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After analyzing the final payload, we determined the winner was… a Remote Administration Tool, which we have named ROKRAT. The address used in the email was 'kgf2016@yonsei.ac.kr' which is the contact email of the Korea Global Forum where the slogan in 2016 was "Peace and Unification of the Korean Peninsula". This fact gives more credit and legitimacy to the email. This file is decoded and finally an executable is launched: ROKRAT. This RAT has the added complexity that the command and control servers are legitimate websites. The malware uses Twitter and two cloud platforms, Yandex and Mediafire, apparently for both C2 communications and exfiltration platforms. Unfortunately, these platforms are difficult to block globally within organizations as their use can be viewed as legitimate in most cases. Additionally, these 3 platforms all make use of HTTPS connectivity, making it much more difficult to identify specific patterns or the usage of specific tokens | ['T1102.002'] |
Skip to main content . We use optional cookies to improve your experience on our websites, such as through social media connections, and to display personalized advertising based on your online activity. If you reject optional cookies, only cookies necessary to provide you the services will be used. Using reg to configure the registry of remote computers limits the parameters that you can use in some operations. Check the syntax and parameters for each operation to verify that they can be used on remote computers . In this article | ['T1112', 'T1012'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - xxmm downloader (also known as KVNDM) — This simple downloader's code is similar to the main xxmm payload. MSGet — This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. MSGet typically downloads encoded binaries from hard-coded URLs. DGet — This simple downloader (see Figure 4) is similar to the wget web server retrieval tool. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity | ['T1140'] |
All the network parameters are stored in the sample and can be easily updated by the author. The CnC is a web server: http://camilleoconnell[.]website The network communication is performed in HTTP. The malware uses an hardcoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html) To register a new infected system the malware perform a POST request to /api/white_walkers/new with data on the compromised system consisting of | ['T1071.001'] |
The SodomMain module is LookBack malware’s remote access Trojan module that can send and receive numerous commands indicative of its function as a RAT. The malware is delivered within the encoded data that is received by the SodomNormal module as part of its initial beacon response. It then runs within the SodomNormal module and uses its “send_data” function for C&C communications | ['T1574.002'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - Screen Capture Tool— This tool can capture the desktop of a victim's system (see Figure 5). Figure 5. Screen Capture Tool usage. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. Install a background monitor tool (e.g | ['T1113'] |
The shellcode then creates a string that it uses to create a registry key to automatically run the final payload each time the system starts. It then opens the registry key 'Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' and sets the value to the "Shell" subkey to the previously created string. Ultimately, the following registry key is created for persistence | ['T1547.014', 'T1547.004'] |
We at Team Nautilus detected and analyzed the Docker Hub account hildeteamtnt, which was used by TeamTNT to store their malicious images. Also, ‘minerescape’ contained a shell script executing a Python file - minedaemon.py. Using a web service (iplogger[.]org) to transmit collected data to the attacker during the discovery process, for instance, the number of cores in the CPU, its speed, system details (using uname -a), and targeted host IP address. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). The script sbs.sh: - Downloading 00.jpg (as /usr/bin/dns_ipv4.tar.gz) which is the file /usr/bin/bioset. Creating a child process that listens to the socket and communicates with the father using a method called ‘Named PIPE’ (also known as FIFO). The father is responsible for deciphering messages and writing it back to the child on the PIPE. Creating a child process that listens to the socket and communicates with the father using a method called ‘Named PIPE’ (also known as FIFO). - The father is responsible for deciphering messages and writing it back to the child on the PIPE. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). - Defense Evasion: Deleting command history. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). Defense Evasion Techniques: Removing system logs (/var/log/syslog). Deleting command history. Logging the activity and encoding it into files (using Base64). - Defense Evasion Techniques: Removing system logs (/var/log/syslog). Deleting command history. Encoding many snippets with base64 (the same snippet may be encoded multiple times). To sum it up . Over four months, TeamTNT uploaded various images, with some being used to perform attacks in the wild | ['T1027'] |
In September 2017, Proofpoint researchers detailed the history and ongoing activities of an actor we track as TA505. TA505 was behind many of the Dridex campaigns that plagued organizations in 2015 and introduced Locky ransomware in 2016, bringing unprecedented scale to malicious spam distribution. Since we wrote our original TA505 profile, the actor has continued to explore the use of new malicious attachments and new payloads. In 2018, though, the scale and regularity of their campaigns decreased, while the diversity of payloads has increased. Given the importance of this actor in the email threat landscape we wanted to revisit our profile and update it with the latest activity from TA505 | ['T1566.001'] |
Remember, Downadup/Conficker spread so widely because so many computers simply did not have a simple security patch, released months before the infections ever started, applied. Weafer ). - Use a robust security software suite that has multiple layers of protection. Even patched systems are continuing to become infected with the .A and .B variants. In many instances, this is occurring because the worm is being passed on via infected removable media, such as USB thumb drives, that are essentially acting as host carriers. Need to Know) - Use caution when opening attachments and accepting file transfers. Use caution when clicking on links to Web pages. Use strong passwords | ['T1091'] |
FIN6 used encoded PowerShell commands to install Cobalt Strike on compromised systems. The attacker made use of Cobalt Strike’s “psexec” lateral movement command to create a Windows service named with a random 16-character string on the target system and execute encoded PowerShell. In some cases, the encoded PowerShell commands were used to download and execute content hosted on the paste site hxxps://pastebin[.]com | ['T1102', 'T1569.002'] |
At this point, the script establishes an HTTP connection to the C2 server. If the server response is comprised only of the same GUID that the malware sent, the script deletes itself. In the case of the second-stage script from Variant A, the script deletes the registry key where it is installed. In the case of Variant C, the script deletes the file from which it is running. If instead the server responds with any data other than the GUID, the second-stage script decrypts the data and saves it as a file | ['T1070.004', 'T1070'] |
Since the original publication of this approach, Proofpoint researchers have observed a number of actors -- “early adopters” -- abusing this file format by embedding it inside Microsoft Word and PDF documents. While the combination of the technique with the Microsoft Word container was described in the initial research, embedding inside PDFs has not been documented and likely originated with another source | ['T1204.001', 'T1204.002'] |
Then extract the image file "image1.jpeg" contained in the document. Find the special logo in the picture data, decode the subsequent steganographic PE data, release the randomly named .exe in the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% directory and run it | ['T1027.003'] |
Enables remote login - Enables screen sharing - Configures remote login permissions for the user - Allows remote login to all - Enables a hidden “root” account in macOS and sets the password specified in the Trojan code | ['T1569.001'] |
The persistence is done during the first execution of the malware using a well-known technique, the “Logon scripts”. It creates a script file registration.bat and writes several strings from the TForm1 object. The final script is | ['T1037.001'] |
The backdoor starts by collecting basic information about the victim’s machine and calculating a 4-byte long victim identifier, based on the user-name, computer-name and the domain name of the target environment | ['T1082'] |
To install Weave Scope on the server the attackers use an exposed Docker API port and create a new privileged container with a clean Ubuntu image. The container is configured to mount the file system of the container to the filesystem of the victim server, thus gaining the attackers access to all files on the server. The initial command given to the container is to download and execute several cryptominers | ['T1611'] |
Watering holes - Weaponized documents exploiting the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) method - Weaponized documents exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Equation Editor - Exploitation of the CVE-2019-0604 vulnerability in Sharepoint - Supply chain attack that compromises a chat software installer, Able Desktop - Exploitation of recent vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) in Microsoft Exchange Server | ['T1195.002', 'T1190'] |
This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011 | ['T1105'] |
Despite the simplicity of most of their tools, the Gamaredon group also is capable of deploying some novelty, such as their Outlook VBA module. However, as it is far from stealthy, in the long run it is no match for a capable organization. The variety of tools Gamaredon has at its disposal can be very effective at fingerprinting a machine and understanding what sensitive data is available, then spreading throughout the network | ['T1025'] |
The communication between the malware and the server is based on the HTTP protocol and slightly varies between the samples. Every few seconds the backdoor sends a POST request to the C&C URL. The result is encrypted and sent back to another URL on the server as the parameter of a POST request | ['T1071.001'] |
Check for blocklisted usernames and computernames: The implant concatenates the username and computer it acquires from the infected endpoint's environment variables. This string is then checked against a list of blocklisted values to determine if the implant should continue execution or exit out. Check for blocklisted process names: The following process names are blocklisted and if found running on the system, the RAT implant will simply exit. The blocklist consists of processes belonging to Virtual Machine software (such as VMWare) and analysis tools (such as ProcessHacker etc | ['T1033', 'T1057', 'T1082', 'T1497.001'] |
It also creates a unique system specific identifier that it will use during the C2 communications to send and receive messages. The system specific identifier is a 16 character string that the Trojan creates using the serial number of the C volume and the first 4 hexadecimal bytes from Environment.UserName | ['T1071.003'] |
This document uses KernelCallbackTable as well to hijack the control flow just like our first module, the injection technique used by the shellcode also resembles the first document. The major difference in this document is that it tries to retrieve a remote HTML page and then executes it using mshta.exe. The remote HTML page is located at https[:]//markettrendingcenter[.]com/member.htm and throws a 404 Not Found which makes it difficult for us to analyze this document any further | ['T1218.005'] |
2) Download the OpenSSL library. Instead of saving the downloaded file, QakBot measures the download speed and deletes the received file | ['T1016.001'] |
This script is executed and is used to decode a static base64 string within the strEncode variable. Using base64 encoding the decoded binary is stored as HncModuleUpdate.exe and is then executed. This specific resource contains malicious shellcode used by the malware. These execution steps allow the launch of the new ROKRAT variant by decoding the PE binary and injecting into the cmd.exe process | ['T1059.005'] |
In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Invoke-Obfuscation has proven to be highly effective at obfuscating PowerShell scripts and in this case, the adversary was able to take advantage of the tool for increased chances of evasion and as an anti-analysis tactic. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The malicious attachment was a simple PE file (SHA256: 5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63) with the filename <redacted> Technical Services.exe. Its sole purpose here is to install the QUADAGENT backdoor and execute it. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails | ['T1204.001'] |
From our analysis, stealing keystrokes is the main function of RunningRat; however, the DLL has code for more extensive functionality. Code is included to copy the clipboard, delete files, compress files, clear event logs, shut down the machine, and much more. However, our current analysis shows no way for such code to be executed | ['T1070.004', 'T1070.001'] |
BackdoorDiplomacy is a group that primarily targets diplomatic organizations in the Middle East and Africa, and less frequently, telecommunication companies. Their initial attack methodology is focused on exploiting vulnerable internet-exposed applications on webservers, in order to drop and execute a webshell. Post compromise, via the webshell, BackdoorDiplomacy deploys open-source software for reconnaissance and information gathering, and favors the use of DLL search order hijacking to install its backdoor, Turian. Finally, BackdoorDiplomacy employs a separate executable to detect removable media, likely USB flash drives, and copy their contents to the main drive’s recycle bin | ['T1574.001'] |
It will use an auto-run registry (HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) named AdobeMX that will execute PowerShell to load the encoded executable via reflective loading (loading an executable from memory rather than from the system’s disks | ['T1059.001'] |
Change file owner and group. This utility is used by malware to change the user ID and/or the group ID of the specified files. This can lock other users’ out of access to the file, thus hampering removal or inspection. It may also be required in order to execute a file in certain, elevated context | ['T1562.001'] |
The iContact binary appears to be a backdoor that gathers user and locale data and engages in encrypted communications with a C2 server over TCP. Functionality includes sending and receiving files and running custom commands such as scanning a directory and deleting files | ['T1005'] |
Overview of discovered Ramsay versions . Malicious documents dropping Ramsay version 1 . This attack vector consists of malicious documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199 intended to drop an older version of Ramsay. Based on the low complexity of the Ramsay agent delivered, the threat actors may be embedding this specific instance within these malicious documents for evaluation purposes. Even though affected documents will be modified, it won’t impact their integrity; each affected Word document remains fully operational after artifact appending has taken place. First, Ramsay looks for Word documents and also, in more recent versions, for PDFs and ZIP archives: Figure 13. Hex-Rays output of spreader scanning routines . It is important to notice that there is a correlation between the target drives Ramsay scans for propagation and control document retrieval. File structure changes during an infection and execution . All of the different artifacts involved in the infection stage are either within the context of the spreader or dropped previously by another Ramsay component. This information will be contained within all logged information Ramsay collects and may be leveraged by operators in order to do further lateral movement over the network in a later stage via a different channel. Some of Ramsay and Retro filename convention . Is important to highlight that among Retro’s documented techniques, it leverages malicious instances of msfte.dll, oci.dll and lame_enc.dll, and via Phantom DLL Hijacking. As previously documented, Ramsay also uses this technique in some of its versions also using msfte.dll and oci.dll. Finally, we noticed Korean language metadata within the malicious documents leveraged by Ramsay, denoting the use of Korean-based templates | ['T1027'] |
When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered. One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos). Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla. In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system. Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to “rescue” each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors | ['T1124', 'T1057', 'T1049', 'T1018'] |
Thursday, April 16, 2020 . PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors . News summary . - Azerbaijan government and energy sector likely targeted by an unknown actor. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. Afterward, it copies 7,074,638 bytes from the end of the file and writes the remaining bytes back to the disk. One, called "frown.py," is responsible for the communications with the command and control (C2). It uses TLS to encrypt the communication that occurs on port 143. For each FTP usage, the credentials are provided by the C2 server during the request. Start routine The communication between the scripts is done via a file called "Abibliophobia23" Commands and results are written into the file using a custom encryption scheme. The binary uses a file system watcher in order to generate an event each time a file is modified in one of the directories in the "Paths" variable of the configuration file. Filesystem monitoring routine Once a file is available, the Dog.exe binary exfiltrates it, using email or FTP depending on the configuration. Additional tools . During our investigation, we identified a couple of additional tools mainly in Python and compiled for Windows: - Klog.exe: A keylogger using an output file called "System32.Log. Tre.py": A script used to create the file with the files/directories tree | ['T1105'] |
This is an application document that has been used to provide a decoy to the Bisonal malware. This conference has some high-ranking government and business attendees. In 2019, a Russian RTF document — судалгаа.doc (research.doc) — was used with an exploit to drop the winhelp.wll file, which contains Bisonal. Based on our research and the released paper mentioned above, the Bisonal malware is part of the Tonto Team arsenal. Tonto Team was mentioned in the media in 2017 as one of the actors who targeted South Korea, when the country announced it would deploy a Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) in response to North Korean missile tests. At this time, researchers connected the Tonto Team to China | ['T1203'] |
Various scans and queries are used to find proxy settings, domain controllers, remote desktop services, Citrix services, and network shares. If the obtained valid account is already member of the domain admins group, the first lateral move in the network is usually to a domain controller where the adversary also deploys a Cobalt Strike beacon. Otherwise, a jump host or other system likely used by domain admins is found and equipped with a Cobalt Strike beacon. If the victim’s network contains other Windows domains or different network security zones, the adversary scans and finds the trust relationships and jump hosts, attempting to move into the other domains and security zones | ['T1021.002', 'T1018'] |
The first of FIN7's new tools is BOOSTWRITE – an in-memory-only dropper that decrypts embedded payloads using an encryption key retrieved from a remote server at runtime. FIN7 has been observed making small changes to this malware family using multiple methods to avoid traditional antivirus detection, including a BOOSTWRITE sample where the dropper was signed by a valid Certificate Authority. One of the analyzed BOOSTWRITE variants contained two payloads: CARBANAK and RDFSNIFFER. While CARBANAK has been thoroughly analyzed and has been used maliciously by several financial attackers including FIN7, RDFSNIFFER is a newly-identified tool recovered by Mandiant investigators | ['T1553.002'] |
TA505 has also recently used LOLbins and legitimate Windows OS processes to perform malicious activities and deliver a payload without being detected. As the entry point of an attack, it delivers a sophisticated email containing a malicious Excel or Word file | ['T1566.002'] |
Security Intelligence . Topics . Tricks of the Trade: A Deeper Look Into TrickBot’s Machinations . TrickBot is a new banking Trojan. An Unusual Man-in-the-Browser Technique . Nowadays, most modern financial malware families are capable of injecting malicious code into ongoing browser sessions (e.g. For this purpose, and much like other advanced banking Trojans, TrickBot deploys a browser-hooking engine designed to intercept communications to and from the victim’s internet browser. With the real-time fetching trick, the malicious code injections themselves are kept securely on the attacker’s server, not in a file on the victim’s endpoint. 7) Finally, TrickBot’s financial module replaces the original response that would normally come from the bank with the C2’s response, and the injected page is displayed on the victim’s end. The actor can turn the webinjections on or off on the fly, easily modify the injections and then push an update to some or all the infected victims instantaneously. Figure 2: TrickBot’s Server Side Web-Injects — Top Level Flow. Figure 5: TrickBot and Dyre both use “sourcelink” and “sourcequery” for their communications. TrickBot passes the target URLs list to its financial module, which is injected into the browser using pipes communication. A redirection attack, in short, means that instead of injecting malicious code into the original webpage, the victim is now redirected to a new site forged by the fraudsters | ['T1185'] |
No exploits were used, so the victim would have to manually execute the malware dropper, which pretends to be an Adobe Flash installer. However, our analysis confirmed that Bad Rabbit uses the EternalRomance exploit as an infection vector to spread within corporate networks | ['T1036.005', 'T1204.002'] |
The Rundll32Call exported function begins by creating a named event named ‘RunOnce’. This event ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. If this is the only instance of DDKong running at the time, the malware continues. This ensures that only a single instance of DDKong is executed at a given time. DDKong attempts to decode an embedded configuration using a single byte XOR key of 0xC3. Once decoded, the configuration contains the data shown in Figure 5 below | ['T1140'] |
The formula uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script that attempts to download and execute a second PowerShell script hosted at the URL hxxp://micrrosoft[.]net/winupdate.ps1. By default, Excel will not launch the command prompt application, but will do so with the user’s consent via the following dialog box in Figure 3 | ['T1547.001', 'T1059.001', 'T1059.001'] |
the malicious DLL installed as a Print Processor) is stored as a file on disk; the modules are stored in the registry by the installer (from the CrLnc.dat file) and are described in Table 6 | ['T1547.012'] |
More specifically, Ramsay looks for any of two given encoded Hardware Profile GUIDs. One of these GUIDs is hardcoded as shown in Figure 14, while the other is dynamically generated based on the compromised victim’s machine. If any of the subject identifiers are found, parsing for a command signature will be attempted | ['T1082'] |
Then, it drops C:\Users\Public\x.vbs. Then it drops, C:\Users\Public\Natso.bat. Then, it executes `Natso.bat`, which is a "fileless" UAC bypass found by James Forshaw. If C:\Windows\Finex still doesn't exist (which means the UAC bypass failed), it will update the Nasto.bat and execute it using the code shown below. This is another UAC bypass technique based on fodhelper.exe. On our test machine, the last bypass was successful, and `C:\Windows\Finex` was successfully created. After that, the DLL deletes the dropped file and exits | ['T1070.004'] |
To install this module, drop the entire PowerSploit folder into one of your module directories. The default PowerShell module paths are listed in the $Env:PSModulePath environment variable | ['T1574.007'] |
As covered above, the attacker dropped two files: Chaos and Client. Chaos is the backdoor that enables the reverse-shell and Client is needed to initiate the connect-back from chaos | ['T1573.001', 'T1059.004'] |
Turla has many names in the information security industry — it is also known as Snake, Venomous Bear, Uroburos and WhiteBear. Turla likes to use compromised web servers and hijacked satellite connections for their command and control (C2) infrastructure. In some operations, they also do not directly communicate to the C2 server. Instead, they use a compromised system inside the targeted network as a proxy, which forwards the traffic to the real C2 server. Well-known malware like Crutch or Kazuar are attributed to Turla. Lately, we have also seen research that has shown potential links between the Sunburst backdoor and Turla. Not every campaign run by Turla can clearly be attributed to them | ['T1584.004'] |
Create processes - Write responses from the control server to a file - Send information for all drives - Write data sent by the control server to a temporary file matching the file path pattern %temp%\DWS00* - Change the time of a file as specified by the control server | ['T1070.006'] |
Something that makes Kobalos unique is the fact that the code for running a C&C server is in Kobalos itself. Any server compromised by Kobalos can be turned into a C&C server by the operators sending a single command. As the C&C server IP addresses and ports are hardcoded into the executable, the operators can then generate new Kobalos samples that use this new C&C server | ['T1059.004'] |
Finally, the command: system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>/dev/null || awk ‘/Boot ROM Version/ {split($0, line, “:”);printf(“%s”, line[2]);} checks if the machine is one of the following: “MBP”, “MBA”, “MB”, “MM”, “IM”, “MP” and “XS”. These codes represent the model of the system. For instance, “MBP” stands for MacBook Pro, “MBA” stands for MacBook Air and so on | ['T1497.001'] |
Whenever winword makes any graphical call, the shellcode executes. This technique to hijack control flow has also been used by other sophisticated attackers such as FinFisher. Lazarus has also used other novel methods to execute shellcode such as by using the function EnumSystemLocalesA as a callback to shellcode written to executable heap | ['T1140', 'T1574.013', 'T1620'] |
X-Session: 0"). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. ChinaChopper web shell. shown in Figure 4, are required to interact with the web shell | ['T1059.003'] |
WINEKEY maintains persistence through reboot via the use of registry RUN keys. Searching for anomalous RUN keys enterprise-wide can help to identify systems impacted by this malware | ['T1547.001'] |
This specific module appears to have been put together from public sources with some added functionality from the attackers. Perhaps the most interesting part here is the unusual command and control mechanism based on TCP/UDP packets, as well as the C&C hostname which fits previously known Turla activity | ['T1205'] |
The domain fabianiarte.com (fabianiarte.it) was compromised to host backend server code and malicious DOTM files. This domain hosted DOTM files that were used to mimic defense contractors’ job profiles as observed in Operation North Star, but the domain also included some rudimentary backend server code that we suspect was used by the implant. According to our analysis of this cache of data this site was compromised to host code on 7/9/2020 | ['T1584.001'] |
More interesting however is it that it also contains support for windows execution via smb shares and IPC. The sample also has a Windows version of the malware embedded inside that it can install on remote windows shares and then execute as a service | ['T1021.002'] |
One for 32-bit and the other for 64-bit, which download an updated version of the loader. The main difference between the two loops is that in case of a Windows x64 infection, there is no check of the loader’s version | ['T1082'] |
It drops ransom notes at various folders in the system and opens one after it has encrypted the data and documents of the victim. As with usual ransomware, it does this to extort money from the victim in exchange for the decryption of their files | ['T1486'] |
Cobalt is one of the most notorious cybercrime operations, with attacks against more than 100 banks across 40 countries attributed to the group. Morphisec Labs believes that the Cobalt Group split following the arrest of one of its top leaders in Spain in March of 2018. While Cobalt Gang 1.0 uses ThreadKit extensively, Cobalt 2.0 adds sophistication to its delivery method, borrowing some of the network infrastructures used by both APT28 (aka Fancy Bear) and MuddyWater. One of the Cobalt 2.0 Group’s latest campaigns, an attack that leads to a Cobalt Strike beacon and to JavaScript backdoor, was investigated and presented by the Talos research team. Cobalt Group Technical Details . Stage 1 - Word Macro + Whitelisting Bypass . As with many other campaigns, the victim received a document with malicious macro visual basic code. Although the code is heavily obfuscated, the entry point is easily identifiable. The VB code is executed starting from the Frame1_Layout function – this method is used much less frequently than the obvious Document_Open or the AutoOpen. Such a combination of registry manipulation was reported a year ago as part of an attack campaign executed by the Cobalt Group against Ukrainian banks. As part of the last execution step of the dll, the malicious code writes a JavaScript scriptlet into the Roaming directory and then it executes CreateProcess on the regsvr32 as described by the UserInitMprLogonScript. Organizations should expect to see much more coming from all Cobalt Group factions during the next year | ['T1027'] |
Establish persistence for itself on the endpoint - Establish persistence of another component of the malware on the endpoint - Update itself on endpoint after a separate updater component downloads the update from the control server | ['T1070.004', 'T1547.001'] |
Regularly, the service checks if a user is logged, by checking if Explorer is running. Once explorer.exe is running, the service configures the environment and executes the C2 contact module: winprint32.exe | ['T1057'] |
The sample collects the user information including current processes, installed software, system language and time zone. The harvested credentials and user information are then sent back to the C2. Here are some highlights about system information stealing | ['T1124'] |
Passgrabber module – collects logins and passwords from various sources: Firefox and Chrome files, Microsoft Vault storage, etc. Instead of using Mimikatz as in previous versions, the module collects passwords using its own algorithms | ['T1555.003'] |
The attackers have employed Cobalt Strike payloads crafted to maintain persistence through reboot via a scheduled task on critical systems in victim environments. In at least once case, attackers have maintained access to a victim environment using stolen credentials to access corporate VPN infrastructure configured to require only single-factor authentication | ['T1547.004'] |
The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C&C mechanism. All the malware samples we’ve seen communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server “cloudme.com”, a cloud services provider. According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in Linköping, Sweden | ['T1102'] |
These websites hosted malware that would be side-loaded with a legitimate signed executable. These tactics are becoming increasingly common by malware authors in order to evade security products and controls. Two variants of the malware employed by C0d0so0 were discovered—one that used HTTP for command and control (C2) communications, and one that used a custom network protocol over port 22 | ['T1132.001', 'T1574.002'] |
Gather all network configuration information and record to a file on disk in a folder created by the implant using the command: cmd.exe /c ipconfig/all >>"%s" & arp -a >>"%s" where %s = <file_path | ['T1016'] |
The overwritten code reads the ransom note string inside the MBR and sets it to appear on the display | ['T1542.003'] |
Consent - Details - [#IABV2SETTINGS#] - About This website uses cookies . We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you’ve provided to them or that they’ve collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email. Kaspersky Lab products detect the different artifacts used in this campaign with the following verdicts: Trojan.Win32.Generic, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Upatre and Backdoor.Win32.HyperBro. Due to tools and tactics in use we attribute the campaign to LuckyMouse Chinese-speaking actor (also known as EmissaryPanda and APT27). Also the C2 domain update.iaacstudio[.]com was previously used in their campaigns. Regarding Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder – although it’s available for everyone and couldn’t be the basis for attribution, we know this encoder has been used by LuckyMouse previously. Even when we observed LuckyMouse using weaponized documents with CVE-2017-11882 (Microsoft Office Equation Editor, widely used by Chinese-speaking actors since December 2017), we can´t prove they were related to this particular attack. The main C2 used in this campaign is bbs.sonypsps[.]com, which resolved to IP-address, that belongs to the Ukrainian ISP network, held by a Mikrotik router using firmware version 6.34.4 (from March 2016) with SMBv1 on board | ['T1574.002'] |
Similar to its dropper, the binary seeks to evade sandboxes. In addition to the previously described trick EvilBunny performs hook detection to trick environments which hook time retrieval APIs. These are NtQuerySystemTime, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime and GetTickCount. Every API is called twice to calculate a delta, while performing a sleep(1000) operation between iteration one and iteration two. This can only be the case if any of the three API’s return values is modified by a system monitoring solution, like a sandbox | ['T1124'] |
Anchor and older versions of Anchor_DNS implement the exact same self deletion routine using two sets of commands to ensure that the dropper is deleted once the malware was successfully deployed | ['T1059.003', 'T1070.004'] |
CTU analysis of one of GOLD KINGSWOOD's campaign using SpicyOmelette (DOC2018.js) exposed additional sophisticated methods to compromise targets. A valid digital certificate was used to sign the malicious script. Windows Scripting Host supports the inclusion of digital signatures, and Figure 2 shows how the signature was appended to the script | ['T1553.002'] |
There are multiple active campaigns currently delivering Emotet. The first is a simple email with a Word document attached. This example also shows the second type of campaign, leveraging a direct URL download instead of Office documents with macros that fetch the malware. Malicious code embedded in the malicious attachment functions as a downloader for the Emotet malware. When this code is executed, PowerShell is invoked, which reaches out to the Emotet malware distribution server, downloads the malicious payload, and executes it, thus infecting the system. In the screenshot above, you can see that the script is configured with multiple URLs that can be used to download the PE32 executable associated with Emotet. The malware is overwhelmingly hosted on compromised websites. These sites are then leveraged as random hosting locations for the campaigns to leverage. The initial URL is requested with a connection keep-alive in the header. Talos has observed recent runs of Emotet checking if the compromised system's IP address is currently found on many spam-related blocklists including those hosted by SpamCop, Spamhaus, and SORBS, among others | ['T1027'] |
Historically, the group has employed the use of a series of phishing origin points, abusing access first at one university and then another | ['T1583.001'] |
After uploading these files, take advantage of the pre-built queries within BloodHound. Queries include: viewing all domain administrators; viewing users with the most local administrator rights; or viewing computers with the most administrative user access. One of these queries gives you the ability to map domain trusts, as shown in Figure 3 | ['T1482'] |
Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files | ['T1204.002'] |
In their advisory published on Jan. 26, 2022, CERT-UA asserted that the initial vector for the malware, dubbed WhisperGate, was either a supply-chain attack or exploitation. The first payload in this infection is responsible for the initial attempt at wiping the systems. The malware executable wipes the master boot record (MBR) and replaces it with the code responsible for displaying the ransom note. Similar to the notorious NotPetya wiper that masqueraded as ransomware during its 2017 campaign, WhisperGate is not intended to be an actual ransom attempt, since the MBR is completely overwritten and has no recovery options. This wiper also tries to destroy the C:\ partition by overwriting it with fixed data. However, most modern systems today have switched to GUID Partition Table (GPT) from MBR, which allows for larger file systems and has fewer limitations, potentially limiting some of the impacts of this executable. As a result, there were additional stages and additional payloads that could inflict more damage to end systems | ['T1561.002'] |
This investigation allowed us to create strong ties between multiple campaigns that Lazarus has conducted, reinforcing our attribution. In this campaign the Lazarus group demonstrated its sophistication level and ability to circumvent the security measures they face during their attacks, such as network segmentation. We assess that Lazarus is a highly prolific group, conducting several campaigns using different strategies | ['T1585.002'] |
This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. It places the resulting executable in an existing directory and creates a scheduled task that will launch it every 10 minutes. As can be seen in Figure 6, the decoded source code still has comments in it, illustrating the apparent sloppiness of Gamaredon’s operators | ['T1027.001', 'T1053.005'] |
The attackers configured multiple C2 servers for various stages, reusing several scripts we’ve seen in previous attacks by the group. Moreover, based on the insights so far, it was possible to figure out the relationship with other Lazarus group campaigns | ['T1584.004'] |
APT40 relies heavily on web shells for an initial foothold into an organization. Depending on placement, a web shell can provide continued access to victims' environments, re-infect victim systems, and facilitate lateral movement | ['T1505.003'] |
Talos has uncovered documents that we assess with moderate confidence are associated with suspected persistent threat actor MuddyWater. MuddyWater has been active since at least November 2017 and has been known to primarily target entities in the Middle East. The "Blackwater.bas" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer. The clear text version of the crf.txt file closely resembled the PowerShell agent that was previously used by the MuddyWater actors when they targeted Kurdish political groups and organizations in Turkey. The actors have made some small changes, such as altering the variable names to avoid Yara detection and sending the results of the commands to the C2 in the URL instead of writing them to file. Notably, a number of the PowerShell commands used to enumerate the host appear to be derived from a GitHub projected called FruityC2. Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) and then query the following information | ['T1036.005'] |
Among the different files dropped by the latest versions of Ramsay we find a Spreader component. This executable will attempt to scan for network shares and removable drives excluding A: and B: drives | ['T1080'] |
These commands allow the threat group to gain information about the compromised computer and the network to which it belongs. Using this information, they can decide to explore further or instruct the compromised computer to download additional malware | ['T1016', 'T1082', 'T1007'] |
1) Moving the (malicious) application into the /Users/user/Library/ directory 2) Executing this persisted copy, via the open command 3) Decrypting embedded strings that relate to file extensions of (likely) interest | ['T1036'] |
TA505 has been responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014, using malicious email campaigns to distribute various banking trojans, ransomware, RATs, and backdoors. TA505 has been focused on delivering downloaders, information stealers, and other malware — threats that can remain in affected systems if not prevented or remediated. With the group's use of email as an entry point for malicious activities, the threat has become more serious for unwitting users and organizations | ['T1566.001'] |
The Autorun manager subsystem is responsible for tracking the way that the malicious module starts in the system and it maintains several different methods for starting automatically (shown below): LinkAutorun The subsystem searches for a LNK file in the target directory, changes the path to “cmd.exe” and the description to ‘ /q /c start “” “%s” && start “” “%s” ‘ TaskScheduler20Autorun The subsystem creates the ITaskService (works only on Windows Vista+) and uses the ITaskService interface to create a new task with a logon trigger StartupAutorun The subsystem creates a LNK file in %STARTUP% ScreenSaverAutorun The subsystem installs as a current screensaver with a hidden window HiddenTaskAutorun The subsystem creates the task ITaskScheduler (works only on pre-Vista NT). The task trigger start date is set to the creation date of the Windows directory ShellAutorun Winlogon registry [HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogon] Shell=”explorer.exe | ['T1547.001', 'T1547.009'] |
Parse the contents of a corresponding textbox within the document and convert it to a command line argument specific to the Windows architecture on the victim’s machine. Execute the command | ['T1059.003'] |
1) Suckfly's first step was to identify a user to target so the attackers could attempt their initial breach into the e-commerce company's internal network. We don't have hard evidence of how Suckfly obtained information on the targeted user, but we did find a large open-source presence on the initial target. 2) On April 22, 2015, Suckfly exploited a vulnerability on the targeted employee's operating system (Windows) that allowed the attackers to bypass the User Account Control and install the Nidiran back door to provide access for their attack. While we know the attackers used a custom dropper to install the back door, we do not know the delivery vector. Based on the amount of open-source information available on the target, it is feasible that a spear-phishing email may have been used. We found evidence that Suckfly used hacktools to move latterly and escalate privileges. To do this the attackers used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain the victim's account credentials. With the account credentials, the attackers were able to access the victim's account and navigate the internal corporate network as though they were the employee. 5) The attackers’ final step was to exfiltrate data off the victim’s network and onto Suckfly’s infrastructure. While we know that the attackers used the Nidiran back door to steal information about the compromised organization, we do not know if Suckfly was successful in stealing other information | ['T1003'] |
In order to download the additional modules, the malware uses the BITSAdmin tool, which this group has relied on for some years to avoid detection, since this is an allowlisted tool from the Windows operating system. By the end of September 2019, we started seeing a new version of Guildma malware being distributed that used a new technique for storing downloaded payloads in NTFS Alternate Data Streams in order to conceal their presence in the system | ['T1105'] |
The BITS mechanism has existed since Windows XP up to the current Windows 10 versions and was developed to create download/upload jobs, mostly to update the OS itself. The following is the command used to exfiltrate data from the victim to the C2 | ['T1010'] |
NV.html, tracked by Microsoft as EnvyScout, can be best described as a malicious dropper capable of de-obfuscating and writing a malicious ISO file to disk. EnvyScout is chiefly delivered to targets of NOBELIUM by way of an attachment to spear-phishing emails | ['T1204.002', 'T1140'] |
In order to identify a particular mining session, a file containing the IP address of the machine and the day’s date is created by the idgenerator script and its output is sent to the C&C server by the updater.sh script | ['T1016'] |
One of the access vectors most used by ACTINIUM is spear-phishing emails with malicious macro attachments that employ remote templates. Remote template injection refers to the method of causing a document to load a remote document template that contains the malicious code, in this case, macros | ['T1566.001', 'T1027', 'T1204.002', 'T1221'] |
First, they use COM object hijacking to make the malware persistent on the system even though the custom backdoor is installed only for a few hours. Second, the hex-encoded string is the C&C used by the custom backdoor while in the Delphi backdoor the C&C is embedded in the configuration | ['T1573.001', 'T1546.015'] |
Creates 2 objects in the AD forest Configuration partition. Updates the SPN of the computer used to include “GC” (Global Catalog) and “E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2” (AD Replication). More info on Kerberos Service Principal Names in the ADSecurity SPN section. Pushes the updates to DCs via DrsReplicaAdd and KCC | ['T1207'] |
The exported procedure HandlerW , responsible for parsing the arguments, shows that it is also possible to try to impersonate an anonymous token or try to steal another’s process token just for the execution of a command | ['T1134.002'] |