake. Federalism doesn’t have a political valence. These days it’s an extraordinarily powerful weapon\nIt can be a source of progressive resistance — against\nTrump’s policies\nprogressives can take a chapter from the conservatives’ playbook and use their control over state and local governments to influence the national agenda, shape policy results, and encourage political compromise\nPeople assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy\nThe federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements\n“cooperative federalism.” But\nthey create\nopportunities for\n“uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state\nlevel can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda, foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state\nopposition costs fiscal resources and political capital the federal government would rather employ elsewhere\nThe GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state\nofficials to get its agenda through. If blue states\nrefuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will\nbe forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price", "role": "user" }, { "content": "change the policies\nmistake\n’s a\nextraordinarily powerful weapon\nsource of progressive resistance\ninfluence the national agenda\nshape policy results\nencourage political compromise\ndepends heavily on states\nimplement federal policy\nimmigration\ndrug laws\nenvironmental policies\ninfrastructure\nhealth care system\n“uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state\nlevel can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government\nforce issues onto the national agenda\ncosts fiscal resources\npolitical capital\nfed\nRepublicans will\nbe forced to compromise\npolitical\nfiscal", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Political costs force federal compliance.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Progressives have long been skeptical of federalism\nprogressives\nshy away from invoking the language of federalism to change the policies they oppose\nThat is a mistake. Federalism doesn’t have a political valence. These days it’s an extraordinarily powerful weapon\nIt can be a source of progressive resistance — against\nTrump’s policies\nprogressives can take a chapter from the conservatives’ playbook and use their control over state and local governments to influence the national agenda, shape policy results, and encourage political compromise\nPeople assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy\nThe federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements\n“cooperative federalism.” But\nthey create\nopportunities for\n“uncooperative federalism.” Progressives at the state\nlevel can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda, foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state\nopposition costs fiscal resources and political capital the federal government would rather employ elsewhere\nThe GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state\nofficials to get its agenda through. If blue states\nrefuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will\nbe forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Federalism\n’s a\npowerful weapon\nCongress depends\non states\nto implement\nimmigration\ndrug laws\nor\nhealth care\ncreate\nopportunities for\n“uncooperative federalism.”\nstate\nlevel\ninfluence policy\nthey force issues onto the\nagenda\ndefeating\nopposition costs\nresources and p\nc\nfed\nwould rather employ elsewhere\nRepublicans will\nbe forced to compromise", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Even if, monopolies don’t drive misinformation—restrictions don’t drive traffic to real news.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nNor are there vertical – or to use the antitrust newspeak, platform – concerns driving the problem of fake news. Facebook is a platform-based distributor of information, including news. This means that news is (one of many) inputs into Facebook. Hubbard suggests that Facebook’s gatekeeper position allows it to harm the traditional media in an effort to keep people on Facebook’s own site. She points, in particular, to Facebook’s use of its proprietary in-app browser and Instant Articles feature, arguing that Facebook uses these to lock users in to Facebook’s platform, denying third-party news sites valuable analytics and advertising revenue, and making it more difficult for users to navigate away from Facebook.\nAs an initial matter, in-app browsers have become common. Facebook, Twitter, and Google News all use them. This suggests that they have been implemented to address a technological problem – to make the mobile browsing experience better for users of each platform. And, indeed, this is the case. Websites that have not been redesigned specifically for mobile platforms often do not work well. Even websites that do have mobile versions often do not work particularly well. The user experience between those websites is often nonstandard, which inconveniences users and may encourage them to discontinue their use of both that website and the platform that sent them there. By using an in-app browser – and especially by offering a standardized format for presenting news content across sites in that browser – platforms can (at least in principle – I will not defend the quality of many in-app browsers, with the recognition that they are a new and improving technology) offer users a superior experience. This means that they will make more use of a platform, yes, benefitting, for instance, Facebook – but it also means that they will consume more content via that platform, benefitting, for instance, media outlets.\nImportantly, mobile browsing, where we see these in-app browsers, is different from browsing in a desktop environment. When a user is sent to a website for an article on a mobile device, they are unlikely to stay on that website once they are done with the article. Rather, they are likely to exit out of the browser, which sends them back to whatever source sent them to the website initially. This means that users are “locked in” to the Facebook platform no matter whether it uses an in-app or external browser.\nHubbard is exactly right that in-app browsers and Instant Articles are an effort to keep users engaged with the Facebook platform. But the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms. The alternative is users getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend their time than waiting for poorly-rendered webpages to load. Facebook knows that if they can make articles quick and easy to access, more people will spend more time on their phones. This is why Facebook is willing to offer content providers a significant share of ad revenue. And, to the extent that publishers of any sort continue to produce content that Facebook users want to engage with, those publishers will continue to be able to demand such a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny its users access to content linked to via Facebook. To the contrary, it has every incentive to get them seamless access to that content, and is willing to pay to do so.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nor are there vertical\nplatform – concerns driving the problem of fake news. Facebook is a platform-based distributor of information, including news\nHubbard suggests\nFacebook’s gatekeeper position allows it to harm the traditional media in an effort to keep people on Facebook’s own site\nin-app browsers have become common\nto address a technological problem – to make the mobile browsing experience better for users of each platform\nEven websites that do have mobile versions often do not work particularly well\nuser experience\nis\nnonstandard, which inconveniences users and may encourage them to discontinue their use of both that website and the platform that sent them there. By using an in-app browser\nplatforms can\noffer users a superior experience\nthey will make more use of a platform, yes, benefitting\nFacebook – but\nalso\nthey will consume more content via that platform, benefitting\nmedia outlets\nmobile browsing\nis different from browsing in a desktop environment\nin-app browsers and Instant Articles are an effort to keep users engaged with the Facebook platform. But the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms. The alternative is users getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend their time\nFacebook knows\nif they can make articles quick and easy to access, more people will spend more time on their phones. This is why Facebook is willing to offer content providers a significant share of ad revenue\nto the extent that publishers of any sort continue to produce content that Facebook users want to engage with, those publishers will continue to be able to demand such a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny its users access to content linked to via Facebook\nit has every incentive to get them seamless access to that content", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Even if, monopolies don’t drive misinformation—restrictions don’t drive traffic to real news.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nor are there vertical\nplatform – concerns driving the problem of fake news. Facebook is a platform-based distributor of information, including news\nHubbard suggests\nFacebook’s gatekeeper position allows it to harm the traditional media in an effort to keep people on Facebook’s own site\nin-app browsers have become common\nto address a technological problem – to make the mobile browsing experience better for users of each platform\nEven websites that do have mobile versions often do not work particularly well\nuser experience\nis\nnonstandard, which inconveniences users and may encourage them to discontinue their use of both that website and the platform that sent them there. By using an in-app browser\nplatforms can\noffer users a superior experience\nthey will make more use of a platform, yes, benefitting\nFacebook – but\nalso\nthey will consume more content via that platform, benefitting\nmedia outlets\nmobile browsing\nis different from browsing in a desktop environment\nin-app browsers and Instant Articles are an effort to keep users engaged with the Facebook platform. But the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms. The alternative is users getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend their time\nFacebook knows\nif they can make articles quick and easy to access, more people will spend more time on their phones. This is why Facebook is willing to offer content providers a significant share of ad revenue\nto the extent that publishers of any sort continue to produce content that Facebook users want to engage with, those publishers will continue to be able to demand such a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny its users access to content linked to via Facebook\nit has every incentive to get them seamless access to that content", "role": "user" }, { "content": "make the mobile browsing experience better\nboth that website and the platform that sent them there\nbenefitting\nmedia outlets\nnot users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms\ngetting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences\nevery incentive to get them seamless access to that content", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Even if, monopolies don’t drive misinformation—restrictions don’t drive traffic to real news.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nor are there vertical\nplatform – concerns driving the problem of fake news. Facebook is a platform-based distributor of information, including news\nHubbard suggests\nFacebook’s gatekeeper position allows it to harm the traditional media in an effort to keep people on Facebook’s own site\nin-app browsers have become common\nto address a technological problem – to make the mobile browsing experience better for users of each platform\nEven websites that do have mobile versions often do not work particularly well\nuser experience\nis\nnonstandard, which inconveniences users and may encourage them to discontinue their use of both that website and the platform that sent them there. By using an in-app browser\nplatforms can\noffer users a superior experience\nthey will make more use of a platform, yes, benefitting\nFacebook – but\nalso\nthey will consume more content via that platform, benefitting\nmedia outlets\nmobile browsing\nis different from browsing in a desktop environment\nin-app browsers and Instant Articles are an effort to keep users engaged with the Facebook platform. But the alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms. The alternative is users getting frustrated with news outlets’ mobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend their time\nFacebook knows\nif they can make articles quick and easy to access, more people will spend more time on their phones. This is why Facebook is willing to offer content providers a significant share of ad revenue\nto the extent that publishers of any sort continue to produce content that Facebook users want to engage with, those publishers will continue to be able to demand such a share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny its users access to content linked to via Facebook\nit has every incentive to get them seamless access to that content", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nor are there\nplatform – concerns driving\nfake news\nin-app browsers\nmake the mobile browsing experience better\nwebsites\nmobile versions\ndo not work\nuser experience\nmay encourage them to discontinue\nuse of\nthe platform that sent them\nin-app browsers\nkeep users engaged with\nFacebook\nthe alternative is not users engaging more with news outlets’ platforms. The alternative is users getting frustrated with news\nmobile experiences and finding more enjoyable ways to spend\ntime\nto the extent\npublishers\nproduce content\nFacebook users want\npublishers will\ndemand\na share of revenue. Facebook has no incentive to deny\nusers access to content\nit has every incentive to get them seamless access", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4. Even with operational changes, no country will ever trust it. SLBMs make it too risky.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation—be it discouraging, conducive, or trivial—cannot be captured precisely. The risk of miscalculation can never be driven to zero, and only history will determine whether a decision-maker’s risk tolerance was correct. Furthermore, given the closely held nature of adversary perceptions on matters related to nuclear weapons, an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty.76 That said, the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU pronouncement by the United States. Their interpretation will go far in determining the policy’s ultimate impact, if any, on the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.77 From the vantage point of Moscow or Beijing, how clearly would NFU signal U.S. intent about the circumstances under which it would consider employing nuclear weapons? In other words, to what extent could they rely on an NFU policy as a predictor of U.S. behavior? Consider how CDRUSSTRATCOM describes his framework for posturing U.S. nuclear forces in light of China’s NFU policy: “It’s my responsibility to make sure that I have thought through what we have to do to deter what they’re capable of doing as opposed to what they say they’re going to do.”78 Applying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself.79 As a statement of intent, and a quickly reversible one at that, declaratory policy may not necessarily guide decision making in a crisis-to-conflict transition or during active hostilities. Perceptions of the credibility of an NFU pledge thus combine with a host of other factors, including U.S. capabilities, doctrine, and operational war plans, to be important.80 Our research concludes that as Moscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal about U.S. nuclear forces, a policy pronouncement of NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the United States will approach a crisis.81 Consistent with the NFU empirical record thus far, a concomitant change in U.S. posture or capability might help convince Russia and China that the pledge is genuine, but there is little guarantee. Strikingly, IDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces, Russia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed. While material evidence of NFU might “give adversaries pause,” according to one former official, the superiority of other aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. For example, an NFU policy complemented by an effort to dealert ICBMs is not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed, accuracy, and survivability and the targeting coverage implications of U.S. SLBM forces. The barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe, especially for a country like the United States, which would pursue the policy after developing and deploying a large, diverse nuclear arsenal structured to provide a flexible set of deterrent options. Assuming that the United States takes all necessary steps to ensure that an NFU policy is implemented and sufficiently messaged to adversaries and that, despite evidence to the contrary, the adversaries believe that pledge, will that belief alter the risk of miscalculation? Again, the available evidence suggests that NFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis. As one former senior leader said, there are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy that can be instantly changed. The historical record is mixed, at best, regarding the effect of declaratory policy on the decision making, operational behavior, and policy of other nation-states. Scholars of international relations and strategic thought point to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is that state’s determination of its own self interests. National decisions to act, including the use of force, are also driven by a state’s interpretation of the strategic setting at the time and its stakes and risks in the midst of a crisis. To this end, there is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory, operational doctrines, and fielded capabilities that make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons, at least in a limited way, to achieve their objectives in a regional conflict under certain circumstances.82 Indeed, U.S. policy and military leaders believe that this scenario is, among all the very unlikely uses of nuclear weapons, the more likely, and it is the scenario currently emphasized in planning and exercises. Given what is known about the adversary, a U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action, particularly action enabled by posture and planning that provide them the option to initiate nuclear use and thus achieve their objectives in a regional conflict. Creating such a perception might also lead adversaries to think that they can better control escalation. Deterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus, and this outcome could produce the opposite effect.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation\ncannot be captured precisely\nThe risk of miscalculation can never be driven to zero\ngiven the closely held nature of adversary perceptions\n, an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty\nthe open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU\nApplying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself.\nMoscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal\na\nNFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the United States will approach a crisis.\nStrikingly\nIDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces\nRussia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed. While material evidence of NFU might\ngive adversaries pause,”\nother aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration.\nan NFU policy\nis not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed, accuracy, and survivability\nof U.S. SLBM forces\nThe barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe\nNFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis\nthere are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy\nThe historical record is mixed, at best\nregarding the effect of declaratory policy on\noperational behavior,\nScholars\npoint to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is\nstate’s\n own self interests.\nthere is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory,\nthat make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons\nto achieve their objectives in a regional conflict\na U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action\nDeterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus, and this outcome could produce the opposite effect.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4. Even with operational changes, no country will ever trust it. SLBMs make it too risky.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation—be it discouraging, conducive, or trivial—cannot be captured precisely. The risk of miscalculation can never be driven to zero, and only history will determine whether a decision-maker’s risk tolerance was correct. Furthermore, given the closely held nature of adversary perceptions on matters related to nuclear weapons, an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty.76 That said, the open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU pronouncement by the United States. Their interpretation will go far in determining the policy’s ultimate impact, if any, on the risk of miscalculation in a crisis.77 From the vantage point of Moscow or Beijing, how clearly would NFU signal U.S. intent about the circumstances under which it would consider employing nuclear weapons? In other words, to what extent could they rely on an NFU policy as a predictor of U.S. behavior? Consider how CDRUSSTRATCOM describes his framework for posturing U.S. nuclear forces in light of China’s NFU policy: “It’s my responsibility to make sure that I have thought through what we have to do to deter what they’re capable of doing as opposed to what they say they’re going to do.”78 Applying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself.79 As a statement of intent, and a quickly reversible one at that, declaratory policy may not necessarily guide decision making in a crisis-to-conflict transition or during active hostilities. Perceptions of the credibility of an NFU pledge thus combine with a host of other factors, including U.S. capabilities, doctrine, and operational war plans, to be important.80 Our research concludes that as Moscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal about U.S. nuclear forces, a policy pronouncement of NFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the United States will approach a crisis.81 Consistent with the NFU empirical record thus far, a concomitant change in U.S. posture or capability might help convince Russia and China that the pledge is genuine, but there is little guarantee. Strikingly, IDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces, Russia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed. While material evidence of NFU might “give adversaries pause,” according to one former official, the superiority of other aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration. For example, an NFU policy complemented by an effort to dealert ICBMs is not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed, accuracy, and survivability and the targeting coverage implications of U.S. SLBM forces. The barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe, especially for a country like the United States, which would pursue the policy after developing and deploying a large, diverse nuclear arsenal structured to provide a flexible set of deterrent options. Assuming that the United States takes all necessary steps to ensure that an NFU policy is implemented and sufficiently messaged to adversaries and that, despite evidence to the contrary, the adversaries believe that pledge, will that belief alter the risk of miscalculation? Again, the available evidence suggests that NFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis. As one former senior leader said, there are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy that can be instantly changed. The historical record is mixed, at best, regarding the effect of declaratory policy on the decision making, operational behavior, and policy of other nation-states. Scholars of international relations and strategic thought point to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is that state’s determination of its own self interests. National decisions to act, including the use of force, are also driven by a state’s interpretation of the strategic setting at the time and its stakes and risks in the midst of a crisis. To this end, there is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory, operational doctrines, and fielded capabilities that make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons, at least in a limited way, to achieve their objectives in a regional conflict under certain circumstances.82 Indeed, U.S. policy and military leaders believe that this scenario is, among all the very unlikely uses of nuclear weapons, the more likely, and it is the scenario currently emphasized in planning and exercises. Given what is known about the adversary, a U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action, particularly action enabled by posture and planning that provide them the option to initiate nuclear use and thus achieve their objectives in a regional conflict. Creating such a perception might also lead adversaries to think that they can better control escalation. Deterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus, and this outcome could produce the opposite effect.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "cannot be captured precisely\nnever be driven to zero\nclosely held nature\ncharacterized by uncertainty\nauthoritative and empirically driven foundation\nconsider and assimilate\nunlikely to alter how they perceive\nattended by a downgrade\nprobably continue to doubt\nultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration.\nan NFU policy\nnot likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis\nspeed\naccuracy\nsurvivability\nappear severe\nfar more fundamental factors\nmixed, at best\noperational behavior,\nhost of factors\nown self interests.\ntheories of victory,\ntheir willingness to employ nuclear weapons\nraise perceived risk\ncomplicate the adversary’s decision calculus\nopposite effect.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 4. Even with operational changes, no country will ever trust it. SLBMs make it too risky.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The truth about the relationship between NFU and miscalculation\ncannot be captured precisely\nThe risk of miscalculation can never be driven to zero\ngiven the closely held nature of adversary perceptions\n, an unclassified attempt to answer such a question will be characterized by uncertainty\nthe open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how potential adversaries like Russia and China perceive the credibility of an NFU\nApplying this perspective forward and drawing on existing and recent scholarship, it is reasonable to suppose potential U.S. adversaries will form an assessment of NFU’s credibility based on much more than the content of the policy declaration itself.\nMoscow and Beijing consider and assimilate the totality of information and intelligence at their disposal\na\nNFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive that the United States will approach a crisis.\nStrikingly\nIDA’s interviews suggests that even if NFU was attended by a downgrade in the overall readiness of U.S. nuclear forces\nRussia and China will probably continue to doubt that U.S. intent and objectives have changed. While material evidence of NFU might\ngive adversaries pause,”\nother aspects of U.S. forces would ultimately overrule or outweigh this consideration.\nan NFU policy\nis not likely to change adversary planning, operations, or crisis behavior due to the perceived speed, accuracy, and survivability\nof U.S. SLBM forces\nThe barriers to a credible NFU policy appear severe\nNFU cannot be expected to have a significant impact on the risk of miscalculation in crisis\nthere are far more fundamental factors involved than the effect of a policy\nThe historical record is mixed, at best\nregarding the effect of declaratory policy on\noperational behavior,\nScholars\npoint to a host of factors that affect a nationstate’s decisions and behaviors, one of which is\nstate’s\n own self interests.\nthere is evidence that today’s nuclear-armed actors have theories of victory,\nthat make plausible their willingness to employ nuclear weapons\nto achieve their objectives in a regional conflict\na U.S. shift to NFU could serve to reinforce adversary perceptions of lower risk and abet aggressive action\nDeterrence aims to raise perceived risk and complicate the adversary’s decision calculus, and this outcome could produce the opposite effect.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "risk of miscalc\ncan never be\nzero\ngiven\nadversary perceptions\nthe open-source literature offers an authoritative and empirically driven foundation for how\nadversaries\nperceive\nNFU\nNFU is unlikely to alter how they perceive\nthe U\nS\nIDA’s interviews suggests\neven if NFU was attended by a downgrade in\nreadiness\nRussia and China will\ncontinue to doubt\nU.S.\nobjectives have changed\nNFU policy\nis not likely to change\nplanning, operations, or crisis\ndue to\nspeed\naccuracy, and survivability\nof\nSLBM\nNFU cannot\nhave a significant impact on\nrisk of miscalculation\nThe historical record is mixed, at best\na host of factors\naffect\nnationstate’s decisions\none of which is\nstate’s\nself interests\noutcome could produce the opposite effect", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: They already have---AI DAOs act autonomously, learn based on new info AND replicate human intelligence---meets every part of their definition", "role": "system" }, { "content": "However, there are different ways in which AI can interact and be implemented in DAOs:\n1.AI at the edges of smart contract: With AI at the edges of the smart contract of the DAO, the AI is able to autonomously make decisions without the token holders. This way, the AI triggers the smart contract to carry out protocols once the AI meets the predetermined conditions of the smart contract. The AI has the capability to run themselves if the token holders decide to cede control of the AI to the running AI itself.\nThe goal of AI DAOs is to automate the administration and management of organizations and firms, hence, the AI in AI DAOs are independent agents that autonomously make decisions.\nBlockchain runs on smart contracts which automate the completion of transactions and functions when certain protocols have been met by humans (people interacting with the blockchain).\nAI in AI DAOs are independent agents in the DAOs that meet the predetermined conditions of the smart contract, thus triggering the smart contract to perform agreed functions without the interference of humans (token holders of the DAOs).\nWith the influence of AI in DAOs, DAOs become autonomous, data-driven, and transparent organizations that run on smart contracts triggered by AI to distribute value amongst its token holders.\nAI in DAOs also helps improve the relationship between users of the DAO and the organizers, moving the users from just customers to investors of the DAO, owning tokens (shares) of the DAO.\n2. AI at the center of smart contracts: With a more complex AI entity at the core of smart contracts, it creates a feedback loop, a sort of control system that continues on its own, making decisions, and actuating outputs with the given resources.\nWith this mechanism in the automation of decision-making, instead of having the token holders vote on every decision, they relay their preferences to the AI, ceding control to the running AI itself which then makes decisions based on established preferences.\nHowever, this can only be effectively done with adaptive ML and AGI whereby the AI learns from past actions and optimizes decisions made themselves.\nAdaptive ML (adaptive machine learning) is the process of retraining the AI to vary its outputs based on the varying algorithms and available information, as the information given to the AI varies with time.\nAGI (artificial general intelligence)is a machine that interacts with the world the same way humans do, with the capacity to execute a huge range of tasks.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there are different ways\nAI can\nbe implemented in DAOs\n1.AI at the edges of smart contract\nAI is able to autonomously make decisions without\ntoken holders\nAI triggers the smart contract to carry out protocols once the AI meets the predetermined conditions of the smart contract\nthe AI in AI DAOs are independent agents that autonomously make decisions\nAI in AI DAOs are independent agents in the DAOs that meet\nconditions of the smart contract, thus triggering the smart contract to perform agreed functions without\ninterference of humans\nWith\nAI\nDAOs become autonomous, data-driven, and transparent organizations\nWith a more complex AI entity at the core of smart contracts, it creates a\ncontrol system that continues on its own, making decisions\nactuating outputs with the given resources\ninstead of\ntoken holders vote on every decision, they relay\npreferences to the AI, ceding control to the running AI itself which\nmakes decisions\nthis can only be effectively done with adaptive ML and AGI whereby the AI learns from past actions and optimizes decisions made themselves\nAdaptive ML\nis the process of retraining the AI to vary its outputs based on the varying algorithms and available information\nAGI\ninteracts with the world the same way humans do, with the capacity to execute a huge range of tasks", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: They already have---AI DAOs act autonomously, learn based on new info AND replicate human intelligence---meets every part of their definition", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there are different ways\nAI can\nbe implemented in DAOs\n1.AI at the edges of smart contract\nAI is able to autonomously make decisions without\ntoken holders\nAI triggers the smart contract to carry out protocols once the AI meets the predetermined conditions of the smart contract\nthe AI in AI DAOs are independent agents that autonomously make decisions\nAI in AI DAOs are independent agents in the DAOs that meet\nconditions of the smart contract, thus triggering the smart contract to perform agreed functions without\ninterference of humans\nWith\nAI\nDAOs become autonomous, data-driven, and transparent organizations\nWith a more complex AI entity at the core of smart contracts, it creates a\ncontrol system that continues on its own, making decisions\nactuating outputs with the given resources\ninstead of\ntoken holders vote on every decision, they relay\npreferences to the AI, ceding control to the running AI itself which\nmakes decisions\nthis can only be effectively done with adaptive ML and AGI whereby the AI learns from past actions and optimizes decisions made themselves\nAdaptive ML\nis the process of retraining the AI to vary its outputs based on the varying algorithms and available information\nAGI\ninteracts with the world the same way humans do, with the capacity to execute a huge range of tasks", "role": "user" }, { "content": "implemented in DAOs\nautonomously make decisions\nare independent agents\nautonomously make decisions\nmaking decisions\nrelay\npreferences to the AI\nAI itself which\nmakes decisions\nadaptive ML\nAGI\nlearns\ninfo", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: They already have---AI DAOs act autonomously, learn based on new info AND replicate human intelligence---meets every part of their definition\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there are different ways\nAI can\nbe implemented in DAOs\n1.AI at the edges of smart contract\nAI is able to autonomously make decisions without\ntoken holders\nAI triggers the smart contract to carry out protocols once the AI meets the predetermined conditions of the smart contract\nthe AI in AI DAOs are independent agents that autonomously make decisions\nAI in AI DAOs are independent agents in the DAOs that meet\nconditions of the smart contract, thus triggering the smart contract to perform agreed functions without\ninterference of humans\nWith\nAI\nDAOs become autonomous, data-driven, and transparent organizations\nWith a more complex AI entity at the core of smart contracts, it creates a\ncontrol system that continues on its own, making decisions\nactuating outputs with the given resources\ninstead of\ntoken holders vote on every decision, they relay\npreferences to the AI, ceding control to the running AI itself which\nmakes decisions\nthis can only be effectively done with adaptive ML and AGI whereby the AI learns from past actions and optimizes decisions made themselves\nAdaptive ML\nis the process of retraining the AI to vary its outputs based on the varying algorithms and available information\nAGI\ninteracts with the world the same way humans do, with the capacity to execute a huge range of tasks", "role": "user" }, { "content": "AI\nimplemented in DAOs\nautonomously make decisions\nAI DAOs are independent agents\ninstead of\ntoken holders vote\nthey relay\npreferences to\nAI, ceding control to\nAI\nwhich\nmakes decisions\nwith adaptive ML and AGI\nAI learns\nAdaptive ML\nis\nretraining\nAI to vary\noutputs based on\ninfo\nAGI\ninteracts\nthe\nway humans do, with\ncapacity to execute\nhuge range of tasks", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 6. Food insecurity doesn’t cause war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.\nAccordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a\nreduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out\nto start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will\npeople on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other\ngroups\nthere is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages\nIn reality\nthe sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems\nResearch has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts\ndebates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 6. Food insecurity doesn’t cause war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a\nreduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out\nto start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will\npeople on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other\ngroups\nthere is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages\nIn reality\nthe sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems\nResearch has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts\ndebates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "little scholarly merit\nincreases\nconflict will break out\nmeans\nwill\nbrink of starvation\nnot in the position to resort to violence\nsocial unrest\nfood shortages\nIn reality\nconsiderably more complex\npolitical structures\nland ownership\ncorruption\ndemocratic reforms\neconomic problems\nsimple resource-related explanations\nmore complex political relationships.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 6. Food insecurity doesn’t cause war.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a\nreduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out\nto start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will\npeople on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other\ngroups\nthere is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages\nIn reality\nthe sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems\nResearch has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts\ndebates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "there is little\nmerit in the notion\na\nreduction in access to food increases\nconflict\nconflict requires people\nhave\nthe means and the will\npeople on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence\nthere is\nmisapprehension that social unrest\nrelates\nto food shortages\nsources of discontent are\nmore complex\npolitical structures\nland\ncorruption\ndesire for\nreforms and\neconomic problems", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: FTC can’t solve.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nOne thing I would say — and I agree with what Hal and Michal have said — is that when we think about algorithmic coordination, or however we are going to discuss it — and I have already mentioned the increasing complexity of algorithms — and talking about one of John’s points, which is that regulators often do not have the kind of high-tech sophistication that a lot of folks do — we are very quickly going to be unable to understand algorithms, so trying to be able to pinpoint where an actual moment of collusion occurs within an algorithm is really going to be increasingly a fool’s errand.\nWe are going to be looking instead at the output and trying to determine inferentially whether the output of an algorithm and the output of, say, a pricing determination has been the result of some kind of behind-the-scenes coordination. \nThat is going to run directly into the body of case law in the United States that is the Twombly case law. The Twombly case law says you have to be able to show a little bit more than just the fact that there happens to be, for instance, pricing similarity. The output of the algorithm under the U.S. case law is not going to be enough I don’t think. You’ve got to show the “who, what, when, where.” That is increasingly difficult with complex algorithms where you cannot show the “who, what, when, where.” You cannot actually understand them enough if they are black-box to be able to do that.\nSo I think that there is a moment in time when Twombly, the U.S. case law on parallel conduct, is going to run smack into the complexity of algorithms and the tendency to look at output as where we are going to get the evidence of some kind of coordination.\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "with\nwhen we think about algorithmic coordination\nwe are very quickly going to be unable to understand algorithms\nso trying to be able to pinpoint where an actual moment of collusion occurs within an algorithm is really going to be increasingly a fool’s errand.\nWe are going to be looking instead at the output and trying to determine inferentially whether the output of an algorithm\npricing determination has been the result of\nbehind-the-scenes coordination\nThat is going to run\ninto\nthe Twombly case law.\nTwombly\nsays you have to\nshow\nmore than just the fact that there happens to be\npricing similarity\noutput of the algorithm under the U.S. case law is not going to be enough I don’t think. You’ve got to show the “who, what, when, where.” That is increasingly difficult with complex algorithms where you cannot show the “who, what, when, where.”\nTwombly, the U.S. case law on parallel conduct, is going to run smack into the complexity of algorithms and the tendency to look at output as where we are going to get the evidence of some kind of coordination", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: FTC can’t solve.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "with\nwhen we think about algorithmic coordination\nwe are very quickly going to be unable to understand algorithms\nso trying to be able to pinpoint where an actual moment of collusion occurs within an algorithm is really going to be increasingly a fool’s errand.\nWe are going to be looking instead at the output and trying to determine inferentially whether the output of an algorithm\npricing determination has been the result of\nbehind-the-scenes coordination\nThat is going to run\ninto\nthe Twombly case law.\nTwombly\nsays you have to\nshow\nmore than just the fact that there happens to be\npricing similarity\noutput of the algorithm under the U.S. case law is not going to be enough I don’t think. You’ve got to show the “who, what, when, where.” That is increasingly difficult with complex algorithms where you cannot show the “who, what, when, where.”\nTwombly, the U.S. case law on parallel conduct, is going to run smack into the complexity of algorithms and the tendency to look at output as where we are going to get the evidence of some kind of coordination", "role": "user" }, { "content": "when we think about algorithmic coordination\nunable to understand algorithms\nfool’s errand\noutput\ndetermine inferentially\noutput of an algorithm\npricing determination\nbehind-the-scenes coordination\nTwombly case law\nmore than\npricing similarity\noutput of the algorithm\nnot going to be enough\nwho\nwhat\nwhen\nwhere\nincreasingly difficult\ncomplex algorithms\nU.S. case law on parallel conduct\nsmack into the complexity of algorithms", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: FTC can’t solve.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nOne thing I would say — and I agree with what Hal and Michal have said — is that when we think about algorithmic coordination, or however we are going to discuss it — and I have already mentioned the increasing complexity of algorithms — and talking about one of John’s points, which is that regulators often do not have the kind of high-tech sophistication that a lot of folks do — we are very quickly going to be unable to understand algorithms, so trying to be able to pinpoint where an actual moment of collusion occurs within an algorithm is really going to be increasingly a fool’s errand.\nWe are going to be looking instead at the output and trying to determine inferentially whether the output of an algorithm and the output of, say, a pricing determination has been the result of some kind of behind-the-scenes coordination. \nThat is going to run directly into the body of case law in the United States that is the Twombly case law. The Twombly case law says you have to be able to show a little bit more than just the fact that there happens to be, for instance, pricing similarity. The output of the algorithm under the U.S. case law is not going to be enough I don’t think. You’ve got to show the “who, what, when, where.” That is increasingly difficult with complex algorithms where you cannot show the “who, what, when, where.” You cannot actually understand them enough if they are black-box to be able to do that.\nSo I think that there is a moment in time when Twombly, the U.S. case law on parallel conduct, is going to run smack into the complexity of algorithms and the tendency to look at output as where we are going to get the evidence of some kind of coordination.\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "with\nalgorithmic coordination\nwe are\ngoing to be unable to understand\ntrying to\npinpoint\ncollusion\nis\ngoing to be\na fool’s errand\nWe are\ntrying to determine inferentially whether\nan algorithm\nhas been\nresult of\ncoordination\nThat is going to run\ninto\nTwombly\noutput\nunder the\ncase law is not going to be enough\n. You’ve got to show the “who, what, when, where.”\nTwombly\nis going to run\ninto\ncomplexity", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Extinction requires 12 degrees", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios.\nThe probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain.\nIt is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction\nexistential risks of climate change\nstem from tail risk\nthe low probability of extreme levels of warming\nand interaction with other sources of risk\nwarming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable\nthe timescales over which such changes might happen could mean\nhumanity is able to adapt\nto avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios\nunless strong action is taken soon by major emitters\nwe will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway\nif we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway\nprobability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%\nand\n10°C is\n3%\nThese estimates are\nhighly uncertain\nIt is likely\nthe world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs\nlong before there is warming of 10°C", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Extinction requires 12 degrees", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction\nexistential risks of climate change\nstem from tail risk\nthe low probability of extreme levels of warming\nand interaction with other sources of risk\nwarming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable\nthe timescales over which such changes might happen could mean\nhumanity is able to adapt\nto avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios\nunless strong action is taken soon by major emitters\nwe will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway\nif we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway\nprobability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%\nand\n10°C is\n3%\nThese estimates are\nhighly uncertain\nIt is likely\nthe world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs\nlong before there is warming of 10°C", "role": "user" }, { "content": "most likely\nvery unlikely to cause human extinction\nlow probability\nwarming of 11-12°C\nhumanity is able to adapt\neven very extreme scenarios\n10%\n3%\nhighly uncertain\nlikely\nlong before there is warming of 10°C", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Extinction requires 12 degrees\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios.\nThe probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain.\nIt is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "most likely levels of\nwarming are very unlikely to cause\nextinction\nexistential risks\nstem from tail risk\nthe low probability of extreme\nwarming\n12°C would render\nthe planet uninhabitable\ntimescales\nmean\nhumanity is able to adapt\nto avoid extinction in even\nextreme scenarios\nprobability of\n6°C is\n10%\nand\n10°C is\n3%\nThese\nare\nhighly uncertain\nIt is likely\nthe world will take action\nonce it begins to impose\ncosts\nlong before\nwarming of 10°C", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Growth overshoots planetary bounds—causes existential disease and starvation from sea level rise, land use, fertilizer scarcity, and chemical pollution.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Limits to Growth (LTG)\nThe MIT team concluded\nsignificant systemic problems were emerging from accelerating industrialization\nand\n.\nthe “assumption of inevitable economic growth” represents “the\n foundation” of economics. Any “limit”\nchallenged this foundation.\nEconomics adopts a\nmodel where production and consumption exist in a circular flow, without a natural context.\nEcological economists reject\nthat human activity is independent of nature\n. Instead\nPhysics\nmatters;\n depletion and pollution are inescapable.\nThe Ecological Footprint\nA\nrelated development is\n“planetary boundaries,” devised by\nRockström\nThe Relevance of LTG to Environmental Health\nThe most serious potential consequence of global environmental change is the erosion of Earth’s life-support systems.\nthe nature of this threat to\nsurvival of the world’s\nspecies—including our own—has received little attention\n.\nLTG did not address climate change as such, but\nmodeled these factors as\na complex system.\nPlanetary Boundaries and Health\nplanetary boundaries\nwas first published in 2009. These\nwere\nEarth System processes\nwhich\nwill be modified by human actions.\nhumans depend on the diversity of life on Earth.\nloss of insects could disrupt pollination, food supply\nloss of birds might trigger\ncrop losses\nreduced complexity of the microbiome of\ncities\ncaus\n diseases\nexceeding multiple planetary boundaries\nrisks\na steep decline towards a civilization-crippling condition.\nPlanetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biosphere Integrity\nRates of extinction are\n100 times the background rate\n.\nBiological diversity of lower order organisms\nare similarly in decline.\nunder deliberate attack are forests, especially species with\ntimber, or growing on land\nfor crops\n.\nInfestations of tree borers\nrender\nlife\nvulnerable to disease and fire. Humans\ndepend on the fabric of other life on earth for their survival—for food, clean air and water, and numerous other ecosystem “services”\nas well as for\ndrugs.\nreduction in ecosystem services will\nharm\nall civilization.\nPlanetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biogeochemical Cycles\npressing\nis\ndisruption of\nbiogeochemical cycles, particularly nitrogen and phosphorous.\nnitrogen\nis\ncascading through our rivers\ninitiating algal blooms and dead zones.\nphosphorous, the other widely dispersed fertilizer,\nis\nin decline, with grim implications for\nag\n. Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Land-System Change\nagricultural land-system change may\nresult in land degradation giving rise to erosion, loss of topsoil, sedimentation of waterways and degradation of coastal zones.\n1 billion people are at risk of desertification globally\n.\nPlanetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Climate Change Also in the amber zone is climate change. Remaining below the 2 [degrees]°C target\nnecessitates tech\nwhich do not yet exist for extracting carbon from the atmosphere.\nnascent carbon reducing tech\nrequire considerable energy\nEven if\ncommitments\nat the 2015 Paris Conference\nare all honored,\nglobal temp\ns will be 2 [degrees]°C hotter than pre-industrial times by 2050\n.\nthe aspirational 1.5°C\ntarget may be reached by the\n 2030s.\nEven if temperature rise\ncan be contained, crop yields will decline and\nplaces will become unliveable due to\ncoastal inundation. Glaciers\nwhose melt supplies electricity to billions in Asia and South America will shrink, coral reefs\nwill disappear, and\ncatastrophic\nsea level rise will result.\nPollution\nNovel entities, novel behaviors, novel environments and health Novel entities\nfrom chemical pollution\nhave\npotential for unwanted geophysical and/or biological effects\nMost novel entities have been generated in the\nhuman-dominated era\nsuch as\nCFCs\nDDT\ndieldrin\nand\npolyvinyl chloride. CFCs, by harming the\nozone\nimpinge on an Earth System function\n;\nUV light\nlead\nto\nskin cancer\n.\nHumans are\nexposed to numerous other emerging environmental hazards\nsince World War II\n140,000 compounds have been synthesized since 1950,\nthe pace of their introduction greatly exceeds that of epidemiological investigation and legal constraint.\nnovel entities\nmany are carcinogenic, while others act as endocrine disruptors\n.\nfewer than half\nhave undergone any testing for safety or toxicity.\nimmunological\neffects\nare\nbarely explored\nand\ncontribute to\ndisease\nWhile some novel entities have been\nbanned\nsuch as the “dirty dozen\n”\n,\nthousands of others are released annually onto the market.\nhumans\nprovide opportunity for the amplification and spread of genes that convey antibiotic resistance.\nIdentified mechanisms for this transfer include air-borne transport\n.\nGlobal Warming and Health\nemissions of greenhouse gases\nmanifest in\nextreme weather events, including heatwaves, droughts, flooding, and major storms including cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes.\nChanges in vector-borne diseases, food security, and sea level rise have long been forecast\n. Global warming is already affecting\nconflict\n.\nFamines, wars and migration can all occur without climate change, but in some cases climate change can make these phenomena much worse.\nAs temperatures rise, insect populations may too, but only to a point. Beyond that point, vector populations may in fact decline.\nBiodiversity Loss and Health\nGenetic diversity is\nthe source of pharmaceutical discovery as well as\ntraditional medicines.\nnature-derived pharmaceuticals come from plants;\n. Nature produces an inspirational variety and complexity of molecules to further manipulate.\na utilitarian appreciation\nextends to livelihoods dependent on\nbiodiversity.\nbiological diversity is required for\nsoil health, pest control\n, pollination and the genetics of livestock and crops.\nThe net effect of deforestation\nfavors mosquitoes that serve as vectors of human diseases including previously obscure pathogens such as Zika and Chikungunya viruses\n.\nreductions\nin biodiversity have increased zoonotic infectious disease\ndue to intensive animal husbandry. Livestock\ncreate\nopportunity for viral amplification and mutations resulting in\nunrecognized animal diseases and zoonoses.\nDeclining Energy Yield From Energy Expended\nthe least understood\nlimit\nto growth is\ndeclining energy return on energy investment (EROEI).\nfossil fuels have been crucial to\nhuman\ndomination of the biosphere.\ngreat powers\nhave frequently acted with violence or duplicity to acquire\nenergy resources, from the Middle East to the Timor Sea.\nthat EROEI is steadily declining is rarely mentioned in mainstream media\n;\n.\ndecline of EROEI may be disconcerting to a public ill-prepared for the future austerity which such a decline implies.\nConclusion\nWithout urgent change\nglobal\nsurvival\nis imperiled", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Limits to Growth (LTG)\nsystemic problems\nemerg\naccelerating industrialization\nand\ninevitable economic growth\nfoundation\necon\nInstead\ndepletion\npollution\nThe Ecological Footprint\n“planetary boundaries,”\nThe Relevance of LTG to Environmental Health\nerosion\nlife-support systems\nPlanetary Boundaries and Health\nplanetary boundaries\ndepend on the diversity of life on Earth\ncrop losses\ndiseases\nPlanetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biosphere Integrity\n100 times\nBio\nd\nin decline\nforests\ntimber\nland\ncrops\nother life\nfood\nclean air\nwater\ndrugs\nall civilization\nPlanetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biogeochemical Cycles\nnitrogen\nand\nphosphorous\nfertilizer\nag\nPlanetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Land-System Change\nPlanetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Climate Change\ndo not yet exist\ntech\nconsiderable energy\nParis\ntemp\ns\n1.5\n30s\nEven if temperature rise\nunliveable\nsea level rise\nPollution\nNovel entities, novel behaviors, novel environments and health Novel entities\nchemical pollution\nhuman-dominated era\nCFCs\nDDT\ndieldrin\npolyvinyl chloride\nharm\nozone\nskin cancer\nnovel entities\ncarcinogenic\nendocrine disruptors\ndisease\nsome\nthousands\nantibiotic resistance\nGlobal Warming and Health\nconflict\ninsect populations\ndecline\nBiodiversity Loss and Health\nGenetic diversity\nsource of pharmaceutical discovery\ntraditional medicines\nplants\nutilitarian appreciation\nsoil health\npest control\npollination\ncrops\ndeforestation\nvector\ndisease\nincrease\n zoonotic infectious disease\nDeclining Energy Yield From Energy Expended\nenergy return on energy investment\ncrucial\nviolence or duplicity\nMid\nEast\nTimor Sea\nfuture austerity\nConclusion\nurgent change\nglobal\nsurvival", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Growth overshoots planetary bounds—causes existential disease and starvation from sea level rise, land use, fertilizer scarcity, and chemical pollution.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Limits to Growth (LTG)\nThe MIT team concluded\nsignificant systemic problems were emerging from accelerating industrialization\nand\n.\nthe “assumption of inevitable economic growth” represents “the\n foundation” of economics. Any “limit”\nchallenged this foundation.\nEconomics adopts a\nmodel where production and consumption exist in a circular flow, without a natural context.\nEcological economists reject\nthat human activity is independent of nature\n. Instead\nPhysics\nmatters;\n depletion and pollution are inescapable.\nThe Ecological Footprint\nA\nrelated development is\n“planetary boundaries,” devised by\nRockström\nThe Relevance of LTG to Environmental Health\nThe most serious potential consequence of global environmental change is the erosion of Earth’s life-support systems.\nthe nature of this threat to\nsurvival of the world’s\nspecies—including our own—has received little attention\n.\nLTG did not address climate change as such, but\nmodeled these factors as\na complex system.\nPlanetary Boundaries and Health\nplanetary boundaries\nwas first published in 2009. These\nwere\nEarth System processes\nwhich\nwill be modified by human actions.\nhumans depend on the diversity of life on Earth.\nloss of insects could disrupt pollination, food supply\nloss of birds might trigger\ncrop losses\nreduced complexity of the microbiome of\ncities\ncaus\n diseases\nexceeding multiple planetary boundaries\nrisks\na steep decline towards a civilization-crippling condition.\nPlanetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biosphere Integrity\nRates of extinction are\n100 times the background rate\n.\nBiological diversity of lower order organisms\nare similarly in decline.\nunder deliberate attack are forests, especially species with\ntimber, or growing on land\nfor crops\n.\nInfestations of tree borers\nrender\nlife\nvulnerable to disease and fire. Humans\ndepend on the fabric of other life on earth for their survival—for food, clean air and water, and numerous other ecosystem “services”\nas well as for\ndrugs.\nreduction in ecosystem services will\nharm\nall civilization.\nPlanetary Boundaries Red Zone: Biogeochemical Cycles\npressing\nis\ndisruption of\nbiogeochemical cycles, particularly nitrogen and phosphorous.\nnitrogen\nis\ncascading through our rivers\ninitiating algal blooms and dead zones.\nphosphorous, the other widely dispersed fertilizer,\nis\nin decline, with grim implications for\nag\n. Planetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Land-System Change\nagricultural land-system change may\nresult in land degradation giving rise to erosion, loss of topsoil, sedimentation of waterways and degradation of coastal zones.\n1 billion people are at risk of desertification globally\n.\nPlanetary Boundaries Amber Zone: Climate Change Also in the amber zone is climate change. Remaining below the 2 [degrees]°C target\nnecessitates tech\nwhich do not yet exist for extracting carbon from the atmosphere.\nnascent carbon reducing tech\nrequire considerable energy\nEven if\ncommitments\nat the 2015 Paris Conference\nare all honored,\nglobal temp\ns will be 2 [degrees]°C hotter than pre-industrial times by 2050\n.\nthe aspirational 1.5°C\ntarget may be reached by the\n 2030s.\nEven if temperature rise\ncan be contained, crop yields will decline and\nplaces will become unliveable due to\ncoastal inundation. Glaciers\nwhose melt supplies electricity to billions in Asia and South America will shrink, coral reefs\nwill disappear, and\ncatastrophic\nsea level rise will result.\nPollution\nNovel entities, novel behaviors, novel environments and health Novel entities\nfrom chemical pollution\nhave\npotential for unwanted geophysical and/or biological effects\nMost novel entities have been generated in the\nhuman-dominated era\nsuch as\nCFCs\nDDT\ndieldrin\nand\npolyvinyl chloride. CFCs, by harming the\nozone\nimpinge on an Earth System function\n;\nUV light\nlead\nto\nskin cancer\n.\nHumans are\nexposed to numerous other emerging environmental hazards\nsince World War II\n140,000 compounds have been synthesized since 1950,\nthe pace of their introduction greatly exceeds that of epidemiological investigation and legal constraint.\nnovel entities\nmany are carcinogenic, while others act as endocrine disruptors\n.\nfewer than half\nhave undergone any testing for safety or toxicity.\nimmunological\neffects\nare\nbarely explored\nand\ncontribute to\ndisease\nWhile some novel entities have been\nbanned\nsuch as the “dirty dozen\n”\n,\nthousands of others are released annually onto the market.\nhumans\nprovide opportunity for the amplification and spread of genes that convey antibiotic resistance.\nIdentified mechanisms for this transfer include air-borne transport\n.\nGlobal Warming and Health\nemissions of greenhouse gases\nmanifest in\nextreme weather events, including heatwaves, droughts, flooding, and major storms including cyclones, typhoons and hurricanes.\nChanges in vector-borne diseases, food security, and sea level rise have long been forecast\n. Global warming is already affecting\nconflict\n.\nFamines, wars and migration can all occur without climate change, but in some cases climate change can make these phenomena much worse.\nAs temperatures rise, insect populations may too, but only to a point. Beyond that point, vector populations may in fact decline.\nBiodiversity Loss and Health\nGenetic diversity is\nthe source of pharmaceutical discovery as well as\ntraditional medicines.\nnature-derived pharmaceuticals come from plants;\n. Nature produces an inspirational variety and complexity of molecules to further manipulate.\na utilitarian appreciation\nextends to livelihoods dependent on\nbiodiversity.\nbiological diversity is required for\nsoil health, pest control\n, pollination and the genetics of livestock and crops.\nThe net effect of deforestation\nfavors mosquitoes that serve as vectors of human diseases including previously obscure pathogens such as Zika and Chikungunya viruses\n.\nreductions\nin biodiversity have increased zoonotic infectious disease\ndue to intensive animal husbandry. Livestock\ncreate\nopportunity for viral amplification and mutations resulting in\nunrecognized animal diseases and zoonoses.\nDeclining Energy Yield From Energy Expended\nthe least understood\nlimit\nto growth is\ndeclining energy return on energy investment (EROEI).\nfossil fuels have been crucial to\nhuman\ndomination of the biosphere.\ngreat powers\nhave frequently acted with violence or duplicity to acquire\nenergy resources, from the Middle East to the Timor Sea.\nthat EROEI is steadily declining is rarely mentioned in mainstream media\n;\n.\ndecline of EROEI may be disconcerting to a public ill-prepared for the future austerity which such a decline implies.\nConclusion\nWithout urgent change\nglobal\nsurvival\nis imperiled", "role": "user" }, { "content": "from\nindustrialization\nand\ngrowth”\ndepletion and pollution are inescapable.\nthe erosion of\nlife-support\n.\nRates of extinction are\n100 times the background\n.\nBio\nd\nare\nin decline.\nunder\nattack are forests\nwith\ntimber, or\nland\nfor crops\n.\nHumans\ndepend on\nother life\nfor\nsurvival\nfood,\nwater, and\ndrugs.\nnitrogen\nand\nphosphorous,\nfertilizer\nis\nin decline, with grim implications for\nag\n.\nEven if\nParis\nare\nhonored\ntemp\ns will be\n1.5\nby the\n30s.\ncatastrophic\nsea level rise will result.\nNovel entities\nfrom chemical pollution\nharm\nthe\nozone\nare carcinogenic,\nothers\nendocrine disruptors\n.\nand\ncontribute to\ndisease\nWhile some\nhave been\nbanned\nthousands\nare released annually\n.\nwarming is already affecting\nconflict\n.\nGenetic diversity is\nthe source of pharmaceutical discovery\nfrom plants\nreductions\nincrease\nzoonotic infectious disease\n.\nWithout urgent change\nglobal\nsurvival\nis imperiled", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Terrorism, accidents, and miscalc.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Still, the goal of getting to zero remains persistent. It has been endorsed by world leaders and the general public; it has been adopted by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly; and it stands as a binding legal obligation under the essential Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps its time is finally coming. As the draft Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty indicate, there are a great many moving parts in this proposal, and several of them strain credulity. To conceptualize a world free of nuclear weapons, we have to presume a global readiness to effectuate the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and sequential deep cuts in nuclear arsenals by the nine states currently possessing them; we need a resolution or at least mitigation of seemingly perpetual regional tensions in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere; and we have to assume that revolutionary new technologies for air-tight verification and enforcement of compliance can be crafted and accepted by mutually suspicious sovereigns. That's asking a lot of the public imagination. On the other hand, the risks of sustaining the nuclearized status quo beggar belief, too. It cannot realistically be argued that a heavily-armed--and perhaps increasingly proliferating--world can perpetually dodge the specter of the use of nuclear weapons, by hostile forces or terrorists, by design, accident, or horrific miscalculation. No one can imagine that the world's current course will continue to escape forever a cataclysm beyond history. Alice in Wonderland's White Queen, who claimed to be able to believe six impossible things before breakfast, would therefore enjoy a rich smorgasbord of competing non-credible choices here: both the option of an unprecedented exploration up the mountain and the option of nervously remaining at our current base camp seem implausibly hazardous and unsustainable.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "getting to zero remains persistent. It has been endorsed by world leaders and the general public; it has been adopted by the United Nations\nstands as a binding legal obligation under\nNon-Proliferation Treaty\nits time is finally coming\nthe risks of sustaining the nuclearized status quo beggar belief\nIt cannot realistically be argued that a heavily-armed\nproliferating\nworld can perpetually dodge the specter of the use of nuc\ns, by hostile forces or terrorists, by design, accident, or horrific miscalculation. No one can imagine\nworld's current course will\nescape forever a cataclysm\nthe option of an unprecedented exploration up the mountain and the option of nervously remaining at our current base camp seem implausibly hazardous and unsustainable", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2. Terrorism, accidents, and miscalc.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "getting to zero remains persistent. It has been endorsed by world leaders and the general public; it has been adopted by the United Nations\nstands as a binding legal obligation under\nNon-Proliferation Treaty\nits time is finally coming\nthe risks of sustaining the nuclearized status quo beggar belief\nIt cannot realistically be argued that a heavily-armed\nproliferating\nworld can perpetually dodge the specter of the use of nuc\ns, by hostile forces or terrorists, by design, accident, or horrific miscalculation. No one can imagine\nworld's current course will\nescape forever a cataclysm\nthe option of an unprecedented exploration up the mountain and the option of nervously remaining at our current base camp seem implausibly hazardous and unsustainable", "role": "user" }, { "content": "getting to zero remains persistent\nendorsed by\nleaders\npublic\nthe risks of\nthe nuclearized status quo\nterrorists\naccident, or\nmiscalc\nremaining at our current base\nseem\nunsustainable", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Policies of radioactive racism are inflected by carceral logics of public ‘safety,’ ‘protection,’ and strategic ‘stability’ that cage our imaginations through myths of ‘accountable’ or ‘reasonable’ violence. They also serve as instruments to punish other states for acting out.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The policies and practices of nuclear weapon development, testing, and use, described earlier, are policies of radioactive racism. The same racist ideology that enables certain governments to explode nuclear bombs, dig up radioactive materials, and bury nuclear waste on Indigenous lands, Pacific islands and North African deserts also lies within carceral systems and border controls.\nThe dismissal of survivor testimony as expert contributions to nuclear weapon discourse or policymaking is mirrored in the exclusion of Black, Latinx [Latine], Asian, Arab, as well as LGBTQ+ and other people with lived experience of police brutality, from decisions about policing and community safety. Similarly, patronising racism is on display when nuclear-armed states argue that countries of the “global south” have no legitimate security interests when it comes to nuclear weapons—that they should just be quiet and let the “adults” handle things.\nNuclear weapons and carceral systems\nBeyond the embeddedness of white supremacy, nuclear weapon policy and activities also hold other similarities to carceral systems of policing and incarceration. As much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison. The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures.\nJust as many people find it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons, many also find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons. Yet, as Angela Davis notes, there is widespread “reluctance to face the realities hidden within [prisons], a fear of thinking about what happens inside them. Thus, the prison is present in our lives and at the same time, it is absent from our lives.”75 Likewise, many people acknowledge that nuclear weapons are horrible, yet claim they are a “necessary evil.” They accept the abstract notion that nuclear weapons “keep us safe”—because the bomb is for them out of sight and out of mind, and not something that they have ever experienced themselves. They exist, but they are meant to never be used. Thousands have been detonated, but on Black and brown bodies, near poor communities, on Indigenous lands.\nThe persistence of the faith that nuclear weapons bring security, force fed to us by the state as dogmatic Truth, is also similar to the faith in carceral systems to keep people safe. In both cases, we must ask, whose security do they serve, and against what or whom do they offer protection? Much like police forces only bring stability and order to the capitalist class, to those with property and wealth that require “protecting” from the masses, nuclear weapons only bring stability and order to the warmongers who seek the capacity to destroy the world in order to preserve their dominance of it.\nResponses to violence and inequalities that are witnessed are also similar. In the face of police brutality, some politicians or even activists suggest that the police can be reformed. With more body cameras, with better training, with more prosecutions and accountability, we can improve the operation of police. Whether these assertions are well intentioned or a deliberate tactic to defuse protest and demands for change, they rest on the notion that the structure itself is fine and its operation just needs to be tweaked. Likewise, there are plenty of advocates for nuclear arms control, calling for reductions of nuclear arsenals done to a “reasonable” level, or for the cancellation of modernisation programmes and development of new missiles or bombers, or for cutting some of the budget for nuclear weapons.\nBut as with police reforms, none of these adjustments get to the heart of the problem—which is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons both are extremely violent tools to oppress, control, and kill human beings. The problem is not simply the budgets or the size or the policies of police forces, the prison system, or nuclear arsenals— the problem is that each of these is designed to cause harm. You cannot reform away something when it is the fundamental nature of that thing.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "policies and practices of nuclear weapon development, testing, and use\nare policies of radioactive racism\nThe same racist ideology that enables\ngovernments to explode nuclear bombs\ndig\nradioactive materials\nand bury nuclear waste on Indigenous lands\nand North African deserts\nlies within carceral systems and border controls\nThe dismissal of survivor testimony as expert contributions to nuclear weapon discourse or policymaking is mirrored in\nexclusion of Black, Latinx [Latine], Asian, Arab, as well as LGBTQ+ and other people\nNuclear weapons and carceral systems\nAs much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison. The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures\nJust as many\nfind it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons, many also find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons\nYet, as Angela Davis notes, there is widespread\nreluctance to face the realities hidden within [prisons], a fear of thinking about what happens inside them.\nLikewise, many\nacknowledge that nuclear weapons are horrible, yet claim they are a “necessary evil.” They accept the abstract notion that nuclear weapons “keep us safe”\nThousands have been detonated, but on Black and brown bodies, near poor communities, on Indigenous lands.\nThe persistence of the faith that nuclear weapons bring security\nis\nsimilar to the faith in carceral systems to keep people safe\nIn both cases, we must ask, whose security do they serve, and against what or whom do they offer protection? Much like police forces only bring stability and order\nto those with property and wealth that require “protecting” from the masses, nuclear weapons only bring stability and order to the warmongers who seek the capacity to destroy the world in order to preserve their dominance of it.\nResponses to violence and inequalities that are witnessed are also similar. In the face of police brutality, some politicians\nsuggest that the police can be reformed\nwith better training\nand accountability\nLikewise\nadvocates for nuclear arms control, call\nfor reductions of nuclear arsenals\nto a “reasonable” level, or for the cancellation of modernisation\nBut as with police reforms, none of these adjustments get to the heart of the problem\nwhich is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons both are extremely violent tools to oppress, control, and kill human beings. The problem is not simply the budgets or the size or the policies of police forces, the prison system, or nuclear arsenals\nthe problem is that each\nis designed to cause harm\nYou cannot reform away something when it is the fundamental nature of that thing.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Policies of radioactive racism are inflected by carceral logics of public ‘safety,’ ‘protection,’ and strategic ‘stability’ that cage our imaginations through myths of ‘accountable’ or ‘reasonable’ violence. They also serve as instruments to punish other states for acting out.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "policies and practices of nuclear weapon development, testing, and use\nare policies of radioactive racism\nThe same racist ideology that enables\ngovernments to explode nuclear bombs\ndig\nradioactive materials\nand bury nuclear waste on Indigenous lands\nand North African deserts\nlies within carceral systems and border controls\nThe dismissal of survivor testimony as expert contributions to nuclear weapon discourse or policymaking is mirrored in\nexclusion of Black, Latinx [Latine], Asian, Arab, as well as LGBTQ+ and other people\nNuclear weapons and carceral systems\nAs much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison. The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures\nJust as many\nfind it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons, many also find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons\nYet, as Angela Davis notes, there is widespread\nreluctance to face the realities hidden within [prisons], a fear of thinking about what happens inside them.\nLikewise, many\nacknowledge that nuclear weapons are horrible, yet claim they are a “necessary evil.” They accept the abstract notion that nuclear weapons “keep us safe”\nThousands have been detonated, but on Black and brown bodies, near poor communities, on Indigenous lands.\nThe persistence of the faith that nuclear weapons bring security\nis\nsimilar to the faith in carceral systems to keep people safe\nIn both cases, we must ask, whose security do they serve, and against what or whom do they offer protection? Much like police forces only bring stability and order\nto those with property and wealth that require “protecting” from the masses, nuclear weapons only bring stability and order to the warmongers who seek the capacity to destroy the world in order to preserve their dominance of it.\nResponses to violence and inequalities that are witnessed are also similar. In the face of police brutality, some politicians\nsuggest that the police can be reformed\nwith better training\nand accountability\nLikewise\nadvocates for nuclear arms control, call\nfor reductions of nuclear arsenals\nto a “reasonable” level, or for the cancellation of modernisation\nBut as with police reforms, none of these adjustments get to the heart of the problem\nwhich is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons both are extremely violent tools to oppress, control, and kill human beings. The problem is not simply the budgets or the size or the policies of police forces, the prison system, or nuclear arsenals\nthe problem is that each\nis designed to cause harm\nYou cannot reform away something when it is the fundamental nature of that thing.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "development\ntesting\nuse\nradioactive racism\nsame racist ideology\ncarceral systems\nborder controls\nsurvivor testimony\nexpert contributions\nBlack\nLatinx [Latine]\nAsian\nArab\nLGBTQ+\nNuclear weapons and carceral systems\nAs much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison. The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures\nsecurity\npolice or prisons\nsecurity without nuclear weapons\nAngela Davis\nkeep us safe\ndetonated\nBlack\nbrown\nwhose security do they serve\nand\nwhom do they offer protection\npolice\nstability\nproperty\nwarmongers\nreformed\naccountability\narms control\nheart of the problem\noppress, control, and kill human beings\ndesigned", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Policies of radioactive racism are inflected by carceral logics of public ‘safety,’ ‘protection,’ and strategic ‘stability’ that cage our imaginations through myths of ‘accountable’ or ‘reasonable’ violence. They also serve as instruments to punish other states for acting out.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "policies and practices of nuclear weapon development, testing, and use\nare policies of radioactive racism\nThe same racist ideology that enables\ngovernments to explode nuclear bombs\ndig\nradioactive materials\nand bury nuclear waste on Indigenous lands\nand North African deserts\nlies within carceral systems and border controls\nThe dismissal of survivor testimony as expert contributions to nuclear weapon discourse or policymaking is mirrored in\nexclusion of Black, Latinx [Latine], Asian, Arab, as well as LGBTQ+ and other people\nNuclear weapons and carceral systems\nAs much as the bomb is a coloniser, it is also a prison. The justifications for nuclear weapon possession, told over and over to our populations and entrenched within our economies and politics, cage our imaginations along with our bodies and our futures\nJust as many\nfind it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons, many also find it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons\nYet, as Angela Davis notes, there is widespread\nreluctance to face the realities hidden within [prisons], a fear of thinking about what happens inside them.\nLikewise, many\nacknowledge that nuclear weapons are horrible, yet claim they are a “necessary evil.” They accept the abstract notion that nuclear weapons “keep us safe”\nThousands have been detonated, but on Black and brown bodies, near poor communities, on Indigenous lands.\nThe persistence of the faith that nuclear weapons bring security\nis\nsimilar to the faith in carceral systems to keep people safe\nIn both cases, we must ask, whose security do they serve, and against what or whom do they offer protection? Much like police forces only bring stability and order\nto those with property and wealth that require “protecting” from the masses, nuclear weapons only bring stability and order to the warmongers who seek the capacity to destroy the world in order to preserve their dominance of it.\nResponses to violence and inequalities that are witnessed are also similar. In the face of police brutality, some politicians\nsuggest that the police can be reformed\nwith better training\nand accountability\nLikewise\nadvocates for nuclear arms control, call\nfor reductions of nuclear arsenals\nto a “reasonable” level, or for the cancellation of modernisation\nBut as with police reforms, none of these adjustments get to the heart of the problem\nwhich is that carceral systems and nuclear weapons both are extremely violent tools to oppress, control, and kill human beings. The problem is not simply the budgets or the size or the policies of police forces, the prison system, or nuclear arsenals\nthe problem is that each\nis designed to cause harm\nYou cannot reform away something when it is the fundamental nature of that thing.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "nuclear weapon development, testing, and use\nare\nradioactive racism\nThe\nideology that\nexplode\nbombs\nand bury\nwaste on Indigenous lands\nand North Africa\nlies within carceral systems and border controls\ndismissal of survivor testimony\nis mirrored in\nexclusion of Black\nLatine\nAsian, Arab\nLGBTQ+\npeople\nthe bomb\nis\na prison\nJust as many\nfind it difficult to imagine security without police or prisons\nmany\nfind it difficult to imagine security without nuclear weapons\nIn both\nwe must ask\nwhose security do they serve\nand\nwhom do they offer protection\nnuclear\nbring\norder to\nwarmongers\nResponses to violence\nare\nsimilar\nsome\nsuggest\npolice can be reformed\nwith\naccountability\nadvocates for\narms control\ncall\nreductions\nto a “reasonable” level\nas with police\nthe heart\nis that carceral systems and nuclear weapons\nare\ntools to oppress\ncontrol\nand kill", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That usurps primacy—turns case", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nChina’s maritime rise has been driven by focused state support beginning in the early 2000s after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The size and focus of Beijing’s efforts accelerated after the 2008 financial crisis when the global maritime industry suffered a collapse in demand. Such support has provided Chinese firms with a strategic buffer from volatile market forces, helping Chinese companies to expand their global market share in shipbuilding and shipping finance by 10 percent and 15 percent, respectively, from 2008 to 2018.3 China encouraged its already massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to consolidate, including support for a 2015 merger that made state-owned China Merchant Group the largest port and logistics company in the world and the 2016 merger of COSCO Group and China Shipping Group to create the world’s third largest shipping firm.4 China also pumped financial support into the sector and set ambitious domestic and global targets. The “Made in China 2025” strategic plan designates maritime equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing as one of ten priority sectors. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013, has deepened preexisting market access and secured new beachheads for Chinese shipping companies abroad. Led by state-owned shipping operators China COSCO Shipping Corporation (COSCO SHIPPING) and China Merchant Group, Chinese companies have invested an estimated $11 billion into overseas ports between 2010 and 2019, including 25 projects across 18 countries.5\nChina’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications for the United States. With 90 percent of global trade traveling by sea, the United States has both commercial and strategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities. The stakes are highest in the event of a military contingency. Current and former U.S. officials have warned that the United States could face maritime logistics challenges during a major conflict given the shrinking size of the U.S. merchant marine fleet.6 China, in contrast, could draw upon superior numbers of state-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce. COSCO SHIPPING is widely recognized as the maritime supply arm of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and has provided logistical support to the PLA Navy’s escort operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. As the U.S. naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan famously observed, “Commercial value cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest of the sea is commerce.”7\nIn order for the United States to fashion a strategic response, it must first have an accurate assessment of the forces driving China’s shipping sector. Previous studies have attempted to quantify the direct subsidies that Chinese shipping companies receive, but they have provided a partial picture at best, owing to the significant gaps in available and reliable data.8 The Chinese state provides support in numerous direct and indirect ways, including subsidies in cash payments, cheap financing and fundraising, tax incentives and concessions, barriers for foreign firms, state-directed industrial consolidation, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property theft, among others.9 Some of these measures can be quantified from open sources, while others remain hidden behind China’s opaque lending and corporate reporting practices. Acknowledging these limitations, this brief explores the scale and scope of China’s state support for its shipping and shipbuilding industry.\n\nIndict—", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China’s maritime rise has been driven by focused state support\nSuch\nprovided Chinese firms with a strategic buffer from volatile market forces\nhelping\ncompanies\nexpand their global market share in shipbuilding and shipping finance by 10\nand 15 percent,\nChina encouraged\n(SOEs) to consolidate\nMade in China 2025\ndesignates maritime equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing as\npriority sectors\nChina’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications for the United States\nthe United States has both commercial and strategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities\nChina\ncould draw upon superior numbers of state-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce\nCOSCO SHIPPING\nprovided\nsupport to the PLA Navy\nCommercial value cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest of the sea is commerce.\nThe Chinese state provides support in numerous direct and indirect ways, including subsidies in cash payments, cheap financing and fundraising, tax incentives and concessions, barriers for foreign firms, state-directed industrial consolidation, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property theft", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That usurps primacy—turns case\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China’s maritime rise has been driven by focused state support\nSuch\nprovided Chinese firms with a strategic buffer from volatile market forces\nhelping\ncompanies\nexpand their global market share in shipbuilding and shipping finance by 10\nand 15 percent,\nChina encouraged\n(SOEs) to consolidate\nMade in China 2025\ndesignates maritime equipment and high-tech vessel manufacturing as\npriority sectors\nChina’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications for the United States\nthe United States has both commercial and strategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities\nChina\ncould draw upon superior numbers of state-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce\nCOSCO SHIPPING\nprovided\nsupport to the PLA Navy\nCommercial value cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest of the sea is commerce.\nThe Chinese state provides support in numerous direct and indirect ways, including subsidies in cash payments, cheap financing and fundraising, tax incentives and concessions, barriers for foreign firms, state-directed industrial consolidation, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property theft", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China’s\nrise has been driven by\nstate support\na\nbuffer from volatile market forces\nhelping\ncompanies\nexpand\nby\n15 percent\nChina encouraged\n(SOEs) to consolidate\nChina’s growing maritime power has far-reaching implications\nU\nS\nhas\nstrategic interests in maintaining robust maritime capabilities\nChina\ncould draw upon\nstate-owned vessels and the world’s largest maritime workforce\nCommercial\ncannot be separated from military\nthe greatest interest of the sea is commerce.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Test ban treaty.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nAs the only country to have come under a nuclear attack in wartime, Japan has officially been a strong opponent of nuclear weapons in the international system. In the postwar period, it signed most of the major international non-proliferation treaties. Japan signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in August 1963, which prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the air, space, and sea. It also signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in February 1970, which sanctions the peaceful development of nuclear technology and prohibits non-nuclear weapons states from developing such weapons. Japan also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, which prohibits nuclear explosions for any purpose. This treaty has not yet entered into force.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Japan has\nbeen a strong opponent of nuclear weapons in the international system\nit signed most of the major international non-proliferation treaties\nthe Partial Test Ban Treaty\nPTBT\nwhich prohibits\ntesting of nuclear weapons\nthe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\nNPT\nwhich sanctions\ndevelopment of nuclear tech\nthe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\nCTBT\nwhich prohibits nuclear explosions", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Test ban treaty.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Japan has\nbeen a strong opponent of nuclear weapons in the international system\nit signed most of the major international non-proliferation treaties\nthe Partial Test Ban Treaty\nPTBT\nwhich prohibits\ntesting of nuclear weapons\nthe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\nNPT\nwhich sanctions\ndevelopment of nuclear tech\nthe Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty\nCTBT\nwhich prohibits nuclear explosions", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Japan has\nbeen a strong opponent of nuclear weapons\nit signed\nmajor\nnon-proliferation treaties\nthe\nPTBT\nNPT\nCTBT", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It’s a misunderstanding of how wars escalates.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s prospect theory gives some support to concern about war by miscalculation. Their idea, which explains lucky streaks and losing streaks is that people are willing to run greater risks to salvage a failing situation than to improve an already advantageous one.[72] Applied to international relations, states on the losing side of wars or the disadvantageous side of crises ought to become desperate and take increasing risks. But that is not what appears to have happened at least among the great powers — not in the Berlin crises, or in the Cuban Missile Crisis, or during the 1956 Hungarian uprising. In those cases, billed as the most fraught superpower confrontations of the nuclear age, both the United States and Soviet Union accurately gauged their relative strength and reached political settlements or conceded to avoid war. \nMoreover, manipulating risk is a strategy, not an accident. For example, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s elevation of nuclear alert levels during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war — something shockingly undertaken without presidential approval — was using the risk of nuclear war to prevent an adversary’s support to a fighting proxy. If that incident had produced war, it would taxonomically have qualified as a failed strategy, not an accidental war. As Trachtenberg has concluded, “the basic point here is that states, by and large, do know what they are doing; to a certain extent, they burn their bridges in the course of a crisis, but they do this with important political objectives in mind.”[73] \nStates can and do choose to de-escalate; there is no automatic ratchet to upward\n\n escalation. For example, president Barack Obama declined to honor the red line drawn against Syrian use of chemical weapons in 2012.[74] Even the most reckless of recent vintage American presidents, Donald Trump, was able to make reasonable risk calculations in crises, by backing away at great reputational cost from striking Iran to retaliate for Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.[75] \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Applied to international relations\nstates on the losing side of wars or\ndisadvantageous side of crises ought to become desperate and take increasing risks\nBut that is not what\nhappened\namong\ngreat powers\nnot in\nBerlin crises\nthe Cuban Missile Crisis\nor\n1956 Hungarian uprising\nIn\ncases\nbilled as the most fraught superpower confrontations of the nuclear age\nboth the United States and Soviet Union accurately gauged\nrelative strength and reached political settlements or conceded to avoid war\nstates\ndo know what they are doing\nStates can and do choose to de-escalate\nthere is no automatic ratchet to upward\nescalation\nEven the most reckless\nTrump\nwas able to make reasonable risk calculations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It’s a misunderstanding of how wars escalates.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Applied to international relations\nstates on the losing side of wars or\ndisadvantageous side of crises ought to become desperate and take increasing risks\nBut that is not what\nhappened\namong\ngreat powers\nnot in\nBerlin crises\nthe Cuban Missile Crisis\nor\n1956 Hungarian uprising\nIn\ncases\nbilled as the most fraught superpower confrontations of the nuclear age\nboth the United States and Soviet Union accurately gauged\nrelative strength and reached political settlements or conceded to avoid war\nstates\ndo know what they are doing\nStates can and do choose to de-escalate\nthere is no automatic ratchet to upward\nescalation\nEven the most reckless\nTrump\nwas able to make reasonable risk calculations", "role": "user" }, { "content": "i\nr\nlosing side of wars\ndisadvantageous side of crises\nincreasing risks\nBerlin crises\nCuban Missile Crisis\n1956 Hungarian uprising\nmost fraught superpower confrontations\nU\nS\naccurately gauged\nrelative strength\npolitical settlements\nconceded to avoid war\nknow what they are doing\nchoose to de-escalate\nautomatic ratchet\nupward\nescalation\nreasonable risk calculations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It’s a misunderstanding of how wars escalates.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Applied to international relations\nstates on the losing side of wars or\ndisadvantageous side of crises ought to become desperate and take increasing risks\nBut that is not what\nhappened\namong\ngreat powers\nnot in\nBerlin crises\nthe Cuban Missile Crisis\nor\n1956 Hungarian uprising\nIn\ncases\nbilled as the most fraught superpower confrontations of the nuclear age\nboth the United States and Soviet Union accurately gauged\nrelative strength and reached political settlements or conceded to avoid war\nstates\ndo know what they are doing\nStates can and do choose to de-escalate\nthere is no automatic ratchet to upward\nescalation\nEven the most reckless\nTrump\nwas able to make reasonable risk calculations", "role": "user" }, { "content": "states on the losing side\nought to become desperate\nthat is not what\nhappened\nnot in\nBerlin\nthe Cuban Missile Crisis\nor\n1956 Hungari\nU\nS\nand Soviet Union accurately gauged\nstrength and reached\nsettlements or conceded\nstates\ndo know what they are doing\nchoose to de-escalate\nthere is no automatic ratchet\nupward\nEven\nTrump\nmake\nrisk calculations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: They agree with the importance of US defense---try or die. GREEN.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Expansion and Modernization. The United States has attempted to denuclearize North Korea for decades to no avail. Despite sanctions and positive inducements, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and modernize its nuclear forces.239 In 2022, North Korea was estimated to have enough material for more than one hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead and launched ballistic missiles over Japan on multiple occasions. While the United States is not solely responsible for the denuclearization of North Korea, Japan relies on the United States for its security. North Korea is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest security asset, the United States, failed to denuclearize and deter ballistic missile testing over Japan. There are amounting reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In 2022, North Korea was estimated to have enough material for more than one hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead and launched ballistic missiles over Japan on multiple occasions\nJapan relies on the United States for its security. North Korea is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest security asset, the United States, failed to denuclearize and deter ballistic missile testing over Japan. There are amounting reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: They agree with the importance of US defense---try or die. GREEN.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In 2022, North Korea was estimated to have enough material for more than one hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead and launched ballistic missiles over Japan on multiple occasions\nJapan relies on the United States for its security. North Korea is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest security asset, the United States, failed to denuclearize and deter ballistic missile testing over Japan. There are amounting reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence", "role": "user" }, { "content": "No\nKo\nenough\none hundred\ntested\nstrike\nU\nS\nlaunched\nJapan\nrelies on\nU\nS\nsecurity\nserious\nthreat\nasset\nU\nS\nfailed\ndeter\ntesting\namounting\ndoubt\ndeterrence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: They agree with the importance of US defense---try or die. GREEN.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Expansion and Modernization. The United States has attempted to denuclearize North Korea for decades to no avail. Despite sanctions and positive inducements, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and modernize its nuclear forces.239 In 2022, North Korea was estimated to have enough material for more than one hundred nuclear weapons. It successfully tested missiles that could strike the United States with a nuclear warhead and launched ballistic missiles over Japan on multiple occasions. While the United States is not solely responsible for the denuclearization of North Korea, Japan relies on the United States for its security. North Korea is a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest security asset, the United States, failed to denuclearize and deter ballistic missile testing over Japan. There are amounting reasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "No\nKo\nhave enough material for\nhundred\nweapons. It\ntested missiles\nand launched\nover Japan\nJapan relies on the United States for its security\nNo\nKo\nis a serious security threat to Japan, and its greatest\nasset, the U\nS\nfailed to\ndeter\ntesting\nreasons for Japan to doubt US extended deterrence", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Timeframe is the opposite.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "No one doubts that South Korea has the technical capability and financial resources to produce nuclear weapons. But if it decided to go nuclear, South Korea would want a sizable, sophisticated, and publicly demonstrated nuclear capability, not a few primitive, untested bombs in the basement. That would be a major, costly, and time-consuming undertaking. South Korea has a large and worldclass civil nuclear energy program, but it doesn’t have the specialized facilities in place to produce a substantial nuclear arsenal. It has no uranium enrichment facilities or readily accessible sources of uranium. It has done plenty of research on ways to separate plutonium from spent fuel but only on a laboratory scale and would need to build a much larger facility. It would have difficulty acquiring uranium that it could irradiate to produce plutonium or identifying spent reactor fuel already in South Korea that could be reprocessed without violating contractual obligations with suppliers or that would provide the optimal grade of plutonium for weapons. It would have to develop a workable bomb design and test it, presumably more than once. Finding a technically suitable and politically acceptable test site in densely populated South Korea could be an insurmountable challenge. Achieving a secure retaliatory capability with survivable basing arrangements could take several years, and it would divert resources from other defense and national priorities\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "So\nKo\ndoesn’t have the specialized facilities in place to produce a substantial nuclear arsenal\nIt has no uranium enrichment facilities or readily accessible sources of uranium. It has done plenty of research on ways to separate plutonium from spent fuel but only on a laboratory scale and would need to build a much larger facility\nhave difficulty acquiring uranium that it could irradiate to produce plutonium or identifying spent reactor\nFinding a technically\nand politically acceptable test site in densely populated South Korea could be an insurmountable challenge. Achieving\ncapability\ncould take several years", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Timeframe is the opposite.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "So\nKo\ndoesn’t have the specialized facilities in place to produce a substantial nuclear arsenal\nIt has no uranium enrichment facilities or readily accessible sources of uranium. It has done plenty of research on ways to separate plutonium from spent fuel but only on a laboratory scale and would need to build a much larger facility\nhave difficulty acquiring uranium that it could irradiate to produce plutonium or identifying spent reactor\nFinding a technically\nand politically acceptable test site in densely populated South Korea could be an insurmountable challenge. Achieving\ncapability\ncould take several years", "role": "user" }, { "content": "So\nKo\nspecialized facilities\nno uranium enrichment\nreadily accessible\nuranium\nplenty\nseparate\nonly\nlab\nscale\ndifficulty\nirradiate\ntechnically\npolitically\ntest site\ndensely populated\ninsurmountable challenge\nseveral years", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Timeframe is the opposite.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "So\nKo\ndoesn’t have the specialized facilities in place to produce a substantial nuclear arsenal\nIt has no uranium enrichment facilities or readily accessible sources of uranium. It has done plenty of research on ways to separate plutonium from spent fuel but only on a laboratory scale and would need to build a much larger facility\nhave difficulty acquiring uranium that it could irradiate to produce plutonium or identifying spent reactor\nFinding a technically\nand politically acceptable test site in densely populated South Korea could be an insurmountable challenge. Achieving\ncapability\ncould take several years", "role": "user" }, { "content": "So\nKo\ndoesn’t have\nuranium\nfacilities or\naccessible\nuranium\nto separate\nonly\na lab\nscale\ndifficulty acquiring uranium\nFinding a technically\nand politically acceptable\nsite\nbe\ninsurmountable\ncapability\ntake several years", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Nuclear threats to North Korea collapse crisis stability---nuclear war", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Crisis stability is just as important as strengthening deterrence. Blind preoccupation with extended deterrence may paradoxically increase the possibility of nuclear war. While maintaining a deterrence posture that is decisive enough to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons, every effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fears, misperceptions or miscalculation on its part. Thus, it is necessary to refrain from using such terms as pre-emptive strikes and decapitation operations that may unnecessarily provoke North Korea. In the case of the deployment of US strategic assets or the transmission of deterrence messages in times of crisis, these should be carefully calibrated with crisis management. Otherwise, a minor conventional armed conflict could quickly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war. Thus, crisis stability through “intra-war deterrence” and “escalation control” is critical. There must be a prudent balance between the two.\nFACING REALITY\nDeterrence and crisis stability are useful but are still a second-best solution to the North Korean nuclear problem since they are predicated on a perpetual security dilemma. The ideal way forward is to restore diplomacy and resolve the conflict peacefully. We all know this is not easy. But a paradigmatic change in our way of thinking can open a new horizon.\nIn this regard, genuine realism is desperately needed. We should admit, if not formally recognize, North Korea as a nuclear-weapons state. We cannot make “complete, verifiable irreversible denuclearization” a precondition for any dialogue. The recent remark by Park Jin, South Korea’s Foreign Minister, that “peace without North Korea’s denuclearization is a false peace” is misleading and unhelpful. While full denuclearization should remain the ultimate goal, a more realistic approach should be sought in which some form of nuclear-arms control limits North Korea’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for the removal of hostile policies and a reduction of sanctions.10\nAs noted, crisis stability is urgent. Seoul and Washington need to show more restraint, with behavior such as downsizing or temporarily suspending South Korea-US joint military exercises, and the deployment of strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. These measures could reduce tensions and build confidence that could bring the North back to dialogue and negotiation. “Denuclearization first, peace later” is not likely to work. Denuclearization and peace-making on the Korean Peninsula should be pursued simultaneously. That seems a more realistic approach.\nStrategic empathy should also be employed. Demonizing North Korea, adhering to the old habit of crime and punishment, and advocating unilateral attitudes could just worsen the situation. It is essential to understand North Korea as it is, not as we think it is or hope it might become.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Crisis stability is just as important as strengthening deterrence\npreoccupation with extended deterrence may paradoxically increase\npossibility of nuclear war. While maintaining a deterrence posture that is decisive enough to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons, every effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fears, misperceptions or miscalculation\nit is necessary to refrain from using such terms as pre-emptive strikes and decapitation operations that may unnecessarily provoke North Korea\nOtherwise, a minor conventional armed conflict could quickly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war\nThe ideal way forward is to restore diplomacy and resolve the conflict peacefully\ngenuine realism is desperately needed\ncrisis stability is urgent. Seoul and Washington need to show\nrestraint\nStrategic empathy should\nbe employed. Demonizing North Korea, adhering to the old habit of crime and punishment, and advocating unilateral attitudes could\nworsen the situation. It is essential to understand North Korea as it is, not as we think it is or hope it might become", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Nuclear threats to North Korea collapse crisis stability---nuclear war", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Crisis stability is just as important as strengthening deterrence\npreoccupation with extended deterrence may paradoxically increase\npossibility of nuclear war. While maintaining a deterrence posture that is decisive enough to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons, every effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fears, misperceptions or miscalculation\nit is necessary to refrain from using such terms as pre-emptive strikes and decapitation operations that may unnecessarily provoke North Korea\nOtherwise, a minor conventional armed conflict could quickly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war\nThe ideal way forward is to restore diplomacy and resolve the conflict peacefully\ngenuine realism is desperately needed\ncrisis stability is urgent. Seoul and Washington need to show\nrestraint\nStrategic empathy should\nbe employed. Demonizing North Korea, adhering to the old habit of crime and punishment, and advocating unilateral attitudes could\nworsen the situation. It is essential to understand North Korea as it is, not as we think it is or hope it might become", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Crisis stability\nparadoxically increase\npossibility of nuclear war\nnot to raise unnecessary fear\nmisperception\nmiscalc\npre-emptive strikes\nunnecessarily provoke No\nKo\nquickly escalate\ncrisis stability is urgent\nrestraint\nStrategic empathy\nDemonizing No\nKo\nunilateral attitudes\nworsen the situation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Nuclear threats to North Korea collapse crisis stability---nuclear war\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Crisis stability is just as important as strengthening deterrence\npreoccupation with extended deterrence may paradoxically increase\npossibility of nuclear war. While maintaining a deterrence posture that is decisive enough to prevent North Korea from using nuclear weapons, every effort is needed not to raise unnecessary fears, misperceptions or miscalculation\nit is necessary to refrain from using such terms as pre-emptive strikes and decapitation operations that may unnecessarily provoke North Korea\nOtherwise, a minor conventional armed conflict could quickly escalate into a full-blown nuclear war\nThe ideal way forward is to restore diplomacy and resolve the conflict peacefully\ngenuine realism is desperately needed\ncrisis stability is urgent. Seoul and Washington need to show\nrestraint\nStrategic empathy should\nbe employed. Demonizing North Korea, adhering to the old habit of crime and punishment, and advocating unilateral attitudes could\nworsen the situation. It is essential to understand North Korea as it is, not as we think it is or hope it might become", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Crisis stability is\nas important as\ndeterrence\ndeterrence may\nincrease\nnuclear war\neffort is needed not to raise unnecessary fear\nmisperception\nor miscalc\nit is necessary to refrain from\nsuch terms as pre-emptive strikes\nthat\nunnecessarily provoke No\nKo\nOtherwise\nminor conventional\nconflict could quickly escalate into\nnuclear war\nWashington need\nrestraint", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Finishing", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55\nNor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence\nChina currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the U\nS\nyet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages\nBeijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes\nif the U\nS\nfeels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense\nwould present a still larger problem and place the U\nS\nin an even worse position\nongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies\nhas pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy\nadditional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Finishing", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence\nChina currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the U\nS\nyet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages\nBeijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes\nif the U\nS\nfeels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense\nwould present a still larger problem and place the U\nS\nin an even worse position\nongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies\nhas pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy\nadditional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses", "role": "user" }, { "content": "military spending\neconomic developments\noppose neo-primacy\nreclaim untrammeled preeminence\ncurrently\nsmaller share\nmilitary purposes\nstill managed to reduce American military advantages\nquite a bit\nallocating more to international purposes\n2 percent\n3\n4\nstill larger problem\neven worse position\ndecouple\nself-sustaining\nadditional economic efforts\noutpace Beijing\ngenerate countervailing Chinese responses", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Finishing\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence\nChina currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the U\nS\nyet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages\nBeijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes\nif the U\nS\nfeels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense\nwould present a still larger problem and place the U\nS\nin an even worse position\nongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies\nhas pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy\nadditional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China currently devotes a small\nshare of\nwealth to military purposes\na China that spends\n4 percent of GDP on defense\nwould present a\nlarger problem\nefforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing\nresponses", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Tons of cartel conduct internationally is sponsored by state governments. That conduct is shielded under the FSIA.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Foreign Defendants May Claim Foreign\nSovereign Immunity \nEven if a plaintiff successfully exerts jurisdiction over a foreign entity, if the defendant is a state-owned entity, it may be able to claim that it is immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Because economic espionage is being conducted more frequently by state-owned entities, particularly in China, many foreign defendants will likely seek immunity under this Act. While there are exceptions to the Act’s provision of immunity, briefing and arguing the matter will certainly extend the resolution of the case overall and possibly involve significant expense.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Even if a plaintiff successfully exerts jurisdiction over a foreign entity, if the defendant is a state-owned entity, it may be able to claim that it is immune from suit under the F\nS\nI\nA\nBecause economic espionage is being conducted more frequently by state-owned entities, particularly in China, many foreign defendants will likely seek immunity under this Act. While there are exceptions to the Act’s provision of immunity, briefing and arguing the matter will\nextend the\ncase\nand\ninvolve significant expense", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Tons of cartel conduct internationally is sponsored by state governments. That conduct is shielded under the FSIA.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even if a plaintiff successfully exerts jurisdiction over a foreign entity, if the defendant is a state-owned entity, it may be able to claim that it is immune from suit under the F\nS\nI\nA\nBecause economic espionage is being conducted more frequently by state-owned entities, particularly in China, many foreign defendants will likely seek immunity under this Act. While there are exceptions to the Act’s provision of immunity, briefing and arguing the matter will\nextend the\ncase\nand\ninvolve significant expense", "role": "user" }, { "content": "jurisdiction\ns\no\ne\nimmune from suit\nF\nS\nI\nA\nChina\nlikely seek immunity\nexceptions\nbriefing\narguing\nextend the\ncase\nsignificant expense", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Tons of cartel conduct internationally is sponsored by state governments. That conduct is shielded under the FSIA.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Even if a plaintiff successfully exerts jurisdiction over a foreign entity, if the defendant is a state-owned entity, it may be able to claim that it is immune from suit under the F\nS\nI\nA\nBecause economic espionage is being conducted more frequently by state-owned entities, particularly in China, many foreign defendants will likely seek immunity under this Act. While there are exceptions to the Act’s provision of immunity, briefing and arguing the matter will\nextend the\ncase\nand\ninvolve significant expense", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Even if a plaintiff\nexerts jurisdiction\nif the defendant is a s\no\ne\nit may be\nimmune from suit under the F\nS\nI\nA\nparticularly in China, many\nwill\nseek immunity\nWhile there are exceptions\nbriefing and arguing the matter will\nextend the\ncase\nand\ninvolve significant expense", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No NFU credibility. Lack of durability means no one would believe an NFU. It would undermine crisis-stability and ensure allied prolif.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "No First Use\nOne of the most anticipated elements of the Nuclear Posture Review is a possible modification to American nuclear “declaratory policy,” or the conditions under which the United States might employ nuclear weapons in a conflict. Declaratory policy is an important component of the review, since unlike force development or arms control (which take time to bring to fruition), the president could alter declaratory policy at any time. Currently, the United States has a policy of “calculated ambiguity,” in which it threatens to use nuclear weapons in response to “extreme circumstances” including both nuclear and large-scale non-nuclear attacks.\nIn recent years, the policy of calculated ambiguity has been criticized for being too broad. Then-candidate Biden campaigned on reducing the role of American nuclear weapons by adopting a declaratory policy of “sole use” or “no first use,” in which the United States would promise only to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an adversary nuclear strike. No first use would narrow the cases in which the United States would use nuclear weapons, foreswearing their employment in response to mass-casualty conventional attacks or chemical and biological weapons. Proponents of no first use argue that the current ambiguous declaratory policy poses escalation risks, since adversaries might become convinced that the United States would attack them in a crisis. A no-first-use pledge would reassure these adversaries and remove provocations that might drive them to violent behavior. Over time, proponents argue, a no-first-use policy would also contribute to greater normative restraint on the use and perhaps even possession of nuclear weapons.\nAll reasonable people share President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in world affairs, but unfortunately no first use is not the “quick fix” that its proponents claim. Such a policy would not even solve the narrow crisis-stability problem it seeks to address. Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise to avoid nuclear use, especially one that could be reversed at any time. Nor does it contribute to America’s ability to deter Russian and Chinese aggression, a challenge that is best met with the current policy of calculated ambiguity. Finally, far from advancing the cause of normative restraint, an American no-first-use policy could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Many American partners would see no first use as a reduction in America’s commitment to their security, which might drive them to seek independent nuclear forces.\nThere are other areas where current nuclear declaratory policy might be improved, especially as it pertains to the relationship of nuclear weapons to emerging capabilities like cyber attacks. But shifting entirely to a no-first-use declaratory policy during the worst security crisis of the post-Cold War era would be a terrible idea, especially for an administration that hopes to rally American partners and create broad coalitions to contain adversaries. Hopefully, the Biden administration has listened to American partners’ concerns and will avoid radically altering declaratory policy.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Declaratory policy is an important component of the review, since unlike force development or arms control (which take time to bring to fruition), the president could alter declaratory policy at any time.\nOver time, proponents argue, a no-first-use policy would also contribute to greater normative restraint on the use and perhaps even possession of nuclear weapons.\nAll reasonable people share President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in world affairs, but unfortunately no first use is not the “quick fix” that its proponents claim. Such a policy would not even solve the narrow crisis-stability problem it seeks to address. Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise to avoid nuclear use, especially one that could be reversed at any time. Nor does it contribute to America’s ability to deter Russian and Chinese aggression, a challenge that is best met with the current policy of calculated ambiguity. Finally, far from advancing the cause of normative restraint, an American no-first-use policy could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Many American partners would see no first use as a reduction in America’s commitment to their security, which might drive them to seek independent nuclear forces.\nBut shifting entirely to a no-first-use declaratory policy during the worst security crisis of the post-Cold War era would be a terrible idea, especially for an administration that hopes to rally American partners and create broad coalitions to contain adversaries.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No NFU credibility. Lack of durability means no one would believe an NFU. It would undermine crisis-stability and ensure allied prolif.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Declaratory policy is an important component of the review, since unlike force development or arms control (which take time to bring to fruition), the president could alter declaratory policy at any time.\nOver time, proponents argue, a no-first-use policy would also contribute to greater normative restraint on the use and perhaps even possession of nuclear weapons.\nAll reasonable people share President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in world affairs, but unfortunately no first use is not the “quick fix” that its proponents claim. Such a policy would not even solve the narrow crisis-stability problem it seeks to address. Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise to avoid nuclear use, especially one that could be reversed at any time. Nor does it contribute to America’s ability to deter Russian and Chinese aggression, a challenge that is best met with the current policy of calculated ambiguity. Finally, far from advancing the cause of normative restraint, an American no-first-use policy could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Many American partners would see no first use as a reduction in America’s commitment to their security, which might drive them to seek independent nuclear forces.\nBut shifting entirely to a no-first-use declaratory policy during the worst security crisis of the post-Cold War era would be a terrible idea, especially for an administration that hopes to rally American partners and create broad coalitions to contain adversaries.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "not the “quick fix”\nunlikely to be reassured\nverbal promise\ncould be reversed at any time.\nRussian and Chinese aggression\nseek independent nuclear forces\nworst security crisis\nbroad coalitions to contain adversaries.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No NFU credibility. Lack of durability means no one would believe an NFU. It would undermine crisis-stability and ensure allied prolif.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Declaratory policy is an important component of the review, since unlike force development or arms control (which take time to bring to fruition), the president could alter declaratory policy at any time.\nOver time, proponents argue, a no-first-use policy would also contribute to greater normative restraint on the use and perhaps even possession of nuclear weapons.\nAll reasonable people share President Joe Biden’s desire to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in world affairs, but unfortunately no first use is not the “quick fix” that its proponents claim. Such a policy would not even solve the narrow crisis-stability problem it seeks to address. Adversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise to avoid nuclear use, especially one that could be reversed at any time. Nor does it contribute to America’s ability to deter Russian and Chinese aggression, a challenge that is best met with the current policy of calculated ambiguity. Finally, far from advancing the cause of normative restraint, an American no-first-use policy could contribute to nuclear proliferation. Many American partners would see no first use as a reduction in America’s commitment to their security, which might drive them to seek independent nuclear forces.\nBut shifting entirely to a no-first-use declaratory policy during the worst security crisis of the post-Cold War era would be a terrible idea, especially for an administration that hopes to rally American partners and create broad coalitions to contain adversaries.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "n\nf\nu\nnot the “quick fix\nproponents claim\npolicy would not\nsolve\ncrisis-stability\nAdversaries are unlikely to be reassured by a verbal promise\nthat could be reversed at any time.\npartners\nsee\nreduction in\ncommitment\nwhich\ndrive them to seek independent nuclear forces\nshifting\nduring the worst security crisis\nwould be a terrible idea,", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: We would never use a nuke first, especially against a weaker adversary.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The three non-material considerations-the tradition of non-use, moral concerns, and legal principles-all generate reputation concerns for a potential user of nuclear weapons. Reputation here is used in its straightforward meaning: the general esteem in which a country and its leader are held by domestic and international opinion. States, like firms, worry about how they are perceived. The chief concern here may be that the use of nuclear weapons would be condemned worldwide and that the leader who orders such use could suffer irreparable reputational costs. The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences can intermingle in these instances. 70\nA global power like the United States has a considerable stake in maintaining its reputation and image. Although the Iraq invasion tarnished that image temporarily, much of the criticism has been on the decline of US reputation in the world as a result of the ill-conceived war. A nuclear attack on a smaller state, even if it were part of the so-called rogue group, would cause major reputation erosion for the United States. Robert Jervis argues that self-deterrence occurs against a very weak adversary that the United States wants to rebuild after the war. \"Ironically, the disparity in military power between the United States and its rogue adversaries increases self-deterrence, especially because the United States may want to befriend or rebuild those it is currently coercing.\" 7 In other words, the United States wants to appeal to various publics' opinions: its own, its allies', its opponent's, and the world's. The use of unnecessary force would mean that the United States would suffer reputation damage and the larger purpose of attack could fail.\nThis discussion suggests that the nuclear weapons states have been driven by two types of reputation: deterrence reputation versus non-use reputation. First, they are motivated by a reputation for resolve to use their weapons in order to signal retaliatory threat for deterrence vis-a-vis other nuclear states. Second, toward non-nuclear states, the reverse becomes the case; they are driven by a desire to signal non-use in order to project the image of benign intent and thereby prevent these states from seeking nuclear weapons.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "three non-material considerations\nthe tradition of non-use, moral concerns, and legal principles\ngenerate reputation concerns for a potential user of nuclear weapons\nStates\nworry about how they are perceived\nuse of nuclear weapons would be condemned worldwide\nthe leader who orders such use could suffer irreparable reputational costs\nA global power like the United States has a considerable stake in maintaining its reputation and image\nA nuclear attack on a smaller state\nwould cause major reputation erosion for the United States\nself-deterrence occurs against a\nweak adversary\nthe United States wants to rebuild after the war\nthe disparity in military power between the United States and its rogue adversaries increases self-deterrence\nbecause the United States may want to befriend or rebuild those it is currently coercing\nThe use of unnecessary force would mean\nthe United States would suffer reputation damage and the larger purpose of attack could fail\nnuclear weapons states\nare motivated by a reputation for resolve\ntoward non-nuclear states, the reverse becomes the case; they are driven by a desire to signal non-use\nto project the image of benign intent and\nprevent these states from seeking nuclear weapons", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: We would never use a nuke first, especially against a weaker adversary.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The three non-material considerations-the tradition of non-use, moral concerns, and legal principles-all generate reputation concerns for a potential user of nuclear weapons. Reputation here is used in its straightforward meaning: the general esteem in which a country and its leader are held by domestic and international opinion. States, like firms, worry about how they are perceived. The chief concern here may be that the use of nuclear weapons would be condemned worldwide and that the leader who orders such use could suffer irreparable reputational costs. The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences can intermingle in these instances. 70\nA global power like the United States has a considerable stake in maintaining its reputation and image. Although the Iraq invasion tarnished that image temporarily, much of the criticism has been on the decline of US reputation in the world as a result of the ill-conceived war. A nuclear attack on a smaller state, even if it were part of the so-called rogue group, would cause major reputation erosion for the United States. Robert Jervis argues that self-deterrence occurs against a very weak adversary that the United States wants to rebuild after the war. \"Ironically, the disparity in military power between the United States and its rogue adversaries increases self-deterrence, especially because the United States may want to befriend or rebuild those it is currently coercing.\" 7 In other words, the United States wants to appeal to various publics' opinions: its own, its allies', its opponent's, and the world's. The use of unnecessary force would mean that the United States would suffer reputation damage and the larger purpose of attack could fail.\nThis discussion suggests that the nuclear weapons states have been driven by two types of reputation: deterrence reputation versus non-use reputation. First, they are motivated by a reputation for resolve to use their weapons in order to signal retaliatory threat for deterrence vis-a-vis other nuclear states. Second, toward non-nuclear states, the reverse becomes the case; they are driven by a desire to signal non-use in order to project the image of benign intent and thereby prevent these states from seeking nuclear weapons.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "tradition of non-use, moral concerns\nlegal principles\nrep\nworry about how they are perceived\nnuc\ns\ncondemned worldwide\nirreparable rep\ncosts\nthe U\nS\nconsiderable stake\nmajor reputation erosion\nU\nS\nU\nS\nU\nS\nincreases self-deterrence\nU\nS\nU\nS\nreputation damage\nthe larger purpose of attack could fail\nsignal non-use\nnuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: We would never use a nuke first, especially against a weaker adversary.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The three non-material considerations-the tradition of non-use, moral concerns, and legal principles-all generate reputation concerns for a potential user of nuclear weapons. Reputation here is used in its straightforward meaning: the general esteem in which a country and its leader are held by domestic and international opinion. States, like firms, worry about how they are perceived. The chief concern here may be that the use of nuclear weapons would be condemned worldwide and that the leader who orders such use could suffer irreparable reputational costs. The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences can intermingle in these instances. 70\nA global power like the United States has a considerable stake in maintaining its reputation and image. Although the Iraq invasion tarnished that image temporarily, much of the criticism has been on the decline of US reputation in the world as a result of the ill-conceived war. A nuclear attack on a smaller state, even if it were part of the so-called rogue group, would cause major reputation erosion for the United States. Robert Jervis argues that self-deterrence occurs against a very weak adversary that the United States wants to rebuild after the war. \"Ironically, the disparity in military power between the United States and its rogue adversaries increases self-deterrence, especially because the United States may want to befriend or rebuild those it is currently coercing.\" 7 In other words, the United States wants to appeal to various publics' opinions: its own, its allies', its opponent's, and the world's. The use of unnecessary force would mean that the United States would suffer reputation damage and the larger purpose of attack could fail.\nThis discussion suggests that the nuclear weapons states have been driven by two types of reputation: deterrence reputation versus non-use reputation. First, they are motivated by a reputation for resolve to use their weapons in order to signal retaliatory threat for deterrence vis-a-vis other nuclear states. Second, toward non-nuclear states, the reverse becomes the case; they are driven by a desire to signal non-use in order to project the image of benign intent and thereby prevent these states from seeking nuclear weapons.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "tradition of non-use, moral concerns, and legal principles\ngenerate rep\nconcerns for a potential user\nuse\ncondemned worldwide\nleader\ncould suffer irreparable rep\ncosts\nglobal power like the U\nS\nhas\nconsiderable stake in\nits\nimage\nattack on a smaller state\nwould cause major reputation erosion\nself-deterrence occurs against a\nweak adversary\nthe U\nS\nwants to rebuild\ndisparity\nbetween the U\nS\nand\nadversaries increases self-deterrence\nuse of unnecessary force would mean\nthe larger purpose\ncould fail\ntoward non-nuclear states\nthey are driven by a desire to signal non-use\nto project\nbenign intent and\nprevent\nstates\nseeking nuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Escalation is mathematically inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although this example is particular to China, the potential presence of corruption indicates a regularly overlooked flaw in the certainty of the rational choice nuclear deterrence argument: humans are inherently fallible. \nTypically, we accept such fallibility in our leaders; they are human, but the acceptable margin of error nears zero in the case of such incomparable power. A misreading of an adversary’s intent, a failure of internal communication, or a leak of sensitive information by a corrupt official could all lead to a nuclear crisis from which de-escalation cannot be assured. Such a level of risk is unacceptable. Studies show that an exchange of just 1% of the world’s nuclear arsenal would cause a nuclear famine that devastates two billion people’s lives. In other words, even a limited nuclear war is not survivable. \nClose Calls \nProponents of nuclear deterrence would have you believe nuclear accidents and miscalculations are impossible. They argue our leaders would never consider such an inconceivable possibility and that layers of backstops, checks, and secret codes would prevent any possible unintended escalation. But the nuclear taboo has remained intact through luck, not skill. \nThe record is scattered with terrifyingly close calls. Not only did US military officials recommend aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on multiple occasions during the Cold War, but nuclear accidents are a very real possibility. Take, for example, the 1966 “broken arrow” incident in which an American B-52 bomber collided with a refueling tanker and released four hydrogen bombs onto the town of Palomares, Spain. Fortunately, none of the four bombs experienced a nuclear chain reaction, but the conventional explosives blasted radioactive plutonium across the Spanish countryside, a dirty bomb dropped accidentally on a US ally. A Soviet official at the time commented: “Only a fortunate stroke of luck saved the Spanish population of the area from catastrophe.” The US government had to buy much of the farmland from the locals and burn or store the contaminated land. More than 50 years later, the cleanup is not complete. \nEven more extraordinary fortune saved the residents of North Carolina and much of the United States. A 1961 accident in which a fuel leak caused the mid-flight breakup of a B-52 created a tailspin. The centrifugal forces pulled a lanyard and a hydrogen bomb, approximately 1000 times more powerful than the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, released and tumbled toward the earth. Unaware of this accidental launch, the weapons system automatically and successfully completed all weapons arming stages. The firing signal was sent when the weapon hit the ground. The only thing preventing this catastrophe and the potential death of tens of thousands of Americans was a singular on/off safety switch, identical in design to that of a household light switch. Such switches have been miswired before, so “safe mode” armed the weapon instead of deactivating it. In short, the people of Palomares and North Carolina were little more than lucky. \nOn multiple occasions, signals have been misread, and nuclear launch protocols have been initiated until somebody detected errors in warning systems resulting from weather, faulty technology, and ignored signals. Unauthorized arming is also not an impossibility. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, US personnel in Turkey loaded nuclear missiles onto planes without authorization from the US president or the secretary of defense. In 2007, in a remarkable lapse in nuclear security, six nuclear missiles were mistakenly loaded onto a US bomber readying for conventional operations. It took 36 hours for the US Air Force to realize the warheads were missing. Meanwhile, six nuclear weapons sat unguarded and armed on the tarmac. Eric Schlosser’s book, “Command and Control,” is scattered with similar close calls. \nWe have survived these accidents without catastrophe, but their sheer existence shatters the perception that their occurrence is impossible. In each of Schlosser’s cases, a full nuclear detonation was a very realistic possibility. How long are we willing to gamble with these stakes? As Martin Hellman points out, if you continue to play a game of chance, so long as the possibility of the event is above zero, then the likelihood it will eventually occur becomes a mathematical certainty. In the nuclear case, “the only way to survive Russian Roulette is to stop playing.” \nStepping Away \nThe system must work perfectly to ensure our continued safety against nuclear weapons. The morality and rationality of global leaders must hold, commanders must not be tempted by corruption or glory, electronic safety systems must not malfunction, and operators must not miscommunicate. Each day, the present system remains, and humanity gambles it will not have to live through the horrors of a nuclear conflict, and we do so based on precarious assumptions of rationality and a misplaced faith in the unimpeachability of security systems. \nWith the leaders of China and Russia possessing enormous nuclear arsenals, failing to control corruption and dissent within their armies, and seeking to establish dynastic legacies based on the unquestionable legitimacy of both their historical narratives and future ambitions, is their continued rationality and temperament so reliable as to bet the future of humanity on its continuation? With misread signals, communications flaws, corruptible commanders, miswiring, and accidental detonations already existing in the historical record, are we certain we wish to continue gambling on the security of nuclear safety systems? \nAt the very least, a commitment to reduce the number of missiles on “Hair Trigger Alert” can reduce the risk of uncontrolled, unintended, or unauthorized nuclear launch. In short, American intercontinental ballistic missiles are kept ready to launch. It is possible for missiles on “Hair Trigger Alert” to be in the sky within ten minutes of initiation. Such rapid response is rationalized as necessary to retaliate against an oncoming strike against the US, but this rationale is no longer persuasive. Day-to-day, the posture significantly increases the chance of an accidental or unauthorized launch or an intentional launch owing to a false warning being carried through to completion. In an arena where the margin for error is already low, existing US launch posture decreases the time in which errors can be corrected without raising the level of US national security — the US nuclear-armed submarines ensure retaliatory capacity without the need for this level of alert. Instead, if the actors involved made mutual commitments to step back from this posture and store nuclear warheads separately from their launch missiles, the threat level posed by irrational or ill-informed decisions would decrease significantly.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "regularly overlooked flaw in\ncertainty of\nnuclear deterrence\nhumans are inherently fallible\nacceptable margin of error\nzero\nmisreading of\nadversary’s intent\nfailure of internal communication\nleak of sensitive information\nlead to a nuclear crisis\nlevel of risk is unacceptable\nStudies show\nexchange of just 1% of\nworld’s nuclear arsenal\ncause\nnuclear famine\neven a limited nuclear war is not survivable\nrecord\nscattered with terrifyingly close calls\nUS military officials recommend aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on multiple occasions\nnuclear accidents are a very real possibility\nOn multiple occasions\nsignals\nmisread\nnuclear launch protocols\ninitiated until somebody detected errors in warning systems resulting from weather\nfaulty technology\nignored signals\nUnauthorized arming\nnot\nimpossibility\nTurkey loaded nuclear missiles onto planes without authorization from the US president\nsheer existence shatters\nperception\noccurrence is impossible\nfull nuclear detonation\na very realistic possibility\nif you continue to play\ngame of chance\nlikelihood it\n occur becomes\nmathematical certainty\nthe only way to survive Russian Roulette is to stop playing\nsystem must work perfectly to ensure\ncontinued safety against nuclear weapons\nmorality and rationality of global leaders must hold\ncommanders must not be tempted by corruption or glory\nelectronic safety systems must not malfunction\noperators must not miscommunicate\nEach day\nhumanity gambles\nbased on precarious assumptions of rationality and\nmisplaced faith in\nunimpeachability of security systems\nWith misread signals\ncommunications flaws\ncorruptible commanders\nmiswiring\naccidental detonations already existing in\nhistorical record\nare we certain we wish to continue gambling\ncommitment to reduce\nnumber of missiles on\nHair Trigger Alert\nreduce\nrisk of uncontrolled\nunintended\nunauthorized nuclear launch\nposture significantly increases\nchance of\naccidental or unauthorized launch or\nintentional launch owing to a false warning\nexisting US launch posture decreases\ntime in which errors can be corrected\nif\nactors\nmade mutual commitments to step back\nthreat level\nwould decrease significantly", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Escalation is mathematically inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "regularly overlooked flaw in\ncertainty of\nnuclear deterrence\nhumans are inherently fallible\nacceptable margin of error\nzero\nmisreading of\nadversary’s intent\nfailure of internal communication\nleak of sensitive information\nlead to a nuclear crisis\nlevel of risk is unacceptable\nStudies show\nexchange of just 1% of\nworld’s nuclear arsenal\ncause\nnuclear famine\neven a limited nuclear war is not survivable\nrecord\nscattered with terrifyingly close calls\nUS military officials recommend aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on multiple occasions\nnuclear accidents are a very real possibility\nOn multiple occasions\nsignals\nmisread\nnuclear launch protocols\ninitiated until somebody detected errors in warning systems resulting from weather\nfaulty technology\nignored signals\nUnauthorized arming\nnot\nimpossibility\nTurkey loaded nuclear missiles onto planes without authorization from the US president\nsheer existence shatters\nperception\noccurrence is impossible\nfull nuclear detonation\na very realistic possibility\nif you continue to play\ngame of chance\nlikelihood it\n occur becomes\nmathematical certainty\nthe only way to survive Russian Roulette is to stop playing\nsystem must work perfectly to ensure\ncontinued safety against nuclear weapons\nmorality and rationality of global leaders must hold\ncommanders must not be tempted by corruption or glory\nelectronic safety systems must not malfunction\noperators must not miscommunicate\nEach day\nhumanity gambles\nbased on precarious assumptions of rationality and\nmisplaced faith in\nunimpeachability of security systems\nWith misread signals\ncommunications flaws\ncorruptible commanders\nmiswiring\naccidental detonations already existing in\nhistorical record\nare we certain we wish to continue gambling\ncommitment to reduce\nnumber of missiles on\nHair Trigger Alert\nreduce\nrisk of uncontrolled\nunintended\nunauthorized nuclear launch\nposture significantly increases\nchance of\naccidental or unauthorized launch or\nintentional launch owing to a false warning\nexisting US launch posture decreases\ntime in which errors can be corrected\nif\nactors\nmade mutual commitments to step back\nthreat level\nwould decrease significantly", "role": "user" }, { "content": "regularly overlooked\ncertainty\ninherently fallible\nmargin of error\nzero\nadversary’s intent\ninternal communication\nsensitive information\nnuclear crisis\nlevel of risk\n1%\nlimited nuclear war\nterrifyingly close calls\naggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes\nmultiple occasions\nnuclear accidents\nvery real possibility\nmultiple occasions\nweather\nfaulty technology\nignored signals\nauthorization from the US president\nsheer existence\nvery realistic\ncontinue to play\ngame of chance\nmathematical certainty\nonly way\nRussian Roulette\nperfectly\ncontinued safety\nmorality\nrationality\ncorruption\nelectronic safety systems\nmalfunction\nmiscommunicate\nprecarious assumptions\nmisplaced faith\nunimpeachability\nmisread signals\ncommunications flaws\ncorruptible commanders\nmiswiring\naccidental detonations\nhistorical record\ncontinue gambling\nHair Trigger Alert\nsignificantly increases\naccidental\nunauthorized\nUS launch posture\nerrors\nmutual commitments\ndecrease significantly", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Escalation is mathematically inevitable.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "regularly overlooked flaw in\ncertainty of\nnuclear deterrence\nhumans are inherently fallible\nacceptable margin of error\nzero\nmisreading of\nadversary’s intent\nfailure of internal communication\nleak of sensitive information\nlead to a nuclear crisis\nlevel of risk is unacceptable\nStudies show\nexchange of just 1% of\nworld’s nuclear arsenal\ncause\nnuclear famine\neven a limited nuclear war is not survivable\nrecord\nscattered with terrifyingly close calls\nUS military officials recommend aggressive pre-emptive nuclear strikes on multiple occasions\nnuclear accidents are a very real possibility\nOn multiple occasions\nsignals\nmisread\nnuclear launch protocols\ninitiated until somebody detected errors in warning systems resulting from weather\nfaulty technology\nignored signals\nUnauthorized arming\nnot\nimpossibility\nTurkey loaded nuclear missiles onto planes without authorization from the US president\nsheer existence shatters\nperception\noccurrence is impossible\nfull nuclear detonation\na very realistic possibility\nif you continue to play\ngame of chance\nlikelihood it\n occur becomes\nmathematical certainty\nthe only way to survive Russian Roulette is to stop playing\nsystem must work perfectly to ensure\ncontinued safety against nuclear weapons\nmorality and rationality of global leaders must hold\ncommanders must not be tempted by corruption or glory\nelectronic safety systems must not malfunction\noperators must not miscommunicate\nEach day\nhumanity gambles\nbased on precarious assumptions of rationality and\nmisplaced faith in\nunimpeachability of security systems\nWith misread signals\ncommunications flaws\ncorruptible commanders\nmiswiring\naccidental detonations already existing in\nhistorical record\nare we certain we wish to continue gambling\ncommitment to reduce\nnumber of missiles on\nHair Trigger Alert\nreduce\nrisk of uncontrolled\nunintended\nunauthorized nuclear launch\nposture significantly increases\nchance of\naccidental or unauthorized launch or\nintentional launch owing to a false warning\nexisting US launch posture decreases\ntime in which errors can be corrected\nif\nactors\nmade mutual commitments to step back\nthreat level\nwould decrease significantly", "role": "user" }, { "content": "overlooked flaw in\ncertainty of\nnuclear deterrence\nhumans are\nfallible\nacceptable margin of error\nzero\nmisreading\nadversary’s intent\nfailure of\ncommunication\nleak of\ninformation\nlead to\ncrisis\nerrors in warning\nweather\nfaulty technology\nignored signals\nTurkey loaded nuc\ns\nwithout authorization\nexistence shatters\nperception\noccurrence\nimpossible\nif you\nplay\ngame of chance\nlikelihood\noccur becomes\nmathematical certainty\nonly way to survive Russian Roulette is to stop playing\nsystem must work perfectly\nmisread signals\ncommunications flaws\ncorruptible commanders\nmiswiring\naccidental detonations already\nin\nhistori\nare we certain we wish to continue gambling\nHair Trigger\nsignificantly increases\nchance\nmutual commitments to step back\nthreat\ndecrease significantly", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Mutual aid solidifies neoliberalism and state-centricity---instead of challenging structural forces, it fills gaps in the system, allowing it to run more smoothly without foundational change.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Dean Spade (2020: 136) argues that resistant left movements model three kinds of action that directly change material conditions: ‘(a) work to dismantle harmful systems … (b) work to directly provide for people targeted by such systems … and (c) work to build an alternative infrastructure through which people can get their needs met’. Mutual aid addresses (b) but as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end capitalism and create a society without hierarchies and borders. In what follows, I will consider some of the actions that anarchists have undertaken during the COVID-19 crisis that address Spade’s criteria (a) and (c), whilst adding a fourth practice, which is not often covered under the rubric of action but ought to be: (d) publishing critique—in particular, I focus on anarchist critiques of securitisation and policing in the COVID-19 crisis, and anarchist critiques of capitalism. The publishing of propaganda and critique has a long and often hidden history in anarchist movement practice (Hoyt 2014; Ferretti 2017) and it is important because it helps to raise awareness of, and identify targets for, the other modes of action. Anarchist critiques during the COVID-19 crisis have largely been online, on blogs and social media, but also through word-of-mouth and exemplary actions while engaging in mutual aid with communities.\nIn London, the mutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care. There is a mutual aid group for each local borough, and these are divided by borough, zone and neighbourhood. There are also some London-wide networks and groups that co-ordinate or provide forums for people with specific interests, for example a Radical Assembly which provides a forum for radical left-wing and anarchist organisers, many of whom are dissatisfied with the lack of politicisation in their local ward. Local groups are composed of local community members helping others who are more vulnerable or who need to self-isolate to avoid spreading illness with tasks such as picking up and delivering groceries, medicines and other essentials, offering transportation to medical facilities, offering donations such as cleaning supplies, medical supplies and food for out-of-work people, offering home cooked meals, home/apartment cleaning, offering phonecalls, video chats and companionship, online entertainment such as yoga or dance classes, advice and advocacy navigating services, child care and pet care. Anarchists have also been involved in direct actions such as making masks, sewing scrubs and garnering donations of PPE for medical professionals. Similar to Occupy Sandy, these groups are utilising open source and internet technology, including Google docs with listing of groups, and being used by groups to organise resources, crowd-sourced lists of activities and initiatives, resource guides, webinars, slack channels, online meetups, peer-to-peer loan programmes and other forms of mutual aid emerging online and on-the-ground (Raymond 2020).\nThe mainstream perspective on disaster relief in general, and the coronavirus epidemic in particular, assumes that humans are selfish and competitive and are in need of a co-ordinating authority to tell them what to do. Mutual aid turns the conservative idea of the ‘disaster utopia’ on its head, positing that it is not a momentary suspension of division that leads communities to unite in mutual aid, but that this illustrates an alternative lifeworld that is normally hindered by the minorities in power and by media hegemonies (Solnit 2010: 8–9).\nAn interesting perspective on the current crisis is that Kropotkin’s original treatise on mutual aid was in large partly a critique of the then-fashionable ‘social Darwinism’ of the anarchist’s conservative contemporaries. Kropotkin’s idea that co-operation helps species thrive more than competition seems ever-more relevant as an alternative perspective in the current conjecture where our Conservative government have been accused of openly Darwinist ideas of ‘herd immunity’ (Malnick 2020) and pursuing policy lines based around ideas of ‘survival of the fittest’. Millstein defines mutual aid as ‘collective care’ involving ‘making sure everyone can take time off work, have a home and enough food, stay hydrated and wash their hands, not feel alone or abandoned, receive health and other care’ (Milstein 2020). Commentators have remarked how incredible it is that ‘basic bonds of solidarity, empathy and altruism’ have remained intact in the UK despite a decade of austerity and political polarisation (Quarshie 2020). Similar to Kropotkin, contemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state, and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism, for example an activist involved in co-operation Birmingham links the activities of their solidarity kitchen to a crisis of food poverty which has been ongoing since the 2008 crisis, resulting in the widespread use of foodbanks. The author-activist argues that food aid will become one of the most pressing concerns for the working class as we slip into recession again due to COVID-19. The food bank system is critiqued as a form of bureaucratic violence, since applicants are required to engage with a third-sector system who have a huge amount of control over the lives of the working class, who are required to explain their needs and justify themselves to paid professionals who act as gate-keepers for eligibility. This is seen to be part of a deliberate strategy of disempowerment of the working class enacted by both Tories and new Labour. It is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity, and they argue that the popularity of the solidarity kitchen, providing over 150 free vegan meals a day, with demand far in excess of this, pays testament to the need for a political project to combat food poverty, which should operate on multiple levels: ‘Both redistribution projects but also projects creating the conditions for autonomous production’. Such a project would involve not only direct provision through mutual aid, but also challenging land rights, completely re-thinking how farming and agriculture, and radically re-shaping supply chains (Yarrow Way 2020).\nIn the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society. As described in Chap. 1, in terms of the social/political principle, the very definition of the state for anarchists is that it is parasitic of the creative energies of society. COVID-19 is exposing the fragility of capital, at the same time as capitalists are attempting to mobilise the crisis in their interests, at least partially through the technologies of the state. Radicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital. The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid, ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish. From the anarchist view both stimulus and securitisation are two sides of the same coin designed to protect the needs of capital by stopping people from revolting in insurrection and/or engaging in exodus from the system by meeting their own needs though social recomposition. However, the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them, filling in gaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike, because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services. In the UK, this was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy, in the terms of David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ vision (Quarshie 2020) and has become part of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus. Assuming that authentic anti-authoritarian desire is possible, the political and discursive context has implications for how disaster anarchists and other radicals might seek to act during the COVID-19 pandemic.\nThis ‘social capital’ trope reappears in the liberal-Left media on COVID-19, for example Raymond (2020) rehearses phraseology of ‘vulnerability’ (the assumption that it is communities that are fragile, not capitalism) and ‘resilience’ (the idea that it is the responsibility of lower-level communities to recover from higher-level shocks, inflicted upon them by the policies of states and inequalities of capitalism—with emphasis on recovery rather than resistance or transformation). From this perspective, mutual aid is not radical, but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things—even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state. Rather than seeking resistance to a destructive and authoritarian complicity between state and capital, Raymond proclaims that ‘it’s unfortunate that those in power are unwilling to step up adequately’ (Raymond 2020). From the perspective of reformist social democratic and left-liberal approaches, local movements are lauded insofar as they embody flexible and responsive local knowledge—but at the same time there is a contradictory desire to control them. Associationalist views can often come across as quite critical— for example Naomi Klein is able to critique the dispossession of communities by disaster capitalists using shock doctrine neoliberalism; yet her alternatives rely on Keynesian economic stimulus and the co-optation of social movements into a state-led social democratic consensus (Klein 2007). Anarchists and other radicals might argue that all state responses are two sides to the same coin—the choice whether to co-opt through economic stimulus and capture movements or control/repress through securitisation is always there.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Spade\nargues that resistant left movements model\nMutual aid\nbut as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end capitalism and create a society without hierarchies and borders\nmutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care\ncontemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state, and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism\nIt is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity\nIn the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society\nRadicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital. The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid, ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish\nHowever, the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them, filling in gaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike, because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services\nthis was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy\nand has become part of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus\nmutual aid is not radical, but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things—even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Mutual aid solidifies neoliberalism and state-centricity---instead of challenging structural forces, it fills gaps in the system, allowing it to run more smoothly without foundational change.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Spade\nargues that resistant left movements model\nMutual aid\nbut as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end capitalism and create a society without hierarchies and borders\nmutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care\ncontemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state, and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism\nIt is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity\nIn the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society\nRadicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital. The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid, ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish\nHowever, the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them, filling in gaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike, because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services\nthis was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy\nand has become part of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus\nmutual aid is not radical, but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things—even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Spade\nMutual aid\nnot sufficient\ncap\nlinked\nstate\ncapitalism\nrepertoire of actions\ndealing with mutual aid\nsecuritised and militarised lockdown rules\nlaissez-faire neoliberal approach\neconomic stimulus\nbenign\ncomplicit\nsupporting them\nfilling in gaps\nmitigating failures\nMutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike\nopenly articulated\nconservative policy\npart of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus\nmutual aid is not radical\ncomplicit with the state\nrestoring the normal running of things", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Mutual aid solidifies neoliberalism and state-centricity---instead of challenging structural forces, it fills gaps in the system, allowing it to run more smoothly without foundational change.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Dean Spade (2020: 136) argues that resistant left movements model three kinds of action that directly change material conditions: ‘(a) work to dismantle harmful systems … (b) work to directly provide for people targeted by such systems … and (c) work to build an alternative infrastructure through which people can get their needs met’. Mutual aid addresses (b) but as has been argued above this alone is not sufficient to end capitalism and create a society without hierarchies and borders. In what follows, I will consider some of the actions that anarchists have undertaken during the COVID-19 crisis that address Spade’s criteria (a) and (c), whilst adding a fourth practice, which is not often covered under the rubric of action but ought to be: (d) publishing critique—in particular, I focus on anarchist critiques of securitisation and policing in the COVID-19 crisis, and anarchist critiques of capitalism. The publishing of propaganda and critique has a long and often hidden history in anarchist movement practice (Hoyt 2014; Ferretti 2017) and it is important because it helps to raise awareness of, and identify targets for, the other modes of action. Anarchist critiques during the COVID-19 crisis have largely been online, on blogs and social media, but also through word-of-mouth and exemplary actions while engaging in mutual aid with communities.\nIn London, the mutual aid groups are organising a very wide range of relief and support work, generally focused around social care. There is a mutual aid group for each local borough, and these are divided by borough, zone and neighbourhood. There are also some London-wide networks and groups that co-ordinate or provide forums for people with specific interests, for example a Radical Assembly which provides a forum for radical left-wing and anarchist organisers, many of whom are dissatisfied with the lack of politicisation in their local ward. Local groups are composed of local community members helping others who are more vulnerable or who need to self-isolate to avoid spreading illness with tasks such as picking up and delivering groceries, medicines and other essentials, offering transportation to medical facilities, offering donations such as cleaning supplies, medical supplies and food for out-of-work people, offering home cooked meals, home/apartment cleaning, offering phonecalls, video chats and companionship, online entertainment such as yoga or dance classes, advice and advocacy navigating services, child care and pet care. Anarchists have also been involved in direct actions such as making masks, sewing scrubs and garnering donations of PPE for medical professionals. Similar to Occupy Sandy, these groups are utilising open source and internet technology, including Google docs with listing of groups, and being used by groups to organise resources, crowd-sourced lists of activities and initiatives, resource guides, webinars, slack channels, online meetups, peer-to-peer loan programmes and other forms of mutual aid emerging online and on-the-ground (Raymond 2020).\nThe mainstream perspective on disaster relief in general, and the coronavirus epidemic in particular, assumes that humans are selfish and competitive and are in need of a co-ordinating authority to tell them what to do. Mutual aid turns the conservative idea of the ‘disaster utopia’ on its head, positing that it is not a momentary suspension of division that leads communities to unite in mutual aid, but that this illustrates an alternative lifeworld that is normally hindered by the minorities in power and by media hegemonies (Solnit 2010: 8–9).\nAn interesting perspective on the current crisis is that Kropotkin’s original treatise on mutual aid was in large partly a critique of the then-fashionable ‘social Darwinism’ of the anarchist’s conservative contemporaries. Kropotkin’s idea that co-operation helps species thrive more than competition seems ever-more relevant as an alternative perspective in the current conjecture where our Conservative government have been accused of openly Darwinist ideas of ‘herd immunity’ (Malnick 2020) and pursuing policy lines based around ideas of ‘survival of the fittest’. Millstein defines mutual aid as ‘collective care’ involving ‘making sure everyone can take time off work, have a home and enough food, stay hydrated and wash their hands, not feel alone or abandoned, receive health and other care’ (Milstein 2020). Commentators have remarked how incredible it is that ‘basic bonds of solidarity, empathy and altruism’ have remained intact in the UK despite a decade of austerity and political polarisation (Quarshie 2020). Similar to Kropotkin, contemporary anarchists have linked their mutual aid to a radical structural critique of both the authoritarian nature of the state, and the unequal, competitive and exploitative nature of capitalism, for example an activist involved in co-operation Birmingham links the activities of their solidarity kitchen to a crisis of food poverty which has been ongoing since the 2008 crisis, resulting in the widespread use of foodbanks. The author-activist argues that food aid will become one of the most pressing concerns for the working class as we slip into recession again due to COVID-19. The food bank system is critiqued as a form of bureaucratic violence, since applicants are required to engage with a third-sector system who have a huge amount of control over the lives of the working class, who are required to explain their needs and justify themselves to paid professionals who act as gate-keepers for eligibility. This is seen to be part of a deliberate strategy of disempowerment of the working class enacted by both Tories and new Labour. It is argued that anarchists have a huge role to play in leading a radical counter-narrative of working-class empowerment and solidarity, and they argue that the popularity of the solidarity kitchen, providing over 150 free vegan meals a day, with demand far in excess of this, pays testament to the need for a political project to combat food poverty, which should operate on multiple levels: ‘Both redistribution projects but also projects creating the conditions for autonomous production’. Such a project would involve not only direct provision through mutual aid, but also challenging land rights, completely re-thinking how farming and agriculture, and radically re-shaping supply chains (Yarrow Way 2020).\nIn the context of crises of capitalism, understanding mutual aid gets to the very heart of the nature of the relationship between state, capital and society. As described in Chap. 1, in terms of the social/political principle, the very definition of the state for anarchists is that it is parasitic of the creative energies of society. COVID-19 is exposing the fragility of capital, at the same time as capitalists are attempting to mobilise the crisis in their interests, at least partially through the technologies of the state. Radicals would argue that mutual aid and associated social responses to the pandemic are forms of social recomposition that are essentially in conflict with state and capital. The state/capital formation has at its disposal a repertoire of actions at its disposal for dealing with mutual aid, ranging from securitised and militarised lockdown rules effectively preventing the possibility of mutual aid; to a more laissez-faire neoliberal approach backed up by economic stimulus which might encourage mutual aid to flourish. From the anarchist view both stimulus and securitisation are two sides of the same coin designed to protect the needs of capital by stopping people from revolting in insurrection and/or engaging in exodus from the system by meeting their own needs though social recomposition. However, the controversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against these state-capital formations, rather than being benign or even complicit in supporting them, filling in gaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is in fact very convenient for governments and capitalists alike, because it creates social support systems reliant on free volunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing for social and labour reproduction to continue in the midst of austerity, tax cuts for the rich and the decimation of public services. In the UK, this was even quite openly articulated as conservative policy, in the terms of David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ vision (Quarshie 2020) and has become part of the neoliberal, decentralising consensus. Assuming that authentic anti-authoritarian desire is possible, the political and discursive context has implications for how disaster anarchists and other radicals might seek to act during the COVID-19 pandemic.\nThis ‘social capital’ trope reappears in the liberal-Left media on COVID-19, for example Raymond (2020) rehearses phraseology of ‘vulnerability’ (the assumption that it is communities that are fragile, not capitalism) and ‘resilience’ (the idea that it is the responsibility of lower-level communities to recover from higher-level shocks, inflicted upon them by the policies of states and inequalities of capitalism—with emphasis on recovery rather than resistance or transformation). From this perspective, mutual aid is not radical, but rather creates temporary ‘lifelines’ for ‘when government falls short’, yet ultimately mutual aid is complicit with the state insofar as it has the function of restoring the normal running of things—even if the author would rather have a somewhat more social democratic, rather than neoliberal state. Rather than seeking resistance to a destructive and authoritarian complicity between state and capital, Raymond proclaims that ‘it’s unfortunate that those in power are unwilling to step up adequately’ (Raymond 2020). From the perspective of reformist social democratic and left-liberal approaches, local movements are lauded insofar as they embody flexible and responsive local knowledge—but at the same time there is a contradictory desire to control them. Associationalist views can often come across as quite critical— for example Naomi Klein is able to critique the dispossession of communities by disaster capitalists using shock doctrine neoliberalism; yet her alternatives rely on Keynesian economic stimulus and the co-optation of social movements into a state-led social democratic consensus (Klein 2007). Anarchists and other radicals might argue that all state responses are two sides to the same coin—the choice whether to co-opt through economic stimulus and capture movements or control/repress through securitisation is always there.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Spade\nargues\nresistant\nmovements model\nMutual aid\nbut\nthis\nis not sufficient to end cap\nand create a society without hierarchies\nanarchists\nlinked\nmutual aid to\nradical\ncritique of\nthe\nstate, and\ncapitalism\nIt is argued\nanarchists have a\nrole to play\nleading a radical counter-narrative of\nsolidarity\nRadicals\nargue\nmutual aid\nare\nsocial recomposition\n.\nHowever\ncontroversy rests in the extent to which mutual aid is a radical practice that acts against\nformations, rather than being\ncomplicit in supporting them, filling\ngaps and mitigating failures. Mutual aid is\nvery convenient for governments and capitalists\nbecause it creates\nsystems reliant on\nvolunteer time, where state services are withdrawn—allowing\nlabour reproduction\nin the midst of austerity, tax cuts\nand\ndecimation of public services\nthis was\nopenly articulated as conservative policy\nand has become part of the neoliberal\nconsensus\nmutual aid is not radical, but\ncomplicit with the state\nit has the function of restoring\nnormal running of things—even if the author would rather have a\nmore social democratic, rather than neoliberal state", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Disarming” requires comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all US nuclear weapons", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons, pursuant to a verifiable, legally binding international agreement--has long been one of the most ambitious, controversial, and urgent items on the agenda for arms control. To date, however, most of the discussion of \"getting to zero\" has highlighted the political, military, technical and diplomatic dimensions of this complex problem, and there has been relatively little attention to the legal requirements for drafting such a novel treaty.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons,\nhas long been one of the most ambitious, controversial, and urgent item\n on the agenda for arms control.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: “Disarming” requires comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all US nuclear weapons\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons, pursuant to a verifiable, legally binding international agreement--has long been one of the most ambitious, controversial, and urgent items on the agenda for arms control. To date, however, most of the discussion of \"getting to zero\" has highlighted the political, military, technical and diplomatic dimensions of this complex problem, and there has been relatively little attention to the legal requirements for drafting such a novel treaty.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nuclear disarmament--the comprehensive, universal, and permanent abolition of all nuclear weapons\nhas long been\nthe most\nurgent item\non the agenda", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Too far out – surprises inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One reason voters turn against the president’s party during midterms is that public policy sometimes moves too far toward that party’s preferences. But this time, there is a major exception in the form of the Supreme Court’s decision on abortion. There is plenty of evidence that the ruling that overturned Roe v. Wade has mobilized supporters of abortion rights, though it’s hard to know just how meaningful that will be.\nAdd to the uncertainty the fairly wide margin of error that all polls always have, along with the possibility that we could get a larger polling error.\nA final wild card is the Covid-19 pandemic, which even in diminished form still weighs on many aspects of voters’ lives. All election forecasts are based on previous similar situations, which means that this year we have little information to go on.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "voters turn against the president’s party during midterms\npublic policy sometimes moves too far toward that party’s preferences\nthere is a major exception in the form of\nabortion\nthe ruling\nhas mobilized supporters of abortion rights\nAdd to the uncertainty the fairly wide margin of error that all polls always have, along with the possibility that we could get a larger polling error\nA final wild card is\nCovid\nwhich even in diminished form still weighs on many aspects of voters’ lives. All election forecasts are based on previous similar situations, which means that this year we have little information to go on", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Too far out – surprises inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "voters turn against the president’s party during midterms\npublic policy sometimes moves too far toward that party’s preferences\nthere is a major exception in the form of\nabortion\nthe ruling\nhas mobilized supporters of abortion rights\nAdd to the uncertainty the fairly wide margin of error that all polls always have, along with the possibility that we could get a larger polling error\nA final wild card is\nCovid\nwhich even in diminished form still weighs on many aspects of voters’ lives. All election forecasts are based on previous similar situations, which means that this year we have little information to go on", "role": "user" }, { "content": "major exception\nabortion\nmobilized supporters\nlarger polling error\nCovid\nprevious similar situations\nwe have little information to go on", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Too far out – surprises inevitable.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "voters turn against the president’s party during midterms\npublic policy sometimes moves too far toward that party’s preferences\nthere is a major exception in the form of\nabortion\nthe ruling\nhas mobilized supporters of abortion rights\nAdd to the uncertainty the fairly wide margin of error that all polls always have, along with the possibility that we could get a larger polling error\nA final wild card is\nCovid\nwhich even in diminished form still weighs on many aspects of voters’ lives. All election forecasts are based on previous similar situations, which means that this year we have little information to go on", "role": "user" }, { "content": "voters turn against the president\nthere is a major exception\nabortion\nthe ruling\nhas mobilized supporters\nAdd\nthe\nmargin of error\nA final wild card is\nCovid\nwhich\nstill weighs on\nvoters’ lives\nforecasts are based on previous similar situations\nthis year we have little info", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Aggressive nuclear posture escalates US-China tensions---eliminating first strike solves.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "While US defense analysts and their Chinese counterparts are aware of the potential escalation risks between nuclear-armed great powers, their respective doctrines do not address how an adversary might respond to escalatory behavior. Instead, these rival strategic communities generally assume that escalation in future conflict can be effectively countered and contained by establishing and sustaining escalation dominance. Chinese doctrinal emphasis on seizing the initiative early and pre-emptively in conventional warfare to achieve escalation dominance may result in the opposite outcome: triggering rapid and possibly uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear level of conflict.125 However, the evidence does not suggest that China intends to use nuclear missiles to achieve escalation dominance, or for deliberate escalation.\nA central challenge in defining strategic stability between the US and China is that both parties lack a common definition of “strategic stability”—unlike Russia the US does not maintain an official policy of mutual vulnerability with China—and have mutually exclusive concerns about this strategic dyad. Beijing’s overarching concern relates to perceptions that the US seeks superior conventional (especially counterforce and missile defenses) and nuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct first strikes against China’s comparatively smaller and less diversified nuclear deterrent, thus undermining Chinese retaliatory capability.126 Washington’s principal concern is that Beijing will not eschew the use of its expansive conventional forces and power projection capacity to enforce its claims in regional territorial disputes with its neighbors (i.e., the East and South China Seas), several of whom are US treaty allies (South Korea and Japan), or strategic partners (Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines)—that is, China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities could be used to neutralize US operational conventional capacity to defend its allies and unilaterally alter the status quo in a future regional contingency.127 Further, these divergent threat perceptions and views on strategic stability are complicated by the significant disparities between the two states’ nuclear arsenals—the US and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s total stockpile of nuclear weapons.128\nThe broadening of US-China great-power strategic competition (i.e., trade relations, regional disputes, cyber espionage, and the coronavirus pandemic and general political confrontation) evinces classical “security dilemma” dynamics (see Chapter 4)—that is, both sides perceive the other’s behavior as threatening and respond to secure themselves in ways that can lead to action-reaction dynamics, spirals of mistrust and arms racing, and other destabilizing escalatory behavior.129 Consequently, both sides lack confidence in the other’s willingness to stabilize strategic relations; nor are they incentivized to pursue measures (arms control, build mutual trust, transparency, or display unilateral restraint) to enhance strategic stability.130 Absent commonly held escalation thresholds and a mutual framework to deter either side from violating them, a US-China crisis operating under the assumption that they can effectively control escalation (e.g., in the South China Seas, the Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Straits) would likely increase the risks of inadvertent escalation—because both sides underestimate their ability to prevent a situation spiraling out of control.131\nAccording to Avery Goldstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania—who uses deterrence theory to analyze factors leading to first-strike instability in the US-China strategic dyad—Chinese overconfidence in its ability to prevent conventional military confrontation escalating to nuclear war might increase the risk of a conflict or crisis inadvertently or accidentally crossing the nuclear Rubicon.132 Moreover, divergent views of US-China attitudes about controlling escalation below and above the nuclear threshold could also be detrimental to crisis stability. The US defense community is generally more concerned that a low-level conventional conflict might escalate to a nuclear level but is, apparently, less concerned about the ability of the US to control escalation above the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, during a US-China crisis Washington may overstate the possibility that Beijing would use nuclear weapons, and simultaneously understate the scale of a Chinese retaliatory nuclear response.133\nFurthermore, in a future US-China conflict the US would have a strong incentive to pre-emptively attack China’s mobile missiles and attendant (and likely dual-use) command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to achieve escalation dominance, which Beijing could misperceive as a conventional counterforce attack or, worse, as a precursor to a first nuclear strike.134 Chinese analysts generally assume that the US intends to undermine China’s relatively small nuclear deterrent and attendant support systems with advanced conventional weapons—especially US conventional prompt global strike and missile defenses.135 In short, divergent US-China attitudes about the ability to de-escalate a low-intensity conventional or nuclear conflict makes a conventional conflict more likely to escalate to a high level of intensity.136\nManaging military (especially inadvertent) escalation risk has not been a traditional feature of Chinese strategic thinking.137 China’s strategic community is believed to share a high level of confidence in the ability of China’s long-standing no-first-use nuclear pledge to control escalation.138 Because Chinese analysts view China’s no-first-use commitment as a de facto firebreak between the use of its conventional and nuclear capabilities to de-escalate a situation, the resultant overconfidence might increase inadvertent escalation risks.139 This overconfidence could make it less likely that Chinese leaders recognize escalation risks caused by miscalculation or misperception of US intentions. China’s sanguine attitude to managing escalation can in part be attributed to the belief that once the nuclear Rubicon is crossed, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be easily controlled by either side. Because of this belief, Chinese analysts do not believe that a limited nuclear war would stay limited. Moreover, China’s operational doctrine does not contain plans to wage a limited nuclear war, which China might pursue if it believed nuclear escalation could be controlled.140\nAnother complicating factor is that new escalation thresholds and operating norms for AI-augmented weapons have yet to emerge. Today’s thresholds in the context of autonomous weapon systems are considered inappropriate and ambiguous.141 Without commonly held operational norms and an adversary’s strategic priorities and political objectives, militaries deploying military AI could inadvertently cross already vague escalation thresholds.142 In 2016, for example, China captured a US underwater drone, asserting that it posed a hazard to Chinese maritime navigation. Washington, in response, called China’s behavior “unlawful,” claiming the drone was a “sovereign immune vessel.”143 This episode ended with China returning the drone after days of diplomatic contention, and demonstrated the potential risk of inadvertent escalation caused by the ambiguities surrounding the deployment of new (and especially dual-use) technology in contested territory between strategic rivals that is considered in Chapter 4. In sum, the combination of first-strike vulnerability and opportunity enabled by a growing portfolio of technologies such as AI for warfighting, coercion, and influence will have significant implications for escalation dynamics in future warfare.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "While US defense analysts and their Chinese counterparts are aware of the potential escalation risks\ntheir respective doctrines do not address how an adversary might respond to escalatory behavior\nthese rival strategic communities generally assume that escalation\ncan be effectively countered\nby establishing and sustaining escalation dominance. Chinese doctrinal emphasis on seizing the initiative\nin conventional warfare to achieve escalation dominance may result in\ntriggering rapid and possibly uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear level of conflict\nA central challenge in defining strategic stability between the US and China is that both parties lack a common definition of\nstrategic stability\nthe US does not maintain an official policy of mutual vulnerability with China\nBeijing’s overarching concern relates to perceptions that the US seeks\nnuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct first strikes against China’s comparatively smaller and less diversified nuclear deterrent\nsides lack confidence in the other’s willingness to stabilize strategic relations; nor are they incentivized to pursue measures\narms control, build mutual trust, transparency, or display unilateral restraint\nto enhance strategic stability\na US-China crisis operating under the assumption that they can effectively control escalation\nin the S\nC\nS\nKorea\nor Taiwan\nwould likely increase the risks of inadvertent escalation\nbecause both sides underestimate their ability to prevent a situation spiral\nout of control\nin a future US-China conflict the US would have a strong incentive to pre-emptively attack China’s mobile missiles and attendant\ncommand, control, communications, and intelligence systems to achieve escalation dominance, which Beijing could misperceive\nas a precursor to a first nuclear strike\nAnother complicating factor is that new escalation thresholds and operating norms for AI-augmented weapons have yet to emerge\nWithout commonly held operational norms and an adversary’s strategic priorities and political objectives, militaries deploying military AI could inadvertently cross already vague escalation thresholds\ncombination of first-strike vulnerability and opportunity enabled by a growing portfolio of tech\nsuch as AI for warfighting, coercion, and influence will have significant implications for escalation dynamics", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Aggressive nuclear posture escalates US-China tensions---eliminating first strike solves.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "While US defense analysts and their Chinese counterparts are aware of the potential escalation risks between nuclear-armed great powers, their respective doctrines do not address how an adversary might respond to escalatory behavior. Instead, these rival strategic communities generally assume that escalation in future conflict can be effectively countered and contained by establishing and sustaining escalation dominance. Chinese doctrinal emphasis on seizing the initiative early and pre-emptively in conventional warfare to achieve escalation dominance may result in the opposite outcome: triggering rapid and possibly uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear level of conflict.125 However, the evidence does not suggest that China intends to use nuclear missiles to achieve escalation dominance, or for deliberate escalation.\nA central challenge in defining strategic stability between the US and China is that both parties lack a common definition of “strategic stability”—unlike Russia the US does not maintain an official policy of mutual vulnerability with China—and have mutually exclusive concerns about this strategic dyad. Beijing’s overarching concern relates to perceptions that the US seeks superior conventional (especially counterforce and missile defenses) and nuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct first strikes against China’s comparatively smaller and less diversified nuclear deterrent, thus undermining Chinese retaliatory capability.126 Washington’s principal concern is that Beijing will not eschew the use of its expansive conventional forces and power projection capacity to enforce its claims in regional territorial disputes with its neighbors (i.e., the East and South China Seas), several of whom are US treaty allies (South Korea and Japan), or strategic partners (Taiwan, Singapore, and the Philippines)—that is, China’s nuclear and conventional capabilities could be used to neutralize US operational conventional capacity to defend its allies and unilaterally alter the status quo in a future regional contingency.127 Further, these divergent threat perceptions and views on strategic stability are complicated by the significant disparities between the two states’ nuclear arsenals—the US and Russia still possess more than 90 percent of the world’s total stockpile of nuclear weapons.128\nThe broadening of US-China great-power strategic competition (i.e., trade relations, regional disputes, cyber espionage, and the coronavirus pandemic and general political confrontation) evinces classical “security dilemma” dynamics (see Chapter 4)—that is, both sides perceive the other’s behavior as threatening and respond to secure themselves in ways that can lead to action-reaction dynamics, spirals of mistrust and arms racing, and other destabilizing escalatory behavior.129 Consequently, both sides lack confidence in the other’s willingness to stabilize strategic relations; nor are they incentivized to pursue measures (arms control, build mutual trust, transparency, or display unilateral restraint) to enhance strategic stability.130 Absent commonly held escalation thresholds and a mutual framework to deter either side from violating them, a US-China crisis operating under the assumption that they can effectively control escalation (e.g., in the South China Seas, the Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Straits) would likely increase the risks of inadvertent escalation—because both sides underestimate their ability to prevent a situation spiraling out of control.131\nAccording to Avery Goldstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania—who uses deterrence theory to analyze factors leading to first-strike instability in the US-China strategic dyad—Chinese overconfidence in its ability to prevent conventional military confrontation escalating to nuclear war might increase the risk of a conflict or crisis inadvertently or accidentally crossing the nuclear Rubicon.132 Moreover, divergent views of US-China attitudes about controlling escalation below and above the nuclear threshold could also be detrimental to crisis stability. The US defense community is generally more concerned that a low-level conventional conflict might escalate to a nuclear level but is, apparently, less concerned about the ability of the US to control escalation above the nuclear threshold. Paradoxically, during a US-China crisis Washington may overstate the possibility that Beijing would use nuclear weapons, and simultaneously understate the scale of a Chinese retaliatory nuclear response.133\nFurthermore, in a future US-China conflict the US would have a strong incentive to pre-emptively attack China’s mobile missiles and attendant (and likely dual-use) command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to achieve escalation dominance, which Beijing could misperceive as a conventional counterforce attack or, worse, as a precursor to a first nuclear strike.134 Chinese analysts generally assume that the US intends to undermine China’s relatively small nuclear deterrent and attendant support systems with advanced conventional weapons—especially US conventional prompt global strike and missile defenses.135 In short, divergent US-China attitudes about the ability to de-escalate a low-intensity conventional or nuclear conflict makes a conventional conflict more likely to escalate to a high level of intensity.136\nManaging military (especially inadvertent) escalation risk has not been a traditional feature of Chinese strategic thinking.137 China’s strategic community is believed to share a high level of confidence in the ability of China’s long-standing no-first-use nuclear pledge to control escalation.138 Because Chinese analysts view China’s no-first-use commitment as a de facto firebreak between the use of its conventional and nuclear capabilities to de-escalate a situation, the resultant overconfidence might increase inadvertent escalation risks.139 This overconfidence could make it less likely that Chinese leaders recognize escalation risks caused by miscalculation or misperception of US intentions. China’s sanguine attitude to managing escalation can in part be attributed to the belief that once the nuclear Rubicon is crossed, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be easily controlled by either side. Because of this belief, Chinese analysts do not believe that a limited nuclear war would stay limited. Moreover, China’s operational doctrine does not contain plans to wage a limited nuclear war, which China might pursue if it believed nuclear escalation could be controlled.140\nAnother complicating factor is that new escalation thresholds and operating norms for AI-augmented weapons have yet to emerge. Today’s thresholds in the context of autonomous weapon systems are considered inappropriate and ambiguous.141 Without commonly held operational norms and an adversary’s strategic priorities and political objectives, militaries deploying military AI could inadvertently cross already vague escalation thresholds.142 In 2016, for example, China captured a US underwater drone, asserting that it posed a hazard to Chinese maritime navigation. Washington, in response, called China’s behavior “unlawful,” claiming the drone was a “sovereign immune vessel.”143 This episode ended with China returning the drone after days of diplomatic contention, and demonstrated the potential risk of inadvertent escalation caused by the ambiguities surrounding the deployment of new (and especially dual-use) technology in contested territory between strategic rivals that is considered in Chapter 4. In sum, the combination of first-strike vulnerability and opportunity enabled by a growing portfolio of technologies such as AI for warfighting, coercion, and influence will have significant implications for escalation dynamics in future warfare.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "US\nChinese\ndoctrines\nescalatory behavior\neffectively countered\nseizing the initiative\nuncontrollable escalation\ncentral challenge\nstrategic stability\nmutual vulnerability\noverarching concern\nconduct first strikes\nlack confidence\npursue measures\nunilateral restraint\nS\nC\nS\nKorea\nTaiwan\ninadvertent escalation\nspiral\nout of control\npre-emptively attack\nprecursor\nfirst nuclear strike\ncomplicating factor\nAI\nmilitary AI\nescalation thresholds\nfirst-strike vulnerability\ngrowing\ntech", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Aggressive nuclear posture escalates US-China tensions---eliminating first strike solves.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "While US defense analysts and their Chinese counterparts are aware of the potential escalation risks\ntheir respective doctrines do not address how an adversary might respond to escalatory behavior\nthese rival strategic communities generally assume that escalation\ncan be effectively countered\nby establishing and sustaining escalation dominance. Chinese doctrinal emphasis on seizing the initiative\nin conventional warfare to achieve escalation dominance may result in\ntriggering rapid and possibly uncontrollable escalation to a nuclear level of conflict\nA central challenge in defining strategic stability between the US and China is that both parties lack a common definition of\nstrategic stability\nthe US does not maintain an official policy of mutual vulnerability with China\nBeijing’s overarching concern relates to perceptions that the US seeks\nnuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct first strikes against China’s comparatively smaller and less diversified nuclear deterrent\nsides lack confidence in the other’s willingness to stabilize strategic relations; nor are they incentivized to pursue measures\narms control, build mutual trust, transparency, or display unilateral restraint\nto enhance strategic stability\na US-China crisis operating under the assumption that they can effectively control escalation\nin the S\nC\nS\nKorea\nor Taiwan\nwould likely increase the risks of inadvertent escalation\nbecause both sides underestimate their ability to prevent a situation spiral\nout of control\nin a future US-China conflict the US would have a strong incentive to pre-emptively attack China’s mobile missiles and attendant\ncommand, control, communications, and intelligence systems to achieve escalation dominance, which Beijing could misperceive\nas a precursor to a first nuclear strike\nAnother complicating factor is that new escalation thresholds and operating norms for AI-augmented weapons have yet to emerge\nWithout commonly held operational norms and an adversary’s strategic priorities and political objectives, militaries deploying military AI could inadvertently cross already vague escalation thresholds\ncombination of first-strike vulnerability and opportunity enabled by a growing portfolio of tech\nsuch as AI for warfighting, coercion, and influence will have significant implications for escalation dynamics", "role": "user" }, { "content": "US\nand\nChinese\ndoctrines do not address\nescalatory behavior\nemphasis on\nthe initiative\nto achieve\ndominance\nresult in\nescalation to\nnuclear\nconflict\nboth parties lack\nstrategic stability\nthe US does not maintain\nmutual vulnerability\nconcern relates to\nfirst strikes against China’s\ndeterrent\nlack confidence in\nwillingness to stabilize\nrelations\nnor\nincentivized to pursue\nunilateral restraint\nto enhance\nstability\ncrisis\nin the S\nC\nS\nKorea\nor Taiwan\nspiral\nout of control\nUS\nincentive to pre-emptively attack\nmisperceive\nas a\nfirst\nstrike\nAI\ncross\nvague\nthresholds\ncombination of\nvulnerability and\ntech\nhave significant implications", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Nuclear forces” refers to all weaponry and infrastructure supporting the use of nuclear weapons.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and, if necessary, defeating two near peers simultaneously? \nDoes the United States have sufficient weapons of the right types, and will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes? If not, what changes are needed? \nThe term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations. The platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components: those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed. The operationally-deployed component is readily available (immediately or within a few days), while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and\ndefeating two\npeers simultaneously?\nDoes the U\nS\nhave sufficient weapons\nand will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes?\nwhat changes are needed?\nThe term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations\nplatforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components\nthose that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed\nThe operationally-deployed component is readily available\nwhile the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Nuclear forces” refers to all weaponry and infrastructure supporting the use of nuclear weapons.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and\ndefeating two\npeers simultaneously?\nDoes the U\nS\nhave sufficient weapons\nand will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes?\nwhat changes are needed?\nThe term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations\nplatforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components\nthose that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed\nThe operationally-deployed component is readily available\nwhile the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nThe term “nuclear forces” refers\nto\ndelivery platforms\nweapons\nsupport systems\ncommand and control assets\nmilitary infrastructure", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: “Nuclear forces” refers to all weaponry and infrastructure supporting the use of nuclear weapons.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and, if necessary, defeating two near peers simultaneously? \nDoes the United States have sufficient weapons of the right types, and will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes? If not, what changes are needed? \nThe term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations. The platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components: those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed. The operationally-deployed component is readily available (immediately or within a few days), while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nnuclear forces” refers\nto\ndelivery platforms\nweapons\nsupport systems\ncommand and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: AND the plan would eliminate counterforce targeting, forcing a shift to retaliatory deterrence that targets enemy cities---extinction", "role": "system" }, { "content": "At the beginning of 2019, Democratic presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren introduced the No First Use Act to the Senate, which contained only one sentence: “It is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first”. That summer, she tweeted a similar sentiment, saying (in part), “The U.S. is not going to use nuclear weapons preemptively, and we need to say so to the entire world”. Since this is essentially the only time, at least in this race, that a presidential candidate has made a public statement about nuclear strategy, I think this is a good opportunity to discuss the basics of nuclear doctrine and to take a look at the policy of No First Use (NFU).\nBroadly speaking, there are two related but distinct things that need to be looked at to understand a state’s nuclear strategy. The more tangible of the two is what I would describe as force structure, or the physical aspect of a country’s nuclear force. This includes the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the yield of those weapons, delivery vehicles (missiles, submarines, airplanes), communications infrastructure, etc. Since this post is not primarily about force structure, I won’t be going into detail about any of these things. Instead, I’ll simply note that force structure should be determined by doctrine.\nThe second aspect of a state’s nuclear strategy is its doctrine. A country’s nuclear doctrine is the set of rules that determines when and how its nuclear weapons will be used. NFU, if implemented, would be part of the United States’ nuclear doctrine that addresses the question of “when”. It’s an extremely simple rule – a nuclear version of “do not fire unless fired upon”. The US would not be the first country to implement such a rule; NFU is currently part of China’s and India’s nuclear doctrines, and was briefly part of the Soviet Union/Russia’s doctrine.\n===COUNTERFORCE VS COUNTERVALUE===\nUnlike NFU, which addresses the question of when nuclear weapons will be used, counterforce and countervalue strategies are elements of doctrine that address how nuclear weapons will be used – specifically, what their targets will be. A country with a counterforce strategy plans to use its strategic nuclear weapons against elements of the enemy’s nuclear force structure to prevent them from launching their nuclear weapons. Countervalue, as the name suggests, targets what the enemy country values – primarily its citizens and its economic base. In practice, countervalue targeting is synonymous with city targeting.\nThe case for countervalue targeting is simple – the mere possibility of apocalyptic levels of destruction should be enough to stop an adversary from committing aggression that may lead to a nuclear war. If you were the USSR, for example, would you willingly attempt to conquer West Germany and France if it meant entering into a general nuclear war with the United States in which tens of millions of your own citizens would be killed over the course of a few hours, and the survivors were left to inhabit an impoverished and irradiated wasteland? Advocates for countervalue strategies would argue that the answer to this question is “obviously not” – in fact, Robert Jervis, a well-known advocate for a small nuclear force with a countervalue doctrine, wrote a book entitled “The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution” in which he argues that military competition between great powers is essentially over because of nuclear weapons.\nWhile it would be great if the above picture was true, and we could do away with international conflict for the low, low price of a few hundred nuclear warheads per state, such strategies are inherently flawed, and cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional ones, but that’s the topic of a future post). In fact, countervalue second-strike strategies have major strategic and moral issues that make them essentially useless for major powers.\nThe primary strategic issue with a countervalue targeting strategy is that it involves a threat that isn’t credible against either counterforce strategies or even other countervalue strategies. Countervalue strategies deter by making the enemy believe that they will be destroyed if they attack. But unless the targeted country has handed its launch authority over to computers or accidentally allows launches by rogue officers, the attacking country has good reason to believe that the targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons.\nIt’s easy to see why this is the case, especially if the attacker has a counterforce strategy. Let’s take as an example the United States and China, who have counterforce and countervalue strategies, respectively. If, next Tuesday, the US decided to launch a strike against China’s ~300 nuclear weapons, and was 95% successful, what would the PRC do with its 15 remaining weapons? The answer is simple: nothing. Once the attacker launches its weapons, the logic of the countervalue targeting strategy is flipped on its head; why would the Chinese use their small remaining arsenal to retaliate against US cities if the Americans could rain down even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities? In my mind, this is the primary failure of countervalue targeting strategies; it never makes sense to use your weapons for their intended purpose, even AFTER you’ve been attacked!\nA related problem is that under a countervalue targeting scheme, you lose all coercive leverage by actually using your weapons. Countervalue targeting is theoretically effective because the enemy’s cities are “hostages” that you can threaten with destruction if you are attacked. If, in the above scenario, the Chinese used their 15 remaining weapons to destroy the 10-15 largest American cities, what would stop the Americans from telling China “if you don’t surrender and use your entire economy to rebuild the United States, we’ll destroy 1 of your cities at random per week until you do”? Nothing – the PRC killed its American “hostages”. The Americans now have nothing to lose, and the Chinese everything!\nOf course, this doesn’t mean that it’s sensible to attack nuclear weapons states with countervalue strategies willy-nilly – computer errors do occur, militaries could sometimes have rogue officers, and the intense stress created by crisis situations could lead political leaders to do things that are not in their country’s best interest. In that sense, having a countervalue strategy is probably better than having nothing at all, because it introduces risk into an attacker’s calculus. Keep in mind, however, that countries with these strategies are incentivized to both exaggerate how much these factors matter and to do everything in their power to stop them from actually mattering. China, for example, will try its hardest to convince US policymakers and academics that its officers in the strategic rocket forces would launch their missiles in a patriotic fervor, consequences be damned, if the US were to attack. Behind the scenes, however, there is little doubt that the PRC is trying very hard to ensure that that couldn’t happen. China has traditionally taken a very conservative approach to its nuclear weapons, and there could be no greater nightmare for Beijing than a situation in which they’ve lost control of their own forces in a way that could lead to the destruction of their own country.\n===NFU AND TARGETING DOCTRINES===\nYou likely noticed in the previous section that I mentioned NFU alongside countervalue targeting, and counterforce targeting alongside first-strike strategies. This wasn’t arbitrary – NFU requires a countervalue strategy, and counterforce strategies work best when they are first-strike. The reasons for both of these are simple.\nUnder a NFU strategy, counterforce nuclear targeting is useless – the enemy has already launched the weapons that you would be trying to destroy or disable! The only targets remaining are the enemy’s major cities, leaving you with a massive pile of useless ordinance for the reasons outlined above. Even if the enemy had only launched a relatively limited counterforce strike, it’s very unlikely that they would have left you with the command/control infrastructure or intelligence/surveillance resources to land whatever warheads you still had on their remaining nuclear weapons. A counterforce targeting strategy, therefore, requires a first-use strategy – you may save a few small-medium sized cities by destroying reserve weapons stockpiles and other infrastructure after an initial launch, but for the most part, once the enemy launches its weapons, the game is up.\nIt’s probably clear at this point why I think NFU is not a policy that the United States should adopt. If paired with the current counterforce policy, we’ll be launching our weapons once it was far too late. If we switched to a countervalue policy, our arsenal will be nearly useless at deterring attack. Strategic considerations are not the only reason, however, to reject countervalue targeting.\n===WORLD TARGETS IN MEGADEATHS===\nFor some, NFU isn’t about strategy at all. Rather, they believe that strategies that involve a first-strike are simply immoral. How could it be right for a country to attack another with little or no warning using the most powerful and terrifying weapons the world has ever seen? This argument has been around for a long time, and has become more popular alongside the growing movement to abolish nuclear weapons. In many ways, I’m sympathetic to this argument. First strikes obviously escalate crises and create a lot of risk for millions of people.\nThe problem, however, comes when considering that a No First Use pledge comes packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy for the reasons stated above. While I don’t think this terminology is as euphemistic as some others do, I think it’s worth being explicit about what that means: NFU REQUIRES the threat of indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of millions of innocent civilians. This is why I find it somewhat surprising that people on the left side of the political spectrum, such as Warren, are the primary cheerleaders for such a doctrine. How could people who believe that it is immoral and undemocratic to launch a surprise attack not believe that it is immoral and undemocratic to kill hundreds of millions of people? Perhaps they simply don’t understand the basics of nuclear strategy (reasonable for normal people, TERRIFYING for a presidential candidate), or maybe they are content with having an ineffective nuclear force if it means not compromising their principles (but if this was the case, why would they advocate for NFU rather than abolition?).\nAnyone who has seen examples of the ghastly Cold War charts estimating civilian war dead, or has read accounts of Hiroshima, Chernobyl, or the firebombing of German and Japanese cities should be immediately horrified by the prospect of aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities. If you care about having a moral foreign policy, it’s hard to see how leaving half a billion Chinese citizens burned alive, irradiated, crushed by debris, or simply starving wouldn’t cancel out all of the good your policies would do before or after such an action.\n===CONCLUSION===\nIn terms of Warren’s endorsement of the policy, I’m conflicted. On one hand, I think NFU is one of the worst policies ever presented to the American people, and I’m fairly disturbed that a major presidential candidate has publicly declared it as her policy. On the other hand, I appreciate that Senator Warren has is at least discussing nuclear issues publicly. The issues pages for Biden, Sanders, and Buttigieg contain no references to nuclear weapons whatsoever. Given the fact that the primary job of the President is commanding the nation’s military to keep Americans safe from attack, and that nuclear weapons are the most important aspect of that military, it’s disappointing to see most of the candidates ignore the issue entirely. Despite producing a Nuclear Posture Review that included many good policies in 2018, the Trump administration doesn’t appear willing or able to follow through with most of those policies. It seems that the best we can hope for in this election cycle is for the security situation in the West Pacific not to decline fast enough that nuclear strategy becomes relevant in the next 4-5 years.\nLooking back at this blog’s first post, it should be clear by now that a NFU pledge violates at least goals #1-4 of the nuclear force (more to come about #5!). It violates #2 and #4 through strategic impotence, and #1 and #3 due to the fact that it involves threatening to kill a LOT of people. In fact, the much-feared “nuclear winter” that could destroy human civilization is only possible through countervalue targeting, since the cooling is caused by smoke and dust from firestorms in major cities hit by nuclear weapons.\nI don’t mean to say that all counterforce first-strike strategies are perfect. The details of any strategy matter almost as much as its broad outlines. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous devices ever created and should be treated with extreme caution regardless of how exactly you deploy them. This caution, however, must not come in the form of reflexive decisions based on what appears at first glance to be “less aggressive”. It must instead come as a set of policies crafted after a great deal of thought and considerations of goals, capabilities, known off-target effects, and uncertainty.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "force structure\nincludes the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal\nyield of those weapons, delivery vehicles\ncommunications infrastructure, etc\nsecond aspect of a state’s nuclear strategy is its doctrine\nthe set of rules that determines when and how its nuclear weapons will be used. NFU, if implemented, would be part of the U\nS\nnuclear doctrine that addresses the question of “when\nUnlike NFU, which addresses the question of when nuclear weapons will be used, counterforce and countervalue strategies are elements of doctrine that address how nuclear weapons will be used\nwhat their targets will be. A country with a counterforce strategy plans to use its strategic nuclear weapons against elements of the enemy’s nuclear force structure to prevent them from launching\nCountervalue\ntargets what the enemy country values – primarily its citizens and its economic base\ncountervalue targeting is synonymous with city targeting\nsuch strategies are inherently flawed, and cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional ones\ncountervalue second-strike strategies have major strategic and moral issues that make them essentially useless for major powers\nit involves a threat that isn’t credible against either counterforce strategies or even other countervalue strategies. Countervalue strategies deter by making the enemy believe\nthey will be destroyed if they attack\nunless the targeted country has handed its launch authority over to computers or accidentally allows launches by rogue officers, the attacking country has good reason to believe\nthe targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons\nIf, next Tuesday, the US decided to launch a strike against China’s ~300 nuclear weapons, and was 95% successful, what would the PRC do with its 15 remaining weapons?\nnothing. Once the attacker launches\nthe logic of the countervalue targeting strategy is flipped on its head; why would the Chinese use their small remaining arsenal to retaliate against US cities if the Americans could rain down even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities?\nit never makes sense to use your weapons for their intended purpose, even AFTER you’ve been attacked!\nunder a countervalue targeting scheme, you lose all coercive leverage by actually using your weapons. Countervalue targeting is theoretically effective because the enemy’s cities are “hostages” that you can threaten with destruction if you are attacked. If\nthe Chinese used their 15 remaining weapons to destroy the 10-15 largest American cities, what would stop the Americans from telling China “if you don’t surrender and use your entire economy to rebuild the U\nS\nwe’ll destroy 1 of your cities at random per week until you do”? Nothing\nthe PRC killed its American “hostages”. The Americans now have nothing to lose, and the Chinese everything!\nNFU requires a countervalue strategy, and counterforce strategies work best when they are first-strike\nUnder\nNFU strategy, counterforce nuclear targeting is useless\nthe enemy has already launched the weapons\nyou would be trying to destroy or disable! The only targets remaining are the enemy’s major cities\nEven if the enemy had only launched a relatively limited counterforce strike, it’s very unlikely that they would have left you with the command/control infrastructure or intelligence/surveillance resources to land whatever warheads you still had on their remaining nuclear weapons\ncounterforce targeting\nrequires a first-use strategy\nNFU\nIf paired with the current counterforce policy, we’ll be launching our weapons once it was far too late. If we switched to a countervalue policy, our arsenal will be nearly useless at deterring attack\nFirst strikes obviously escalate crises and create a lot of risk for millions of people\nThe problem\ncomes when considering that a No First Use pledge comes packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy\nNFU REQUIRES the threat of indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of millions of innocent civilians\nAnyone who has seen examples of the ghastly Cold War charts estimating civilian war dead, or has read accounts of\nfirebombing of German and Japanese cities should be immediately horrified by the prospect of aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities\nthe much-feared “nuclear winter” that could destroy human civilization is only possible through countervalue targeting, since the cooling is caused by smoke and dust from firestorms in major cities hit by nuclear weapons\nNuclear weapons are the most dangerous devices ever created and should be treated with extreme caution regardless of how exactly you deploy them. This caution\nmust not come in the form of reflexive decisions based on what appears at first glance to be “less aggressive", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: AND the plan would eliminate counterforce targeting, forcing a shift to retaliatory deterrence that targets enemy cities---extinction", "role": "system" }, { "content": "force structure\nincludes the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal\nyield of those weapons, delivery vehicles\ncommunications infrastructure, etc\nsecond aspect of a state’s nuclear strategy is its doctrine\nthe set of rules that determines when and how its nuclear weapons will be used. NFU, if implemented, would be part of the U\nS\nnuclear doctrine that addresses the question of “when\nUnlike NFU, which addresses the question of when nuclear weapons will be used, counterforce and countervalue strategies are elements of doctrine that address how nuclear weapons will be used\nwhat their targets will be. A country with a counterforce strategy plans to use its strategic nuclear weapons against elements of the enemy’s nuclear force structure to prevent them from launching\nCountervalue\ntargets what the enemy country values – primarily its citizens and its economic base\ncountervalue targeting is synonymous with city targeting\nsuch strategies are inherently flawed, and cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional ones\ncountervalue second-strike strategies have major strategic and moral issues that make them essentially useless for major powers\nit involves a threat that isn’t credible against either counterforce strategies or even other countervalue strategies. Countervalue strategies deter by making the enemy believe\nthey will be destroyed if they attack\nunless the targeted country has handed its launch authority over to computers or accidentally allows launches by rogue officers, the attacking country has good reason to believe\nthe targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons\nIf, next Tuesday, the US decided to launch a strike against China’s ~300 nuclear weapons, and was 95% successful, what would the PRC do with its 15 remaining weapons?\nnothing. Once the attacker launches\nthe logic of the countervalue targeting strategy is flipped on its head; why would the Chinese use their small remaining arsenal to retaliate against US cities if the Americans could rain down even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities?\nit never makes sense to use your weapons for their intended purpose, even AFTER you’ve been attacked!\nunder a countervalue targeting scheme, you lose all coercive leverage by actually using your weapons. Countervalue targeting is theoretically effective because the enemy’s cities are “hostages” that you can threaten with destruction if you are attacked. If\nthe Chinese used their 15 remaining weapons to destroy the 10-15 largest American cities, what would stop the Americans from telling China “if you don’t surrender and use your entire economy to rebuild the U\nS\nwe’ll destroy 1 of your cities at random per week until you do”? Nothing\nthe PRC killed its American “hostages”. The Americans now have nothing to lose, and the Chinese everything!\nNFU requires a countervalue strategy, and counterforce strategies work best when they are first-strike\nUnder\nNFU strategy, counterforce nuclear targeting is useless\nthe enemy has already launched the weapons\nyou would be trying to destroy or disable! The only targets remaining are the enemy’s major cities\nEven if the enemy had only launched a relatively limited counterforce strike, it’s very unlikely that they would have left you with the command/control infrastructure or intelligence/surveillance resources to land whatever warheads you still had on their remaining nuclear weapons\ncounterforce targeting\nrequires a first-use strategy\nNFU\nIf paired with the current counterforce policy, we’ll be launching our weapons once it was far too late. If we switched to a countervalue policy, our arsenal will be nearly useless at deterring attack\nFirst strikes obviously escalate crises and create a lot of risk for millions of people\nThe problem\ncomes when considering that a No First Use pledge comes packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy\nNFU REQUIRES the threat of indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of millions of innocent civilians\nAnyone who has seen examples of the ghastly Cold War charts estimating civilian war dead, or has read accounts of\nfirebombing of German and Japanese cities should be immediately horrified by the prospect of aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities\nthe much-feared “nuclear winter” that could destroy human civilization is only possible through countervalue targeting, since the cooling is caused by smoke and dust from firestorms in major cities hit by nuclear weapons\nNuclear weapons are the most dangerous devices ever created and should be treated with extreme caution regardless of how exactly you deploy them. This caution\nmust not come in the form of reflexive decisions based on what appears at first glance to be “less aggressive", "role": "user" }, { "content": "force structure\ndoctrine\nNFU, if implemented\nU\nS\nwhen nuc\ns\nhow\ntargets\nnuc\ns\nprevent\nlaunching\nCountervalue\ncitizens and its economic base\ncity targeting\ncannot prevent nuclear conflicts\nthreat that isn’t credible\nthe targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons\nnothing\neven MORE destruction upon Chinese cities?\nU\nS\nkilled its American “hostages\nNFU requires a countervalue strategy\nfirst-strike\nuseless\nalready launched the weapons\nonly targets remaining\nmajor cities\ncounterforce targeting\nrequires a first-use strategy\nlaunching our weapons once it was far too late\nnearly useless at deterring attack\nN\nF\nU\npackaged with a countervalue targeting strategy\nNFU REQUIRES\nfirebombing of German and Japanese cities\naiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities\nmuch-feared “nuclear winter\ndestroy human civilization\nonly possible through countervalue targeting", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: AND the plan would eliminate counterforce targeting, forcing a shift to retaliatory deterrence that targets enemy cities---extinction\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "force structure\nincludes the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal\nyield of those weapons, delivery vehicles\ncommunications infrastructure, etc\nsecond aspect of a state’s nuclear strategy is its doctrine\nthe set of rules that determines when and how its nuclear weapons will be used. NFU, if implemented, would be part of the U\nS\nnuclear doctrine that addresses the question of “when\nUnlike NFU, which addresses the question of when nuclear weapons will be used, counterforce and countervalue strategies are elements of doctrine that address how nuclear weapons will be used\nwhat their targets will be. A country with a counterforce strategy plans to use its strategic nuclear weapons against elements of the enemy’s nuclear force structure to prevent them from launching\nCountervalue\ntargets what the enemy country values – primarily its citizens and its economic base\ncountervalue targeting is synonymous with city targeting\nsuch strategies are inherently flawed, and cannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional ones\ncountervalue second-strike strategies have major strategic and moral issues that make them essentially useless for major powers\nit involves a threat that isn’t credible against either counterforce strategies or even other countervalue strategies. Countervalue strategies deter by making the enemy believe\nthey will be destroyed if they attack\nunless the targeted country has handed its launch authority over to computers or accidentally allows launches by rogue officers, the attacking country has good reason to believe\nthe targeted country will never launch its nuclear weapons\nIf, next Tuesday, the US decided to launch a strike against China’s ~300 nuclear weapons, and was 95% successful, what would the PRC do with its 15 remaining weapons?\nnothing. Once the attacker launches\nthe logic of the countervalue targeting strategy is flipped on its head; why would the Chinese use their small remaining arsenal to retaliate against US cities if the Americans could rain down even MORE destruction upon Chinese cities?\nit never makes sense to use your weapons for their intended purpose, even AFTER you’ve been attacked!\nunder a countervalue targeting scheme, you lose all coercive leverage by actually using your weapons. Countervalue targeting is theoretically effective because the enemy’s cities are “hostages” that you can threaten with destruction if you are attacked. If\nthe Chinese used their 15 remaining weapons to destroy the 10-15 largest American cities, what would stop the Americans from telling China “if you don’t surrender and use your entire economy to rebuild the U\nS\nwe’ll destroy 1 of your cities at random per week until you do”? Nothing\nthe PRC killed its American “hostages”. The Americans now have nothing to lose, and the Chinese everything!\nNFU requires a countervalue strategy, and counterforce strategies work best when they are first-strike\nUnder\nNFU strategy, counterforce nuclear targeting is useless\nthe enemy has already launched the weapons\nyou would be trying to destroy or disable! The only targets remaining are the enemy’s major cities\nEven if the enemy had only launched a relatively limited counterforce strike, it’s very unlikely that they would have left you with the command/control infrastructure or intelligence/surveillance resources to land whatever warheads you still had on their remaining nuclear weapons\ncounterforce targeting\nrequires a first-use strategy\nNFU\nIf paired with the current counterforce policy, we’ll be launching our weapons once it was far too late. If we switched to a countervalue policy, our arsenal will be nearly useless at deterring attack\nFirst strikes obviously escalate crises and create a lot of risk for millions of people\nThe problem\ncomes when considering that a No First Use pledge comes packaged with a countervalue targeting strategy\nNFU REQUIRES the threat of indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of millions of innocent civilians\nAnyone who has seen examples of the ghastly Cold War charts estimating civilian war dead, or has read accounts of\nfirebombing of German and Japanese cities should be immediately horrified by the prospect of aiming our nuclear weapons at Chinese or Russian cities\nthe much-feared “nuclear winter” that could destroy human civilization is only possible through countervalue targeting, since the cooling is caused by smoke and dust from firestorms in major cities hit by nuclear weapons\nNuclear weapons are the most dangerous devices ever created and should be treated with extreme caution regardless of how exactly you deploy them. This caution\nmust not come in the form of reflexive decisions based on what appears at first glance to be “less aggressive", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NFU\naddresses\nwhen nuc\ns will be used, counterforce and countervalue\naddress how\ncounterforce\nplans to use\nnuc\ns against\nenemy’s nuclear force\nto prevent\nlaunching\nCountervalue\ntargets\ncitizens and\neconomic base\nsynonymous with city targeting\nsuch strategies\ncannot prevent nuclear conflicts (or conventional\nit involves a threat that isn’t credible\nunder\ncountervalue\nyou lose all\nleverage by actually using\nweapons\nNFU requires\ncountervalue\nand counterforce\nwork best when they are first-strike\nUnder\nNFU\ncounterforce\nis useless\nenemy\nalready launched\nweapons\nyou would be trying to destroy\nonly targets remaining are\nmajor cities\nThe problem\nN\nF\nU\ncomes packaged with\ncountervalue\nNFU REQUIRES\nthreat of\nslaughter of hundreds of millions\nnuclear winter” that could destroy\ncivilization is only possible through countervalue\nsince\ncooling is caused by smoke\nin\ncities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unilateral antitrust will be manipulated AND perceived as protectionist---that shatters co-op and is the nail in trade’s coffin---only prior harmonization avoids the link", "role": "system" }, { "content": "VI. CONCLUSION\nThere is a clear \"conflict between the evolving economic and technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing compartmentalization of the world political system composed of sovereign states . . . .\" 196 This conflict can breed protectionist political views. Unless and until there is a complete paradigm shift away from protectionism, which is impossible, the global economy will not meet the \"rational\" assumptions necessary to preserve free market efficiency.\nSome amount of protectionism is inevitable. Although \"inefficient\" in economic and academic circles, protectionism preserves the sovereign powers enjoyed by certain countries. In this way, it is a necessity of free [*146] trade. This paper is not intended to be a commentary on whether protectionism is right or wrong, but rather a demonstration and prediction that antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term.\nWhile attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of the web of international trade agreements currently in existence, individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims, especially given that an international authoritative body governing the use of antitrust does not exist. Countries serious about preserving free trade may cooperate with one another to adopt realistic economic policies that serve to dull the blade of antitrust law through regional agreements, but ought not to attempt to eliminate it altogether.\nAntitrust law, like medicine, must be used appropriately to be effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade, as promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders. In this way, antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade. Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric fueling the current political landscape, antitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade's coffin, instead of the key to its preservation. It may be a nail that nations are able to ignore for the sake of its benefit, or it may be the one that finally puts an end to the pursuit of truly international free trade. Only time will tell, but one thing is clear: anti-trust law is a field that will impact the international economic community significantly for years to come.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "compartmentalization of\nstates\ncan breed protectionist political views. Unless\nthere is a\nparadigm shift\nSome amount of protectionism is inevitable\nantitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term\nindividual countries may\nuse domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims\nantitrust laws\nare\nat risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders\nantitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade\nantitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade's coffin", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Unilateral antitrust will be manipulated AND perceived as protectionist---that shatters co-op and is the nail in trade’s coffin---only prior harmonization avoids the link", "role": "system" }, { "content": "VI. CONCLUSION\nThere is a clear \"conflict between the evolving economic and technical interdependence of the globe and the continuing compartmentalization of the world political system composed of sovereign states . . . .\" 196 This conflict can breed protectionist political views. Unless and until there is a complete paradigm shift away from protectionism, which is impossible, the global economy will not meet the \"rational\" assumptions necessary to preserve free market efficiency.\nSome amount of protectionism is inevitable. Although \"inefficient\" in economic and academic circles, protectionism preserves the sovereign powers enjoyed by certain countries. In this way, it is a necessity of free [*146] trade. This paper is not intended to be a commentary on whether protectionism is right or wrong, but rather a demonstration and prediction that antitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term.\nWhile attempting to act on this protectionism is difficult because of the web of international trade agreements currently in existence, individual countries may still use domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims, especially given that an international authoritative body governing the use of antitrust does not exist. Countries serious about preserving free trade may cooperate with one another to adopt realistic economic policies that serve to dull the blade of antitrust law through regional agreements, but ought not to attempt to eliminate it altogether.\nAntitrust law, like medicine, must be used appropriately to be effective. While antitrust laws generally should encourage free trade, as promoting competition is the aim of their enforcement, they are also at risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders. In this way, antitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade. Absent a change in perceptions and the protectionist rhetoric fueling the current political landscape, antitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade's coffin, instead of the key to its preservation. It may be a nail that nations are able to ignore for the sake of its benefit, or it may be the one that finally puts an end to the pursuit of truly international free trade. Only time will tell, but one thing is clear: anti-trust law is a field that will impact the international economic community significantly for years to come.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "compartmentalization\nprotectionist political views\nUnless\nthere is a\nparadigm shift\nSome amount\ninevitable\ncan\nwill\nwielded\nmeet protectionist aims\nthwart free trade\nexacerbated\nperceptions\nunfair enforcement\ndivisive rhetoric\nweaken the already delicate international cooperative framework\nmanipulated\nserve protectionist viewpoints\nbecome a nail in free trade's coffin", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Unilateral antitrust will be manipulated AND perceived as protectionist---that shatters co-op and is the nail in trade’s coffin---only prior harmonization avoids the link\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "compartmentalization of\nstates\ncan breed protectionist political views. Unless\nthere is a\nparadigm shift\nSome amount of protectionism is inevitable\nantitrust law, a tool of political and economic power, can and will be wielded by individual countries to promote protectionist policies that will affect the international trade landscape in the near term\nindividual countries may\nuse domestic antitrust law to meet protectionist aims\nantitrust laws\nare\nat risk of being used to thwart free trade. That risk is further exacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and the divisive rhetoric of world leaders\nantitrust law has the potential to weaken the already delicate international cooperative framework that exists to foster free trade\nantitrust law is likely to be manipulated to serve protectionist viewpoints, making it increasingly likely to become a nail in free trade's coffin", "role": "user" }, { "content": "compartmentalization\nbreed protectionist\nviews. Unless\nthere is a\nparadigm shift\nantitrust\nwill be wielded\nto\naffect\ntrade\ncountries\nuse\nantitrust\nto meet protectionist aims\nrisk\nto thwart\ntrade\nis\nexacerbated by perceptions of unfair enforcement and\ndivisive rhetoric\nantitrust\nhas\npotential to weaken the\ndelicate\ncooperative framework that exists\nlikely\nmanipulated\nmaking it\na nail in\ntrade's coffin", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Permanent missions to disarmament fora ensure there’s sufficient capital already ready, waiting, and compartmentalized for the plan", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Progress is not only necessary, but it is possible.\nOn June 2, President Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including China France, and the U.K., “without preconditions.”\nSullivan was critical of Russia's suspension of New START but also noted that “Russia has publicly committed to adhere to the treaty’s central limits.”\nHe said: “It is in neither [U.S. or Russian] interests to embark on an open-ended competition in strategic nuclear forces,” and the United States is “prepared to stick to the central limits as long as Russia does.\"\nWith New START due to expire in 2026, Sullivan suggested that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.” Given the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons, we agree that nuclear disarmament diplomacy must be “compartmentalized” and not held hostage to demands on other matters.\nOn June 5, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russia remains open to dialogue with the United States on arms control. He described Sullivan’s comments as “important and positive,” but said Russia wants to learn more about the proposal through formal diplomatic channels. To date, however, the two sides have not agreed to engage in such a dialogue. \nNow is the time for the two sides to begin a serious dialogue focused on a new arms control and disarmament framework before 2026, when New START will expire and when the next NPT Review Conference will be held.\nThe negotiation of a complex, bilateral nuclear arms control framework to replace New START would be difficult in good times and extraordinarily difficult so long as Russia's war on Ukraine continues.\nNevertheless, there is scope for the White House and the Kremlin to reach a unilateral, reciprocal arrangement that neither will exceed the deployed strategic warhead limit set by New START until a more permanent arms control arrangement comes into effect. This would contribute to a more stable international security environment and improve conditions for overdue progress on multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament.\nIn the absence of such a U.S.-Russian arrangement before New START ends, each side could upload more warheads on their strategic delivery systems quickly, and China might decide to accelerate its ongoing strategic nuclear buildup. Avoiding such a scenario is in the national security interests of all nations.\nSullivan also said that U.S. President Joe Biden supports “new multilateral arms control efforts,” involving all five nuclear-armed members of the NPT. “We’re under no illusions that reaching risk reduction and arms control measures in that setting will be easy. But we do believe it is possible,” he said. Sullivan proposed that all five states agree on greater transparency on nuclear doctrines, more effective crisis communications channels, common rules for missile launch notification, and policies to keep “humans in the loop” for command, control, and use of nuclear weapons.\nWe believe that all five can and should immediately reaffirm and update the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which pledges they will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.” It requires that “if at any time there is the risk of a nuclear conflict [each side] shall immediately enter into urgent consultations…to avert this risk.”\nSo far, the P5 Process has been positive, but it has underperformed. If it is to make a serious contribution to the implementation of the NPT, all five participants must elevate their commitment to the dialogue and be prepared to take on significant commitments and refrain from making any and all kinds of threats of nuclear weapons use for any reason.\nNuclear risk reduction strategies are fundamental but they are not a substitute for progress on arms control and disarmament. Risk reduction measures cannot erase the tensions that can lead to nuclear war, they cannot remove the inherent dangers of nuclear deterrence policies, nor can they prevent dangerous forms of qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms racing. \nNow is the time for leaders of non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society groups to demand that all five NPT nuclear-armed states engage in good faith efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in keeping with their solemn NPT Article VI obligations.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Progress is not only necessary, but it is possible\nBiden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with\nother nuclear-armed members of the\nNPT), including China\nSullivan suggested that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the U\nS\nis ready to engage\nnow\nwe agree that nuclear disarmament diplomacy must be “compartmentalized” and not held hostage to demands on other matters\nNow is the time\nto begin a serious dialogue focused on a new arms control and disarmament framework\nthere is scope for the White House\nBiden supports “new multilateral arms control efforts,” involving all five nuclear-armed members of the NPT\nSo far, the P5 Process has been positive, but it has underperformed. If it is to make a serious contribution to the implementation of the NPT, all five participants must elevate their commitment to the dialogue and be prepared to take on significant commitments\nNuclear risk reduction strategies are fundamental but they are not a substitute for progress on arms control and disarmament", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Permanent missions to disarmament fora ensure there’s sufficient capital already ready, waiting, and compartmentalized for the plan\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Progress is not only necessary, but it is possible.\nOn June 2, President Biden's National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including China France, and the U.K., “without preconditions.”\nSullivan was critical of Russia's suspension of New START but also noted that “Russia has publicly committed to adhere to the treaty’s central limits.”\nHe said: “It is in neither [U.S. or Russian] interests to embark on an open-ended competition in strategic nuclear forces,” and the United States is “prepared to stick to the central limits as long as Russia does.\"\nWith New START due to expire in 2026, Sullivan suggested that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework.” Given the existential risks posed by nuclear weapons, we agree that nuclear disarmament diplomacy must be “compartmentalized” and not held hostage to demands on other matters.\nOn June 5, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Russia remains open to dialogue with the United States on arms control. He described Sullivan’s comments as “important and positive,” but said Russia wants to learn more about the proposal through formal diplomatic channels. To date, however, the two sides have not agreed to engage in such a dialogue. \nNow is the time for the two sides to begin a serious dialogue focused on a new arms control and disarmament framework before 2026, when New START will expire and when the next NPT Review Conference will be held.\nThe negotiation of a complex, bilateral nuclear arms control framework to replace New START would be difficult in good times and extraordinarily difficult so long as Russia's war on Ukraine continues.\nNevertheless, there is scope for the White House and the Kremlin to reach a unilateral, reciprocal arrangement that neither will exceed the deployed strategic warhead limit set by New START until a more permanent arms control arrangement comes into effect. This would contribute to a more stable international security environment and improve conditions for overdue progress on multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament.\nIn the absence of such a U.S.-Russian arrangement before New START ends, each side could upload more warheads on their strategic delivery systems quickly, and China might decide to accelerate its ongoing strategic nuclear buildup. Avoiding such a scenario is in the national security interests of all nations.\nSullivan also said that U.S. President Joe Biden supports “new multilateral arms control efforts,” involving all five nuclear-armed members of the NPT. “We’re under no illusions that reaching risk reduction and arms control measures in that setting will be easy. But we do believe it is possible,” he said. Sullivan proposed that all five states agree on greater transparency on nuclear doctrines, more effective crisis communications channels, common rules for missile launch notification, and policies to keep “humans in the loop” for command, control, and use of nuclear weapons.\nWe believe that all five can and should immediately reaffirm and update the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which pledges they will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.” It requires that “if at any time there is the risk of a nuclear conflict [each side] shall immediately enter into urgent consultations…to avert this risk.”\nSo far, the P5 Process has been positive, but it has underperformed. If it is to make a serious contribution to the implementation of the NPT, all five participants must elevate their commitment to the dialogue and be prepared to take on significant commitments and refrain from making any and all kinds of threats of nuclear weapons use for any reason.\nNuclear risk reduction strategies are fundamental but they are not a substitute for progress on arms control and disarmament. Risk reduction measures cannot erase the tensions that can lead to nuclear war, they cannot remove the inherent dangers of nuclear deterrence policies, nor can they prevent dangerous forms of qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms racing. \nNow is the time for leaders of non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society groups to demand that all five NPT nuclear-armed states engage in good faith efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in keeping with their solemn NPT Article VI obligations.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nis ready to engage in\ndiplomacy with\nNPT\nincluding China\nnuclear disarm\ndiplomacy\n“compartmentalized” and not\nhostage to\nother matters\nBiden supports “new multilat\narms control efforts", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Filing data proves.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Concerns about increased government liability were in the air during the 1970s and 1980s. During that period, the \"dominant articulated perception of constitutional tort litigation\" was that § 1983 \"cases flood the federal courts.\" The Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action against state and local government officials under § 1983 in 1961, and the number of civil rights filings increased from several hundred to tens of thousands in the years between 1961 and 1979. This expansion in federal civil rights filings and liability corresponded with a collapse of the insurance market for municipal liability coverage. As John Rappaport has described, municipal liability insurance was widely available from the 1960s to the mid-1970s. Then the market contracted, with [*323] premiums doubling between 1974 and 1976, and many jurisdictions were left uninsured by 1977. After a few years of improvement, there was another decline in the early 1980s.\n[FOOTNOTE] Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 645 (1987); see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (\"There is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being appended to complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions where 'civil rights' of any kind are at best an afterthought.\"); Federalism and the Federal Judiciary: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 5-13 (1984) (statement of John D. Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of Missouri) (explaining that § 1983 filings against police officers \"skyrocket[ed]\" from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, growing \"in the thousands of percentage increase[s]\"); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & SOC. ORD. 557, 563, 567 (arguing that the \"deluge\" of § 1983 cases from 1960 to 1971 and the Court's decisions that \"substantially expand[ed] section 1983's subject matter jurisdiction\" have \"placed additional burdens on federal courts\"). Note, however, that Eisenberg and Schwab, after examining the evidence, concluded that \"[n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent civil rights litigation explosion.\" Eisenberg & Schwab, supra, at 695. [END FOOTNOTE]", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the \"dominant articulated perception of constitutional tort litigation\" was that\n\"cases flood the federal courts.\"\nNote, however, that Eisenberg and Schwab, after examining the evidence, concluded that \"[n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent civil rights litigation explosion", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Filing data proves.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the \"dominant articulated perception of constitutional tort litigation\" was that\n\"cases flood the federal courts.\"\nNote, however, that Eisenberg and Schwab, after examining the evidence, concluded that \"[n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent civil rights litigation explosion", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the \"dominant\nperception\nwas that\n\"cases flood the\ncourts.\"\nhowever\nEisenberg and Schwab, after examining\nevidence, concluded\n\"[n]ational filing data refute the myth of a recent\nlitigation explosion", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Warming causes extinction—US is key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nImagine that US leaders were told that hundreds of nuclear weapons were set on a timer to detonate across the planet, progressively and in increasing numbers, over the coming years and decades. The lives of millions would be upended, if not made nearly impossible to survive, by transformed weather patterns and resource scarcity. Tens of millions would become migrants as regions became uninhabitable. Millions would die, more and more as time went on. If this science fiction were reality, US leaders would lead an international effort to immediately disarm and dismantle the weapons.\nBut this isn’t science fiction. Climate change is a ticking time bomb, literally threatening to end human life on earth over the coming centuries. As climate journalist Peter Brannen describes it, Earth faced a similar crisis hundreds of millions of years ago during the “Great Dying” when volcanoes spewed so much carbon dioxide into the air – including magma that blanketed an area as large as the lower 48 US states, 1km deep – that it almost killed all life. Today, Brannen says, “we’re shooting carbon dioxide up into the atmosphere 10 times faster than the ancient volcanoes”.\nEven in the shorter term, climate change will make the world far more dangerous. A World Bank Group report estimates that climate change could drive 140 million people to move within their countries’ borders by 2050. A report by the Trump administration finds climate change could reduce the size of the US economy by 10% – more than twice as bad as the worst part of the Great Recession – by 2100. Growing resource scarcity could cause more wars. Deadly and destructive extreme weather events such as Hurricanes Harvey and Maria and California’s Camp fire are mild symptoms of the plague to come.\nThere is no greater national security threat than climate change. Even the specter of nuclear war between great powers – the only thing that could remotely mimic the effects of climate change over time – is a much lower risk than climate change, which is already happening.\nEvery year we fail to act the problem grows, and the solution becomes more difficult. As America dithers, climate change is sparking a slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust. If the world fails to urgently mitigate climate change, no other challenge – not the rise of China, Russian aggression, terrorism, nor some other future geopolitical peril – will matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause of these threats or suffer from them.\nAmerica’s failure is not for lack of capacity to safeguard against future threats – the US invests hundreds of billions of dollars every year in defense to deter adversaries such as Russia and China, and tens of billions more in intelligence capabilities to monitor threats. Instead, America is paralyzed by a lack of political will. Donald Trump and his allies in Congress – many of whom deny the existence of climate change – are making the problem worse. The president announced his intent to withdraw the US from the Paris climate agreement and is rolling back regulations that would have cut emissions.\nDespite this dark reality, there is reason for hope. In 2015, the world came together to negotiate the Paris agreement, which set the goal of limiting global temperature increases to well below 2C. Despite a hostile Trump administration, many US governors, mayors, businesses and private citizens are already leading the way. So are other countries as they seize the economic and public health opportunity that comes with a clean energy future.\nThe path ahead, to say the least, is daunting. Even if the US were not to leave the Paris climate agreement, the action required to realize its potential is enormous. US policymakers will need to use every policy tool in their toolbox to drive unprecedented deployment of clean energy and build out zero-carbon transportation infrastructure. When the US leads by example, domestic emissions will fall, and new diplomatic doors to more ambitious climate action will open.\n\n\nPIC—", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Imagine that US leaders were told that hundreds of nuclear weapons were set on a timer to detonate across the planet\nThe lives of millions would be upended, if not made\n impossible to survive, by transformed weather patterns and resource scarcity. Tens of millions would become migrants as regions became uninhabitable. Millions would die, more and more as time went on.\nClimate change is a ticking time bomb, literally threatening to end human life on earth\nin the shorter term, climate change will make the world far more dangerous.\nreport estimates that climate change could drive 140 million people to move\nclimate change could reduce the size of the US economy by 10% – more than twice as bad as the worst part of the Great Recession\nGrowing resource scarcity could cause more wars.\nThere is no greater national security threat than climate change. Even the specter of nuclear war between great powers\nis a much lower risk than climate change\nEvery year we fail to act the problem grows, and the solution becomes more difficult.\nclimate change is sparking a slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust.\nno other challenge – not the rise of China, Russian aggression, terrorism, nor some other future geopolitical peril – will matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause\nor suffer from them\nUS policymakers will need to use every policy tool in their toolbox\nWhen the US leads by example, domestic emissions will fall, and new diplomatic doors to more ambitious climate action will open", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Warming causes extinction—US is key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Imagine that US leaders were told that hundreds of nuclear weapons were set on a timer to detonate across the planet\nThe lives of millions would be upended, if not made\n impossible to survive, by transformed weather patterns and resource scarcity. Tens of millions would become migrants as regions became uninhabitable. Millions would die, more and more as time went on.\nClimate change is a ticking time bomb, literally threatening to end human life on earth\nin the shorter term, climate change will make the world far more dangerous.\nreport estimates that climate change could drive 140 million people to move\nclimate change could reduce the size of the US economy by 10% – more than twice as bad as the worst part of the Great Recession\nGrowing resource scarcity could cause more wars.\nThere is no greater national security threat than climate change. Even the specter of nuclear war between great powers\nis a much lower risk than climate change\nEvery year we fail to act the problem grows, and the solution becomes more difficult.\nclimate change is sparking a slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust.\nno other challenge – not the rise of China, Russian aggression, terrorism, nor some other future geopolitical peril – will matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause\nor suffer from them\nUS policymakers will need to use every policy tool in their toolbox\nWhen the US leads by example, domestic emissions will fall, and new diplomatic doors to more ambitious climate action will open", "role": "user" }, { "content": "hundreds of nuclear weapons\ndetonate\nmillions\nupended\nimpossible to survive\ntransformed weather patterns\nresource scarcity\nTens of millions\nmigrants\nuninhabitable\nMillions would die\nmore\nmore\nClimate change\nthreaten\nto end human life on earth\nshort\nterm\ndangerous\n140 million people\nmove\nUS econ\n10%\ntwice as bad\nGreat Recession\nresource scarcity\nmore wars\nThere is no greater national security threat than climate change\nspecter of nuclear war\nmuch lower risk\nfail to act\nproblem grows\nsolution\nmore difficult\nslow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust\nrise of China\nRussian aggression\nterrorism\nfuture geopolitical peril\nhumans won’t survive\ncause\nsuffer\npolicymakers\nevery policy tool\nleads by example\ndomestic emissions will fall\nnew diplomatic doors\nmore ambitious", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Warming causes extinction—US is key.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Imagine that US leaders were told that hundreds of nuclear weapons were set on a timer to detonate across the planet\nThe lives of millions would be upended, if not made\n impossible to survive, by transformed weather patterns and resource scarcity. Tens of millions would become migrants as regions became uninhabitable. Millions would die, more and more as time went on.\nClimate change is a ticking time bomb, literally threatening to end human life on earth\nin the shorter term, climate change will make the world far more dangerous.\nreport estimates that climate change could drive 140 million people to move\nclimate change could reduce the size of the US economy by 10% – more than twice as bad as the worst part of the Great Recession\nGrowing resource scarcity could cause more wars.\nThere is no greater national security threat than climate change. Even the specter of nuclear war between great powers\nis a much lower risk than climate change\nEvery year we fail to act the problem grows, and the solution becomes more difficult.\nclimate change is sparking a slow-motion nuclear-scale holocaust.\nno other challenge – not the rise of China, Russian aggression, terrorism, nor some other future geopolitical peril – will matter because humans won’t survive to be the cause\nor suffer from them\nUS policymakers will need to use every policy tool in their toolbox\nWhen the US leads by example, domestic emissions will fall, and new diplomatic doors to more ambitious climate action will open", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Climate change\nthreaten\nto end\nlife on earth\nshort\nterm\nclimate change\nmake the world\ndangerous\nresource scarcity\ncause\nwars\nnuclear war\nis\nlower risk\nno other challenge\nmatter because humans won’t survive to be the cause\npolicymakers\nneed\nevery policy tool\nWhen the US leads by example\nemissions\nfall\nand\ndiplomatic doors\nopen", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Failure spills over to great power conflict.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Civil-military relationships are not an end in themselves. These relationships exist only to provide effective national security policies in a given geopolitical environment in the context of democratic accountability. Unfortunately, the environment is not benign. As they sort through the civil-military and institutional baggage — the items they bring with them and the items they inherit — Biden’s team must also navigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on all of the other stubborn problems that have bedeviled leaders in the post-Cold War era, including: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational networks of terrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And, of course, Biden must still lead the country out of the worst pandemic in a century while recovering from all of the associated economic upheaval. There will be no strategic holiday during which the Biden team can painstakingly sort through its civil-military affairs.\nThe new commander-in-chief starts with the enormous advantage of being “not Trump.” He will need all of that advantage — and will need to have learned from Obama-era missteps — in order to navigate through the tricky civil-military waters we have described above. Members of the Biden team come in as seasoned professionals, but we hope that leads them to caution and humility rather than unwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If Lloyd Austin wins over the critics and proves himself to be both fully sensitive to these civil-military realities and savvy in how he seeks to overcome them, he may yet emerge as the successful and strong secretary of defense the Department of Defense so desperately needs. The early slate of civilian nominees named for key roles is a welcome sign. The initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone, especially after the tumultuous and stressful transition. Even so, the norm of civilian management of the Defense Department will be more difficult to reestablish, like so many other civil-military norms that have weakened in recent years, if Congress does grant another recently-retired general legal permission to serve as secretary of defense. Biden, and Austin, will need all the top civilian defense talent they can get.\nNotwithstanding all of the other urgent priorities vying for his attention, neglect of the civil-military file would likely impose intolerable costs on Biden down the road — a price that would be vividly evident, sooner or later, when an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is for the Biden team to attend to both policy and process at the same time — to move out quickly on the pandemic and the economy, while also setting the national security establishment on the path to healthier civil-military relations. Problems in the civil-military foundations of an administration must be fixed before a crisis lays bare the rot that may lie just out of view.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "C\nm\nr\nexist\nto provide effective national security policies in a\ngeopolitical environment\nUnfortunately, the environment is not benign\nBiden\nmust\nnavigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on\nstubborn problems\nincluding:\nprolif\nof w\nm\nd\nterrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And\nBiden must\nlead the country out of the\npandemic\nThere will be no strategic holiday during which the\nteam can\nsort through its civil-military affairs\nHe will need all of that advantage — and\nlearn\nfrom Obama-era missteps\nto navigate through\ntricky civil-military waters\ncaution and humility rather\nunwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If\nAustin\nproves\nfully sensitive to\nc\nm\nr\nand savvy\nhe may\nemerge as the successful\nsec\ndef\nthe D\no\nD\nso desperately needs. The early slate\nis\nwelcome\nThe initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone\nneglect of the civil-military file would\nimpose intolerable costs\ndown the road — a price that would be vividly evident\nwhen an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is\nto attend to\npolicy and process at the same time", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Failure spills over to great power conflict.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "C\nm\nr\nexist\nto provide effective national security policies in a\ngeopolitical environment\nUnfortunately, the environment is not benign\nBiden\nmust\nnavigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on\nstubborn problems\nincluding:\nprolif\nof w\nm\nd\nterrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And\nBiden must\nlead the country out of the\npandemic\nThere will be no strategic holiday during which the\nteam can\nsort through its civil-military affairs\nHe will need all of that advantage — and\nlearn\nfrom Obama-era missteps\nto navigate through\ntricky civil-military waters\ncaution and humility rather\nunwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If\nAustin\nproves\nfully sensitive to\nc\nm\nr\nand savvy\nhe may\nemerge as the successful\nsec\ndef\nthe D\no\nD\nso desperately needs. The early slate\nis\nwelcome\nThe initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone\nneglect of the civil-military file would\nimpose intolerable costs\ndown the road — a price that would be vividly evident\nwhen an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is\nto attend to\npolicy and process at the same time", "role": "user" }, { "content": "C\nm\nr\ngeopolitical environment\nnot benign\nBiden\ngreat-power conflict\ninstability in the broader Middle East\nprolif\nw\nm\nd\nterrorism\nfailed states\nethnic rivalries\npandemic\nno strategic holiday\nlearn\nmissteps\nnavigate through\ntricky civil-military waters\nc\nm\nr\nsavvy\nsuccessful\nsec\ndef\nD\no\nD\nwelcome\ninitial weeks\nparticular importance\nsetting the tone\nintolerable costs\nprice\nvividly evident\na\nurgent national security crisis\npolicy\nprocess\nsame time", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Failure spills over to great power conflict.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "C\nm\nr\nexist\nto provide effective national security policies in a\ngeopolitical environment\nUnfortunately, the environment is not benign\nBiden\nmust\nnavigate intensified great-power conflict, persistent instability in the broader Middle East, strained ties with key allies, and little progress on\nstubborn problems\nincluding:\nprolif\nof w\nm\nd\nterrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries. And\nBiden must\nlead the country out of the\npandemic\nThere will be no strategic holiday during which the\nteam can\nsort through its civil-military affairs\nHe will need all of that advantage — and\nlearn\nfrom Obama-era missteps\nto navigate through\ntricky civil-military waters\ncaution and humility rather\nunwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If\nAustin\nproves\nfully sensitive to\nc\nm\nr\nand savvy\nhe may\nemerge as the successful\nsec\ndef\nthe D\no\nD\nso desperately needs. The early slate\nis\nwelcome\nThe initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone\nneglect of the civil-military file would\nimpose intolerable costs\ndown the road — a price that would be vividly evident\nwhen an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is\nto attend to\npolicy and process at the same time", "role": "user" }, { "content": "geopolitical environment\nis not benign\nmust\nnavigate\ngreat-power conflict\ninstability in the\nMiddle East\nprolif\nterrorism, failed states, and ethnic rivalries\nHe will\nnavigate\ntricky\nwaters\nearly slate\nis\nwelcome\ninitial weeks\nwill be of particular importance\nsetting the tone\nneglect\nimpose\ncosts\nevident\nwhen a\ncrisis takes\nstage", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “The USFG should” calls for debates over government action.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. \n4 Impacts:", "role": "user" }, { "content": "each topic contains certain key elements\n. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should\nthe agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should\nthat urges action\nFor example, should adopt\nmeans to put a\npolicy into action though governmental means\nPropositions of policy deal with future action.\nThe entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: “The USFG should” calls for debates over government action.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "each topic contains certain key elements\n. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should\nthe agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should\nthat urges action\nFor example, should adopt\nmeans to put a\npolicy into action though governmental means\nPropositions of policy deal with future action.\nThe entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "in “The United States should\nthe agent is the subject\nThe verb should\nurges action\nshould\nmeans to put a\npolicy into action though governmental means\nThe entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Resonant foreign policy criticism causes vote-switching in battleground states", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Four years ago, when American voters last faced a decision about who should be their President, defense and national security issues were far from the forefront of their minds. Instead, the 2020 Presidential Election contest was fought amidst a public health crisis and an economic crisis\nIn 2024, the context in which the current election is being fought is very different. While the world still wrestles with the economic fallout from the pandemic, the global security situation has deteriorated appreciably. \nRussia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked the biggest land war in Europe since World War II, the Middle East is once again ablaze in conflict, and Taiwan continues to be menaced by the threat of invasion from an increasingly belligerent China. America’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, meanwhile, invited questions about America’s willingness and ability to meet its commitments to its allies, questions which remain unresolved.\nAs a result, national security, the condition of America’s armed forces, and the role America should play in the world will all feature far more prominently in the coming election campaign than they did in 2020.\nTo see how Americans view these, and other, national security and defense-related issues, we at Redfield & Wilton Strategies, in partnership with The Telegraph, recently polled 5,010 voters in the crucial swing states of Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.\nFor a start, our poll finds that between 39% and 48% of voters in these six states say defense will be an ‘extremely’ important issue in determining how they will vote in the next Presidential Election. \nWhen responses for all issues are averaged for the number of respondents in all six states who rate the issue as ‘extremely’ important, that places defense eighth out of nineteen issues listed, behind the likes of abortion (44%-50%), taxation (38%-49%), and policing/crime (39%-50%), but ahead of issues such as the job market (37%-48%), the Supreme Court (37%-43%), and the housing market (38%-41%).\nThe Biden Administration earns net approval ratings for its performance on defense from as low as -16% in Arizona to as high as a neutral 0% in Florida. \nThis range in approval ratings is higher than the range in the Administrations’ ratings on issues such as foreign policy (-20% to -4%) and immigration (-27% to -16%), but lower than its ratings on issues like the economy (-9% to +1%) and healthcare (+1% to +10%).\nWhen asked who between Joe Biden and Donald Trump they trust more on defense, pluralities in all six states polled select Donald Trump. Between 42% and 49% select Trump, while only between 31% and 35% select Biden, suggesting a lead on this issue that is larger than Trump’s overall voting intention lead.\nWhile the Republican Party also leads the Democratic Party in all six states when voters are asked which party voters trust more on national security and defense, the gap is narrower than is the case between the two party’s figureheads.\nBetween 40% and 45% most trust the Republican Party on national security and defense, against between 34% and 38% who most trust the Democratic Party.\nRegarding spending on the armed forces, most swing state voters would prefer the US Government to increase defense spending, even at the cost of reducing spending elsewhere.\nBetween 48% and 56% would prefer the US to increase spending on the armed forces, at the cost of less spending on other programs. Conversely, between 25% to 30% would instead prefer the US to decrease spending on the armed forces, to the benefit of more spending on other programs.\nDonald Trump’s 2020 voters are particularly more likely to prefer increased defense spending.\nPluralities of respondents in every swing state polled name China as the country which represents the greatest threat to the United States and its interests, with Russia the second most common choice. \nNotably, among 2020 Biden voters in all six swing states, Russia is the most common choice, though to a lesser extent to which China is the most common choice among 2020 Trump voters.\nWhen it comes to identifying America’s closest ally, the United Kingdom is named by a majority of voters in Arizona (55%) and by pluralities in Florida (46%), Georgia (37%), North Carolina (46%), and Pennsylvania (46%).\nCanada is the most frequent choice for voters in Michigan (44%) and is the second choice of voters in the other five states. Germany (16%-28%), France (17%-21%) and Israel (13%-20%) are also common choices.\nMajorities in all six states believe the United States should seek to be a global force for good, while around a third (32%-36%) think the United States should only seek to defend itself from direct threats. \nWhile the view that the US should seek to be a global force for good is overwhelmingly held by Biden 2020 voters (57%-68%), it is also a view shared by a majority or plurality of Trump 2020 votes in five of the six states polled.\nSwing state voters express overwhelming support for America’s continued membership of NATO, with support ranging from between 68% (Georgia) and 73% (North Carolina).\nFewer than 10% of voters in all six states polled oppose the United States being a member of the alliance.\nAround two-thirds (61%-67%) of voters believe the United States should stay in NATO, while only between 12% and 16% think it should leave the alliance.\nSince 2014, NATO members have agreed to commit 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense spending. This target was reaffirmed by alliance members in 2023.\nPluralities of voters in all six swing states believe the 2% target is ‘about right.’ Between a fifth and a quarter (21%-24%) think that target is too low, while 8%-14% think that it is too high.\nIn the wake of Donald Trump’s recent comments suggesting that he would not defend a NATO member state that did not meet its 2% commitment to defense spending, most swing state voters believe the US should be committed to NATO allies defense regardless of their defense spending. \nMajorities of voters in Florida (52%), Pennsylvania (51%), and Georgia (50%) think the US should be committed to the defense of NATO allies regardless of whether they have met the 2% target. Pluralities of voters in Arizona (46%), Michigan (48%), and North Carolina (48%) also agree with this position.\nConversely, around one-third (29%-36%) believe the US should not be committed to the defense of NATO allies who haven’t met the 2% target. This view is disproportionately held by Trump 2020 voters, including by a majority of Trump voters in Arizona (52%) and pluralities in Michigan (39%), North Carolina (44%), and Pennsylvania (43%).\nHowever, there is general agreement with the proposition that Europe is too reliant on the United States for its military defense.\nMajorities of voters in Arizona (51%) and Pennsylvania (50%) hold this view, as do pluralities in the other four states polled. Majorities of Trump 2020 voters in all six states agree, as do pluralities of Biden 2020 voters in five of the six states. Only between 11% and 18% disagree.\nIn response to the Houthi’s campaign to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, the US and her allies are currently waging a campaign of airstrikes against the group in Yemen, a campaign which attracts the support of between 53% and 58% of respondents, depending on the state.\nMore broadly, overwhelmingly majorities (68%-74%) believe the United States should be engaged in armed missions far from the United States to help preserve freedom of navigation at sea, a position which the United States has used to justify naval operations in the Taiwan strait.\nTaken together, these results point to an American electorate which is not as polarized on defense matters as some commentary may suggest nor as isolationist. \nSupport for the US acting as a global force for good is overwhelming, as is support for continued membership of NATO. In the global context of an increasingly troubled international situation, most voters also support increases in defense spending, even at a cost to other government programs.\nThis nuance is critical to understand ahead of an election campaign in which the candidates’ respective policy proposals on national security and defense matters will receive far greater scrutiny and be of far more significance than was the case four years ago. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Four years ago\nnational security issues were far from the forefront\n2020\nwas\npublic health\nand\neconomic\nIn 2024\nthe context\nis\nvery different\nthe global security situation has deteriorated appreciably\nRussia\nMiddle East\nTaiwan\nnational security\nand the role America should play in the world will\nfeature\nprominently in the coming election campaign\nin\ncrucial swing states\n48% of voters\nsay defense will be an ‘extremely’ important issue in determining how they will vote in the next Presidential Election\nswing state voters\nprefer the US to increase spending on the armed forces\nrespondents in every swing state polled name China as\nthreat\nMajorities in all six states believe the United States should\nbe a global force\nSwing state voters express\nsupport for\nNATO\noverwhelmingly majorities\nbelieve the United States should be engaged in armed missions far from the U\nS\nthese results point to an American electorate which is not as polarized on defense matters as some\nsuggest nor as isolationist\nSupport for the US acting as a global force for good is overwhelming\nvoters\nsupport increases in defense spending\nThis nuance is critical\nahead of an election campaign in which\npolicy\non national security and\nwill receive far greater scrutiny and be of far more significance than was the case four years ago", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Resonant foreign policy criticism causes vote-switching in battleground states", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Four years ago\nnational security issues were far from the forefront\n2020\nwas\npublic health\nand\neconomic\nIn 2024\nthe context\nis\nvery different\nthe global security situation has deteriorated appreciably\nRussia\nMiddle East\nTaiwan\nnational security\nand the role America should play in the world will\nfeature\nprominently in the coming election campaign\nin\ncrucial swing states\n48% of voters\nsay defense will be an ‘extremely’ important issue in determining how they will vote in the next Presidential Election\nswing state voters\nprefer the US to increase spending on the armed forces\nrespondents in every swing state polled name China as\nthreat\nMajorities in all six states believe the United States should\nbe a global force\nSwing state voters express\nsupport for\nNATO\noverwhelmingly majorities\nbelieve the United States should be engaged in armed missions far from the U\nS\nthese results point to an American electorate which is not as polarized on defense matters as some\nsuggest nor as isolationist\nSupport for the US acting as a global force for good is overwhelming\nvoters\nsupport increases in defense spending\nThis nuance is critical\nahead of an election campaign in which\npolicy\non national security and\nwill receive far greater scrutiny and be of far more significance than was the case four years ago", "role": "user" }, { "content": "20\nhealth\necon\n24\nvery different\nRussia\nMiddle East\nTaiwan\nfeature\nprominently\nelection campaign\ncrucial swing\n48%\nextremely\nimportant\ndetermining\nvote\nswing state voters\nincrease spending\nChina\nthreat\nall six\nU\nS\nglobal force\nNATO\noverwhelmingly majorities\nU\nS\nengage\narmed missions\nU\nS\nnor as isolationist\noverwhelming\npolicy\nnational security\nreceive far greater scrutiny\nmore significance\nfour years ago", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Resonant foreign policy criticism causes vote-switching in battleground states\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Four years ago\nnational security issues were far from the forefront\n2020\nwas\npublic health\nand\neconomic\nIn 2024\nthe context\nis\nvery different\nthe global security situation has deteriorated appreciably\nRussia\nMiddle East\nTaiwan\nnational security\nand the role America should play in the world will\nfeature\nprominently in the coming election campaign\nin\ncrucial swing states\n48% of voters\nsay defense will be an ‘extremely’ important issue in determining how they will vote in the next Presidential Election\nswing state voters\nprefer the US to increase spending on the armed forces\nrespondents in every swing state polled name China as\nthreat\nMajorities in all six states believe the United States should\nbe a global force\nSwing state voters express\nsupport for\nNATO\noverwhelmingly majorities\nbelieve the United States should be engaged in armed missions far from the U\nS\nthese results point to an American electorate which is not as polarized on defense matters as some\nsuggest nor as isolationist\nSupport for the US acting as a global force for good is overwhelming\nvoters\nsupport increases in defense spending\nThis nuance is critical\nahead of an election campaign in which\npolicy\non national security and\nwill receive far greater scrutiny and be of far more significance than was the case four years ago", "role": "user" }, { "content": "20\nwas\nhealth\nand\necon\n24\nis\ndifferent\nnational security\nand the role America should play\nwill\nfeature\nprominently in the coming election\nin\ncrucial swing states\n48% of voters\nsay defense will be\nextremely\nimportant\nin determining how they\nvote\nswing state voters\nprefer\nincrease spending on\narmed forces\nrespondents in every swing state polled name China as\nthreat\nMajorities\nbelieve the U\nS\nshould\nbe a global force\noverwhelmingly majorities\nbelieve the U\nS\nshould\nengage\nin armed missions far from the U\nS\nSupport\nis overwhelming\npolicy\non national security\nwill receive\ngreat\nscrutiny and be of far more significance than\nfour years ago", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Democrats are in agreement on the need for quick reform.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Oil and gas companies have spent years pushing for legislation to revise permitting laws they say are delaying needed energy infrastructure, without success. But pent up bipartisan demand for faster permitting and the makeup of Congress have given top industry officials optimism for legislative action on permitting in 2023.\n\"It won't be easy, but divided government gives us a real chance to build consensus around meaningful reform,\" American Petroleum Institute president Mike Sommers said today at his group's annual State of American Energy event.\nPipelines, energy projects on public land, LNG export facilities, electric transmission lines and other energy projects often have to navigate a labyrinth of time-consuming permitting requirements. For larger projects, permitting can take years, particularly if there are challenges from residents and environmentalists.\nDemocrats led by US senator Joe Manchin (D-West Virginia) last year made some progress on permitting through a bill that focused on electric transmission lines for renewables and approving the delayed $6.6bn Mountain Valley natural gas pipeline. Although the bill was thwarted by a lack of Republican support, oil industry officials see the support by Democrats — including President Joe Biden — as a promising sign for permitting advancing this year.\nRepublicans intend to advance their own permitting bill out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which is chaired by Cathy McMorris Rogers (D-Washington). Rogers said although she had concerns with Manchin's bill, including its handling of local input on electric transmission, she applauded the recognition by Democrats of the need for permitting legislation.\n\"There is a bipartisan recognition and now we'll go to work on the details to actually get permitting reform done,\" Rogers said at the industry event.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "divided government gives us a real chance to build consensus around meaningful reform,\nDemocrats led by\nManchin\nmade some progress on permitting\nthe bill was thwarted by a lack of Republican support\n officials see the support by Democrats\nincluding\nBiden\nas a promising sign for permitting advancing this year.\nRepublicans intend to advance their own permitting bill out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee\nRogers said although she had concerns\nshe applauded the recognition by Democrats of the need for permitting legislation.\nThere is a bipartisan recognition and now we'll go to work on the details to actually get permitting reform done,\"", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Democrats are in agreement on the need for quick reform.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "divided government gives us a real chance to build consensus around meaningful reform,\nDemocrats led by\nManchin\nmade some progress on permitting\nthe bill was thwarted by a lack of Republican support\n officials see the support by Democrats\nincluding\nBiden\nas a promising sign for permitting advancing this year.\nRepublicans intend to advance their own permitting bill out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee\nRogers said although she had concerns\nshe applauded the recognition by Democrats of the need for permitting legislation.\nThere is a bipartisan recognition and now we'll go to work on the details to actually get permitting reform done,\"", "role": "user" }, { "content": "divided government\nreal chance\nbuild consensus\nmeaningful reform\nsupport by Democrats\nincluding\nBiden\npromising sign\npermitting advancing this year\nRepublicans\nRogers\napplauded\nrecognition\nDemocrats of the need\npermitting legislation\nbipartisan recognition\ngo to work\nactually get permitting reform done", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Democrats are in agreement on the need for quick reform.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Oil and gas companies have spent years pushing for legislation to revise permitting laws they say are delaying needed energy infrastructure, without success. But pent up bipartisan demand for faster permitting and the makeup of Congress have given top industry officials optimism for legislative action on permitting in 2023.\n\"It won't be easy, but divided government gives us a real chance to build consensus around meaningful reform,\" American Petroleum Institute president Mike Sommers said today at his group's annual State of American Energy event.\nPipelines, energy projects on public land, LNG export facilities, electric transmission lines and other energy projects often have to navigate a labyrinth of time-consuming permitting requirements. For larger projects, permitting can take years, particularly if there are challenges from residents and environmentalists.\nDemocrats led by US senator Joe Manchin (D-West Virginia) last year made some progress on permitting through a bill that focused on electric transmission lines for renewables and approving the delayed $6.6bn Mountain Valley natural gas pipeline. Although the bill was thwarted by a lack of Republican support, oil industry officials see the support by Democrats — including President Joe Biden — as a promising sign for permitting advancing this year.\nRepublicans intend to advance their own permitting bill out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which is chaired by Cathy McMorris Rogers (D-Washington). Rogers said although she had concerns with Manchin's bill, including its handling of local input on electric transmission, she applauded the recognition by Democrats of the need for permitting legislation.\n\"There is a bipartisan recognition and now we'll go to work on the details to actually get permitting reform done,\" Rogers said at the industry event.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "divided government gives us a\nchance to build consensus around\nreform\nofficials see\nsupport by Democrats\nincluding\nBiden\nas a promising sign for permitting advancing this year.\nRogers\napplauded\nrecognition by Democrats of the need\nThere is a bipartisan recognition\nto actually get permitting reform done", "role": "assistant" } ]