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The emails first originated from a spoofed sender that impersonated a Meetings Services Assistant at the United Nations General Assembly Secretariat. The threat actor achieved this impersonation by utilizing the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go, which allows users to alter the envelope sender field while using a unique sender address generated by the service | ['T1585.002'] |
The new spear-phishing docs used by MuddyWater rely on social engineering to persuade users to enable macros. The attackers rely on a range of compromised hosts to deliver their attacks | ['T1566.001'] |
FANCY BEAR adversary used different tradecraft, deploying X-Agent malware with capabilities to do remote command execution, file transmission and keylogging | ['T1105'] |
The next program sent to victims enumerates all the drives on the infected system and executes the following command on them | ['T1083'] |
Once explorer.exe is running, the service configures the environment and executes the C2 contact module: winprint32.exe. This module is responsible for launching the document search module, contact the C2 and exfiltrate the collected documents | ['T1020', 'T1041'] |
To initially gain access to the environment, Managed Defense analysts identified that FIN6 compromised an internet facing system. Following the compromise of this system, analysts identified FIN6 leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally within the environment using the Windows’ Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP | ['T1003.001', 'T1021.001', 'T1078'] |
Use of Open Source Tools In an attempt to avoid detection and as an anti-analysis tactic, the OilRig group abused an open source tool called Invoke-Obfuscation to obfuscate the code used for QUADAGENT. Invoke-Obfuscation is freely available via a Github repository and allows a user to change the visual representation of a PowerShell script simply by selecting the desired obfuscation techniques. Invoke-Obfuscation offers a variety of obfuscation techniques, and by analyzing the script we were able to ascertain the specific options in this attack. After identifying the specific options used to obfuscate QUADAGENT, we were able to deobfuscate the PowerShell script and perform additional analysis. We found two obfuscation techniques applied to the script: the first one changing the representation of variables; the second one changing the representation of strings in the script. Invoke-Obfuscation calls the string obfuscation used by the actors to further obfuscate this script Reorder, which uses the string formatting functionality within PowerShell to reconstruct strings from out of order substrings (ex. 1}{0}" -f 'bar','foo'). During our analysis, we installed Invoke-Obfuscation and used it to obfuscate a previously collected QUADAGENT sample to confirm our analysis. We captured the commands we ran in Invoke-Obfuscation in the animation in Figure 3 below, which visualizes the steps the threat actor may have taken to create the payload delivered in this attack | ['T1059.003'] |
The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. Afterward, the module will delete old "sft" files assuming they were already exfiltrated. After a pause of 6,500 milliseconds, it will start its search for the targeted files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp | ['T1083'] |
Cookie Notice . This website uses cookies to help personalize and improve your experience. By Continuing to use this site, you are consenting to the use of cookies. Further research into the IP address hosting the spoofed page revealed a broader campaign to steal credentials. Countries with targeted universities. Source: Secureworks) . After entering their credentials into the fake login page, victims were redirected to the legitimate website where they were automatically logged into a valid session or were prompted to enter their credentials again. Numerous spoofed domains referenced the targeted universities' online library systems, indicating the threat actors' intent to gain access to these resources. CTU™ researchers were unable to confirm functionality of all identified spoofed pages because some of the domains were not accessible at the time of analysis. Domain registrations indicate the infrastructure to support this campaign was still being created when CTU researchers discovered the activity. A domain registered in May 2018 also contained subdomains spoofing university targets. These subdomains redirected visitors to spoofed login pages on other attacker-controlled domains | ['T1583.001'] |
T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.002: Spearphishing Link - T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service - - - T1204.001: Malicious Link - T1204.002: Malicious File - T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005: Visual Basic - T1059.005: Visual Basic - - T1053.005: Scheduled Task - T1129: Shared Modules - T1106: Native API - T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation - - T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information T1027.002: Software Packing - T1027.002: Software Packing - T1553: Subvert Trust Controls T1553.002: Code Signing - T1553.002: Code Signing - T1218: Signed Binary Proxy Execution T1218.010: Regsvr32 - T1218.010: Regsvr32 - - T1497.001: System Checks - T1497.002: User Activity Based Checks - T1497.003: Time Based Evasion - T1112: Modify Registry - T1070: Indicator Removal on Host T1070.004: File Deletion - T1070.004: File Deletion - T1140: De-obfuscate/Decode Files or Information - - - T1090.003: Multi-hop Proxy - T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer - - T1055: Process Injection T1055.012: Process Hollowing - T1055.012: Process Hollowing - - T1082: System Information Discovery - T1049: System Network Connections Discovery - T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery - T1057: Process Discovery - T1033: System Owner/User Discovery - T1518: Software Discovery T1518.001: Security Software Discovery - T1518.001: Security Software Discovery - Persistence T1546: Event Triggered Execution T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1546: Event Triggered Execution - T1547: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | ['T1070.004'] |
After the execution of rundll32.exe, the PowerShell script enu.ps1 is executed. This script is encoded with Base64 in order to avoid detection by antivirus products | ['T1027'] |
Config.json" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. This configuration file contains the same actor pool and wallet information as the first. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called "XbashY" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. TermsHost.exe" is a PE32 Monero miner. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. Advertising for the miner promotes it as offering startup registry key persistence, mining only while idle, and the ability to inject the miner into "Windows processes to bypass firewalls. The sample grabs the config file "xmr.txt," which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. The sample also creates the UPX-packed file "dDNLQrsBUE.url" in the Windows Start Menu Folder | ['T1547.001'] |
Config.json" is a mining config file for XMRig, an open-source Monero miner. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called "XbashY" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. TermsHost.exe" is a PE32 Monero miner. Based on the config file it uses, it appears to be the Monero Silent Miner. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. Advertising for the miner promotes it as offering startup registry key persistence, mining only while idle, and the ability to inject the miner into "Windows processes to bypass firewalls. The sample grabs the config file "xmr.txt," which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. The sample also creates the UPX-packed file "dDNLQrsBUE.url" in the Windows Start Menu Folder. Intriguingly, this file appears to share some similarities with Cobalt Strike, the popular penetration testing software, which would allow the attacker to have greater control over the infected system | ['T1027.002'] |
The ROKRAT author implements several techniques typically seen to frustrate human analysts and avoid sandbox execution. First, the malware does not run on Windows XP systems. The code used to perform this task: The malware checks the process names in use on the victim machine. It compares if the executed process name matches a partial name hardcoded in the sample. Here is the complete list | ['T1057'] |
In this version, a shortcut is created in order to launch winnit.exe in the following path %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Anti virus service.lnk. As in the previous version, the ID of the infected system is generated with exactly the same method. The C2 is different and the analysed version this time only contains a single domain | ['T1547.001'] |
If yes, it generates an RSA PKCS key using CryptGenKey that is used for encryption of communication session keys. It then writes the RSA key to the PRVK key in the [Version] section of the config file. Turla’s Carbon backdoor also implements RSA encryption on the session keys for some of its C&C channels | ['T1573.002'] |
root/.ssh/{id_rsa, id_rsa.pub} – the SSH pair key used to update the miner from the C&C server using SCP. opt/{bootsync.sh, bootlocal.sh} – the system startup commands that try to update the miner from the C&C server and run it (see Scripts 7 and 8 | ['T1105'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. Datper uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity | ['T1071.001'] |
Hardcore Nationalist group SideWinder is a threat group active since 2012 according to Kaspersky. This group mainly targets Pakistanis and Chinese military & government entities’ windows machines. They also target mobile phone devices. This is the second time this group is using COVID-19 theme to lure victims, thereby capitalizing on the fear of global pandemic. Sidewinder aka HN2 is believed to be an Indian state sponsored group. A detailed analysis of SideWinder attacks on Pakistani military officials was also published in April | ['T1204.002', 'T1204.001'] |
The SolarWinds Orion API is vulnerable to authentication bypass that could allow a remote attacker to execute API commands | ['T1203'] |
Grandoreiro’s DGA uses two strings (prefix and suffix) hardcoded in the binary and the local date as inputs. Note that based on the DGA, a different website is required for each day. We have observed some variants also using a custom base64 alphabet | ['T1568.002'] |
WastedLocker will attempt to encrypt files on local as well as remote (network adjacent and accessible) and removable drives | ['T1135'] |
The infection chain starts with an email in which the victim receives a download link that fetches the first-stage downloader. As we found in our analysis, this first-stage downloader is responsible for fetching a malicious MSI file hosted on an attacker-controlled GitHub page. This MSI file is downloaded and executed on the endpoint. As a result, a malicious Python-compiled binary is dropped on the file system, which uses the Dropbox API for command-and-control (C&C) communication | ['T1566.002', 'T1105', 'T1102.002', 'T1204.001'] |
At the second stage, the attackers remotely connected to the device and scanned the local network seeking to gain access to public shared folders, web servers, and any other open resources. The aim was to harvest information about the network, above all, servers and workstations used for making payments. At the same time, the attackers tried to brute-force or sniff login data for such machines. If the firewall blocked access from one segment of the network to another, but allowed a reverse connection, the attackers used a different payload to build tunnels | ['T1040'] |
As a result of all of the above actions, when attempting to surf the web, the user’s web browser will first ask the attacker web page on TOR for proxy settings. The user traffic is then redirected through a proxy controlled by the attacker, who carries out a Man-In-the-Middle attack and impersonates the various sites the user attempts to surf. The attacker is free to read the victim’s traffic and tamper with it in any way they please | ['T1557'] |
After execution, Ragnar Locker Ransomware encrypts the files and adds the extension “.ragnar” and an 8 digit number | ['T1486'] |
When referring to additional plugins, it is worth noting that in early versions of Valak the plugins were downloaded by the second stage JS via PowerShell. More recent versions of Valak abandoned the popular yet easily detectable PowerShell downloader approach and transitioned to PluginHost as a means of managing and downloading additional payloads. This transition indicates that the Valak authors are looking for stealthier approaches and ways to improve their evasion techniques | ['T1059.001'] |
Controlled by Micropsia operators, the malware is able to register to an event of USB volume insertion to detect new connected USB flash drives. Once an event is triggered, Micropsia executes an RAR tool to recursively archive files based on a predefined list of file extensions (*.xls, *.xlsx, *.csv, *.odt, *.doc, *.docx, *.ppt, *.pptx, *.pdf, *.mdb, *.accdb, *.accde, *.txt | ['T1560.001', 'T1119'] |
We were able to source a sample that may be the malware involved in the May 2018 attacks. We ran it, and it broke the boot sector as expected (see Figure 1). An initial analysis of the file revealed it was created using Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS), an open-source application used to create setup programs. The actor behind this threat used the application and purposely named it “MBR Killer. There are no indications of network-related behavior in this malware | ['T1027'] |
In some attacks, Whitefly has used a second piece of custom malware, Trojan.Nibatad. Like Vcrodat, Nibatad is also a loader that leverages search order hijacking, and downloads an encrypted payload to the infected computer. And similar to Vcrodat, the Nibatad payload is designed to facilitate information theft from an infected computer | ['T1027'] |
Creates a new registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command - Sets the “Default” value to “path of the malware” - Creates a value “DelegateExecute” and sets the value to “0” - Executes %systemDirectory%sdclt.exe to bypass the UAC as shown below (figure 7 | ['T1112'] |
These two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt contain instructions for MESSAGETAP to target and save contents of SMS messages | ['T1560.003'] |
1) Send initial proxy module request. The initial request contains the bot ID, external IP address of the infected machine, reverse DNS lookup of the external IP address, internet speed (measured earlier) and seconds since the proxy module started. 2) Establish a connection (proxy commands sequence 1->10->11) with the PROXY-C2. 3) Initialize sessions, perform socks5 authorization with login/password (received from PROXY-C2 with command 10). 4) Begin SOCKS5-like communication wrapped into the QakBot proxy module protocol | ['T1090.002'] |
A technical relevant fact about this campaign is the use of Python embedded into Windows executables of the malware. There is no multi-platform support as the code is heavily Windows-oriented (use of libraries). However, we discovered several clues that the attackers prepared the infrastructure for Mac OS X and Unix victims as well. In addition to Windows components, we also found a mobile (Android) component | ['T1053.005', 'T1059.006'] |
The second version does not carry the payload directly but instead downloads it from a C2 into the same location as before. The C2 server address is embedded in the main executable in the TinkaOTP bundle. The hardcoded download and execution code are easily visible as they are unencrypted, plain UTF strings in the binary | ['T1105'] |
Guloader is a downloader that has been active since 2019. It is known to deliver various malware, more notably: Agent-Tesla, Netwire, FormBook, Nanocore, and Parallax RAT | ['T1102'] |
All of the backdoors identified – excluding RoyalDNS – required APT15 to create batch scripts in order to install its persistence mechanism. This was achieved through the use of a simple Windows run key | ['T1059.003'] |
Once communication with the C2 server has been established, QakBot is known to download and use additional modules in order to perform its malicious operations | ['T1095', 'T1105'] |
This DLL has no other noticeable characteristics, as it functions like a typical malicious sideload. After loading the encrypted payload in memory, it transfers the execution to a shellcode that is located at the beginning of the file. Once loaded in memory, the ZeroT shellcode does not present any kind of obfuscation, unlike that for PlugX. As in the new PlugX dropper detailed below, this is done using RC4 and RtlDecompressBuffer. As in PlugX samples, the PE header of ZeroT has been tampered with, specifically the “MZ” and “PE” constants (Fig | ['T1574.002'] |
One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading - One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file - One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL | ['T1574.002', 'T1574.002', 'T1574.002'] |
The `Download3rdStage` will first decode `https://discord.com` and try to connect to it. Then, it performs a time-based anti-debug check, as shown in the code below. If any of these checks fail, the DLL will not download the third stage | ['T1497.003'] |
Learn more about our Personal Data Protection PolicyAccept Cookies . DeepMalwareAnalysis . Joe Security's Blog . TrickBot's new API-Hammering explained . Published on: 13.07.2020 As usual, at Joe Security, we keep a close eye on evasive malware. It turned out to be a new TrickBot sample using API hammering to bypass analysis. Two Stage API Hammering . Right after the entry point, the sample tries to load taskmgr.exe as a DLL: This is likely a trick to bypass emulators that do not check if a given DLL exists if LoadLibraryEx is called. Since before the loop FreeConsole has been called all printf calls do basically nothing: This code has been directly copied from the documentation of printf: So what is the purpose of those numerous printf loops. As a result, the massive amount of calls delay the execution process and overload the sandbox with junk data. This behavior is called API Hammering. API Hammering is not a new technique, we have already seen it several years ago e.g. Joe Sandbox detects the API hammering successfully and rates it as malicious: Right after the printf flood, the sample performs another loop to delay execution by creating and writing to a temporary file - the second stage. In between it performs random sleeps: Again, the purpose is to overload the sandbox and delay the execution. No matter what technology your favorite sandbox uses, it has to handle API Hammering correctly | ['T1106'] |
When generating the URLs within the HTTP POST and GET requests, XAgent sets one HTTP parameter using a specific data structure that contains this agent_id value. This parameter transmits the agent_id to the C2 server to obtain commands the actor wishes to execute on the compromised system. The data structure used to transmit the agent_id to the C2 is as follows | ['T1106'] |
Inception’s malware is modular and the attackers will load plugins based on requirements for each attack. The group has used a range of plugins in recent attacks, some of which are improved versions of plugins used in 2014, while others were previously unseen | ['T1057'] |
When running under a limited UAC account, the installer extracts d3d9.dll and creates a persistence key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run | ['T1547.001'] |
The process begins with the consistent execution of a malicious DLL using the legitimate regsvr32.exe Windows Utility. Once executed, the DLL is deleted from the system and its components are dropped to the system | ['T1218.010'] |
Following the initial compromise, in many instances the BackdoorDiplomacy group employed open-source reconnaissance and red-team tools to evaluate the environment for additional targets of opportunity and lateral movement. Among the tools documented are | ['T1105', 'T1588.002'] |
Once the library is called by one of the triggering events implemented in its code, it reads a configuration file from a shared Google Document. If it is not able to connect to the address, it uses a hardcoded one | ['T1565.002'] |
Hildegard uses LD_PRELOAD to hide the malicious process launched inside the containers. The malware modified the /etc/ld.so.preload file to intercept shared libraries’ imported functions | ['T1574.006'] |
The threat actor connected via Remote Desktop from a Domain Controller to a vCenter server and opened a PowerShell console, then used the PowerShell command -ep bypass to circumvent the execution policy. Using the Windows Azure Active Directory PowerShell Module, the threat actor connected to the victim’s O365 tenant and began performing enumeration queries | ['T1087.002', 'T1482'] |
Targets are sent spear phishing e-mails that lead them to a web site displaying a lure document and are immediately prompted to install a malicious Google Chrome extension. It then redirects the user to install a “Font Manager” extension from the Chrome Web Store, as seen in Figure 2. Figure 2: HTML Source of Phishing Page The malicious extensions, now removed from the Chrome Web Store, contain reviews left by the threat actor using compromised Google+ accounts. It should be noted however, that some users reported deleting the extension immediately because it prevented the Chrome browser from functioning properly. The malicious Chrome extensions declare permissions to run on every URL in the browser, as seen in Figure 3. Loading jQuery.js from an external site makes no sense, since the latest version of extension has a legitimate jQuery.js included in the extension bundle. Figure 4: Given the threat actor’s propensity for password theft, and the fact that the malicious Chrome extensions were situated to read data from every website, it's likely that the intent is to steal browser cookies and passwords. Figure 5: Certificate used to sign MECHANICAL/GREASE While the threat actors did use a few tools to automate intrusions, we also found a ZIP archive of tools that demonstrate their propensity for password theft to propagate. Advise users to be wary of any prompts to install browser extensions, even if they are hosted on an official extension site. They spent significant time and resources doing reconnaissance on their targets, as evidenced by the comments left on the Chrome extension page | ['T1176'] |
After the payload execution it reaches out to the C2 via POST request as shown below | ['T1071.001'] |
All RDAT samples have malicious verdicts in WildFire and have protections in place through Cortex XDR. DNS tunneling protocols used for C2 communications are blocked via DNS Security. All C2 domains are classified as Command-and-Control for URL Filtering. AutoFocus customers can monitor activity via the rdat_backdoor tag | ['T1132.002', 'T1132.001'] |
Endpoint Protection . The Trojan.Hydraq Incident . It has been about a week since news of the mysterious Hydraq Trojan (also known as Aurora) attack broke with the unveiling of a threat by Google to pull its operations out of China. In addition the blog also mentioned that a host of other large corporations were also targets of this same attack. In this attack a PDF file was used to exploit the Adobe Acrobat, Reader, and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1862/BID35759). This PDF installed a Trojan horse which was an earlier version of the current Trojan.Hydraq. Considering the efforts that the attackers put into staging the attack as a whole, the end malware is not so sophisticated. Download a remote file, save it as %Temp%\mdm.exe, and then execute it. This means the remote attacker has the ability to see in real time any user interface activity as if they were sitting right next to the user. As described in the previously posted blog (Hydraq - An Attack of Mythical Proportions), an unpatched Internet Explorer vulnerability (BID 37815) was used as one of the propagation vectors for this particular Trojan.Hydraq attack. This security hole allows remote exploitation, which means that attackers can run any malicious code of their liking on a victim’s machine by taking advantage of the vulnerability. Prevention & Mitigation Trojan.Hydraq has been known to be spread through specially crafted PDF files and also through malicious Web sites. The attacker can exploit this issue by supplying a malicious Flash ('.swf') file or by embedding a malicious Flash application in a PDF file | ['T1105'] |
We mentioned earlier that docx files (like xlsx and pptx) are part of the OOXML standard. The document defining this standard[6], describes the syntax and values that can be used as an example. An interesting file to look at is the ‘settings.xml’ file that can be discovered in the ‘Word’ container of the docx zip file. This file contains settings with regards to language, markup and more. First, we extracted all the data from the settings.xml files and started to compare. All the documents below contained the same language values | ['T1221'] |
FireEye has dubbed the cybercrime gang FIN5. One of the most unique things about FIN5 is that in every intrusion we responded to where FIN5 has been active, legitimate access was identified. They had valid user credentials to remotely log into the network," said Barry Vengerik, principal threat analyst at FireEye. No sexy zero-days, no remote exploits -- not even spearphishing | ['T1110'] |
It looks like GrowlHelper creates an executable named Software Update Check when it thinks it’s online. I was pretty excited when I first found this, but quickly realized it just drops a copy of itself with a different name | ['T1036.004'] |
FireEye assesses APT33 may be behind a series of intrusions and attempted intrusions within the engineering industry. FireEye's Managed Defense has responded to and contained numerous intrusions that we assess are related. The actor is leveraging publicly available tools in early phases of the intrusion; however, we have observed them transition to custom implants in later stage activity in an attempt to circumvent our detection | ['T1555', 'T1003.001', 'T1552.001', 'T1003.005', 'T1555.003', 'T1552.006', 'T1003.004', 'T1588.002'] |
PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for clarity | ['T1105'] |
The attackers manually send a command to the JS or C# component to drop and execute a batch file from one of their servers. That batch file writes a malicious INF file and supplies it as a parameter to the Microsoft utility cmstp.exe, which executes a remote scriptlet specified in the INF file. This technique has been documented in the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base as CMSTP; an example of how this technique is used may be found here. This technique has been used in the past by Cobalt, another financially motivated group. The remote scriptlet contains obfuscated JS code that drops an OCX file and executes it via regsvr32.exe | ['T1059.007'] |
cmd.exe /C choice /C Y /N /D Y /T 2 & Del After sleeping, the Trojan will create a GUID and write it to %APPDATA%\Windows\GDI.bin. It then moves itself to %APPDATA%\Windows\WindowsImplantment.exe and sets both of these files to have the hidden and system flags to hide them from the user. With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently. This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task. This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution. After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server. The process in which the Trojan communicates with its C2 server is very similar to the previous OopsIE Trojan that we discussed in our previous blog. Also, the oops string used to signify and erroneous transmission from the C2, which gave OopsIE its name is reversed to spoo. hex(STDOUT of whoami command)> If the C2 server wishes to send a command, it will respond to the beacon above by echoing the whoami command results sent by the Trojan to the C2 in the URL. The command handler in this OopsIE variant is very similar to the previous version, as it contains the same three (1, 2 and 3) commands seen in Table 2 | ['T1105'] |
In october 2016 Group-IB published the report about the Cobalt group. Network penetration In all cases investigated by Group-IB, the Cobalt group used a set of spear phishing emails to gain initial access to the corporate infrastructure. However, some of the email addresses belong to employees that no longer work at the organization, which means that the Cobalt group likely uses out-of-date mailing lists. However, when there is use of a security policy that prohibits the transfer of encrypted archives, such an email message may be blocked, so the attackers would send .doc files that contain exploits for Microsoft Office (fig. For organizations that perform timely updates of their systems and adhere to strict security policies, the Cobalt group employs another method to deliver malicious code through emails with Word documents containing a malicious macro. Therefore, the Cobalt group registered domains are similar to real ones (for example, diebold.pw), and configured their email server to distribute acting as these legitimate domains (fig. Provision of the malware survivability The Cobalt group uses different methods to ensure malware survivability on corporate networks. From our experience, the Cobalt group uses a new method to provide its survivability in every attack. Additional means of circumventing anti-virus tools include the use of exploits to increase the level of rights and privileges, bypassing UAC, and injecting code into trusted processes. Conclusion After infecting one computer on an organization's network, the Cobalt group analyzes the programs used on it and search for critical servers and the computers from which they are accessed | ['T1068'] |
The dropped payload is a DLL file that has been packed using the UPX packer. The unpacked sample is highly obfuscated and important API calls and strings have been encrypted using a custom encryption algorithm. Whenever in the code the malware needs to use a string, it takes the encrypted string and passes it into two functions to decrypt it | ['T1027.002'] |
This document likely marks the first observed use of this technique by APT28. The use of DDE with PowerShell allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a victim’s system regardless whether macros are enabled | ['T1559.002'] |
POWERTON is a backdoor written in PowerShell; FireEye has not yet identified any publicly available toolset with a similar code base, indicating that it is likely custom-built. POWERTON is designed to support multiple persistence mechanisms, including WMI and auto-run registry key. POWERTON typically gets deployed as a later stage backdoor and is obfuscated several layers | ['T1547.001'] |
A batch file that is used to run Bitsadmin and Rundll to download and execute the Egregor payload. A Zip file contains a binary file that is an RClone client, renamed svchost, and RClone config files (webdav, ftp and dropbox) used later for exfiltration | ['T1059.003'] |
The screenshot above shows an abbreviated view of the in-memory PowerShell backdoor. The PowerShell backdoor has the following capabilities | ['T1049', 'T1518', 'T1027'] |
The archive contains two files; the first is an executable file, while the second is a decoy PDF document. The bear’s lair . The Stage-1 downloader will download and execute a new downloader, written in C++, not so different from other Zebrocy downloaders. How the bear hunts . In this section we describe in more detail the commands performed manually by the operators through their Delphi backdoor. As we did not identify a pattern in the order which the commands are invoked, we believe the operators are executing them manually. The first set of commands gathers information about the victim’s computer and environment: The commands above are commonly executed when the operators first connect to a newly activated backdoor. Moreover, the backdoor contains a list of filenames related to credentials from software listed below (database names): The operators take care of retrieving these databases if they are present on the victim’s computer. The operators retrieve these files on the machine using the DOWNLOAD_LIST command. This command can be used when the operators are aware of the presence of interesting files on the computer. This backdoor is executed using the CMD_EXECUTE command: There are some interesting facts here. The first set of commands is the same and executed during a very short timeframe, which raises another question: is it automated | ['T1083'] |
The reason for this is that most of the file comprises meaningless overlay data, since the file is an automatically generated AutoIT executable with an AutoIT3 script embedded inside. Once started, it downloads additional malware from the C2 and also uploads some basic system information, stealing, among other things, the user’s Google Chrome credentials. The backdoor also pings the C2 server at regular intervals. A good security analyst can spot this while analyzing firewall log files and thereby find out that something suspicious might be going on in the network | ['T1105'] |
Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use the ‘at' or ‘schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity. In particular, review network access for use of mobile USB modems on corporate systems | ['T1547.001'] |
This structure parses out executable scripts from data provided via a remote operator. In this case, the REGEX value indicates this implant will receive scripts compressed (tar files). The malware will then decompress them before executing the embedded script. Analysis indicates the WellMail implant is similar in design and structure to the WellMess implant -- and both accept and execute shell scripts from a remote operator | ['T1105'] |
Narrow attacks targeted the Automotive industry among others, while the large malicious spam campaigns appear to be associated with threat actor TA505, an actor responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014 | ['T1204.002'] |
We have discovered that malware dubbed WinDealer, spread by Chinese-speaking APT actor LuoYu, has an ability to perform intrusions through a man-on-the-side attack | ['T1204.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1566.001', 'T1566.002', 'T1120'] |
Finally, the malware changes the password of the local users. In the files analyzed, all the passwords chosen by the actor have the same pattern: Aa153 | ['T1531'] |
The configuration file for Torisma is encrypted using the algorithm VEST[1] in addition to the communication sent over the C2 channel. From our research this encryption method is not commonly used anywhere, in fact it was a proposed cipher that did not become a standard to be implemented in general technologies[2 | ['T1041', 'T1573.001'] |
In response to historical disclosures detailing TA416 PlugX malware infection and encoding methods, the group appears to have adopted a rapid rate of development for their PlugX payloads. The group uses different legitimate PE files to initiate sideloading, as well as a variety of PlugX DLL loaders including the PotPlayer and DocCon versions noted in this publication. TA416 also uses different variants of the final PlugX payload in which the communication routines are observed to be different when closely analyzed. Additionally, the payload DAT file decryption method has evolved regularly since the beginning of 2022. Several observed decryption schemas and a sample configuration are included below with date ranges detailing the evolution of observed PlugX payloads | ['T1027'] |
Usually, after infection the bot sends a ‘PING’ message, ‘SYSTEM INFO’ message and ‘ASK for COMMAND’ message, and the C2 replies with ‘ACK’ and ‘COMMAND’ messages. If additional modules were pushed by the C2, the bot sends a ‘STOLEN INFO’ message containing data stolen by the modules | ['T1041'] |
The malware can use 2 different public RSA keys: one exported using the crypto api in a public blob or using the embedded in base64 in the malware. The malware will only use the second one if it cannot create the crypto context or has some problem with the crypto api functions | ['T1106'] |
Pillowmint is usually installed through a malicious shim database which allows the malware to persist in the system | ['T1546.011'] |
1) An application is bundled with virtualization software, a Linux image and additional files used to achieve persistence. 2) User downloads the application and follows attached instructions on how to install it. 3) LoudMiner is installed first, the actual VST software after. 4) LoudMiner hides itself and becomes persistent on reboot. 5) The Linux virtual machine is launched and the mining starts. 6) Scripts inside the virtual machine can contact the C&C server to update the miner (configuration and binaries | ['T1569.002', 'T1218.007'] |
Once on the network, the attackers engaged in network reconnaissance and retrieved a list of trusted domains and a list of domain controllers with the following commands | ['T1482'] |
When REvil was first discovered, it was delivered to targets via exploitation of Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities. There are reports that the threat actors leveraged a strategic web compromise (SWC) to deliver REvil by compromising the Italian WinRAR . it website and replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware. The SWC resulted in the infection of unsuspecting WinRAR customers' systems. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers. The diversity and complexity of delivery mechanisms employed by the REvil threat actors in a short period of time suggest a high level of sophistication | ['T1189'] |
ZxShell.dll is injected in a shared SVCHOST process. The Svchost group registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost is opened and the netsvc group value data is queried to generate a name for the service | ['T1055.001'] |
MSTIC has observed NICKEL actors using exploits against unpatched systems to compromise remote access services and appliances. Upon successful intrusion, they have used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts. MSTIC has also observed NICKEL perform frequent and scheduled data collection and exfiltration from victim networks | ['T1614.001', 'T1082'] |
DriveSlayer is digitally signed using a valid certificate and also abuses a legitimate EaseUS Partition Master driver to gain raw disk access and manipulate the disk to make the system inoperable | ['T1553.002'] |
Like any other typical PoS malware, Pillowmint iterates a list of processes and process them two at a time. it uses the API OpenProcess() using the PROCESS_VM_READ and PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION flags to obtain a handle then reads the memory’s content via ReadProcessMemory() API two chunks at a time. Depending on the Pillowmint version, it may encrypt the stolen CC data with AES encryption algorithm + Base64. This is then written to a file named "ldb_e.log" in Windows System directory | ['T1106'] |
Along with the EDRPOU numbers, the backdoor collects proxy and email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application | ['T1087.003'] |
Kimsuky is a highly motivated threat actor targeting a number of entities in South Korea. This group has been relentlessly creating new infection chains to deliver different types of malware to their victims. Such targeted attacks can result in the leak of restricted research, unauthorized access for espionage and even destructive attacks against target organizations | ['T1588.002'] |
Once the Bazar loader downloads its payload, the Bazar backdoor, it is decrypted using the same method as the aforementioned Team9 variant | ['T1104'] |
For the investigators at NCC Group and Fox-IT these pieces of evidence supported the hypothesis of the adversary achieving credentials access by brute force, and more specifically by credential stuffing or password spraying | ['T1589.001'] |
Once gaining the initial foothold into a container, Hildegard establishes either a tmate session or an IRC channel back to the C2. It is unclear how TeamTNT chooses and tasks between these two C2 channels, as both can serve the same purpose. At the time of writing, tmate sessions are the only way the attacker interacts with the compromised containers | ['T1219', 'T1219'] |
After loading its configuration data, GoldMax checks the current date-time value of the compromised system against the activation date from the configuration data | ['T1016', 'T1497.003', 'T1124'] |
Once the VBScript in XSL has been run, console commands launched by the JS code continue to be executed. Three files are copied into the folder OFFICE12 that was created in the user profile. Those files are | ['T1220'] |
POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called “living off the land” – to make an especially stealthy backdoor. POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI. Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through enhanced logging or in memory. The backdoor's infrequent beaconing, traffic obfuscation, extensive encryption and use of geographically local, legitimate websites for command and control (C2) make identification of its network traffic difficult. Every aspect of POSHSPY is efficient and covert | ['T1059.001'] |
The attack typically begins with an attempt – most probably via a spearphishing email – to lure the intended victim into running the malicious dropper, which is attached to the email. In order to increase the likelihood that the unsuspecting victim will actually click on it, the malicious executable masquerades as a document or spreadsheet by displaying a fake icon | ['T1566.001', 'T1204.002'] |
From the main function, the malware invokes a function named eiht_get_update. This function attempts to read a remote file (ret.txt) from andrewka6.pythonanywhere.com that contained the address of the remote command and control server. If that failed, the malware would default to using the hard-coded (albeit encrypted) IP address 167.71.237.219. In order to gather information about the infected host, it invokes a function named: ei_get_host_info …which in turn invokes various macOS APIs such as getlogin and gethostname | ['T1620'] |
It executes the other modules and collects initial information about the machine, including information about the network, locale, and the keyboard language | ['T1082'] |
On February 12, 2018 at 16:45 (all times are in the organization’s local time), an email was sent to the organization advertising a job vacancy at an American global service provider. The email contained a malicious link to hxxp://mynetwork.ddns[DOT].net:880 | ['T1566.002'] |
Figure 3 outlines the architecture of Crutch version 3. It includes a backdoor that communicates with a hardcoded Dropbox account using the official HTTP API. In some variants, we noticed the presence of recovery C&C channels using either GitHub or a regular domain | ['T1071.001'] |
Loader Trojan The payload dropped to the system by the macro is an executable that is responsible for installing and executing a dynamic link library (DLL) to the system. The loader has several coding features that make it interesting. Upon execution, the loader will decrypt the embedded payload (DLL) using a custom algorithm followed by decompressing it using the RtlDecompressBuffer API. This API is normally used for Windows drivers, but there is nothing to prevent a userland process from using it, and the parameters are documented on MSDN. The compression algorithm used is LZNT1 with maximum compression level. The payload is decrypted using a starting 10-byte XOR key of: 0x3950BE2CD37B2C7CCBF8. The payload is in the loader at file offset: 0x19880 - 0x1F23C size of 0x59BD. The payload can be decrypted and decompressed with the following Python script | ['T1027'] |