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Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Complete rejection of rights fails and turns case.
Highlight Ratio: 0.7 | CONCLUSION
It is necessary to look at
critiques
of
rights. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to remember that their vision is
incomplete
As
Race
scholars have shown
it is easy to disown
rights when you have
power to defend yourself
But
the total rejection of
law or rights could be worse than their strategic use
it is necessary to remember that behind the abstract problems
there are histories of actual
beings that can improve their daily life
with recourse to
law and rights
The fate
must be enough to constrain the critical perspectives to make a generalization
about
rights
a critical theory of law and rights should understand the role of the struggle | critiques
rights
vision is
incomplete
As
Race
scholars have shown
it is easy to disown
rights when you have
power to defend yourself
But
total rejection
could be worse than their strategic use
behind
abstract problems
there are
actual
beings that can improve their daily life
with recourse to
law and rights
must be enough to constrain
critical perspectives to make a generalization
about
rights
a critical theory of
rights should understand the role of the struggle | 245,972 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Complete rejection of rights fails and turns case.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "CONCLUSION\nIt is necessary to look at\ncritiques\nof\nrights. Nevertheless, it is\nnecessary to remember that their vision is\nincomplete\nAs\nRace\nscholars have shown\nit is easy to disown\nrights when you have\npower to defend yourself\nBut\nthe total rejection of\nlaw or rights could be worse than their strategic use\nit is necessary to remember that behind the abstract problems\nthere are histories of actual\nbeings that can improve their daily life\nwith recourse to\nlaw and rights\nThe fate\nmust be enough to constrain the critical perspectives to make a generalization\nabout\nrights\na critical theory of law and rights should understand the role of the struggle",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "critiques\nrights\nvision is\nincomplete\nAs\nRace\nscholars have shown\nit is easy to disown\nrights when you have\npower to defend yourself\nBut\ntotal rejection\ncould be worse than their strategic use\nbehind\nabstract problems\nthere are\nactual\nbeings that can improve their daily life\nwith recourse to\nlaw and rights\nmust be enough to constrain\ncritical perspectives to make a generalization\nabout\nrights\na critical theory of\nrights should understand the role of the struggle",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Congress will pass a CR. | Key to watch for FABBS members is the status of Fiscal Year 2022 appropriations. Federal funding expires at the end of September, and Congress is increasingly likely to pass a stopgap continuing resolution (CR) to avoid a government shutdown. CRs disrupt the regular appropriations process, preventing agencies from instituting new programs and creating uncertainty that makes planning ahead difficult. If Congress is unable to pass regular appropriations, the work that has already been done to support funding increases and policy wins for the behavioral and brain sciences may be jeopardized. FABBS has joined community members in urging Congress to pass regular appropriations bills instead of normalizing CRs.
| Key to watch
is the status of Fiscal Year 2022 appropriations. Federal funding expires at the end of September, and Congress is increasingly likely to pass a stopgap continuing resolution (CR) to avoid a government shutdown | 245,973 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Congress will pass a CR.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Key to watch for FABBS members is the status of Fiscal Year 2022 appropriations. Federal funding expires at the end of September, and Congress is increasingly likely to pass a stopgap continuing resolution (CR) to avoid a government shutdown. CRs disrupt the regular appropriations process, preventing agencies from instituting new programs and creating uncertainty that makes planning ahead difficult. If Congress is unable to pass regular appropriations, the work that has already been done to support funding increases and policy wins for the behavioral and brain sciences may be jeopardized. FABBS has joined community members in urging Congress to pass regular appropriations bills instead of normalizing CRs.\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "Key to watch\nis the status of Fiscal Year 2022 appropriations. Federal funding expires at the end of September, and Congress is increasingly likely to pass a stopgap continuing resolution (CR) to avoid a government shutdown",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Turn --- Plan causes Russia to maintain arsenals and increase saber-rattling --- decimates NPT cred | The next US president faces lots of questions relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear threat reduction. Here’s one: Should the United States unilaterally reduce strategic forces deemed to be in excess of the Pentagon’s needs, or wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with the Russian Federation?
The arguments to proceed unilaterally with deeper cuts are straightforward. The Obama Administration has determined that the United States can drop below New START limits without harming US national security, so why not save money now, rather than later? We’re all familiar with the “bargaining chip” phase of arms control, when expensive chips were deployed rather than cashed in. So why repeat this sorry history? Unilateral reductions could also affirm Washington’s commitment to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in US defense posture, while reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s grand bargain, which calls on the nuclear “haves” to move toward zero and the “have-nots” to continue their abstinence.
The counterarguments to wait for Russian President Vladimir Putin are as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal “second to none.” Numbers may be a lesser indicator of capability than qualitative aspects of the competition, but they still matter, which is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to Mr. Putin, who is engaged in bullying tactics that harken back to an earlier era when Kremlin leaders brandished the Bomb. Unilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others. In this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions, rather than accelerating them.
While New START allows for and even anticipates deeper cuts, President Barack Obama has decided to hold off on further reductions until Mr. Putin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions below New START levels would be a[n oblivious] tone-deaf response to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and what’s going on in eastern Ukraine, Georgia, etc. The United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions be likely to make the next NPT Review Conference any easier.
| Should the United States unilaterally reduce
forces
or wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with
Russia
The
proceed unilaterally
counterarguments
are as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal
second to none
Numbers may be a lesser indicator
but they still matter
which is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to
Putin, who is engaged in bullying tactics
Unilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others
In this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions
Obama has decided to hold off on further reductions until
Putin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions
would be a[n oblivious]
response to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of
Ukraine
The United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions
make the next NPT Review Conference any easier | 245,976 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Turn --- Plan causes Russia to maintain arsenals and increase saber-rattling --- decimates NPT cred",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "The next US president faces lots of questions relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear threat reduction. Here’s one: Should the United States unilaterally reduce strategic forces deemed to be in excess of the Pentagon’s needs, or wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with the Russian Federation?\nThe arguments to proceed unilaterally with deeper cuts are straightforward. The Obama Administration has determined that the United States can drop below New START limits without harming US national security, so why not save money now, rather than later? We’re all familiar with the “bargaining chip” phase of arms control, when expensive chips were deployed rather than cashed in. So why repeat this sorry history? Unilateral reductions could also affirm Washington’s commitment to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in US defense posture, while reinforcing the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s grand bargain, which calls on the nuclear “haves” to move toward zero and the “have-nots” to continue their abstinence.\nThe counterarguments to wait for Russian President Vladimir Putin are as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal “second to none.” Numbers may be a lesser indicator of capability than qualitative aspects of the competition, but they still matter, which is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to Mr. Putin, who is engaged in bullying tactics that harken back to an earlier era when Kremlin leaders brandished the Bomb. Unilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others. In this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions, rather than accelerating them.\nWhile New START allows for and even anticipates deeper cuts, President Barack Obama has decided to hold off on further reductions until Mr. Putin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions below New START levels would be a[n oblivious] tone-deaf response to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and what’s going on in eastern Ukraine, Georgia, etc. The United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions be likely to make the next NPT Review Conference any easier.\n\n\n\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "Should the United States unilaterally reduce\nforces\nor wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with\nRussia\nThe\nproceed unilaterally\ncounterarguments\nare as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal\nsecond to none\nNumbers may be a lesser indicator\nbut they still matter\nwhich is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to\nPutin, who is engaged in bullying tactics\nUnilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others\nIn this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions\nObama has decided to hold off on further reductions until\nPutin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions\nwould be a[n oblivious]\nresponse to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of\nUkraine\nThe United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions\nmake the next NPT Review Conference any easier",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Turn --- Plan causes Russia to maintain arsenals and increase saber-rattling --- decimates NPT cred | Should the United States unilaterally reduce
forces
or wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with
Russia
The
proceed unilaterally
counterarguments
are as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal
second to none
Numbers may be a lesser indicator
but they still matter
which is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to
Putin, who is engaged in bullying tactics
Unilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others
In this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions
Obama has decided to hold off on further reductions until
Putin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions
would be a[n oblivious]
response to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of
Ukraine
The United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions
make the next NPT Review Conference any easier | second to none
but they still matter
reinforce Putin’s belief system
useful for leveraging others
delay Russian reductions
not succeed
unilateral reductions
make the next NPT | 245,977 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Turn --- Plan causes Russia to maintain arsenals and increase saber-rattling --- decimates NPT cred",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Should the United States unilaterally reduce\nforces\nor wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with\nRussia\nThe\nproceed unilaterally\ncounterarguments\nare as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal\nsecond to none\nNumbers may be a lesser indicator\nbut they still matter\nwhich is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to\nPutin, who is engaged in bullying tactics\nUnilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others\nIn this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions\nObama has decided to hold off on further reductions until\nPutin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions\nwould be a[n oblivious]\nresponse to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of\nUkraine\nThe United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions\nmake the next NPT Review Conference any easier",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "second to none\nbut they still matter\nreinforce Putin’s belief system\nuseful for leveraging others\ndelay Russian reductions\nnot succeed\nunilateral reductions\nmake the next NPT",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Turn --- Plan causes Russia to maintain arsenals and increase saber-rattling --- decimates NPT cred
Highlight Ratio: 0.4 | Should the United States unilaterally reduce
forces
or wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with
Russia
The
proceed unilaterally
counterarguments
are as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal
second to none
Numbers may be a lesser indicator
but they still matter
which is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to
Putin, who is engaged in bullying tactics
Unilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others
In this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions
Obama has decided to hold off on further reductions until
Putin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions
would be a[n oblivious]
response to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of
Ukraine
The United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions
make the next NPT Review Conference any easier | Should the U
S
unilaterally reduce
forces
or wait
agreement
in parallel with
Russia
The
unilateral
counterarguments
are as follows
Numbers
still matter
A
reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to
Putin, who is engaged in bullying tactics
Unilateral reductions
reinforce Putin’s belief
that
weapons are useful for leveraging others
cutting unilaterally
delay Russian reductions
The U
S
will not succeed in reducing t
salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral
reductions
make the next NPT Rev
Con
easier | 245,978 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Turn --- Plan causes Russia to maintain arsenals and increase saber-rattling --- decimates NPT cred\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Should the United States unilaterally reduce\nforces\nor wait instead for an agreement to proceed in parallel with\nRussia\nThe\nproceed unilaterally\ncounterarguments\nare as follows: Friends and allies are reassured by the United States having a nuclear arsenal\nsecond to none\nNumbers may be a lesser indicator\nbut they still matter\nwhich is why treaties spell them out. Another reason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to\nPutin, who is engaged in bullying tactics\nUnilateral reductions might inadvertently reinforce Putin’s belief system that nuclear weapons are useful for leveraging others\nIn this event, cutting unilaterally might even delay Russian reductions\nObama has decided to hold off on further reductions until\nPutin decides to downsize Russia’s ambitious and costly strategic modernization programs. What might the next U.S. president decide? I come down on the side of waiting, primarily because unilateral reductions\nwould be a[n oblivious]\nresponse to Russian warplanes buzzing US surface ships and simulating nuclear attacks on Sweden. Plus, there’s the matter of\nUkraine\nThe United States will not succeed in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral U.S. reductions\nmake the next NPT Review Conference any easier",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "Should the U\nS\nunilaterally reduce\nforces\nor wait\nagreement\nin parallel with\nRussia\nThe\nunilateral\ncounterarguments\nare as follows\nNumbers\nstill matter\nA\nreason to wait is to avoid sending the wrong signal to\nPutin, who is engaged in bullying tactics\nUnilateral reductions\nreinforce Putin’s belief\nthat\nweapons are useful for leveraging others\ncutting unilaterally\ndelay Russian reductions\nThe U\nS\nwill not succeed in reducing t\nsalience of nuclear weapons by unilateral reductions if Putin keeps doing what he’s doing. Nor would unilateral\nreductions\nmake the next NPT Rev\nCon\neasier",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: NFU is solely a declaratory policy. | A few other key concepts have permeated the debate about nuclear weapons declaratory policy over the decades. One has been “no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons. This is a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The United States has never chosen to adopt such a policy since 1945. Several administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation that allowed for first use if the circumstances warranted. It was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.
China, however, has been the chief adherent of this NFU policy from the outset. China detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964, and it has since chosen to develop and deploy only a relatively small nuclear force (estimated to be about 350 deployed nuclear weapons in 2020) compared with the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). Simultaneous to its first nuclear test, China announced “it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.” China has since periodically endorsed the NFU policy, and it has sought to have the United States adopt a similar policy, although the United States has consistently refused.Footnote17
Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev adopted a NFU pledge for the Soviet Union in 1982, although a noteworthy alteration was made to the pledge in 1993. At that time, Russian Chief of the General Staff Pavel Grachev announced that the Russian doctrine ruled out the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that had signed the NPT unless they were allied with a nuclear-armed country. However, he added, “As for those states that have nuclear weapons, the doctrine says nothing.”Footnote18
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review instituted by President Obama made an important modification to long-standing US policy. It stated that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” It should be noted that this pledge does not apply to Russia and China, which are both nuclear weapon states, nor to North Korea, which is no longer a party to the NPT. Its application to Iran remains contentious, depending upon whether “it is in compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”
India is another nuclear weapons state that has adopted varying NFU positions. These will be briefly discussed in a later section of this book.
It must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy and so does not preclude a state, such as China, from violating the principle and using nuclear weapons first in a crisis.
| “no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons
is a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The U
S
has never chosen to adopt such a policy
Several administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation
It was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the
nuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.
It must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy | 245,979 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NFU is solely a declaratory policy.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "A few other key concepts have permeated the debate about nuclear weapons declaratory policy over the decades. One has been “no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons. This is a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The United States has never chosen to adopt such a policy since 1945. Several administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation that allowed for first use if the circumstances warranted. It was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.\nChina, however, has been the chief adherent of this NFU policy from the outset. China detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964, and it has since chosen to develop and deploy only a relatively small nuclear force (estimated to be about 350 deployed nuclear weapons in 2020) compared with the United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union). Simultaneous to its first nuclear test, China announced “it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.” China has since periodically endorsed the NFU policy, and it has sought to have the United States adopt a similar policy, although the United States has consistently refused.Footnote17\nCommunist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev adopted a NFU pledge for the Soviet Union in 1982, although a noteworthy alteration was made to the pledge in 1993. At that time, Russian Chief of the General Staff Pavel Grachev announced that the Russian doctrine ruled out the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that had signed the NPT unless they were allied with a nuclear-armed country. However, he added, “As for those states that have nuclear weapons, the doctrine says nothing.”Footnote18\nThe 2010 Nuclear Posture Review instituted by President Obama made an important modification to long-standing US policy. It stated that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” It should be noted that this pledge does not apply to Russia and China, which are both nuclear weapon states, nor to North Korea, which is no longer a party to the NPT. Its application to Iran remains contentious, depending upon whether “it is in compliance with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”\nIndia is another nuclear weapons state that has adopted varying NFU positions. These will be briefly discussed in a later section of this book.\nIt must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy and so does not preclude a state, such as China, from violating the principle and using nuclear weapons first in a crisis.\n\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "“no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons\nis a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The U\nS\nhas never chosen to adopt such a policy\nSeveral administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation\nIt was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the\nnuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.\nIt must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: NFU is solely a declaratory policy. | “no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons
is a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The U
S
has never chosen to adopt such a policy
Several administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation
It was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the
nuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.
It must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy | “no first use (NFU) ”
nuclear weapons
pledge
government not to be
first state
use nuc
s
conventional conflict
U
S
never chosen
purposefully vague
all
credibility
nuclear deterrent
must be emphasized
solely
declaratory policy | 245,980 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: NFU is solely a declaratory policy.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "“no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons\nis a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The U\nS\nhas never chosen to adopt such a policy\nSeveral administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation\nIt was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the\nnuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.\nIt must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "“no first use (NFU) ”\nnuclear weapons\npledge\ngovernment not to be\nfirst state\nuse nuc\ns\nconventional conflict\nU\nS\nnever chosen\npurposefully vague\nall\ncredibility\nnuclear deterrent\nmust be emphasized\nsolely\ndeclaratory policy",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: NFU is solely a declaratory policy.
Highlight Ratio: 0.1 | “no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons
is a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The U
S
has never chosen to adopt such a policy
Several administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation
It was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the
nuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.
It must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy | NFU
is a pledge by a government not to be
first
to use nuc
s during
conventional conflict
It must be emphasized
that NFU is solely a declaratory policy | 245,981 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: NFU is solely a declaratory policy.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "“no first use (NFU) ” of nuclear weapons\nis a pledge by a government not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons during a conventional conflict. The U\nS\nhas never chosen to adopt such a policy\nSeveral administrations, including the Clinton and Obama administrations, considered the issue but rejected this declaratory policy, choosing instead to present a purposefully vague formulation\nIt was argued internally in both administrations that keeping all options open strengthened the credibility of the\nnuclear deterrent. The United States’ chief nuclear allies, Great Britain and France, also have chosen to refrain from making such a commitment. A key consideration motivating the rejection of NFU was the need to be able to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike against the significant Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces then threatening Western Europe. It was widely believed that preemptive nuclear use was the most credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.\nIt must be emphasized, however, that NFU is solely a declaratory policy",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "NFU\nis a pledge by a government not to be\nfirst\nto use nuc\ns during\nconventional conflict\nIt must be emphasized\nthat NFU is solely a declaratory policy",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: 2---Democracy Promotion lays the groundwork for imperial control and military intervention – those who don’t fit Western values must either submit or be violently overthrown | The timing of the increased emphasis on democracy promotion as the ultimate goal of US foreign policy can be attributed to the hegemonic decline that coincided with the decreased legitimacy of its role with the unjust war declared on Iraq. As Flint puts it, this was a time when the world leader faced a challenge symptomatic of the beginning of a period of de-concentration and hegemonic decline.The National Security Strategy Document clearly stated that it was time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. Monten argues that military actions and ensuing democracy promotion programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to their immediate security motivations, were driven in part by the neoconservative desire to restore US strength and credibility. They also aimed at reversing popular reluctance about the use of force, and reversing perceptions of US weakness and failure of will. The language of the NSS balanced an identification of a threat to US society and people, in terms of continued terrorist attacks, with a global commitment to promoting a particular vision of order, including economic relationships.Thus, the GMEI appears as a perfect example of American internationalism in this respect.¶ The GMEI was a clear indication of the attempt by the USA to forge its global leadership in this region by integrating these ‘failed states’ into the modern world that it had in mind. This was seen as a way to prevent the spread of terrorism from these countries. The war on Afghanistan and Iraq were thus perceived by the USA to be two opportunities to begin transforming the whole region of the Greater Middle East. It seems therefore that discourse and policy concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were coming to be increasingly used as a pretext or justification to shape the geopolitical code and the geopolitical imagination of the USA. The projection of power in newly imagined geographies, such as the Middle East, was one outcome of this new geopolitical code and vision. In short, ‘global social engineering’ became a primary goal of the USA because it had acquired the capability to use military intervention as a means of forcing political change.¶ Another influential pretext was the new US strategic vision that can be termed ‘integration’ into a Western and American set of values and modus operandi. Falah and Flint refer to this integrative power of ‘prime modernity’.According to this view, state and inter-state political institutions that can support the hegemonic power's global project of an open economic space are repackaged as the necessary foundations for a way of life that has been defined as modern and therefore should be wanted by most states.They further argue that prime modernity is used to construct a prime morality.Thus “faltering states” are identified as those whose economic practices, political institutions, and civil society do not meet the preferred definition imposed by the USA. Next, such states are equated with terrorism, with terrorism against the USA being portrayed as a crime against the ‘basic’ moral values of humanity.This integration strategy in turn creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated.Although geopolitical actions under the guise of world leadership provide material benefits for the United States, this self-interest becomes equated instead with benefits for the whole world. Such benefits are presented and defined through values.Flint further argues that if the calculations of war are traceable back to material interests, such as access to oil, then governments must usually emphasise values and ideas in justifying their foreign policy, especially when it involves invading another country. The world leader must therefore convince its international as well as domestic audience, that the actions are for the benefit of all rather than its own interests. In this respect, the GMEI represents a US search for allies. Flint also argues that the power of the world leader rests not on its military strength alone, but rather on a package of innovations that it claims will benefit the whole world. The central ingredients of this package are national self-determination and democracy, or the rule of law. Together, these “innovations” combine to form the integrative power of the world leader: the collection of ideas, values, and institutions designed to bring order and stability to the world. Regarding GMEI, this theory of integrative power of prime modernity contextualised the positions, objectives and problems of the region. It also facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership and regional interests. That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for justification for the US extra-territorial activities.
| the increased emphasis on democracy promotion
can be attributed to
the decreased legitimacy of its role
this was a time when the world leader faced a challenge symptomatic of
hegemonic decline
military actions and ensuing democracy promotion
were driven
by the
desire to restore US strength and credibility
The GMEI was a clear indication of the attempt by the USA to forge its global leadership in this region by integrating these ‘failed states’ into the modern world that it had in mind
discourse and policy concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were coming to be increasingly used as a pretext or justification to shape the geopolitical code and the geopolitical imagination of the USA. The projection of power in
the Middle East, was one outcome
state and inter-state political institutions that can support the hegemonic power's global project of an open economic space are repackaged as the necessary foundations for a way of life that has been defined as modern and therefore should be wanted by most states
prime modernity is used to construct a prime morality
Thus “faltering states” are identified as those whose
institutions
do not meet the preferred definition imposed by the USA. Next, such states are equated with terrorism
This integration strategy in turn creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated
if the calculations of war are traceable back to material interests
then governments must usually emphasise values and ideas
this theory of integrative power of prime modernity contextualised the positions, objectives and problems of the region. It also facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership and regional interests. That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for justification for the US extra-territorial activities | 245,982 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2---Democracy Promotion lays the groundwork for imperial control and military intervention – those who don’t fit Western values must either submit or be violently overthrown",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "The timing of the increased emphasis on democracy promotion as the ultimate goal of US foreign policy can be attributed to the hegemonic decline that coincided with the decreased legitimacy of its role with the unjust war declared on Iraq. As Flint puts it, this was a time when the world leader faced a challenge symptomatic of the beginning of a period of de-concentration and hegemonic decline.The National Security Strategy Document clearly stated that it was time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. Monten argues that military actions and ensuing democracy promotion programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to their immediate security motivations, were driven in part by the neoconservative desire to restore US strength and credibility. They also aimed at reversing popular reluctance about the use of force, and reversing perceptions of US weakness and failure of will. The language of the NSS balanced an identification of a threat to US society and people, in terms of continued terrorist attacks, with a global commitment to promoting a particular vision of order, including economic relationships.Thus, the GMEI appears as a perfect example of American internationalism in this respect.¶ The GMEI was a clear indication of the attempt by the USA to forge its global leadership in this region by integrating these ‘failed states’ into the modern world that it had in mind. This was seen as a way to prevent the spread of terrorism from these countries. The war on Afghanistan and Iraq were thus perceived by the USA to be two opportunities to begin transforming the whole region of the Greater Middle East. It seems therefore that discourse and policy concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were coming to be increasingly used as a pretext or justification to shape the geopolitical code and the geopolitical imagination of the USA. The projection of power in newly imagined geographies, such as the Middle East, was one outcome of this new geopolitical code and vision. In short, ‘global social engineering’ became a primary goal of the USA because it had acquired the capability to use military intervention as a means of forcing political change.¶ Another influential pretext was the new US strategic vision that can be termed ‘integration’ into a Western and American set of values and modus operandi. Falah and Flint refer to this integrative power of ‘prime modernity’.According to this view, state and inter-state political institutions that can support the hegemonic power's global project of an open economic space are repackaged as the necessary foundations for a way of life that has been defined as modern and therefore should be wanted by most states.They further argue that prime modernity is used to construct a prime morality.Thus “faltering states” are identified as those whose economic practices, political institutions, and civil society do not meet the preferred definition imposed by the USA. Next, such states are equated with terrorism, with terrorism against the USA being portrayed as a crime against the ‘basic’ moral values of humanity.This integration strategy in turn creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated.Although geopolitical actions under the guise of world leadership provide material benefits for the United States, this self-interest becomes equated instead with benefits for the whole world. Such benefits are presented and defined through values.Flint further argues that if the calculations of war are traceable back to material interests, such as access to oil, then governments must usually emphasise values and ideas in justifying their foreign policy, especially when it involves invading another country. The world leader must therefore convince its international as well as domestic audience, that the actions are for the benefit of all rather than its own interests. In this respect, the GMEI represents a US search for allies. Flint also argues that the power of the world leader rests not on its military strength alone, but rather on a package of innovations that it claims will benefit the whole world. The central ingredients of this package are national self-determination and democracy, or the rule of law. Together, these “innovations” combine to form the integrative power of the world leader: the collection of ideas, values, and institutions designed to bring order and stability to the world. Regarding GMEI, this theory of integrative power of prime modernity contextualised the positions, objectives and problems of the region. It also facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership and regional interests. That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for justification for the US extra-territorial activities.\n\n\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "the increased emphasis on democracy promotion\ncan be attributed to\nthe decreased legitimacy of its role\nthis was a time when the world leader faced a challenge symptomatic of\nhegemonic decline\nmilitary actions and ensuing democracy promotion\nwere driven\nby the\ndesire to restore US strength and credibility\nThe GMEI was a clear indication of the attempt by the USA to forge its global leadership in this region by integrating these ‘failed states’ into the modern world that it had in mind\ndiscourse and policy concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were coming to be increasingly used as a pretext or justification to shape the geopolitical code and the geopolitical imagination of the USA. The projection of power in\nthe Middle East, was one outcome\nstate and inter-state political institutions that can support the hegemonic power's global project of an open economic space are repackaged as the necessary foundations for a way of life that has been defined as modern and therefore should be wanted by most states\nprime modernity is used to construct a prime morality\nThus “faltering states” are identified as those whose\ninstitutions\ndo not meet the preferred definition imposed by the USA. Next, such states are equated with terrorism\nThis integration strategy in turn creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated\nif the calculations of war are traceable back to material interests\nthen governments must usually emphasise values and ideas\nthis theory of integrative power of prime modernity contextualised the positions, objectives and problems of the region. It also facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership and regional interests. That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for justification for the US extra-territorial activities",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: 2---Democracy Promotion lays the groundwork for imperial control and military intervention – those who don’t fit Western values must either submit or be violently overthrown
Highlight Ratio: 0.5 | the increased emphasis on democracy promotion
can be attributed to
the decreased legitimacy of its role
this was a time when the world leader faced a challenge symptomatic of
hegemonic decline
military actions and ensuing democracy promotion
were driven
by the
desire to restore US strength and credibility
The GMEI was a clear indication of the attempt by the USA to forge its global leadership in this region by integrating these ‘failed states’ into the modern world that it had in mind
discourse and policy concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were coming to be increasingly used as a pretext or justification to shape the geopolitical code and the geopolitical imagination of the USA. The projection of power in
the Middle East, was one outcome
state and inter-state political institutions that can support the hegemonic power's global project of an open economic space are repackaged as the necessary foundations for a way of life that has been defined as modern and therefore should be wanted by most states
prime modernity is used to construct a prime morality
Thus “faltering states” are identified as those whose
institutions
do not meet the preferred definition imposed by the USA. Next, such states are equated with terrorism
This integration strategy in turn creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated
if the calculations of war are traceable back to material interests
then governments must usually emphasise values and ideas
this theory of integrative power of prime modernity contextualised the positions, objectives and problems of the region. It also facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership and regional interests. That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for justification for the US extra-territorial activities | the
emphasis on democracy promotion
can be attributed to
decreased legitimacy
symptomatic of
hegemonic decline
The GMEI was
the attempt
to forge
global leadership
by integrating
failed states’
concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were
used as a pretext
to shape the geopolitical
imagination of the USA
institutions that
support the hegemonic power's global project
are repackaged as
necessary foundations for
life
faltering states” are identified as those whose
institutions
do not meet the preferred definition
Next, such states are equated with terrorism
This
creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are
unwilling or unable to be incorporated
integrative power
facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership
That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for
US extra-territorial activities | 245,984 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2---Democracy Promotion lays the groundwork for imperial control and military intervention – those who don’t fit Western values must either submit or be violently overthrown\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "the increased emphasis on democracy promotion\ncan be attributed to\nthe decreased legitimacy of its role\nthis was a time when the world leader faced a challenge symptomatic of\nhegemonic decline\nmilitary actions and ensuing democracy promotion\nwere driven\nby the\ndesire to restore US strength and credibility\nThe GMEI was a clear indication of the attempt by the USA to forge its global leadership in this region by integrating these ‘failed states’ into the modern world that it had in mind\ndiscourse and policy concerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were coming to be increasingly used as a pretext or justification to shape the geopolitical code and the geopolitical imagination of the USA. The projection of power in\nthe Middle East, was one outcome\nstate and inter-state political institutions that can support the hegemonic power's global project of an open economic space are repackaged as the necessary foundations for a way of life that has been defined as modern and therefore should be wanted by most states\nprime modernity is used to construct a prime morality\nThus “faltering states” are identified as those whose\ninstitutions\ndo not meet the preferred definition imposed by the USA. Next, such states are equated with terrorism\nThis integration strategy in turn creates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated\nif the calculations of war are traceable back to material interests\nthen governments must usually emphasise values and ideas\nthis theory of integrative power of prime modernity contextualised the positions, objectives and problems of the region. It also facilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership and regional interests. That is why this theory constituted a solid ground for justification for the US extra-territorial activities",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "the\nemphasis on democracy promotion\ncan be attributed to\ndecreased legitimacy\nsymptomatic of\nhegemonic decline\nThe GMEI was\nthe attempt\nto forge\nglobal leadership\nby integrating\nfailed states’\nconcerns carrying a neo-conservative imprint were\nused as a pretext\nto shape the geopolitical\nimagination of the USA\ninstitutions that\nsupport the hegemonic power's global project\nare repackaged as\nnecessary foundations for\nlife\nfaltering states” are identified as those whose\ninstitutions\ndo not meet the preferred definition\nNext, such states are equated with terrorism\nThis\ncreates its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are\nunwilling or unable to be incorporated\nintegrative power\nfacilitated the opportunity to establish alliances guaranteeing US world leadership\nThat is why this theory constituted a solid ground for\nUS extra-territorial activities",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Trolls are risk averse---they only target legitimately invalid patents. | C. Privateers Facilitate Meritorious Patent Assertions
Even if privateers have caused an increase in patent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious. As explained in Section I.B, privateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents than other kinds of patent trolls by virtue of acquiring them from operating entities.157 Their enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrowly targeted towards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats against end users or entire industries. Taken together, these indicate that the privateer model would be expected to assert claims that are generally meritorious as a rule.
Additionally, operating entities tend to use privateers to break up their patent portfolios into intelligible, coherent chunks that make more sense for assertion.158 For example, a company may have a vast portfolio overall, but only a few patents relating to semiconductors. By splitting off a sub-portfolio of only the semiconductor patents, the privateer simplifies litigation for all parties involved, minimizing the patents that need to be examined in any dispute. Contrast this with what is sometimes called the IBM method of intimidation, wherein an entire massive portfolio is coupled with vague threats and used as a cudgel.159 During negotiations between Sun Microsystems and IBM in the 1980s, IBM’s chief negotiator was quoted as saying:
OK, maybe you don’t infringe these seven patents. But we have 10,000 U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay us $20 million?160
Perhaps ironically then, privateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement with IBM-style intimidation.
Analogizing to the world of litigation finance offers further evidence that privateers ultimately assert disproportionately meritorious claims. The business model of privateers is in many ways modeled after litigation financiers: buying up patents—”claims”—from operating entities that don’t have the resources or willingness to bear the risk of litigation, and then asserting them. Intellectual Ventures is perhaps the most well-publicized of these privateers, and they state their business model as such:
[I]magine an inventor out there, someone with a brilliant idea, a breakthrough. This inventor has a patent, but still, companies are stealing his idea and he doesn’t have the money or legal savvy to stop them. That’s where Intellectual Ventures comes in. They buy this inventor’s patent and make sure that companies who are using the idea pay for it.161
Privateers, like litigation financiers, take on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset. Even where victorious, failure to reach a licensing agreement with the infringer (resulting solely in an injunction or exclusion order) brings them little or no financial benefit since they do not participate in the product market themselves. Moreover, where an operating entity maintains some kind of partial interest in royalties that the privateer collects or sets minimum revenue targets, the stakes are raised even further.162 The result is that, like litigation financiers, privateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and “the underlying law giving rise to the . . . claim” favors their position as plaintiff.163 In other words, privateers will avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions. | Even if privateers have caused
patent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious
privateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents
Their enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrow
towards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats
privateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement
Privateers
take on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset
The result is that
privateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and
will avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions | 245,985 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Trolls are risk averse---they only target legitimately invalid patents.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "C. Privateers Facilitate Meritorious Patent Assertions \nEven if privateers have caused an increase in patent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious. As explained in Section I.B, privateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents than other kinds of patent trolls by virtue of acquiring them from operating entities.157 Their enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrowly targeted towards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats against end users or entire industries. Taken together, these indicate that the privateer model would be expected to assert claims that are generally meritorious as a rule.\nAdditionally, operating entities tend to use privateers to break up their patent portfolios into intelligible, coherent chunks that make more sense for assertion.158 For example, a company may have a vast portfolio overall, but only a few patents relating to semiconductors. By splitting off a sub-portfolio of only the semiconductor patents, the privateer simplifies litigation for all parties involved, minimizing the patents that need to be examined in any dispute. Contrast this with what is sometimes called the IBM method of intimidation, wherein an entire massive portfolio is coupled with vague threats and used as a cudgel.159 During negotiations between Sun Microsystems and IBM in the 1980s, IBM’s chief negotiator was quoted as saying:\nOK, maybe you don’t infringe these seven patents. But we have 10,000 U.S. patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you want to make this easy and just pay us $20 million?160\nPerhaps ironically then, privateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement with IBM-style intimidation.\nAnalogizing to the world of litigation finance offers further evidence that privateers ultimately assert disproportionately meritorious claims. The business model of privateers is in many ways modeled after litigation financiers: buying up patents—”claims”—from operating entities that don’t have the resources or willingness to bear the risk of litigation, and then asserting them. Intellectual Ventures is perhaps the most well-publicized of these privateers, and they state their business model as such:\n[I]magine an inventor out there, someone with a brilliant idea, a breakthrough. This inventor has a patent, but still, companies are stealing his idea and he doesn’t have the money or legal savvy to stop them. That’s where Intellectual Ventures comes in. They buy this inventor’s patent and make sure that companies who are using the idea pay for it.161\nPrivateers, like litigation financiers, take on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset. Even where victorious, failure to reach a licensing agreement with the infringer (resulting solely in an injunction or exclusion order) brings them little or no financial benefit since they do not participate in the product market themselves. Moreover, where an operating entity maintains some kind of partial interest in royalties that the privateer collects or sets minimum revenue targets, the stakes are raised even further.162 The result is that, like litigation financiers, privateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and “the underlying law giving rise to the . . . claim” favors their position as plaintiff.163 In other words, privateers will avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "Even if privateers have caused\npatent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious\nprivateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents\nTheir enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrow\ntowards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats\nprivateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement\nPrivateers\ntake on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset\nThe result is that\nprivateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and\nwill avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Trolls are risk averse---they only target legitimately invalid patents. | Even if privateers have caused
patent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious
privateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents
Their enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrow
towards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats
privateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement
Privateers
take on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset
The result is that
privateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and
will avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions | if
patent assertions
still
meritorious
very nature
higher-quality
more likely
narrow
practicing
broad
blanketing threats
contributes
merit
transparency
threat
s
less attractive
whole portfolio
cover
weak
unspecified claims
substantial amount
downside risk
non-infringement
sink their costs
invalidation
destroys
only asset
result
lowest
avoid frivolous
unfounded | 245,986 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Trolls are risk averse---they only target legitimately invalid patents.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Even if privateers have caused\npatent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious\nprivateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents\nTheir enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrow\ntowards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats\nprivateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement\nPrivateers\ntake on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset\nThe result is that\nprivateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and\nwill avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "if\npatent assertions\nstill\nmeritorious\nvery nature\nhigher-quality\nmore likely\nnarrow\npracticing\nbroad\nblanketing threats\ncontributes\nmerit\ntransparency\nthreat\ns\nless attractive\nwhole portfolio\ncover\nweak\nunspecified claims\nsubstantial amount\ndownside risk\nnon-infringement\nsink their costs\ninvalidation\ndestroys\nonly asset\nresult\nlowest\navoid frivolous\nunfounded",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Trolls are risk averse---they only target legitimately invalid patents.
Highlight Ratio: 0.5 | Even if privateers have caused
patent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious
privateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents
Their enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrow
towards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats
privateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement
Privateers
take on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset
The result is that
privateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and
will avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions | Even if privateers
caused
assertions, most
are still
meritorious
privateers by
nature
have
quality patents
rather than broad
threats
privateering
contributes to merit
through transparency in
threat
s
privateering
makes it less attractive for
entities to
cover for weak
claims of infringement
Privateers
take on
substantial
risk
They risk
non-infringement that sink
costs
or
invalidation that destroys their only asset
The result is
privateers
avoid
unfounded assertions | 245,987 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Trolls are risk averse---they only target legitimately invalid patents.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Even if privateers have caused\npatent assertions, most of those claims are still ultimately meritorious\nprivateers by their very nature will tend to have higher-quality patents\nTheir enforcement efforts are also more likely to be narrow\ntowards practicing competitors rather than broad, blanketing threats\nprivateering actually contributes to meritorious claims through transparency in negotiations, threat letters, and complaints filed. The privateering model makes it less attractive for operating entities to bring their whole portfolio to the table to cover for weak or unspecified claims of infringement\nPrivateers\ntake on a substantial amount of downside risk in the tradeoff. They risk findings of non-infringement that sink their costs of litigation, or worse, patent invalidation that destroys their only asset\nThe result is that\nprivateers will assert “in cases where the risk is the lowest” and\nwill avoid frivolous or unfounded assertions",
"role": "user"
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"content": "Even if privateers\ncaused\nassertions, most\nare still\nmeritorious\nprivateers by\nnature\nhave\nquality patents\nrather than broad\nthreats\nprivateering\ncontributes to merit\nthrough transparency in\nthreat\ns\nprivateering\nmakes it less attractive for\nentities to\ncover for weak\nclaims of infringement\nPrivateers\ntake on\nsubstantial\nrisk\nThey risk\nnon-infringement that sink\ncosts\nor\ninvalidation that destroys their only asset\nThe result is\nprivateers\navoid\nunfounded assertions",
"role": "assistant"
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Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: There are obviously a lot of ways to ‘categorize’ nuclear weapons. Their interpretation can’t shape neg prep and is no better than ‘only our aff is topical.’ | This paper presents how nuclear weapons may be categorized according to
• Weapons technology;
• Intended use;
• Means of delivery;
• Operational status; or
• Names or model designations.
The relevance for nuclear disarmament verification of each method of categorization is discussed.
Introduction
Many different ways and many different terms are used to characterize nuclear weapons. Some may be relevant to nuclear disarmament verification, others most likely not. Some characteristics may be impossible to verify due to proliferation concerns. This paper provides a short overview of the terminology.
In Phase I of the IPNDV, a “nuclear explosive device” was defined simply as a device containing both weapons usable fissile materials and high explosives. For Phase II, the official P5 definition may be more appropriate: A “nuclear weapon” is a “weapon assembly that is capable of producing an explosion and massive damage and destruction by the sudden release of energy instantaneously released from self-sustaining nuclear fission and/or fusion.”
Nuclear weapons may be categorized in multiple ways according to weapons technology, intended use, means of delivery, and operational status, as well as by their actual names or model designations. This is discussed below.
How an inspector can be become confident that the system being verified is indeed of a specific, uniquely identified type, is a further question beyond the scope of this paper. Verifying that two systems are of the same type, based on measurable characteristics and supporting information as described throughout the paper, is more straightforward to accomplish.
Categorization According to Weapons Technology
Basic nuclear physics describes two different ways of releasing energy from atomic nuclei: “fission” (splitting) of heavy nuclei or “fusion” (merging) of light nuclei.
The early nuclear weapons were all fission weapons in which the fissile material, that is, uranium and/or plutonium of suitable quality, undergoes a very rapid fission chain reaction. Fissile material emits alpha and gamma radiation, the former is stopped by any kind of casing and is therefore irrelevant for nuclear disarmament verification, but the latter, especially gamma radiation from plutonium, will get through substantial layers of material and may therefore be of interest to disarmament verification inspectors.
There are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons. The type used in a given weapon may affect how and where the inspectors make their measurements.
Fusion weapons are also known as thermonuclear weapons. The fusion process requires large amounts of energy to begin, which is provided by first setting off a fission charge. Fusion weapons are therefore often referred to as two-stage weapons because each weapon contains two charges, a primary (fission) stage and a secondary (fusion) stage. The primary stage will contain fissile material as described above and may be of use for nuclear disarmament verification inspectors. Very little official information about the secondary stage has been made available to the public.
Basic nuclear physics limits the yield (the released energy) of a fission weapon, while in principle the yield of a fusion weapon is almost unlimited. The physical characteristics of nuclear weapons will, to some extent, depend on the technology used in a given weapon. However, this is hard to generalize because weight and shape also depends heavily on intended use of the weapon, engineering sophistication, yield, etc. Some weapons have been several meters long and weighed several tons, whereas other weapons could be launched by artillery guns.
Some knowledge of the technology applied in a given weapon is essential for nuclear disarmament verification purposes because this determines what possible radiation may be detected and which methods may or must be used in the verification process. Physical characteristics such as shape and dimensions of the outer casing may provide supporting verification information. Relevant technical information can only be provided by the weapons owner, for example as part of the declaration process.
Categorization According to Intended Use
This categorization divides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The dividing line between the categories is rather fuzzy. As the names imply, strategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance, whereas non-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role. Depending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function. Furthermore, for one State, strategic balance may be measured relative to its neighbor, while for another State, global balance may be the most important.
Several definitions exist of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. However, the only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty. This definition applies only between the United States and Russia, although China also considers its longer-range weapons to be strategic nuclear weapons. Other States possessing nuclear weapons may have different views on what constitutes a “strategic weapon”; for example, if a nuclear weapon is capable of hitting the territory of a given State, the States in question may consider that weapon to be strategic regardless of its range.
“Non-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical nuclear weapons,” “sub-strategic nuclear weapons,” “battlefield nuclear weapons,” or “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria, but again very similar systems in different States are likely to be defined differently. For example, in the United States, there is a differentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons, which are related to both range and intended use.
Whether a specific nuclear weapon is considered strategic or not should be of little or no importance to nuclear disarmament verification because the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon.
Categorization According to Means of Delivery
Many ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons to their intended point of detonation. At the highest level, all nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories classified by where the delivery systems are based: ground-launched, sea-launched, or air-launched/air-delivered. Space-based nuclear weapons, although possible, are not considered in this paper because they are prohibited by the widely accepted Outer Space Treaty, which entered into force in 1967.
Ground-launched nuclear weapons include ground launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) as well as artillery shells and landmines with nuclear charges. Many different types of ballistic missiles have been developed for different purposes. They have been designed to carry different weights over different ranges, and they use different propellants. They are often subcategorized according to range, for example as shown in the Table IV-1-1 below:
As an example of the lack of standardization of these terms, one may observe that the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) defines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km. (This remains a non-standard definition of short range, however; the MTCR definition of 300 km as the lower limit appears to have gained greater credence.)
Both GLBMs and GLCMs may be launched from fixed launchers (such as missile silos) or from mobile, land-based transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).
Many ballistic missiles are equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); thereby each containing several nuclear warheads. The term “nuclear warhead” is therefore often used for general bookkeeping purposes instead of the term “nuclear weapon,” even though the term “warhead” is defined conventionally as referring only to the explosive elements delivered by a missile.
Sea-launched nuclear weapons include ballistic missiles and cruise missiles as well as torpedoes, depth charges, and mines equipped with nuclear charges. These weapons may be launched from surface vessels or submarines. The terms “SLBM” and “SLCM” are used somewhat ambiguously. They are often taken to mean submarine-launched ballistic missile and submarine-launched cruise missile, respectively, but “SL” could also be read as “sea-launched” or “ship-launched.” For example, the United States generally uses SLCM to mean a sealaunched cruise missile regardless of whether it is launched from a ship or from a submarine. However, sometimes the term “ShLCM” has been used to specify a “ship-launched cruise missile.” Sea-launched ballistic missiles may be further subcategorized according to range as described above for ground-launched ballistic missiles.
Air-launched nuclear weapons include air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Torpedoes may also be launched from aircraft. Air-delivered nuclear weapons are nuclear bombs that are dropped close to the intended point of detonation. Traditionally, these were unguided bombs, also known as gravity bombs, but modern bombs may be precision-guided bombs, also referred to as smart bombs, which include tail kits to improve the accuracy of the bomb.
The term “nuclear triad” is used when discussing nuclear weapon possessor States that deploy (strategic) nuclear weapons in all three general basing modes, that is, ground-launched ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear capable aircraft.
As far as nuclear disarmament verification goes, the techniques and technologies applied would be the same regardless of means of delivery. One useful aspect of describing systems this way, however, is that it provides inspectors with an approximate idea of what they are likely to encounter in the field. Consistency with regard to delivery vehicle, location, certain characteristics, etc. may help build confidence.
Access requirements to sites with different categories of nuclear weapons may vary, and hence the verification procedures will depend somewhat on the type of site the systems are on (naval bases, silos, mobile launchers, etc.). In summary, some information on means of delivery may be important regarding the practicalities of nuclear disarmament verification, but may not provide sufficient information on its own to identify weapon systems or individual weapons or warheads.
Categorization According to Operational Status
This categorization may be carried out in multiple ways. The discussion below first follows the approach used by the Status of World Nuclear Forces, a commonly quoted non-governmental organization (NGO) and then presents the system used in the United States. Other nuclear weapon possessing states probably have similar categories for weapons in their stockpiles.
At the top level in the NGO categorization, all nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile, that is, they are in military custody earmarked for military use, or they are awaiting dismantlement, that is, retired, but still intact. In late 2018, roughly one-third of all warheads fell in the latter category.
The warheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed. According to the same NGO source, in late 2018, about 40 percent of the nuclear warheads in the military stockpiles were deployed.
The deployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert (ready to be used on short notice) and those that are not.
Non-deployed weapons may be awaiting deployment, undergoing maintenance, or be kept in long-term reserve. Reasons for keeping a substantial number of nuclear weapons in reserve may be to ensure that the State can meet possible future geopolitical challenges and/or to safeguard against potential technical problems due to an aging arsenal.
In the U.S. categorization, all nuclear warheads are part of the military stockpile. This stockpile can be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile. Weapons in the active stockpile are maintained to ensure that the military requirements for operational warheads are met. The inactive stockpile is composed of warheads retained in a nonoperational status and can provide augmentation or replacement warheads to the active stockpile. These two categories can be further broken down into subcategories.
There are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics. Active ready consists of warheads available for wartime employment planning. Active ready warheads can be loaded onto missiles or made available for use on aircraft within required timelines. Active hedge warheads are retained for deployment to manage technological risks in the active ready stockpile or to augment the active ready stockpile in response to geopolitical developments. Active logistics warheads are used to facilitate workflow and sustain the operational status of active ready or active hedge quantities. They may be in various stages of assembly.
The inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve. The inactive hedge consists of warheads retained for deployment to manage technological risks in the active ready stockpile or to augment the active ready stockpile in response to geopolitical developments. Inactive logistics warheads are used for logistical and surveillance purposes; these warheads may be in various stages of disassembly. Inactive reserve warheads are retained to provide long-term risk mitigation. Warheads in this category are exempt from future refurbishment modifications or alterations.
Warheads in some of the different categories may have different characteristics, but these would not be directly observable to the nuclear disarmament verification inspectors. Different categories of warheads may be stored in different locations.
In and of themselves the above categories do not add much verification value unless they are accompanied by further information as to what this means for the physical location or state of the warhead. If a deployed system refers to the system being mated with a delivery vehicle, this would be verifiable, and similarly if it refers to the system being at a specific location. The nuclear disarmament verification inspectors would most likely prefer to meet the warhead that is to be dismantled as close to its end of deployment as possible. This will increase their confidence that the device that they are introduced to really is the warhead that it is claimed to be.
Categorization According to Names or Model Designations
This form of categorization is quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name (for example, Little Boy or Blue Danube) and/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example, B61, Mk53, W78, or WE177). Warheads of the same general model may also have different modifications that can further differentiate the warhead or bomb. For example, the B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications to enable different uses or to increase its safety, security, and reliability (identified as B61-1, B61-2, etc.). The differences represented by the modifications may or may not be observable for a nuclear disarmament verification inspector.
Furthermore, one would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number.
In the field of nuclear disarmament verification, these designations are important for bookkeeping purposes. It is important to uniquely identify each object under verification in ways that are meaningful to all participating parties.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented five independent ways of categorizing nuclear weapons according to:
(1) Weapons technology;
(2) Intended use;
(3) Means of delivery;
(4) Operational status; and
(5) Names or model designations.
In principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems. In the earlier sections of this paper, we have discussed the relevance of each of the different systems to nuclear disarmament verification. | nuclear weapons may be categorized according to
Weapons technology
Intended use
Means of delivery
Operational status; or
Names or model designations
Many different ways and
terms are used to characterize nuclear weapons
There are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons
Categorization According to Intended Use
divides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic
and non-strategic
The dividing line
is
fuzzy
strategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance
non-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role
Depending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function
the only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty
Non-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical
sub-strategic
battlefield
or “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria
in the U
S
differentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons
are related to both range and intended use
Whether a specific nuclear weapon is
strategic or not should be of
no importance to nuclear disarmament
because the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon
Many ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons
all nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories
ground
sea
or air-launched
As an example of the lack of standardization of these terms
INF
defines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km
This remains a non-standard definition of short range
Categorization According to Operational Status
may be carried out in multiple ways
all nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile
in military custody earmarked for military use, or
are awaiting dismantlement
retired, but still intact
warheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed
deployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert
and those that are not
the military stockpile
can be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile
There are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics
The inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve
Categorization According to Names or Model Designations
is quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name
and/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example
B61
W78
the B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications
identified as B61-1, B61-2
one would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number
In principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems | 245,988 | [
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"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: There are obviously a lot of ways to ‘categorize’ nuclear weapons. Their interpretation can’t shape neg prep and is no better than ‘only our aff is topical.’",
"role": "system"
},
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"content": "This paper presents how nuclear weapons may be categorized according to \n• Weapons technology; \n• Intended use; \n• Means of delivery; \n• Operational status; or \n• Names or model designations. \nThe relevance for nuclear disarmament verification of each method of categorization is discussed. \nIntroduction \nMany different ways and many different terms are used to characterize nuclear weapons. Some may be relevant to nuclear disarmament verification, others most likely not. Some characteristics may be impossible to verify due to proliferation concerns. This paper provides a short overview of the terminology. \nIn Phase I of the IPNDV, a “nuclear explosive device” was defined simply as a device containing both weapons usable fissile materials and high explosives. For Phase II, the official P5 definition may be more appropriate: A “nuclear weapon” is a “weapon assembly that is capable of producing an explosion and massive damage and destruction by the sudden release of energy instantaneously released from self-sustaining nuclear fission and/or fusion.” \nNuclear weapons may be categorized in multiple ways according to weapons technology, intended use, means of delivery, and operational status, as well as by their actual names or model designations. This is discussed below. \nHow an inspector can be become confident that the system being verified is indeed of a specific, uniquely identified type, is a further question beyond the scope of this paper. Verifying that two systems are of the same type, based on measurable characteristics and supporting information as described throughout the paper, is more straightforward to accomplish. \nCategorization According to Weapons Technology \nBasic nuclear physics describes two different ways of releasing energy from atomic nuclei: “fission” (splitting) of heavy nuclei or “fusion” (merging) of light nuclei. \nThe early nuclear weapons were all fission weapons in which the fissile material, that is, uranium and/or plutonium of suitable quality, undergoes a very rapid fission chain reaction. Fissile material emits alpha and gamma radiation, the former is stopped by any kind of casing and is therefore irrelevant for nuclear disarmament verification, but the latter, especially gamma radiation from plutonium, will get through substantial layers of material and may therefore be of interest to disarmament verification inspectors. \nThere are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons. The type used in a given weapon may affect how and where the inspectors make their measurements. \nFusion weapons are also known as thermonuclear weapons. The fusion process requires large amounts of energy to begin, which is provided by first setting off a fission charge. Fusion weapons are therefore often referred to as two-stage weapons because each weapon contains two charges, a primary (fission) stage and a secondary (fusion) stage. The primary stage will contain fissile material as described above and may be of use for nuclear disarmament verification inspectors. Very little official information about the secondary stage has been made available to the public. \nBasic nuclear physics limits the yield (the released energy) of a fission weapon, while in principle the yield of a fusion weapon is almost unlimited. The physical characteristics of nuclear weapons will, to some extent, depend on the technology used in a given weapon. However, this is hard to generalize because weight and shape also depends heavily on intended use of the weapon, engineering sophistication, yield, etc. Some weapons have been several meters long and weighed several tons, whereas other weapons could be launched by artillery guns. \nSome knowledge of the technology applied in a given weapon is essential for nuclear disarmament verification purposes because this determines what possible radiation may be detected and which methods may or must be used in the verification process. Physical characteristics such as shape and dimensions of the outer casing may provide supporting verification information. Relevant technical information can only be provided by the weapons owner, for example as part of the declaration process. \nCategorization According to Intended Use \nThis categorization divides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The dividing line between the categories is rather fuzzy. As the names imply, strategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance, whereas non-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role. Depending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function. Furthermore, for one State, strategic balance may be measured relative to its neighbor, while for another State, global balance may be the most important. \nSeveral definitions exist of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. However, the only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty. This definition applies only between the United States and Russia, although China also considers its longer-range weapons to be strategic nuclear weapons. Other States possessing nuclear weapons may have different views on what constitutes a “strategic weapon”; for example, if a nuclear weapon is capable of hitting the territory of a given State, the States in question may consider that weapon to be strategic regardless of its range. \n“Non-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical nuclear weapons,” “sub-strategic nuclear weapons,” “battlefield nuclear weapons,” or “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria, but again very similar systems in different States are likely to be defined differently. For example, in the United States, there is a differentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons, which are related to both range and intended use. \nWhether a specific nuclear weapon is considered strategic or not should be of little or no importance to nuclear disarmament verification because the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon. \nCategorization According to Means of Delivery \nMany ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons to their intended point of detonation. At the highest level, all nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories classified by where the delivery systems are based: ground-launched, sea-launched, or air-launched/air-delivered. Space-based nuclear weapons, although possible, are not considered in this paper because they are prohibited by the widely accepted Outer Space Treaty, which entered into force in 1967. \nGround-launched nuclear weapons include ground launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) as well as artillery shells and landmines with nuclear charges. Many different types of ballistic missiles have been developed for different purposes. They have been designed to carry different weights over different ranges, and they use different propellants. They are often subcategorized according to range, for example as shown in the Table IV-1-1 below: \n\nAs an example of the lack of standardization of these terms, one may observe that the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) defines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km. (This remains a non-standard definition of short range, however; the MTCR definition of 300 km as the lower limit appears to have gained greater credence.) \nBoth GLBMs and GLCMs may be launched from fixed launchers (such as missile silos) or from mobile, land-based transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). \nMany ballistic missiles are equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); thereby each containing several nuclear warheads. The term “nuclear warhead” is therefore often used for general bookkeeping purposes instead of the term “nuclear weapon,” even though the term “warhead” is defined conventionally as referring only to the explosive elements delivered by a missile. \nSea-launched nuclear weapons include ballistic missiles and cruise missiles as well as torpedoes, depth charges, and mines equipped with nuclear charges. These weapons may be launched from surface vessels or submarines. The terms “SLBM” and “SLCM” are used somewhat ambiguously. They are often taken to mean submarine-launched ballistic missile and submarine-launched cruise missile, respectively, but “SL” could also be read as “sea-launched” or “ship-launched.” For example, the United States generally uses SLCM to mean a sealaunched cruise missile regardless of whether it is launched from a ship or from a submarine. However, sometimes the term “ShLCM” has been used to specify a “ship-launched cruise missile.” Sea-launched ballistic missiles may be further subcategorized according to range as described above for ground-launched ballistic missiles. \nAir-launched nuclear weapons include air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). Torpedoes may also be launched from aircraft. Air-delivered nuclear weapons are nuclear bombs that are dropped close to the intended point of detonation. Traditionally, these were unguided bombs, also known as gravity bombs, but modern bombs may be precision-guided bombs, also referred to as smart bombs, which include tail kits to improve the accuracy of the bomb. \nThe term “nuclear triad” is used when discussing nuclear weapon possessor States that deploy (strategic) nuclear weapons in all three general basing modes, that is, ground-launched ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear capable aircraft. \nAs far as nuclear disarmament verification goes, the techniques and technologies applied would be the same regardless of means of delivery. One useful aspect of describing systems this way, however, is that it provides inspectors with an approximate idea of what they are likely to encounter in the field. Consistency with regard to delivery vehicle, location, certain characteristics, etc. may help build confidence. \nAccess requirements to sites with different categories of nuclear weapons may vary, and hence the verification procedures will depend somewhat on the type of site the systems are on (naval bases, silos, mobile launchers, etc.). In summary, some information on means of delivery may be important regarding the practicalities of nuclear disarmament verification, but may not provide sufficient information on its own to identify weapon systems or individual weapons or warheads. \nCategorization According to Operational Status \nThis categorization may be carried out in multiple ways. The discussion below first follows the approach used by the Status of World Nuclear Forces, a commonly quoted non-governmental organization (NGO) and then presents the system used in the United States. Other nuclear weapon possessing states probably have similar categories for weapons in their stockpiles. \nAt the top level in the NGO categorization, all nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile, that is, they are in military custody earmarked for military use, or they are awaiting dismantlement, that is, retired, but still intact. In late 2018, roughly one-third of all warheads fell in the latter category. \nThe warheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed. According to the same NGO source, in late 2018, about 40 percent of the nuclear warheads in the military stockpiles were deployed. \nThe deployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert (ready to be used on short notice) and those that are not. \nNon-deployed weapons may be awaiting deployment, undergoing maintenance, or be kept in long-term reserve. Reasons for keeping a substantial number of nuclear weapons in reserve may be to ensure that the State can meet possible future geopolitical challenges and/or to safeguard against potential technical problems due to an aging arsenal. \nIn the U.S. categorization, all nuclear warheads are part of the military stockpile. This stockpile can be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile. Weapons in the active stockpile are maintained to ensure that the military requirements for operational warheads are met. The inactive stockpile is composed of warheads retained in a nonoperational status and can provide augmentation or replacement warheads to the active stockpile. These two categories can be further broken down into subcategories. \nThere are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics. Active ready consists of warheads available for wartime employment planning. Active ready warheads can be loaded onto missiles or made available for use on aircraft within required timelines. Active hedge warheads are retained for deployment to manage technological risks in the active ready stockpile or to augment the active ready stockpile in response to geopolitical developments. Active logistics warheads are used to facilitate workflow and sustain the operational status of active ready or active hedge quantities. They may be in various stages of assembly. \nThe inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve. The inactive hedge consists of warheads retained for deployment to manage technological risks in the active ready stockpile or to augment the active ready stockpile in response to geopolitical developments. Inactive logistics warheads are used for logistical and surveillance purposes; these warheads may be in various stages of disassembly. Inactive reserve warheads are retained to provide long-term risk mitigation. Warheads in this category are exempt from future refurbishment modifications or alterations. \nWarheads in some of the different categories may have different characteristics, but these would not be directly observable to the nuclear disarmament verification inspectors. Different categories of warheads may be stored in different locations. \nIn and of themselves the above categories do not add much verification value unless they are accompanied by further information as to what this means for the physical location or state of the warhead. If a deployed system refers to the system being mated with a delivery vehicle, this would be verifiable, and similarly if it refers to the system being at a specific location. The nuclear disarmament verification inspectors would most likely prefer to meet the warhead that is to be dismantled as close to its end of deployment as possible. This will increase their confidence that the device that they are introduced to really is the warhead that it is claimed to be. \nCategorization According to Names or Model Designations \nThis form of categorization is quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name (for example, Little Boy or Blue Danube) and/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example, B61, Mk53, W78, or WE177). Warheads of the same general model may also have different modifications that can further differentiate the warhead or bomb. For example, the B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications to enable different uses or to increase its safety, security, and reliability (identified as B61-1, B61-2, etc.). The differences represented by the modifications may or may not be observable for a nuclear disarmament verification inspector. \nFurthermore, one would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number. \nIn the field of nuclear disarmament verification, these designations are important for bookkeeping purposes. It is important to uniquely identify each object under verification in ways that are meaningful to all participating parties. \nConclusion \nIn this paper, we have presented five independent ways of categorizing nuclear weapons according to: \n(1)\tWeapons technology; \n(2)\tIntended use; \n(3)\tMeans of delivery; \n(4)\tOperational status; and \n(5)\tNames or model designations. \nIn principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems. In the earlier sections of this paper, we have discussed the relevance of each of the different systems to nuclear disarmament verification. ",
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},
{
"content": "nuclear weapons may be categorized according to\nWeapons technology\nIntended use\nMeans of delivery\nOperational status; or\nNames or model designations\nMany different ways and\nterms are used to characterize nuclear weapons\nThere are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons\nCategorization According to Intended Use\ndivides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic\nand non-strategic\nThe dividing line\nis\nfuzzy\nstrategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance\nnon-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role\nDepending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function\nthe only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty\nNon-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical\nsub-strategic\nbattlefield\nor “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria\nin the U\nS\ndifferentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons\nare related to both range and intended use\nWhether a specific nuclear weapon is\nstrategic or not should be of\nno importance to nuclear disarmament\nbecause the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon\nMany ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons\nall nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories\nground\nsea\nor air-launched\nAs an example of the lack of standardization of these terms\nINF\ndefines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km\nThis remains a non-standard definition of short range\nCategorization According to Operational Status\nmay be carried out in multiple ways\nall nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile\nin military custody earmarked for military use, or\nare awaiting dismantlement\nretired, but still intact\nwarheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed\ndeployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert\nand those that are not\nthe military stockpile\ncan be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile\nThere are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics\nThe inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve\nCategorization According to Names or Model Designations\nis quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name\nand/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example\nB61\nW78\nthe B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications\nidentified as B61-1, B61-2\none would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number\nIn principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: There are obviously a lot of ways to ‘categorize’ nuclear weapons. Their interpretation can’t shape neg prep and is no better than ‘only our aff is topical.’ | nuclear weapons may be categorized according to
Weapons technology
Intended use
Means of delivery
Operational status; or
Names or model designations
Many different ways and
terms are used to characterize nuclear weapons
There are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons
Categorization According to Intended Use
divides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic
and non-strategic
The dividing line
is
fuzzy
strategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance
non-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role
Depending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function
the only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty
Non-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical
sub-strategic
battlefield
or “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria
in the U
S
differentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons
are related to both range and intended use
Whether a specific nuclear weapon is
strategic or not should be of
no importance to nuclear disarmament
because the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon
Many ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons
all nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories
ground
sea
or air-launched
As an example of the lack of standardization of these terms
INF
defines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km
This remains a non-standard definition of short range
Categorization According to Operational Status
may be carried out in multiple ways
all nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile
in military custody earmarked for military use, or
are awaiting dismantlement
retired, but still intact
warheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed
deployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert
and those that are not
the military stockpile
can be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile
There are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics
The inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve
Categorization According to Names or Model Designations
is quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name
and/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example
B61
W78
the B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications
identified as B61-1, B61-2
one would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number
In principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems | nuc
s may be categorized
tech
Names or model designations
Many different ways
Categorization According to Intended Use
one of two possible categories
fuzzy
Depending on their deployment
same weapon systems
only usable definition
Non-strategic nuclear weapons
tactical
sub-strategic
battlefield
theater
no strict definitions of these terms
yield
delivery vehicle
intended use
other criteria
U
S
both range and intended use
strategic or not
no importance to nuclear disarm
three general categories
ground
sea
or air-launched
lack of standardization
non-standard definition
Operational Status
part of the military stockpile
awaiting dismantlement
deployed with operational forces
non-deployed
on high alert
further divided
three subcategories
active ready
active hedge
active logistics
inactive hedge
inactive logistics
inactive reserve
Names or Model Designations
B61
W78
each individual warhead or bomb
unique serial number
In principle
nuc
s
terms from all of these five categorization
s | 245,989 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: There are obviously a lot of ways to ‘categorize’ nuclear weapons. Their interpretation can’t shape neg prep and is no better than ‘only our aff is topical.’",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "nuclear weapons may be categorized according to\nWeapons technology\nIntended use\nMeans of delivery\nOperational status; or\nNames or model designations\nMany different ways and\nterms are used to characterize nuclear weapons\nThere are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons\nCategorization According to Intended Use\ndivides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic\nand non-strategic\nThe dividing line\nis\nfuzzy\nstrategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance\nnon-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role\nDepending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function\nthe only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty\nNon-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical\nsub-strategic\nbattlefield\nor “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria\nin the U\nS\ndifferentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons\nare related to both range and intended use\nWhether a specific nuclear weapon is\nstrategic or not should be of\nno importance to nuclear disarmament\nbecause the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon\nMany ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons\nall nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories\nground\nsea\nor air-launched\nAs an example of the lack of standardization of these terms\nINF\ndefines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km\nThis remains a non-standard definition of short range\nCategorization According to Operational Status\nmay be carried out in multiple ways\nall nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile\nin military custody earmarked for military use, or\nare awaiting dismantlement\nretired, but still intact\nwarheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed\ndeployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert\nand those that are not\nthe military stockpile\ncan be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile\nThere are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics\nThe inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve\nCategorization According to Names or Model Designations\nis quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name\nand/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example\nB61\nW78\nthe B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications\nidentified as B61-1, B61-2\none would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number\nIn principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "nuc\ns may be categorized\ntech\nNames or model designations\nMany different ways\nCategorization According to Intended Use\none of two possible categories\nfuzzy\nDepending on their deployment\nsame weapon systems\nonly usable definition\nNon-strategic nuclear weapons\ntactical\nsub-strategic\nbattlefield\ntheater\nno strict definitions of these terms\nyield\ndelivery vehicle\nintended use\nother criteria\nU\nS\nboth range and intended use\nstrategic or not\nno importance to nuclear disarm\nthree general categories\nground\nsea\nor air-launched\nlack of standardization\nnon-standard definition\nOperational Status\npart of the military stockpile\nawaiting dismantlement\ndeployed with operational forces\nnon-deployed\non high alert\nfurther divided\nthree subcategories\nactive ready\nactive hedge\nactive logistics\ninactive hedge\ninactive logistics\ninactive reserve\nNames or Model Designations\nB61\nW78\neach individual warhead or bomb\nunique serial number\nIn principle\nnuc\ns\nterms from all of these five categorization\ns",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: There are obviously a lot of ways to ‘categorize’ nuclear weapons. Their interpretation can’t shape neg prep and is no better than ‘only our aff is topical.’
Highlight Ratio: 0.1 | nuclear weapons may be categorized according to
Weapons technology
Intended use
Means of delivery
Operational status; or
Names or model designations
Many different ways and
terms are used to characterize nuclear weapons
There are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons
Categorization According to Intended Use
divides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic
and non-strategic
The dividing line
is
fuzzy
strategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance
non-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role
Depending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function
the only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty
Non-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical
sub-strategic
battlefield
or “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria
in the U
S
differentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons
are related to both range and intended use
Whether a specific nuclear weapon is
strategic or not should be of
no importance to nuclear disarmament
because the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon
Many ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons
all nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories
ground
sea
or air-launched
As an example of the lack of standardization of these terms
INF
defines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km
This remains a non-standard definition of short range
Categorization According to Operational Status
may be carried out in multiple ways
all nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile
in military custody earmarked for military use, or
are awaiting dismantlement
retired, but still intact
warheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed
deployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert
and those that are not
the military stockpile
can be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile
There are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics
The inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve
Categorization According to Names or Model Designations
is quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name
and/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example
B61
W78
the B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications
identified as B61-1, B61-2
one would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number
In principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems | nuc
s may be categorized according to
tech
use
delivery
Operational status
Names or model designations
Depending on
deployment, the same weapon
could
have
strategic or
non-strategic function
often referred to
as “tactical
or “theater
There are no strict definitions
they could refer to yield, delivery
use
the
differentiation
should be of
no importance to
disarm
All types
have a
model designation
each
warhead
a unique serial number
nuc
s may be described by
all of these
categorization
s | 245,990 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: There are obviously a lot of ways to ‘categorize’ nuclear weapons. Their interpretation can’t shape neg prep and is no better than ‘only our aff is topical.’\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "nuclear weapons may be categorized according to\nWeapons technology\nIntended use\nMeans of delivery\nOperational status; or\nNames or model designations\nMany different ways and\nterms are used to characterize nuclear weapons\nThere are two different types of nuclear weapons making use of fission: gun-type assemblies and implosion weapons\nCategorization According to Intended Use\ndivides all nuclear weapons into one of two possible categories: strategic\nand non-strategic\nThe dividing line\nis\nfuzzy\nstrategic weapons are intended to play a role in the bigger picture with deterrence and power balance\nnon-strategic nuclear weapons may play a more operative role\nDepending on their deployment, the same weapon systems could in many cases have either a strategic or a non-strategic function\nthe only usable definition seems to be the simple one stating that a strategic nuclear weapon is any weapon covered by a strategic arms control treaty\nNon-strategic nuclear weapons” are often referred to by numerous other names such as “tactical\nsub-strategic\nbattlefield\nor “theater nuclear weapons.” There are no strict definitions of these terms; they could refer to yield, delivery vehicle, intended use, or other criteria\nin the U\nS\ndifferentiation between battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and theater nuclear weapons\nare related to both range and intended use\nWhether a specific nuclear weapon is\nstrategic or not should be of\nno importance to nuclear disarmament\nbecause the tools and procedures applied would be largely independent of the intended use of the weapon\nMany ways exist for delivering nuclear weapons\nall nuclear weapons would fall into one of three general categories\nground\nsea\nor air-launched\nAs an example of the lack of standardization of these terms\nINF\ndefines an “intermediate-range missile” to have a range of 1,000–5,500 km and a “shorter-range missile” to have a range of 500– 1,000 km\nThis remains a non-standard definition of short range\nCategorization According to Operational Status\nmay be carried out in multiple ways\nall nuclear warheads are either part of the military stockpile\nin military custody earmarked for military use, or\nare awaiting dismantlement\nretired, but still intact\nwarheads in the military stockpile may be further subdivided into those that are deployed with operational forces and those that are non-deployed\ndeployed warheads may be subdivided into those that are on high alert\nand those that are not\nthe military stockpile\ncan be further divided into the active stockpile and the inactive stockpile\nThere are three subcategories in the U.S. active stockpile: active ready, active hedge, and active logistics\nThe inactive stockpile is composed of inactive hedge, inactive logistics, and inactive reserve\nCategorization According to Names or Model Designations\nis quite obvious and straightforward. All types of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons have a name\nand/or an alphanumeric model designation (for example\nB61\nW78\nthe B61 gravity bomb has appeared in several different modifications\nidentified as B61-1, B61-2\none would expect each individual warhead or bomb to be identified by a unique serial number\nIn principle, any nuclear weapons may be described by terms from all of these five categorization systems",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "nuc\ns may be categorized according to\ntech\nuse\ndelivery\nOperational status\nNames or model designations\nDepending on\ndeployment, the same weapon\ncould\nhave\nstrategic or\nnon-strategic function\noften referred to\nas “tactical\nor “theater\nThere are no strict definitions\nthey could refer to yield, delivery\nuse\nthe\ndifferentiation\nshould be of\nno importance to\ndisarm\nAll types\nhave a\nmodel designation\neach\nwarhead\na unique serial number\nnuc\ns may be described by\nall of these\ncategorization\ns",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Restrict definition is so out of context. | We use the foregoing principles in interpreting ORS 308.205(2) (1989). That statute did not define "restriction." In ordinary usage, a "restriction" is: "1: something that restricts: QUALIFICATION: as a: a regulation that restricts or restrains * * * b: a limitation placed [***9] on the use or enjoyment of real or other property; esp: [*28] an encumbrance on land restricting the uses to which it may be put." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1937 (unabridged ed 1993). A restriction thus is "a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property, without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute or by contract), and without any necessary reference to the absence of an economic benefit in exchange for placement of that restriction. | In ordinary usage, a "restriction" is:
something that restricts
as
a regulation that restricts or restrains
A restriction thus is "a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property
without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute | 245,991 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Restrict definition is so out of context.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "We use the foregoing principles in interpreting ORS 308.205(2) (1989). That statute did not define \"restriction.\" In ordinary usage, a \"restriction\" is: \"1: something that restricts: QUALIFICATION: as a: a regulation that restricts or restrains * * * b: a limitation placed [***9] on the use or enjoyment of real or other property; esp: [*28] an encumbrance on land restricting the uses to which it may be put.\" Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 1937 (unabridged ed 1993). A restriction thus is \"a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment\" of the property, without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute or by contract), and without any necessary reference to the absence of an economic benefit in exchange for placement of that restriction.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "In ordinary usage, a \"restriction\" is:\nsomething that restricts\nas\na regulation that restricts or restrains\nA restriction thus is \"a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment\" of the property\nwithout any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Restrict definition is so out of context. | In ordinary usage, a "restriction" is:
something that restricts
as
a regulation that restricts or restrains
A restriction thus is "a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property
without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute | something that restricts
regulation
restricts or restrains
placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property
without any necessary reference
process
led
placement
form
statute | 245,992 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Restrict definition is so out of context.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "In ordinary usage, a \"restriction\" is:\nsomething that restricts\nas\na regulation that restricts or restrains\nA restriction thus is \"a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment\" of the property\nwithout any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "something that restricts\nregulation\nrestricts or restrains\nplaced on the use or enjoyment\" of the property\nwithout any necessary reference\nprocess\nled\nplacement\nform\nstatute",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Restrict definition is so out of context.
Highlight Ratio: 0.5 | In ordinary usage, a "restriction" is:
something that restricts
as
a regulation that restricts or restrains
A restriction thus is "a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property
without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute | A restriction
is "a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment" of the property
without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction | 245,993 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Restrict definition is so out of context.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "In ordinary usage, a \"restriction\" is:\nsomething that restricts\nas\na regulation that restricts or restrains\nA restriction thus is \"a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment\" of the property\nwithout any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction, without any necessary reference to the form of the restriction (e.g., by statute",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "A restriction\nis \"a limitation placed on the use or enjoyment\" of the property\nwithout any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: It’s only a question of time, which hinges on deterrence. | Apparently, unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP and the Chinese people. If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission and betraying his own promise. In addition, he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP and among the Chinese people, lose credibility and legitimacy as a leader who can defend China’s national interests and dignity against external pressures and challenges, and face criticism, opposition, or even a coup from within the party or the military. More seriously, he would also risk provoking social unrest or nationalist backlash from the public, who have been indoctrinated with patriotic education and propaganda for decades. Xi’s legitimacy has been largely based on the unification with Taiwan since the Therefore, he cannot afford to give up his historical unification task voluntarily.
While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider its actions and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction.
The CCP may postpone the implementation of the unification mission under certain circumstances: Significant shifts in the regional or global landscape might prompt a reassessment of priorities. Substantial domestic opposition to the unification task or mounting international pressure could compel a leader to reconsider their top priority. The potential Chinese domestic political fallout may lead to backlash from factions or interest groups within China. A change in the CCP’s political ideology can also influence a leader’s position on the unification task. A significant shift in public attitudes toward the unification task has the potential to influence a leader’s decision-making process and could also create opportunities for alternative arrangements and potentially reduce the urgency of pursuing reunification through military force. Nevertheless, all these hypothetical conditions are highly unlikely to occur under any CCP administration.
Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later. While Xi has not ruled out the use of force, he has also expressed his preference for based on the One-China principle and the. Is it possible for the PRC to reach the goal of peaceful unification with Taiwan based on the 1992 Consensus? Reality shows that since Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s, Taiwanese people’s minds are getting farther and farther away from the PRC.
| unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP
If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission
he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP
lose credibility and legitimacy
and face
even a coup from within the party or the military
he would also risk
nationalist backlash
from the public
Xi’s legitimacy has been
based on the unification with Taiwan
he cannot afford to give up
unification
While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider
and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction
Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later | 245,994 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It’s only a question of time, which hinges on deterrence.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Apparently, unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP and the Chinese people. If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission and betraying his own promise. In addition, he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP and among the Chinese people, lose credibility and legitimacy as a leader who can defend China’s national interests and dignity against external pressures and challenges, and face criticism, opposition, or even a coup from within the party or the military. More seriously, he would also risk provoking social unrest or nationalist backlash from the public, who have been indoctrinated with patriotic education and propaganda for decades. Xi’s legitimacy has been largely based on the unification with Taiwan since the Therefore, he cannot afford to give up his historical unification task voluntarily.\nWhile U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider its actions and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction.\nThe CCP may postpone the implementation of the unification mission under certain circumstances: Significant shifts in the regional or global landscape might prompt a reassessment of priorities. Substantial domestic opposition to the unification task or mounting international pressure could compel a leader to reconsider their top priority. The potential Chinese domestic political fallout may lead to backlash from factions or interest groups within China. A change in the CCP’s political ideology can also influence a leader’s position on the unification task. A significant shift in public attitudes toward the unification task has the potential to influence a leader’s decision-making process and could also create opportunities for alternative arrangements and potentially reduce the urgency of pursuing reunification through military force. Nevertheless, all these hypothetical conditions are highly unlikely to occur under any CCP administration.\nTherefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later. While Xi has not ruled out the use of force, he has also expressed his preference for based on the One-China principle and the. Is it possible for the PRC to reach the goal of peaceful unification with Taiwan based on the 1992 Consensus? Reality shows that since Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s, Taiwanese people’s minds are getting farther and farther away from the PRC.\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP\nIf Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission\nhe would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP\nlose credibility and legitimacy\nand face\neven a coup from within the party or the military\nhe would also risk\nnationalist backlash\nfrom the public\nXi’s legitimacy has been\nbased on the unification with Taiwan\nhe cannot afford to give up\nunification\nWhile U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider\nand carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction\nTherefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: It’s only a question of time, which hinges on deterrence. | unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP
If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission
he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP
lose credibility and legitimacy
and face
even a coup from within the party or the military
he would also risk
nationalist backlash
from the public
Xi’s legitimacy has been
based on the unification with Taiwan
he cannot afford to give up
unification
While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider
and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction
Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later | Taiwan
goal
CCP
Xi
objective
abandoning
serious
consequences
credibility
legitimacy
coup
party
military
risk
backlash
legitimacy
unification
While U.S. deterrence
cause the CCP
reconsider
carefully evaluate
approach
it won’t halt China’s progression
CCP’s
inevitable sooner or later | 245,995 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It’s only a question of time, which hinges on deterrence.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP\nIf Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission\nhe would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP\nlose credibility and legitimacy\nand face\neven a coup from within the party or the military\nhe would also risk\nnationalist backlash\nfrom the public\nXi’s legitimacy has been\nbased on the unification with Taiwan\nhe cannot afford to give up\nunification\nWhile U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider\nand carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction\nTherefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "Taiwan\ngoal\nCCP\nXi\nobjective\nabandoning\nserious\nconsequences\ncredibility\nlegitimacy\ncoup\nparty\nmilitary\nrisk\nbacklash\nlegitimacy\nunification\nWhile U.S. deterrence\ncause the CCP\nreconsider\ncarefully evaluate\napproach\nit won’t halt China’s progression\nCCP’s\ninevitable sooner or later",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: It’s only a question of time, which hinges on deterrence.
Highlight Ratio: 0.7 | unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP
If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission
he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP
lose credibility and legitimacy
and face
even a coup from within the party or the military
he would also risk
nationalist backlash
from the public
Xi’s legitimacy has been
based on the unification with Taiwan
he cannot afford to give up
unification
While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider
and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction
Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later | unification
has been a
goal for
CCP
If Xi gave up
he would be
abandoning his core mission
face serious
consequences within
CCP
lose credibility and legitimacy
even a coup from
the party or
military
risk
backlash
from
public
Xi’s legitimacy
been
based on
unification
he cannot
give up
While U.S. deterrence
may cause the CCP to reconsider
and carefully evaluate its approach
it won’t halt China’s progression
Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take
Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later | 245,996 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It’s only a question of time, which hinges on deterrence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP\nIf Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission\nhe would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP\nlose credibility and legitimacy\nand face\neven a coup from within the party or the military\nhe would also risk\nnationalist backlash\nfrom the public\nXi’s legitimacy has been\nbased on the unification with Taiwan\nhe cannot afford to give up\nunification\nWhile U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider\nand carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction\nTherefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "unification\nhas been a\ngoal for\nCCP\nIf Xi gave up\nhe would be\nabandoning his core mission\nface serious\nconsequences within\nCCP\nlose credibility and legitimacy\neven a coup from\nthe party or\nmilitary\nrisk\nbacklash\nfrom\npublic\nXi’s legitimacy\nbeen\nbased on\nunification\nhe cannot\ngive up\nWhile U.S. deterrence\nmay cause the CCP to reconsider\nand carefully evaluate its approach\nit won’t halt China’s progression\nTherefore, the CCP’s mission to take\nTaiwan is inevitable sooner or later",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Less likely than nuclear war in other theaters | In the U.S. nuclear community, you’ll often hear a strangely contradictory statement about nuclear weapons. It goes something like this: “We have nuclear weapons so that nuclear weapons will never be used.” U.S. nuclear deterrence, however, hinges on the assumption that adversaries believe that the United States has a functioning stockpile of nuclear weapons that can and will be used. In recent decades, arms control, nonproliferation agreements, and confidence-building measures have reduced the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. However, the risk of a conventional military crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into a theater nuclear war remains. | In recent decades, arms control, nonproliferation agreements, and confidence-building measures have reduced the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the U
S
However, the risk of a conventional military crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into a theater nuclear war remains | 245,997 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Less likely than nuclear war in other theaters",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "In the U.S. nuclear community, you’ll often hear a strangely contradictory statement about nuclear weapons. It goes something like this: “We have nuclear weapons so that nuclear weapons will never be used.” U.S. nuclear deterrence, however, hinges on the assumption that adversaries believe that the United States has a functioning stockpile of nuclear weapons that can and will be used. In recent decades, arms control, nonproliferation agreements, and confidence-building measures have reduced the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States. However, the risk of a conventional military crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into a theater nuclear war remains.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "In recent decades, arms control, nonproliferation agreements, and confidence-building measures have reduced the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the U\nS\nHowever, the risk of a conventional military crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into a theater nuclear war remains",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Less likely than nuclear war in other theaters
Highlight Ratio: 0.7 | In recent decades, arms control, nonproliferation agreements, and confidence-building measures have reduced the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the U
S
However, the risk of a conventional military crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into a theater nuclear war remains | arms control, nonprolif
and c
b
m
s have reduced
possibility of
strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the U
S
However
risk of a conventional
crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into
nuclear war remains | 245,999 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Less likely than nuclear war in other theaters\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "In recent decades, arms control, nonproliferation agreements, and confidence-building measures have reduced the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the U\nS\nHowever, the risk of a conventional military crisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into a theater nuclear war remains",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "arms control, nonprolif\nand c\nb\nm\ns have reduced\npossibility of\nstrategic nuclear exchange between Russia and the U\nS\nHowever\nrisk of a conventional\ncrisis in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia escalating into\nnuclear war remains",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Confluence of legal factors inhibit RoN effectiveness | More broadly, effectiveness has not much to do with the chosen approach, whatever it is objective or subjective. Indeed, effectiveness depends on a large variety of factors, both legal and extra-legal. Therefore, if RoN supporters wants to “save the world”, they would have to look at all those factors instead of focusing on a philosophical paradigm shift. For example, there a lot of legal factors that can be identified and are looking for improvement, such as, inter alia, norms’ coherence, sanctions, corruption, impartiality of public authorities and judges, administrative inertia, regulators’ capture, access to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions, etc. Therefore, the issue must be addressed more broadly than the RoN approach does. That’s why the concept of Environmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting, because of its complexity and, thus, its ability to include the multiplicity of the effectiveness factors.
As a conclusion, the RoN’s theory needs to be putted into perspective to show that it is not “a legal revolution that could save the world”. If the goal is to save the world, and if Law can be part of the solution, it might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside, helping it to be faster, more radical and more effective to fight the ecological crisis. This implies to work on a large scale of factors rather than focusing on a philosophical siren song. | effectiveness
depends on a large variety of factors
legal and extra-legal
RoN
would have to look at all those factors
there a lot of legal factors that can be identified
norms’ coherence
sanctions
corruption
impartiality of public authorities and judges
administrative inertia
regulators’ capture
access to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions
etc
That’s why
Environmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting
because of its complexity
RoN’s theory
is not “a legal revolution that could save the world
it might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside | 246,000 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Confluence of legal factors inhibit RoN effectiveness",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "More broadly, effectiveness has not much to do with the chosen approach, whatever it is objective or subjective. Indeed, effectiveness depends on a large variety of factors, both legal and extra-legal. Therefore, if RoN supporters wants to “save the world”, they would have to look at all those factors instead of focusing on a philosophical paradigm shift. For example, there a lot of legal factors that can be identified and are looking for improvement, such as, inter alia, norms’ coherence, sanctions, corruption, impartiality of public authorities and judges, administrative inertia, regulators’ capture, access to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions, etc. Therefore, the issue must be addressed more broadly than the RoN approach does. That’s why the concept of Environmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting, because of its complexity and, thus, its ability to include the multiplicity of the effectiveness factors.\nAs a conclusion, the RoN’s theory needs to be putted into perspective to show that it is not “a legal revolution that could save the world”. If the goal is to save the world, and if Law can be part of the solution, it might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside, helping it to be faster, more radical and more effective to fight the ecological crisis. This implies to work on a large scale of factors rather than focusing on a philosophical siren song. ",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "effectiveness\ndepends on a large variety of factors\nlegal and extra-legal\nRoN\nwould have to look at all those factors\nthere a lot of legal factors that can be identified\nnorms’ coherence\nsanctions\ncorruption\nimpartiality of public authorities and judges\nadministrative inertia\nregulators’ capture\naccess to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions\netc\nThat’s why\nEnvironmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting\nbecause of its complexity\nRoN’s theory\nis not “a legal revolution that could save the world\nit might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Confluence of legal factors inhibit RoN effectiveness | effectiveness
depends on a large variety of factors
legal and extra-legal
RoN
would have to look at all those factors
there a lot of legal factors that can be identified
norms’ coherence
sanctions
corruption
impartiality of public authorities and judges
administrative inertia
regulators’ capture
access to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions
etc
That’s why
Environmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting
because of its complexity
RoN’s theory
is not “a legal revolution that could save the world
it might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside | large variety
RoN
factors
identified
norms’ coherence
sanctions
corruption
impartiality
judges
administrative inertia
regulators’ capture
interpretation
decisions
interesting
complexity
not
save the world | 246,001 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Confluence of legal factors inhibit RoN effectiveness",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "effectiveness\ndepends on a large variety of factors\nlegal and extra-legal\nRoN\nwould have to look at all those factors\nthere a lot of legal factors that can be identified\nnorms’ coherence\nsanctions\ncorruption\nimpartiality of public authorities and judges\nadministrative inertia\nregulators’ capture\naccess to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions\netc\nThat’s why\nEnvironmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting\nbecause of its complexity\nRoN’s theory\nis not “a legal revolution that could save the world\nit might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "large variety\nRoN\nfactors\nidentified\nnorms’ coherence\nsanctions\ncorruption\nimpartiality\njudges\nadministrative inertia\nregulators’ capture\ninterpretation\ndecisions\ninteresting\ncomplexity\nnot\nsave the world",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Confluence of legal factors inhibit RoN effectiveness
Highlight Ratio: 0.6 | effectiveness
depends on a large variety of factors
legal and extra-legal
RoN
would have to look at all those factors
there a lot of legal factors that can be identified
norms’ coherence
sanctions
corruption
impartiality of public authorities and judges
administrative inertia
regulators’ capture
access to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions
etc
That’s why
Environmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting
because of its complexity
RoN’s theory
is not “a legal revolution that could save the world
it might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside | effectiveness
depends on
large variety of factors
a lot
can be identified
norms’ coherence
sanctions
corruption
impartiality of
judges
admin
inertia
regulators’ capture
access to justice
judges’ interpretation
judicial decisions
etc
Environmental
Law
looking much more interesting
because of
complexity
RoN’s
not
a legal revolution that could save the world | 246,002 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Confluence of legal factors inhibit RoN effectiveness\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "effectiveness\ndepends on a large variety of factors\nlegal and extra-legal\nRoN\nwould have to look at all those factors\nthere a lot of legal factors that can be identified\nnorms’ coherence\nsanctions\ncorruption\nimpartiality of public authorities and judges\nadministrative inertia\nregulators’ capture\naccess to justice, judges’ interpretation, execution of judicial decisions\netc\nThat’s why\nEnvironmental Rule of Law is looking much more interesting\nbecause of its complexity\nRoN’s theory\nis not “a legal revolution that could save the world\nit might be better to improve Environmental Law from the inside",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "effectiveness\ndepends on\nlarge variety of factors\na lot\ncan be identified\nnorms’ coherence\nsanctions\ncorruption\nimpartiality of\njudges\nadmin\ninertia\nregulators’ capture\naccess to justice\njudges’ interpretation\njudicial decisions\netc\nEnvironmental\nLaw\nlooking much more interesting\nbecause of\ncomplexity\nRoN’s\nnot\na legal revolution that could save the world",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Turn---capitalism is an effect of power that we critique---focusing on class is a covert method of oppressing non-normative bodies by ignoring different vectors of oppression---their Kritik only results in a distortion of oppression | Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting. From this perspective, Marxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors. In this model, class becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists. What distinguishes identity politics from Marxist politics is how it detaches oppression from exploitation and separates each oppression from every other.
Oppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect – like two lines from nowhere that suddenly crash into one another at angles – they have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane – wealthy, European, white, cis, male, able-bodied, heterosexual, non-immigrant people from imperialist nations – the vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes – poor, Black or brown, trans, female, intersex, disabled, queer, and colonized – these vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered (having experienced sexual abuse, having a multiple personality, age bias, lookism) helps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering. In its own way, this ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.
Of course, the above model is inspired by Foucault and the source of these vectors is ‘Power’. While poststructuralism has a cynical disdain for terms such as ‘Truth with a capital T’ and ‘Knowledge with a capital K’, the entire edifice depends upon a mysterious ‘Power with a capital P’. The subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power. To continue the metaphor, privilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.
But there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence. Is it possible to see this mysterious force called Power? All we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.
So what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.
What kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power: ethical consumption is therefore paramount – buying local, reusing and recycling, promoting ‘fair’ trade, and eating organic are all little ways of resisting Power. If reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world. Despite the rejection of Aristotle’s essentialism, his virtue ethics are foundational to this configuration of radical resistance. In many ways this mode of political activity is a distortion of Gramsci’s idea of the war of position. Here, the war of position does not lead to or complement the war of maneuver; it supplants it.3 | Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting.
Marxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors.
class becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists.
Oppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect
they have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane
the vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes
these vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered
helps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering.
this ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.
The subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power.
privilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.
But there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence.
All we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.
So what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.
What kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power
If reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world. | 246,003 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Turn---capitalism is an effect of power that we critique---focusing on class is a covert method of oppressing non-normative bodies by ignoring different vectors of oppression---their Kritik only results in a distortion of oppression",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting. From this perspective, Marxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors. In this model, class becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists. What distinguishes identity politics from Marxist politics is how it detaches oppression from exploitation and separates each oppression from every other.\nOppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect – like two lines from nowhere that suddenly crash into one another at angles – they have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane – wealthy, European, white, cis, male, able-bodied, heterosexual, non-immigrant people from imperialist nations – the vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes – poor, Black or brown, trans, female, intersex, disabled, queer, and colonized – these vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered (having experienced sexual abuse, having a multiple personality, age bias, lookism) helps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering. In its own way, this ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.\nOf course, the above model is inspired by Foucault and the source of these vectors is ‘Power’. While poststructuralism has a cynical disdain for terms such as ‘Truth with a capital T’ and ‘Knowledge with a capital K’, the entire edifice depends upon a mysterious ‘Power with a capital P’. The subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power. To continue the metaphor, privilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.\nBut there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence. Is it possible to see this mysterious force called Power? All we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.\nSo what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.\nWhat kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power: ethical consumption is therefore paramount – buying local, reusing and recycling, promoting ‘fair’ trade, and eating organic are all little ways of resisting Power. If reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world. Despite the rejection of Aristotle’s essentialism, his virtue ethics are foundational to this configuration of radical resistance. In many ways this mode of political activity is a distortion of Gramsci’s idea of the war of position. Here, the war of position does not lead to or complement the war of maneuver; it supplants it.3",
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"content": "Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting.\nMarxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors.\nclass becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists.\nOppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect\nthey have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane\nthe vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes\nthese vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered\nhelps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering.\nthis ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.\nThe subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power.\nprivilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.\nBut there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence.\nAll we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.\nSo what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.\nWhat kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power\nIf reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world.",
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Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Turn---capitalism is an effect of power that we critique---focusing on class is a covert method of oppressing non-normative bodies by ignoring different vectors of oppression---their Kritik only results in a distortion of oppression | Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting.
Marxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors.
class becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists.
Oppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect
they have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane
the vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes
these vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered
helps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering.
this ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.
The subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power.
privilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.
But there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence.
All we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.
So what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.
What kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power
If reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world. | Identity politics
schematic politics
theories of oppression
detached
theories of exploitation
different vectors
intersecting
Marxists
distort
class
important
worst
subjects of class
no other oppressions
straight
white
cis
heterosexual men
class
covert method of oppressing
class
top of the oppression hierarchy
reinforcing
trauma
vectors
class
marked
whiteness
maleness
secondary consideration
Oppression
abstract lust
domination
life
economy
social problems
intersect
different points of origin
jet
individual
transparent
blank-slate subjects
situated
dominant plane
vectors
privileges
beams of healing white light
situated
subjugated planes
vectors
lasers
uncovered
explain
total force field
human suffering
humane
attentive
marginalized people
subjugation
new languages
express
suffering
vector model of oppression’
unitary theory of oppressions
figure
individual body
experiences
oppressions
privileges
discovery of new vectors
human condition
concrete
subject
individual
pleasures
pains
privilege
oppression
constitutes
individual
social
status as a conduit
Power
privilege
mirrored ball
red laser
Power
redirected
vulnerable bodies
principle of sociality
self-preservation
refracting
bodies
Ethics
interpersonal
horizon of politics
recognizing
privilege
first step
blackening
Power
absorbed
violently
others
outside
vectors of privilege
trick
twist the pain of disciplinary power
strength
self-empowerment
powerless
resist
rational man
Enlightenment
center
universe
individual
focus
political meaning
interaction
pleasure
mortification
individual body
transactional
market-like configuration
disciplinary power
refracted
masses by the masses
individual behavior
limit
political power
limit
effects
Power
Power
eternal force
Capitalism
arrangement
social violence
effect
Power
care for the self
attend
language
language
symbol
human interaction
Violent speech
discursive activity
Power
misrecognize
mis-categorize
intention
ignorance
asserting Power
Sarcasm
discursive blasphemy
tames
power of Power
care of the self
awareness of others
attentiveness
(neo)liberal politics
academy
critique of neoliberalism
awareness campaigns,
dismantling the system’
individuals
positions of power
extinguish power
commitment to ethical living
locating
privileges
renouncing
acting
extending
Thinking deeply
Power
recognition
capitalism
Power’s effects
subjects
not capable
stopping capitalism
ethically bound
resist
vector of Power
reflecting violence
micro-aggression
small ethical acts micro-heal the world | 246,004 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Turn---capitalism is an effect of power that we critique---focusing on class is a covert method of oppressing non-normative bodies by ignoring different vectors of oppression---their Kritik only results in a distortion of oppression",
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"content": "Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting.\nMarxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors.\nclass becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists.\nOppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect\nthey have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane\nthe vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes\nthese vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered\nhelps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering.\nthis ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.\nThe subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power.\nprivilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.\nBut there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence.\nAll we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.\nSo what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.\nWhat kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power\nIf reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world.",
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"content": "Identity politics\nschematic politics\ntheories of oppression\ndetached\ntheories of exploitation\ndifferent vectors\nintersecting\nMarxists\ndistort\nclass\nimportant\nworst\nsubjects of class\nno other oppressions\nstraight\nwhite\ncis\nheterosexual men\nclass\ncovert method of oppressing\nclass\ntop of the oppression hierarchy\nreinforcing\ntrauma\nvectors\nclass\nmarked\nwhiteness\nmaleness\nsecondary consideration\nOppression\nabstract lust\ndomination\nlife\neconomy\nsocial problems\nintersect\ndifferent points of origin\njet\nindividual\ntransparent\nblank-slate subjects\nsituated\ndominant plane\nvectors\nprivileges\nbeams of healing white light\nsituated\nsubjugated planes\nvectors\nlasers\nuncovered\nexplain\ntotal force field\nhuman suffering\nhumane\nattentive\nmarginalized people\nsubjugation\nnew languages\nexpress\nsuffering\nvector model of oppression’\nunitary theory of oppressions\nfigure\nindividual body\nexperiences\noppressions\nprivileges\ndiscovery of new vectors\nhuman condition\nconcrete\nsubject\nindividual\npleasures\npains\nprivilege\noppression\nconstitutes\nindividual\nsocial\nstatus as a conduit\nPower\nprivilege\nmirrored ball\nred laser\nPower\nredirected\nvulnerable bodies\nprinciple of sociality\nself-preservation\nrefracting\nbodies\nEthics\ninterpersonal\nhorizon of politics\nrecognizing\nprivilege\nfirst step\nblackening\nPower\nabsorbed\nviolently\nothers\noutside\nvectors of privilege\ntrick\ntwist the pain of disciplinary power\nstrength\nself-empowerment\npowerless\nresist\nrational man\nEnlightenment\ncenter\nuniverse\nindividual\nfocus\npolitical meaning\ninteraction\npleasure\nmortification\nindividual body\ntransactional\nmarket-like configuration\ndisciplinary power\nrefracted\nmasses by the masses\nindividual behavior\nlimit\npolitical power\nlimit\neffects\nPower\nPower\neternal force\nCapitalism\narrangement\nsocial violence\neffect\nPower\ncare for the self\nattend\nlanguage\nlanguage\nsymbol\nhuman interaction\nViolent speech\ndiscursive activity\nPower\nmisrecognize\nmis-categorize\nintention\nignorance\nasserting Power\nSarcasm\ndiscursive blasphemy\ntames\npower of Power\ncare of the self\nawareness of others\nattentiveness\n(neo)liberal politics\nacademy\ncritique of neoliberalism\nawareness campaigns,\ndismantling the system’\nindividuals\npositions of power\nextinguish power\ncommitment to ethical living\nlocating\nprivileges\nrenouncing\nacting\nextending\nThinking deeply\nPower\nrecognition\ncapitalism\nPower’s effects\nsubjects\nnot capable\nstopping capitalism\nethically bound\nresist\nvector of Power\nreflecting violence\nmicro-aggression\nsmall ethical acts micro-heal the world",
"role": "assistant"
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] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Turn---capitalism is an effect of power that we critique---focusing on class is a covert method of oppressing non-normative bodies by ignoring different vectors of oppression---their Kritik only results in a distortion of oppression
Highlight Ratio: 0.1 | Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting.
Marxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors.
class becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists.
Oppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect
they have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane
the vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes
these vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered
helps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering.
this ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.
The subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power.
privilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.
But there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence.
All we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.
So what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.
What kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power
If reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world. | class is a covert method of oppressing
by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy
class becomes
marked by whiteness and maleness
those situated on subjugated planes
vectors cut through the body like lasers
privilege acts like a mirrored ball
the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards
more vulnerable bodies
For those outside
vectors of privilege
the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment
let Power know that you
will resist
disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses
Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces
social violence; it is an effect of Power
The best one can do is care for the self and attend to
Violent speech is a
discursive activity disseminating Power
the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them
small ethical acts micro-heal the world | 246,005 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Turn---capitalism is an effect of power that we critique---focusing on class is a covert method of oppressing non-normative bodies by ignoring different vectors of oppression---their Kritik only results in a distortion of oppression\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Identity politics might be better understood as a form of schematic politics where the development of theories of oppression is detached from theories of exploitation. Race, class, nation, gender, sexuality, and disability are understood as wholly different vectors capable of intersecting.\nMarxists supposedly distort the math by identifying class as the most important and worst oppression, and the subjects of class are those who, subtextually, have no other oppressions: straight, white, cis, heterosexual men. So, according to this model, attention to class is a covert method of oppressing women, queer, trans, and colonized people by putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy, thereby reinforcing the trauma of all other vectors.\nclass becomes so marked by whiteness and maleness that it must become a secondary consideration, only meaningful when another oppression already exists.\nOppression is thought to emerge from an abstract lust for domination and therefore has a life separate from the economy. Although social problems might intersect\nthey have wholly different points of origin and they jet out towards the individual, transparent, blank-slate subjects to cut through them. For those situated on the dominant plane\nthe vectors are privileges that pass through their bodies like beams of healing white light. For those situated on subjugated planes\nthese vectors cut through the body like lasers. Each new line of oppression uncovered\nhelps better explain the total force field of human suffering. This model of understanding suffering has some positive aspects. It is humane and attentive to the experience of marginalized people. Those who have experienced subjugation can build new languages to express their suffering.\nthis ‘vector model of oppression’ attempts to build a unitary theory of oppressions through the figure of the individual body, the body that experiences the oppressions and privileges that pass through it. By the continuing discovery of new vectors that shape experience, the human condition becomes concrete.\nThe subject is always an individual experiencing the pleasures or pains that come from a privilege or oppression that constitutes them. With individual bodies experiencing the vectors of privilege and oppression flowing through them, the individual becomes social through its status as a conduit for Power.\nprivilege acts like a mirrored ball so that the red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards other, more vulnerable bodies. The grounding principle of sociality in this model is self-preservation. One saves oneself by refracting Power onto other bodies. Ethics and the interpersonal become the horizon of politics, where recognizing one’s privilege is the first step towards blackening the mirror so that Power will be absorbed and not violently projected onto others. For those outside the vectors of privilege, the trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment, to let Power know that you, although powerless, will resist.\nBut there are downsides to this model of oppression. The first is that it is an interpersonal model of politics grounded in individual experience. The rational man of the Enlightenment may not be at the center of the universe in this model, but the individual is still the focus. What ultimately determines political meaning and interaction is the pleasure and/or mortification of the individual body arranged in a transactional, market-like configuration where disciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses. The model’s individualism produces other problems. A history that is the sum of individual responses to and refractions of Power is no more of a history of human existence than a relay of blinking lights is a history of light. Such a schema is not a history, but a situation, a meaningless existential crisis in which one is positioned arbitrarily. This schematic, space-driven focus on the individual experience of oppression rejects the notion of History as metaphysically suspect, but requires a strange and godlike field called Power2 to ground the meaning of existence.\nAll we can see is Power as it is refracted through the other. We can see only the traces it leaves behind.\nSo what kind of political solutions are generated by this model? First of all, individual behavior is the limit of political power. One can limit the effects of Power, but Power itself is an eternal force. Capitalism is not an arrangement that produces certain types of social violence; it is an effect of Power. The best one can do is care for the self and attend to one’s language, language itself being the symbol of human interaction. To punch, strangle or rape someone is a discursive activity that conveys the message of Power to the body of the other. Violent speech is another discursive activity disseminating Power. To misrecognize or mis-categorize the being of the other through intention or ignorance is another form of asserting Power. Sarcasm is the form of discursive blasphemy that tames the power of Power. Finally, the care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them.\nWhat kind of politics is this? It is left (neo)liberal politics promoted by the academy as a critique of neoliberalism: awareness campaigns, ‘dismantling the system’ by putting aware individuals in positions of power so that they can better extinguish power, commitment to ethical living, locating one’s privileges and renouncing them by not acting upon them or extending them. Thinking deeply about Power leads to a recognition that capitalism is but one of Power’s effects. However, just because subjects are not capable of stopping capitalism does not mean that they are not ethically bound to resist it as they would any other vector of Power\nIf reflecting violence onto another is micro-aggression, small ethical acts micro-heal the world.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "class is a covert method of oppressing\nby putting class at the top of the oppression hierarchy\nclass becomes\nmarked by whiteness and maleness\nthose situated on subjugated planes\nvectors cut through the body like lasers\nprivilege acts like a mirrored ball\nthe red laser sights of Power can be redirected towards\nmore vulnerable bodies\nFor those outside\nvectors of privilege\nthe trick is to twist the pain of disciplinary power into strength and self-empowerment\nlet Power know that you\nwill resist\ndisciplinary power is refracted through the masses by the masses\nCapitalism is not an arrangement that produces\nsocial violence; it is an effect of Power\nThe best one can do is care for the self and attend to\nViolent speech is a\ndiscursive activity disseminating Power\nthe care of the self can extend to an awareness of others and attentiveness towards them\nsmall ethical acts micro-heal the world",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy. | Rural America faces unique challenges and opportunities compared with urban America. However, the contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy has diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise.
Rural is often a catch phrase denoting everything that is not urban or metropolitan. This blog focuses specifically on the 704 counties in which 100.0 percent of the population lives in a rural area (referred to as “rural counties” in this analysis). For more information about how the U.S. Census Bureau defines urban and rural geographies, see Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau.
The newly released Census Bureau data from the American Community Survey 5-year statistics show that rural counties vary widely among themselves and across regions as demonstrated by industry statistics.
Figure 1 shows the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming or manufacturing. In fact, the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties (22.3 percent) is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers. It is in this industry where you find our elementary and middle school teachers and registered nurses. Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry. A smaller share of the workforce is employed in the finance, wholesale trade and information industries combined.
Figure 1. Percent Employed by Type of Industry: Completely Rural Counties
While no longer the top industries in these areas, resource-based activities such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A somewhat higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing. In fact, 12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry, performing duties as assemblers and fabricators, production workers and managers. | contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy
diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise
the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming
the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties
is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers
Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A
higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing
12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry | 246,006 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Rural America faces unique challenges and opportunities compared with urban America. However, the contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy has diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise.\nRural is often a catch phrase denoting everything that is not urban or metropolitan. This blog focuses specifically on the 704 counties in which 100.0 percent of the population lives in a rural area (referred to as “rural counties” in this analysis). For more information about how the U.S. Census Bureau defines urban and rural geographies, see Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau.\nThe newly released Census Bureau data from the American Community Survey 5-year statistics show that rural counties vary widely among themselves and across regions as demonstrated by industry statistics.\nFigure 1 shows the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming or manufacturing. In fact, the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties (22.3 percent) is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers. It is in this industry where you find our elementary and middle school teachers and registered nurses. Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry. A smaller share of the workforce is employed in the finance, wholesale trade and information industries combined.\nFigure 1. Percent Employed by Type of Industry: Completely Rural Counties\nWhile no longer the top industries in these areas, resource-based activities such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A somewhat higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing. In fact, 12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry, performing duties as assemblers and fabricators, production workers and managers.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy\ndiversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise\nthe economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming\nthe largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties\nis employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers\nAnother 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry\nagriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A\nhigher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing\n12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy. | Rural America faces unique challenges and opportunities compared with urban America. However, the contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy has diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise.
Rural is often a catch phrase denoting everything that is not urban or metropolitan. This blog focuses specifically on the 704 counties in which 100.0 percent of the population lives in a rural area (referred to as “rural counties” in this analysis). For more information about how the U.S. Census Bureau defines urban and rural geographies, see Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau.
The newly released Census Bureau data from the American Community Survey 5-year statistics show that rural counties vary widely among themselves and across regions as demonstrated by industry statistics.
Figure 1 shows the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming or manufacturing. In fact, the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties (22.3 percent) is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers. It is in this industry where you find our elementary and middle school teachers and registered nurses. Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry. A smaller share of the workforce is employed in the finance, wholesale trade and information industries combined.
Figure 1. Percent Employed by Type of Industry: Completely Rural Counties
While no longer the top industries in these areas, resource-based activities such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A somewhat higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing. In fact, 12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry, performing duties as assemblers and fabricators, production workers and managers. | far beyond the farm
diversified substantially
the decline
manufacturing
retail sales
educational services
diverse
not necessarily dependent
largest segment
education services
health care
social assistance industry
10.9 percent
rural counties
retail trade industry
and
still employ
higher share
12.1 percent
rural civilian workforce | 246,007 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Rural America faces unique challenges and opportunities compared with urban America. However, the contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy has diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise.\nRural is often a catch phrase denoting everything that is not urban or metropolitan. This blog focuses specifically on the 704 counties in which 100.0 percent of the population lives in a rural area (referred to as “rural counties” in this analysis). For more information about how the U.S. Census Bureau defines urban and rural geographies, see Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau.\nThe newly released Census Bureau data from the American Community Survey 5-year statistics show that rural counties vary widely among themselves and across regions as demonstrated by industry statistics.\nFigure 1 shows the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming or manufacturing. In fact, the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties (22.3 percent) is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers. It is in this industry where you find our elementary and middle school teachers and registered nurses. Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry. A smaller share of the workforce is employed in the finance, wholesale trade and information industries combined.\nFigure 1. Percent Employed by Type of Industry: Completely Rural Counties\nWhile no longer the top industries in these areas, resource-based activities such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A somewhat higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing. In fact, 12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry, performing duties as assemblers and fabricators, production workers and managers.",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "far beyond the farm\ndiversified substantially\nthe decline\nmanufacturing\nretail sales\neducational services\ndiverse\nnot necessarily dependent\nlargest segment\neducation services\nhealth care\nsocial assistance industry\n10.9 percent\nrural counties\nretail trade industry\nand\nstill employ\nhigher share\n12.1 percent\nrural civilian workforce",
"role": "assistant"
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Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy.
Highlight Ratio: 0.4 | contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy
diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise
the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming
the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties
is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers
Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A
higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing
12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry | contributions
go
beyond the farm
rural economy
diversified
Jobs in
ag
are on the decline while
manufacturing
retail
and education
are on the rise
economy
is diverse
not
dependent on farming
largest segment
employed in
education
health care and social assistance
Another 10
percent
employed in
retail
industry
ag
forestry, fishing, hunting and mining
employ one out of 10 workers
A
higher share
in manufacturing | 246,008 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy\ndiversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise\nthe economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming\nthe largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties\nis employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers\nAnother 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry\nagriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A\nhigher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing\n12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "contributions\ngo\nbeyond the farm\nrural economy\ndiversified\nJobs in\nag\nare on the decline while\nmanufacturing\nretail\nand education\nare on the rise\neconomy\nis diverse\nnot\ndependent on farming\nlargest segment\nemployed in\neducation\nhealth care and social assistance\nAnother 10\npercent\nemployed in\nretail\nindustry\nag\nforestry, fishing, hunting and mining\nemploy one out of 10 workers\nA\nhigher share\nin manufacturing",
"role": "assistant"
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] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: US-China nuclear conflict causes extinction. | Because American forces are to strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a nuclear winter and the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot. But even if nuclear weapons are not employed, a war between the two powers could result in immense destruction in China’s industrial heartland and to such key U.S. allies as Japan and South Korea. Fires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere, while the subsequent breakdown in global economic activity would postpone by years any transition to a green economy.
| Because American forces are
to strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a
nuclear winter
and the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot
Fires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere | 246,009 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: US-China nuclear conflict causes extinction.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Because American forces are to strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a nuclear winter and the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot. But even if nuclear weapons are not employed, a war between the two powers could result in immense destruction in China’s industrial heartland and to such key U.S. allies as Japan and South Korea. Fires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere, while the subsequent breakdown in global economic activity would postpone by years any transition to a green economy.\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "Because American forces are\nto strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a\nnuclear winter\nand the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot\nFires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: US-China nuclear conflict causes extinction. | Because American forces are to strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a nuclear winter and the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot. But even if nuclear weapons are not employed, a war between the two powers could result in immense destruction in China’s industrial heartland and to such key U.S. allies as Japan and South Korea. Fires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere, while the subsequent breakdown in global economic activity would postpone by years any transition to a green economy.
| forces
strike
targets
Chinese
China’s use
preparations
detected
nuclear strike
thermonuclear
resulting from
nuclear winter
death of billions
climate-change
moot
Fires
course
battle
carbon
atmosphere | 246,010 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: US-China nuclear conflict causes extinction.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Because American forces are to strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a nuclear winter and the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot. But even if nuclear weapons are not employed, a war between the two powers could result in immense destruction in China’s industrial heartland and to such key U.S. allies as Japan and South Korea. Fires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere, while the subsequent breakdown in global economic activity would postpone by years any transition to a green economy.\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "forces\nstrike\ntargets\nChinese\nChina’s use\npreparations\ndetected\nnuclear strike\nthermonuclear\nresulting from\nnuclear winter\ndeath of billions\nclimate-change\nmoot\nFires\ncourse\nbattle\ncarbon\natmosphere",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: US-China nuclear conflict causes extinction.
Highlight Ratio: 0.6 | Because American forces are
to strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a
nuclear winter
and the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot
Fires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere | American forces are
to strike
vital targets on the Chinese mainland
if preparations for
use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any
thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would
cause a
nuclear winter
and
death of billions
making
climate
moot
Fires ignited
would
add
carbon to the atmosphere | 246,011 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: US-China nuclear conflict causes extinction.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "Because American forces are\nto strike at vital targets on the Chinese mainland, it’s impossible to preclude China’s use of nuclear weapons or, if preparations for such use are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any full-scale thermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would probably cause a\nnuclear winter\nand the death of billions of people, making the climate-change peril moot\nFires ignited in the course of battle would, of course, add additional carbon to the atmosphere",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "American forces are\nto strike\nvital targets on the Chinese mainland\nif preparations for\nuse are detected, a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Any\nthermonuclear conflagration resulting from that would\ncause a\nnuclear winter\nand\ndeath of billions\nmaking\nclimate\nmoot\nFires ignited\nwould\nadd\ncarbon to the atmosphere",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: 2. Antinuclear activism doesn’t trade off with other progressive projects. Insofar as it does, it outweighs on scope. | We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before. During the Cold War, an enormous movement — made up of lobbyists and Greenpeace activists, scientists and Catholic nuns and priests, Black Power proponents and Pan-Africanists, Pacific Islanders and Native American nations, lawyers and hippies, and so many others — turned the tide toward disarmament. Through a series of arms control agreements, Russia and the United States reduced their nuclear arsenals by about 87% from a peak of a combined 63,000 warheads in the mid-1980s.
As public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman lobbied and threw around campaign contributions to push for increased weapons spending and more open markets for their weapons, including the expansion of NATO into former Soviet states. By 2009, the United States was spending $29 billion on the maintenance, operation and upgrading of its nuclear arsenal. Now, the only remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia expires in 2026, and Russia pressed pause on scheduled talks in November 2022. The United States is investing up to $1.5 trillion over the next 30 years on updating and modernizing its nuclear weapons and their air, sea and ground delivery systems. We don’t have hard numbers for Russia, but they are spending billions as well.
Tough times require bold vision. We can’t rest until the weapons are eradicated. Our demand can be nothing short of abolition.
Bright lights, big bombs
Cross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy — why unite around this cause and not another? — and the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights.
The antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone. For example, when talking to someone from the Audubon Society, you might say, “If you care about birds, you should care about nuclear weapons — they’ll kill off all the birds!” But that strategy comes off as condescending and simplistic.
There is a more profound way to get at it: “Is your movement animated by a beautiful and equitable vision for the future of life on earth?” There’s a growing understanding that we’re all climate activists now, that because we all care about the future of human and nonhuman life, climate must be woven into everything, from how a municipality responds to the needs of the unhoused to what food or education policy should look like in 10 years. The Movement for Black Lives has a Red, Black & Green New Deal initiative, for example.
Nuclear war is on the same existential scale as climate change. Progressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled. | We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before
As public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world
Cross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy
and the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights
The antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone
Progressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled | 246,012 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Antinuclear activism doesn’t trade off with other progressive projects. Insofar as it does, it outweighs on scope.",
"role": "system"
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{
"content": "We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before. During the Cold War, an enormous movement — made up of lobbyists and Greenpeace activists, scientists and Catholic nuns and priests, Black Power proponents and Pan-Africanists, Pacific Islanders and Native American nations, lawyers and hippies, and so many others — turned the tide toward disarmament. Through a series of arms control agreements, Russia and the United States reduced their nuclear arsenals by about 87% from a peak of a combined 63,000 warheads in the mid-1980s.\nAs public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman lobbied and threw around campaign contributions to push for increased weapons spending and more open markets for their weapons, including the expansion of NATO into former Soviet states. By 2009, the United States was spending $29 billion on the maintenance, operation and upgrading of its nuclear arsenal. Now, the only remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia expires in 2026, and Russia pressed pause on scheduled talks in November 2022. The United States is investing up to $1.5 trillion over the next 30 years on updating and modernizing its nuclear weapons and their air, sea and ground delivery systems. We don’t have hard numbers for Russia, but they are spending billions as well.\nTough times require bold vision. We can’t rest until the weapons are eradicated. Our demand can be nothing short of abolition.\nBright lights, big bombs \nCross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy — why unite around this cause and not another? — and the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights.\nThe antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone. For example, when talking to someone from the Audubon Society, you might say, “If you care about birds, you should care about nuclear weapons — they’ll kill off all the birds!” But that strategy comes off as condescending and simplistic. \nThere is a more profound way to get at it: “Is your movement animated by a beautiful and equitable vision for the future of life on earth?” There’s a growing understanding that we’re all climate activists now, that because we all care about the future of human and nonhuman life, climate must be woven into everything, from how a municipality responds to the needs of the unhoused to what food or education policy should look like in 10 years. The Movement for Black Lives has a Red, Black & Green New Deal initiative, for example. \nNuclear war is on the same existential scale as climate change. Progressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled. ",
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"content": "We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before\nAs public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world\nCross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy\nand the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights\nThe antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone\nProgressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled",
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Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: 2. Antinuclear activism doesn’t trade off with other progressive projects. Insofar as it does, it outweighs on scope. | We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before
As public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world
Cross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy
and the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights
The antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone
Progressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled | we’ve done it before
public attention moved away
weapons manufacturers
maintain
increase
market share
never easy
sound like a distraction
other pressing concerns
prison abolition
workers’ rights
nukes kill everyone
don’t have to drop everything
all of our platforms
keep a spotlight
until it is dismantled | 246,013 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Antinuclear activism doesn’t trade off with other progressive projects. Insofar as it does, it outweighs on scope.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before\nAs public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world\nCross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy\nand the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights\nThe antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone\nProgressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "we’ve done it before\npublic attention moved away\nweapons manufacturers\nmaintain\nincrease\nmarket share\nnever easy\nsound like a distraction\nother pressing concerns\nprison abolition\nworkers’ rights\nnukes kill everyone\ndon’t have to drop everything\nall of our platforms\nkeep a spotlight\nuntil it is dismantled",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: 2. Antinuclear activism doesn’t trade off with other progressive projects. Insofar as it does, it outweighs on scope.
Highlight Ratio: 0.6 | We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before
As public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world
Cross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy
and the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights
The antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone
Progressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled | We know it’s possible
we’ve done it before
As
attention moved away from nuc
s, weapons manufacturers fought to
increase
market share
Cross-movement solidarity
is never easy
the call to abolish nuc
s can sound like a distraction from
other pressing concerns,
The
movement has
ways to remind
that nukes kill everyone
Progressives
don’t have to drop everything to come to the
demonstration, but we need
all
platforms
to keep a spotlight on the
stockpile until it is dismantled | 246,014 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2. Antinuclear activism doesn’t trade off with other progressive projects. Insofar as it does, it outweighs on scope.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "We know it’s possible to move the world toward disarmament because we’ve done it before\nAs public attention moved away from nuclear weapons, weapons manufacturers fought to maintain and increase their market share in a changing world\nCross-movement solidarity around a single cause is never easy\nand the call to abolish nuclear weapons can sound like a distraction from work on other pressing concerns, like prison abolition or workers’ rights\nThe antinuclear movement has experimented with different ways to remind everyone that nukes kill everyone\nProgressives of all stripes don’t have to drop everything to come to the “abolish nukes” demonstration, but we need to use all of our platforms and modalities to keep a spotlight on the nuclear stockpile until it is dismantled",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "We know it’s possible\nwe’ve done it before\nAs\nattention moved away from nuc\ns, weapons manufacturers fought to\nincrease\nmarket share\nCross-movement solidarity\nis never easy\nthe call to abolish nuc\ns can sound like a distraction from\nother pressing concerns,\nThe\nmovement has\nways to remind\nthat nukes kill everyone\nProgressives\ndon’t have to drop everything to come to the\ndemonstration, but we need\nall\nplatforms\nto keep a spotlight on the\nstockpile until it is dismantled",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument.
Tag: Manchin won’t budge—tanks the bill. |
So what’s the endgame here? As my colleague John Nichols reports, Senate Budget Committee chair Bernie Sanders quickly slapped back at Manchin’s proposal to slash the reconciliation bill. “That $3.5 trillion [figure] is already the result of a major, major compromise, and at the very least this bill should contain $3.5 trillion,” Sanders said. But on ABC Sunday, Sanders left room for compromise with Manchin. “We worked together [on the American Rescue Plan], and I think we’re going to do it again,” he said. In that skirmish, you’ll recall, Manchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.
Can we expect a similar outcome? That Manchin poses as a foe of big spending, for his home-state voters and his donors, but then accepts minor concessions and votes with the Democrats? I’m impressed with Sanders’s dealmaking, but I think the two sides are too far apart this time. For one thing, Manchin’s problems aren’t merely with the bill’s essential climate provisions but also with its corporate tax hikes, which he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are both politically problematic—voters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes—and fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt—which Manchin is already complaining about. And when on Tuesday Sanders reiterated that the bill would remain at $3.5 trillion, Manchin replied, “God bless him is all I can say.” But maybe that’s how he negotiates.
| what’s the endgame here?
on the American Rescue Plan
Manchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.
Can we expect a similar outcome?
the two sides are too far apart this time.
Manchin’s problems aren’t merely
climate provisions but also
corporate tax hikes
which he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are
politically problematic
voters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes
and fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt | 246,015 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Manchin won’t budge—tanks the bill.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "\nSo what’s the endgame here? As my colleague John Nichols reports, Senate Budget Committee chair Bernie Sanders quickly slapped back at Manchin’s proposal to slash the reconciliation bill. “That $3.5 trillion [figure] is already the result of a major, major compromise, and at the very least this bill should contain $3.5 trillion,” Sanders said. But on ABC Sunday, Sanders left room for compromise with Manchin. “We worked together [on the American Rescue Plan], and I think we’re going to do it again,” he said. In that skirmish, you’ll recall, Manchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.\nCan we expect a similar outcome? That Manchin poses as a foe of big spending, for his home-state voters and his donors, but then accepts minor concessions and votes with the Democrats? I’m impressed with Sanders’s dealmaking, but I think the two sides are too far apart this time. For one thing, Manchin’s problems aren’t merely with the bill’s essential climate provisions but also with its corporate tax hikes, which he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are both politically problematic—voters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes—and fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt—which Manchin is already complaining about. And when on Tuesday Sanders reiterated that the bill would remain at $3.5 trillion, Manchin replied, “God bless him is all I can say.” But maybe that’s how he negotiates.\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "what’s the endgame here?\non the American Rescue Plan\nManchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.\nCan we expect a similar outcome?\nthe two sides are too far apart this time.\nManchin’s problems aren’t merely\nclimate provisions but also\ncorporate tax hikes\nwhich he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are\npolitically problematic\nvoters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes\nand fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument.
Tag: Manchin won’t budge—tanks the bill. |
So what’s the endgame here? As my colleague John Nichols reports, Senate Budget Committee chair Bernie Sanders quickly slapped back at Manchin’s proposal to slash the reconciliation bill. “That $3.5 trillion [figure] is already the result of a major, major compromise, and at the very least this bill should contain $3.5 trillion,” Sanders said. But on ABC Sunday, Sanders left room for compromise with Manchin. “We worked together [on the American Rescue Plan], and I think we’re going to do it again,” he said. In that skirmish, you’ll recall, Manchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.
Can we expect a similar outcome? That Manchin poses as a foe of big spending, for his home-state voters and his donors, but then accepts minor concessions and votes with the Democrats? I’m impressed with Sanders’s dealmaking, but I think the two sides are too far apart this time. For one thing, Manchin’s problems aren’t merely with the bill’s essential climate provisions but also with its corporate tax hikes, which he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are both politically problematic—voters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes—and fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt—which Manchin is already complaining about. And when on Tuesday Sanders reiterated that the bill would remain at $3.5 trillion, Manchin replied, “God bless him is all I can say.” But maybe that’s how he negotiates.
| American Rescue Plan
loud noises
modest reductions
Can we expect a similar outcome?
too far apart this time
aren’t
climate
corporate tax hikes
politically problematic | 246,016 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Manchin won’t budge—tanks the bill.",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "\nSo what’s the endgame here? As my colleague John Nichols reports, Senate Budget Committee chair Bernie Sanders quickly slapped back at Manchin’s proposal to slash the reconciliation bill. “That $3.5 trillion [figure] is already the result of a major, major compromise, and at the very least this bill should contain $3.5 trillion,” Sanders said. But on ABC Sunday, Sanders left room for compromise with Manchin. “We worked together [on the American Rescue Plan], and I think we’re going to do it again,” he said. In that skirmish, you’ll recall, Manchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.\nCan we expect a similar outcome? That Manchin poses as a foe of big spending, for his home-state voters and his donors, but then accepts minor concessions and votes with the Democrats? I’m impressed with Sanders’s dealmaking, but I think the two sides are too far apart this time. For one thing, Manchin’s problems aren’t merely with the bill’s essential climate provisions but also with its corporate tax hikes, which he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are both politically problematic—voters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes—and fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt—which Manchin is already complaining about. And when on Tuesday Sanders reiterated that the bill would remain at $3.5 trillion, Manchin replied, “God bless him is all I can say.” But maybe that’s how he negotiates.\n",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "American Rescue Plan\nloud noises\nmodest reductions\nCan we expect a similar outcome?\ntoo far apart this time\naren’t\nclimate\ncorporate tax hikes\npolitically problematic",
"role": "assistant"
}
] |
Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio.
Tag: Manchin won’t budge—tanks the bill.
Highlight Ratio: 0.3 | what’s the endgame here?
on the American Rescue Plan
Manchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.
Can we expect a similar outcome?
the two sides are too far apart this time.
Manchin’s problems aren’t merely
climate provisions but also
corporate tax hikes
which he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are
politically problematic
voters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes
and fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt | on the
Rescue Plan
Manchin
ultimately
voted for the
plan
the
sides are too far apart this time.
Manchin’s problems aren’t merely
climate
but also
corporate tax hikes
. Lower rates are
politically problematic | 246,017 | [
{
"content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Manchin won’t budge—tanks the bill.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3",
"role": "system"
},
{
"content": "what’s the endgame here?\non the American Rescue Plan\nManchin made loud noises about opposing the bill, but ultimately demanded modest reductions in unemployment benefits, then voted for the $1.9 trillion plan fairly intact.\nCan we expect a similar outcome?\nthe two sides are too far apart this time.\nManchin’s problems aren’t merely\nclimate provisions but also\ncorporate tax hikes\nwhich he’d like to see set at lower rates. Lower rates are\npolitically problematic\nvoters support the bill’s higher rates for corporate and capital gains taxes\nand fiscally: They’ll result in less revenue, which means greater debt",
"role": "user"
},
{
"content": "on the\nRescue Plan\nManchin\nultimately\nvoted for the\nplan\nthe\nsides are too far apart this time.\nManchin’s problems aren’t merely\nclimate\nbut also\ncorporate tax hikes\n. Lower rates are\npolitically problematic",
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