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African American painter Sam Gilliam (b. 1933) is internationally recognized as one of the foremost painters associated with the Washington Color School, a group of Color Field style painters practicing in Washington, D.C. during the 1950s and 1960s.The Color Field style was an important development in abstract art that emerged after the rise of abstract expressionism. It evolved from complex and minimally representational abstractions in the 1950s to totally nonrepresentational, simplified works of bright colors in the 1960s.Gilliam's participation in the Color Field movement was motivated in part by his reaction to the art of his African American contemporaries, much of which was strictly representational and was intended to convey explicit political statements. Gilliam found their approach to be aesthetically conservative: the message was unmistakable, he felt, and there was little room for the expression of subtlety or ambiguity or, more importantly, the exploration of new artistic territory through experimentation and innovation. For example, one of his contemporaries worked with collage, assembling disparate bits of images from popular magazines into loosely structured compositions that depicted the period's political issues—themes such as urban life, the rural South, and African American music. Though such art was quite popular with the general public, Gilliam was impatient with its straightforward, literal approach to representation. In its place he sought an artistic form that was more expressive than a painted figure or a political slogan, more evocative of the complexity of human experience in general, and of the African American experience in particular. In this he represented a view that was then rare among African American artists.Gilliam's highly experimental paintings epitomized his refusal to conform to the public's expectation that African American artists produce explicitly political art. His early experiments included pouring paint onto stained canvases and folding canvases over onto themselves. Then around 1965 Gilliam became the first painter to introduce the idea of the unsupported canvas. Partially inspired by the sight of neighbors hanging laundry on clotheslines, Gilliam began to drape huge pieces of loose canvas along floors and fold them up and down walls, even suspending them from ceilings, giving them a third dimension and therefore a sculptural quality. These efforts demonstrate a sensitivity to the texture of daily experience, as well as the ability to generate tension by juxtaposing conceptual opposites-such as surface and depth or chaos and control-to form a cohesive whole. In this way, Gilliam helped advance the notion that the deepest, hardest-to-capture emotions and tensions of being African American could not be represented directly, but were expressed more effectively through the creation of moods that would allow these emotions and tensions to be felt by all audiences.

201312_4-RC_1_5

The passage says all of the following EXCEPT

African American painter Sam Gilliam (b. 1933) is internationally recognized as one of the foremost painters associated with the Washington Color School, a group of Color Field style painters practicing in Washington, D.C. during the 1950s and 1960s.The Color Field style was an important development in abstract art that emerged after the rise of abstract expressionism. It evolved from complex and minimally representational abstractions in the 1950s to totally nonrepresentational, simplified works of bright colors in the 1960s.Gilliam's participation in the Color Field movement was motivated in part by his reaction to the art of his African American contemporaries, much of which was strictly representational and was intended to convey explicit political statements. Gilliam found their approach to be aesthetically conservative: the message was unmistakable, he felt, and there was little room for the expression of subtlety or ambiguity or, more importantly, the exploration of new artistic territory through experimentation and innovation. For example, one of his contemporaries worked with collage, assembling disparate bits of images from popular magazines into loosely structured compositions that depicted the period's political issues—themes such as urban life, the rural South, and African American music. Though such art was quite popular with the general public, Gilliam was impatient with its straightforward, literal approach to representation. In its place he sought an artistic form that was more expressive than a painted figure or a political slogan, more evocative of the complexity of human experience in general, and of the African American experience in particular. In this he represented a view that was then rare among African American artists.Gilliam's highly experimental paintings epitomized his refusal to conform to the public's expectation that African American artists produce explicitly political art. His early experiments included pouring paint onto stained canvases and folding canvases over onto themselves. Then around 1965 Gilliam became the first painter to introduce the idea of the unsupported canvas. Partially inspired by the sight of neighbors hanging laundry on clotheslines, Gilliam began to drape huge pieces of loose canvas along floors and fold them up and down walls, even suspending them from ceilings, giving them a third dimension and therefore a sculptural quality. These efforts demonstrate a sensitivity to the texture of daily experience, as well as the ability to generate tension by juxtaposing conceptual opposites-such as surface and depth or chaos and control-to form a cohesive whole. In this way, Gilliam helped advance the notion that the deepest, hardest-to-capture emotions and tensions of being African American could not be represented directly, but were expressed more effectively through the creation of moods that would allow these emotions and tensions to be felt by all audiences.

201312_4-RC_1_6

The passage suggests that Gilliam would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_7

Which one of the following pairs of titles would be most appropriate for passage A and passage B, respectively?

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_8

Which one of the following most accurately expresses how the use of the phrase "skinning animals" in passage A (line 24) relates to the use of the phrase "fish pulled from the ocean" in passage B (line 49)?

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_9

With regard to their respective attitudes toward commerce in virtual items, passage A differs from passage B in that passage A is more

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_10

Based on what can be inferred from their titles, the relationship between which one of the following pairs of documents is most analogous to the relationship between passage A and passage B?

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_11

The passages were most likely taken from which one of the following pairs of sources?

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_12

Which one of the following most accurately describes the relationship between the two passages?

Passage A Millions of people worldwide play multiplayer online games. They each pick, say, a medieval character to play, such as a warrior. Then they might band together in quests to slay magical beasts; their avatars appear as tiny characters striding across a Tolkienesque land.The economist Edward Castronova noticed something curious about the game he played: it had its own economy, a bustling trade in virtual goods. Players generate goods as they play, often by killing creatures for their treasure and trading it. The longer they play, the wealthier they get.Things got even more interesting when Castronova learned about the "player auctions." Players would sometimes tire of the game and decide to sell off their virtual possessions at online auction sites. As Castronova stared at the auction listings, he recognized with a shock what he was looking at. It was a form of currency trading! Each item had a value in the virtual currency traded in the game; when it was sold on the auction site, someone was paying cold hard cash for it. That meant that the virtual currency was worth something in real currency. Moreover, since players were killing monsters or skinning animalsto sell their pelts, they were, in effect, creating wealth. .Passage B Most multiplayer online games prohibit real-world trade in virtual items, but some actually encourage it, for example, by granting participants intellectual property rights in their creations.Although it seems intuitively the case that someone who accepts real money for the transfer of a virtual item should be taxed, what about the player who only accumulates items or virtual currency within a virtual world? Is "loot" acquired in a game taxable,as a prize or award is? And is the profit in a purely in-game trade or sale for virtual currency taxable? These are important questions, given the tax revenues at stake, and there is pressure on governments to answer them, given that the economies of some virtual worlds are comparable to those of small countries.Most people's intuition probably would be that accumulation of assets within a game should not be taxed even though income tax applies even to noncash accessions to wealth. This article will argue that income tax law and policy support that result. Loot acquisitions in game worlds should not be treated as taxable prizes and awards, but rather should be treated like other property that requires effort to obtain, such as fish pulled from the ocean, which is taxed only upon sale. Moreover, in-game trades of virtual items should not be treated as taxable barter.By contrast, tax doctrine and policy counsel taxation of the sale of virtual items for real currency, and, in games that are intentionally commodified,whether the participant cashes out. This approach would leave entertainment value untaxed without creating a tax shelter for virtual commerce

201312_4-RC_2_13

Based on passage B, which one of the following is a characteristic of some "games that are intentionally commodified" (line 54)?

In certain fields of human endeavor, such as music, chess, and some athletic activities, the performance of the best practitioners is so outstanding, so superior even to the performance of other highly experienced individuals in the field, that some people believe some notion of innate talent must be invoked to account for this highest level of performance. Certain psychologists have supported this view with data concerning the performance of prodigies and the apparent heritability of relevant traits. They have noted, for example, that most outstanding musicians are discovered by the age of six, and they have found evidence that some of the qualities necessary for exceptional athletic performance, including superior motor coordination, speed of reflexes, and hand-eye coordination, can be inborn.Until recently, however, little systematic research was done on the topic of superior performance, and previous estimates of the heritability of traits relevant to performance were based almost exclusively on random samples of the general population rather than on studies of highly trained superior performers as compared with the general population. Recent research in different domains of excellence suggests that exceptional performance arises predominantly from acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations, rather than from innate abilities. For example, it has been found that the most accomplished athletes show a systematic advantage in reaction time or perceptual discrimination only in their particular fields of performance, not in more general laboratory tests for these factors. Similarly, superior chess players have exceptional memory for configurations of chess pieces, but only if those configurations are typical of chess games.The vast majority of exceptional adult performers were not exceptional as children, but started instruction early and improved their performance through sustained high-level training. Only extremely rarely is outstanding performance achieved without at least ten years of intensive, deliberate practice. With such intensive training, chess players who may not have superior innate capacities can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on such factors as memory and the ability to process information. Recent research shows that, with the clear exception of some traits such as height, a surprisingly large number of anatomical characteristics, including aerobic capacity and the percentage of muscle fibers, show specific changes that develop from extended intense training. The evidence does not, therefore, support the claim that a notion of innate talent must be invoked in order to account for the difference between good and outstanding performance, since it suggests instead that extended intense training, together with that level of talent common to all reasonably competent performers, may suffice to account for this difference. Since sustained intense training usually depends on an appropriate level of interest and desire, and since those who eventually become superior performers more often show early signs of exceptional interest than early evidence of unusual ability, motivational factors are more likely to be effective predictors of superior performance than is innate talent.

201312_4-RC_3_14

Which one of the following most accurately states the main point of the passage?

In certain fields of human endeavor, such as music, chess, and some athletic activities, the performance of the best practitioners is so outstanding, so superior even to the performance of other highly experienced individuals in the field, that some people believe some notion of innate talent must be invoked to account for this highest level of performance. Certain psychologists have supported this view with data concerning the performance of prodigies and the apparent heritability of relevant traits. They have noted, for example, that most outstanding musicians are discovered by the age of six, and they have found evidence that some of the qualities necessary for exceptional athletic performance, including superior motor coordination, speed of reflexes, and hand-eye coordination, can be inborn.Until recently, however, little systematic research was done on the topic of superior performance, and previous estimates of the heritability of traits relevant to performance were based almost exclusively on random samples of the general population rather than on studies of highly trained superior performers as compared with the general population. Recent research in different domains of excellence suggests that exceptional performance arises predominantly from acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations, rather than from innate abilities. For example, it has been found that the most accomplished athletes show a systematic advantage in reaction time or perceptual discrimination only in their particular fields of performance, not in more general laboratory tests for these factors. Similarly, superior chess players have exceptional memory for configurations of chess pieces, but only if those configurations are typical of chess games.The vast majority of exceptional adult performers were not exceptional as children, but started instruction early and improved their performance through sustained high-level training. Only extremely rarely is outstanding performance achieved without at least ten years of intensive, deliberate practice. With such intensive training, chess players who may not have superior innate capacities can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on such factors as memory and the ability to process information. Recent research shows that, with the clear exception of some traits such as height, a surprisingly large number of anatomical characteristics, including aerobic capacity and the percentage of muscle fibers, show specific changes that develop from extended intense training. The evidence does not, therefore, support the claim that a notion of innate talent must be invoked in order to account for the difference between good and outstanding performance, since it suggests instead that extended intense training, together with that level of talent common to all reasonably competent performers, may suffice to account for this difference. Since sustained intense training usually depends on an appropriate level of interest and desire, and since those who eventually become superior performers more often show early signs of exceptional interest than early evidence of unusual ability, motivational factors are more likely to be effective predictors of superior performance than is innate talent.

201312_4-RC_3_15

Which one of the following most accurately represents the primary function of the final paragraph?

In certain fields of human endeavor, such as music, chess, and some athletic activities, the performance of the best practitioners is so outstanding, so superior even to the performance of other highly experienced individuals in the field, that some people believe some notion of innate talent must be invoked to account for this highest level of performance. Certain psychologists have supported this view with data concerning the performance of prodigies and the apparent heritability of relevant traits. They have noted, for example, that most outstanding musicians are discovered by the age of six, and they have found evidence that some of the qualities necessary for exceptional athletic performance, including superior motor coordination, speed of reflexes, and hand-eye coordination, can be inborn.Until recently, however, little systematic research was done on the topic of superior performance, and previous estimates of the heritability of traits relevant to performance were based almost exclusively on random samples of the general population rather than on studies of highly trained superior performers as compared with the general population. Recent research in different domains of excellence suggests that exceptional performance arises predominantly from acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations, rather than from innate abilities. For example, it has been found that the most accomplished athletes show a systematic advantage in reaction time or perceptual discrimination only in their particular fields of performance, not in more general laboratory tests for these factors. Similarly, superior chess players have exceptional memory for configurations of chess pieces, but only if those configurations are typical of chess games.The vast majority of exceptional adult performers were not exceptional as children, but started instruction early and improved their performance through sustained high-level training. Only extremely rarely is outstanding performance achieved without at least ten years of intensive, deliberate practice. With such intensive training, chess players who may not have superior innate capacities can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on such factors as memory and the ability to process information. Recent research shows that, with the clear exception of some traits such as height, a surprisingly large number of anatomical characteristics, including aerobic capacity and the percentage of muscle fibers, show specific changes that develop from extended intense training. The evidence does not, therefore, support the claim that a notion of innate talent must be invoked in order to account for the difference between good and outstanding performance, since it suggests instead that extended intense training, together with that level of talent common to all reasonably competent performers, may suffice to account for this difference. Since sustained intense training usually depends on an appropriate level of interest and desire, and since those who eventually become superior performers more often show early signs of exceptional interest than early evidence of unusual ability, motivational factors are more likely to be effective predictors of superior performance than is innate talent.

201312_4-RC_3_16

Which one of the following can most reasonably be inferred from the passage?

In certain fields of human endeavor, such as music, chess, and some athletic activities, the performance of the best practitioners is so outstanding, so superior even to the performance of other highly experienced individuals in the field, that some people believe some notion of innate talent must be invoked to account for this highest level of performance. Certain psychologists have supported this view with data concerning the performance of prodigies and the apparent heritability of relevant traits. They have noted, for example, that most outstanding musicians are discovered by the age of six, and they have found evidence that some of the qualities necessary for exceptional athletic performance, including superior motor coordination, speed of reflexes, and hand-eye coordination, can be inborn.Until recently, however, little systematic research was done on the topic of superior performance, and previous estimates of the heritability of traits relevant to performance were based almost exclusively on random samples of the general population rather than on studies of highly trained superior performers as compared with the general population. Recent research in different domains of excellence suggests that exceptional performance arises predominantly from acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations, rather than from innate abilities. For example, it has been found that the most accomplished athletes show a systematic advantage in reaction time or perceptual discrimination only in their particular fields of performance, not in more general laboratory tests for these factors. Similarly, superior chess players have exceptional memory for configurations of chess pieces, but only if those configurations are typical of chess games.The vast majority of exceptional adult performers were not exceptional as children, but started instruction early and improved their performance through sustained high-level training. Only extremely rarely is outstanding performance achieved without at least ten years of intensive, deliberate practice. With such intensive training, chess players who may not have superior innate capacities can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on such factors as memory and the ability to process information. Recent research shows that, with the clear exception of some traits such as height, a surprisingly large number of anatomical characteristics, including aerobic capacity and the percentage of muscle fibers, show specific changes that develop from extended intense training. The evidence does not, therefore, support the claim that a notion of innate talent must be invoked in order to account for the difference between good and outstanding performance, since it suggests instead that extended intense training, together with that level of talent common to all reasonably competent performers, may suffice to account for this difference. Since sustained intense training usually depends on an appropriate level of interest and desire, and since those who eventually become superior performers more often show early signs of exceptional interest than early evidence of unusual ability, motivational factors are more likely to be effective predictors of superior performance than is innate talent.

201312_4-RC_3_17

Which one of the following does the passage say is usually necessary in order for one to keep up intense practice?

In certain fields of human endeavor, such as music, chess, and some athletic activities, the performance of the best practitioners is so outstanding, so superior even to the performance of other highly experienced individuals in the field, that some people believe some notion of innate talent must be invoked to account for this highest level of performance. Certain psychologists have supported this view with data concerning the performance of prodigies and the apparent heritability of relevant traits. They have noted, for example, that most outstanding musicians are discovered by the age of six, and they have found evidence that some of the qualities necessary for exceptional athletic performance, including superior motor coordination, speed of reflexes, and hand-eye coordination, can be inborn.Until recently, however, little systematic research was done on the topic of superior performance, and previous estimates of the heritability of traits relevant to performance were based almost exclusively on random samples of the general population rather than on studies of highly trained superior performers as compared with the general population. Recent research in different domains of excellence suggests that exceptional performance arises predominantly from acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations, rather than from innate abilities. For example, it has been found that the most accomplished athletes show a systematic advantage in reaction time or perceptual discrimination only in their particular fields of performance, not in more general laboratory tests for these factors. Similarly, superior chess players have exceptional memory for configurations of chess pieces, but only if those configurations are typical of chess games.The vast majority of exceptional adult performers were not exceptional as children, but started instruction early and improved their performance through sustained high-level training. Only extremely rarely is outstanding performance achieved without at least ten years of intensive, deliberate practice. With such intensive training, chess players who may not have superior innate capacities can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on such factors as memory and the ability to process information. Recent research shows that, with the clear exception of some traits such as height, a surprisingly large number of anatomical characteristics, including aerobic capacity and the percentage of muscle fibers, show specific changes that develop from extended intense training. The evidence does not, therefore, support the claim that a notion of innate talent must be invoked in order to account for the difference between good and outstanding performance, since it suggests instead that extended intense training, together with that level of talent common to all reasonably competent performers, may suffice to account for this difference. Since sustained intense training usually depends on an appropriate level of interest and desire, and since those who eventually become superior performers more often show early signs of exceptional interest than early evidence of unusual ability, motivational factors are more likely to be effective predictors of superior performance than is innate talent.

201312_4-RC_3_18

Which one of the following most accurately describes the author's main purpose in the passage?

In certain fields of human endeavor, such as music, chess, and some athletic activities, the performance of the best practitioners is so outstanding, so superior even to the performance of other highly experienced individuals in the field, that some people believe some notion of innate talent must be invoked to account for this highest level of performance. Certain psychologists have supported this view with data concerning the performance of prodigies and the apparent heritability of relevant traits. They have noted, for example, that most outstanding musicians are discovered by the age of six, and they have found evidence that some of the qualities necessary for exceptional athletic performance, including superior motor coordination, speed of reflexes, and hand-eye coordination, can be inborn.Until recently, however, little systematic research was done on the topic of superior performance, and previous estimates of the heritability of traits relevant to performance were based almost exclusively on random samples of the general population rather than on studies of highly trained superior performers as compared with the general population. Recent research in different domains of excellence suggests that exceptional performance arises predominantly from acquired complex skills and physiological adaptations, rather than from innate abilities. For example, it has been found that the most accomplished athletes show a systematic advantage in reaction time or perceptual discrimination only in their particular fields of performance, not in more general laboratory tests for these factors. Similarly, superior chess players have exceptional memory for configurations of chess pieces, but only if those configurations are typical of chess games.The vast majority of exceptional adult performers were not exceptional as children, but started instruction early and improved their performance through sustained high-level training. Only extremely rarely is outstanding performance achieved without at least ten years of intensive, deliberate practice. With such intensive training, chess players who may not have superior innate capacities can acquire skills that circumvent basic limits on such factors as memory and the ability to process information. Recent research shows that, with the clear exception of some traits such as height, a surprisingly large number of anatomical characteristics, including aerobic capacity and the percentage of muscle fibers, show specific changes that develop from extended intense training. The evidence does not, therefore, support the claim that a notion of innate talent must be invoked in order to account for the difference between good and outstanding performance, since it suggests instead that extended intense training, together with that level of talent common to all reasonably competent performers, may suffice to account for this difference. Since sustained intense training usually depends on an appropriate level of interest and desire, and since those who eventually become superior performers more often show early signs of exceptional interest than early evidence of unusual ability, motivational factors are more likely to be effective predictors of superior performance than is innate talent.

201312_4-RC_3_19

The passage says that superior chess players do not have exceptional memory for which one of the following?

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_20

The main point of the passage is that an adequate explanation of mirror images

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_21

According to the passage, the left-to-right reversal of objects reflected in mirrors is

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_22

According to the passage, the fact that we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs rather than the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based facilitates our ability to

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_23

It can be inferred that the author of the passage believes that the front-to-back explanation of what mirrors do is

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_24

In the passage the author is primarily concerned with doing which one of the following?

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_25

With which one of the following statements would the author of the passage be most likely to agree?

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_26

The author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about the field-of-sight explanation of what mirrors do?

Physicists are often asked why the image of an object, such as a chair, appears reversed left-to-right rather than, say, top-to-bottom when viewed in a mirror. Their answer is simply that an image viewed in a mirror appears reversed about the axis around which the viewer rotates his or her field of sight in turning from the object to its reflected image. That is, the reversal in question is relative to the position and orientation of the observer when the object is viewed directly. Since we ordinarily rotate our field of sight about a vertical axis, mirror images usually appear reversed left-to-right. This is the field-of-sight explanation. However, some physicists offer a completely different explanation of what mirrors "do," suggesting that mirrors actually reverse things front-to-back. If we place a chair in front of a mirror we can envision how its reflected image will appear by imagining another chair in the space "inside" the mirror. The resulting reflection is identical to, and directly facing, the original chair. The most notable thing about this explanation is that it is clearly based on a false premise: the chair "inside" the mirror is not real, yet the explanation treats it as though it were as real and three dimensional as the original chair. This explanation appeals strongly to many people, however, because it is quite successful at explaining what a mirror does—to a point. It seems natural because we are accustomed to dealing with our mental constructs of objects rather than with the primary sense perceptions on which those constructs are based. In general, we can safely presume a fairly reliable equation between our perceptions and their associated mental constructs, but mirrors are an exception. They present us with sense perceptions that we naturally construe in a way that is contrary to fact. Indeed, mirrors are "designed" to make a two-dimensional surface appear to have depth. Note, for example, that mirrors are among the few objects on which we almost never focus our eyes; rather, we look into them, with our focal lengths adjusted into the imagined space. In addition to its intuitive appeal, the front-to-back explanation is motivated in part by the traditional desire in science to separate the observer from the phenomenon. Scientists like to think that what mirrors do should be explainable without reference to what the observer does (e.g., rotating a field of sight). However, questions about the appearances of images can be properly answered only if we consider both what mirrors do and what happens when we look into mirrors. If we remove the observer from consideration, we are no longer addressing images and appearances, because an image entails an observer and a point of view.

201312_4-RC_4_27

The author mentions the fact that we rarely focus our eyes on mirrors (lines 39-40) primarily in order to

In the last half-century, firefighters in North America have developed a powerful system for fighting wildfires using modern technology. But at the same time, foresters and ecologists are increasingly aware that too much firefighting can be worse than none at all. Over the millennia, many forest ecosystems have evolved in such a way that they are dependent on periodic fires for renewal and for limiting damage when fires do occur. Ancient ponderosa forests, for example, were stable in part because low-intensity fires maintained open forests with low levels of fuel for future fires. These fires burned lightly around the bases of mature trees, leaving these trees alive and clearing the understory of brush and young trees. Scientists can easily count the regular recurrence of fires in these forests over the centuries by examining the scars left on trunks; the typical interval between fires could be as short as 5 years and rarely extended beyond 25 years. If fires are kept out of forests, however, deadwood and other fuels build up; then, when fire is sparked by lightning or some other cause, what results is a fire so large that it leaves total devastation. Such fires often kill off wildlife that might escape low-intensity fires, and they also reach the crowns of centuries-old trees, destroying them and ultimately enabling rains to erode the unprotected topsoil. Because of the relative success of fire-suppression efforts, many forests, including ponderosa forests, have now been free of fire for 50 years or longer, leaving them vulnerable to these devastating crown fires. It is therefore increasingly necessary for land managers in North America to strive to manage rather than eliminate fires; land management policies should recognize the essential role that fire plays in many ecosystems. Fire behavior depends on the complex interaction of three factors-topography, weather, and fuel—and since topography is fixed and weather is unpredictable, fuel is the only element that land managers can control. Land managers should therefore focus their efforts on fuel. A new kind of wildfire management that is designed to simulate the natural role of fire through a combination of selective harvesting and prescribed fires is the most promising method for controlling fuel. Selective timber harvesting focuses on smaller trees-markets for this smaller material do exist-leaving the larger, fire-tolerant trees on the land and thinning the forest, thereby re-creating the conditions that allow for low-intensity burns. Prescribed fire management includes both the intentional lighting of controlled burns and the policy of allowing fires set by lightning to burn when the weather is damp enough to reduce the risk of extensive damage. Once fuels are reduced by these fires, maintenance burns at 15- to 20-year intervals will be needed. When wildfires inevitably occur, they will be more easily controlled and do much less damage.

201406_1-RC_1_1

The primary purpose of the passage is to

In the last half-century, firefighters in North America have developed a powerful system for fighting wildfires using modern technology. But at the same time, foresters and ecologists are increasingly aware that too much firefighting can be worse than none at all. Over the millennia, many forest ecosystems have evolved in such a way that they are dependent on periodic fires for renewal and for limiting damage when fires do occur. Ancient ponderosa forests, for example, were stable in part because low-intensity fires maintained open forests with low levels of fuel for future fires. These fires burned lightly around the bases of mature trees, leaving these trees alive and clearing the understory of brush and young trees. Scientists can easily count the regular recurrence of fires in these forests over the centuries by examining the scars left on trunks; the typical interval between fires could be as short as 5 years and rarely extended beyond 25 years. If fires are kept out of forests, however, deadwood and other fuels build up; then, when fire is sparked by lightning or some other cause, what results is a fire so large that it leaves total devastation. Such fires often kill off wildlife that might escape low-intensity fires, and they also reach the crowns of centuries-old trees, destroying them and ultimately enabling rains to erode the unprotected topsoil. Because of the relative success of fire-suppression efforts, many forests, including ponderosa forests, have now been free of fire for 50 years or longer, leaving them vulnerable to these devastating crown fires. It is therefore increasingly necessary for land managers in North America to strive to manage rather than eliminate fires; land management policies should recognize the essential role that fire plays in many ecosystems. Fire behavior depends on the complex interaction of three factors-topography, weather, and fuel—and since topography is fixed and weather is unpredictable, fuel is the only element that land managers can control. Land managers should therefore focus their efforts on fuel. A new kind of wildfire management that is designed to simulate the natural role of fire through a combination of selective harvesting and prescribed fires is the most promising method for controlling fuel. Selective timber harvesting focuses on smaller trees-markets for this smaller material do exist-leaving the larger, fire-tolerant trees on the land and thinning the forest, thereby re-creating the conditions that allow for low-intensity burns. Prescribed fire management includes both the intentional lighting of controlled burns and the policy of allowing fires set by lightning to burn when the weather is damp enough to reduce the risk of extensive damage. Once fuels are reduced by these fires, maintenance burns at 15- to 20-year intervals will be needed. When wildfires inevitably occur, they will be more easily controlled and do much less damage.

201406_1-RC_1_2

By "maintenance burns" (line 55) the author most clearly refers to

In the last half-century, firefighters in North America have developed a powerful system for fighting wildfires using modern technology. But at the same time, foresters and ecologists are increasingly aware that too much firefighting can be worse than none at all. Over the millennia, many forest ecosystems have evolved in such a way that they are dependent on periodic fires for renewal and for limiting damage when fires do occur. Ancient ponderosa forests, for example, were stable in part because low-intensity fires maintained open forests with low levels of fuel for future fires. These fires burned lightly around the bases of mature trees, leaving these trees alive and clearing the understory of brush and young trees. Scientists can easily count the regular recurrence of fires in these forests over the centuries by examining the scars left on trunks; the typical interval between fires could be as short as 5 years and rarely extended beyond 25 years. If fires are kept out of forests, however, deadwood and other fuels build up; then, when fire is sparked by lightning or some other cause, what results is a fire so large that it leaves total devastation. Such fires often kill off wildlife that might escape low-intensity fires, and they also reach the crowns of centuries-old trees, destroying them and ultimately enabling rains to erode the unprotected topsoil. Because of the relative success of fire-suppression efforts, many forests, including ponderosa forests, have now been free of fire for 50 years or longer, leaving them vulnerable to these devastating crown fires. It is therefore increasingly necessary for land managers in North America to strive to manage rather than eliminate fires; land management policies should recognize the essential role that fire plays in many ecosystems. Fire behavior depends on the complex interaction of three factors-topography, weather, and fuel—and since topography is fixed and weather is unpredictable, fuel is the only element that land managers can control. Land managers should therefore focus their efforts on fuel. A new kind of wildfire management that is designed to simulate the natural role of fire through a combination of selective harvesting and prescribed fires is the most promising method for controlling fuel. Selective timber harvesting focuses on smaller trees-markets for this smaller material do exist-leaving the larger, fire-tolerant trees on the land and thinning the forest, thereby re-creating the conditions that allow for low-intensity burns. Prescribed fire management includes both the intentional lighting of controlled burns and the policy of allowing fires set by lightning to burn when the weather is damp enough to reduce the risk of extensive damage. Once fuels are reduced by these fires, maintenance burns at 15- to 20-year intervals will be needed. When wildfires inevitably occur, they will be more easily controlled and do much less damage.

201406_1-RC_1_3

Which one of the following sentences would most logically complete the last paragraph of the passage?

In the last half-century, firefighters in North America have developed a powerful system for fighting wildfires using modern technology. But at the same time, foresters and ecologists are increasingly aware that too much firefighting can be worse than none at all. Over the millennia, many forest ecosystems have evolved in such a way that they are dependent on periodic fires for renewal and for limiting damage when fires do occur. Ancient ponderosa forests, for example, were stable in part because low-intensity fires maintained open forests with low levels of fuel for future fires. These fires burned lightly around the bases of mature trees, leaving these trees alive and clearing the understory of brush and young trees. Scientists can easily count the regular recurrence of fires in these forests over the centuries by examining the scars left on trunks; the typical interval between fires could be as short as 5 years and rarely extended beyond 25 years. If fires are kept out of forests, however, deadwood and other fuels build up; then, when fire is sparked by lightning or some other cause, what results is a fire so large that it leaves total devastation. Such fires often kill off wildlife that might escape low-intensity fires, and they also reach the crowns of centuries-old trees, destroying them and ultimately enabling rains to erode the unprotected topsoil. Because of the relative success of fire-suppression efforts, many forests, including ponderosa forests, have now been free of fire for 50 years or longer, leaving them vulnerable to these devastating crown fires. It is therefore increasingly necessary for land managers in North America to strive to manage rather than eliminate fires; land management policies should recognize the essential role that fire plays in many ecosystems. Fire behavior depends on the complex interaction of three factors-topography, weather, and fuel—and since topography is fixed and weather is unpredictable, fuel is the only element that land managers can control. Land managers should therefore focus their efforts on fuel. A new kind of wildfire management that is designed to simulate the natural role of fire through a combination of selective harvesting and prescribed fires is the most promising method for controlling fuel. Selective timber harvesting focuses on smaller trees-markets for this smaller material do exist-leaving the larger, fire-tolerant trees on the land and thinning the forest, thereby re-creating the conditions that allow for low-intensity burns. Prescribed fire management includes both the intentional lighting of controlled burns and the policy of allowing fires set by lightning to burn when the weather is damp enough to reduce the risk of extensive damage. Once fuels are reduced by these fires, maintenance burns at 15- to 20-year intervals will be needed. When wildfires inevitably occur, they will be more easily controlled and do much less damage.

201406_1-RC_1_4

The author cites the factors of topography, weather, and fuel in the last paragraph primarily as part of

In the last half-century, firefighters in North America have developed a powerful system for fighting wildfires using modern technology. But at the same time, foresters and ecologists are increasingly aware that too much firefighting can be worse than none at all. Over the millennia, many forest ecosystems have evolved in such a way that they are dependent on periodic fires for renewal and for limiting damage when fires do occur. Ancient ponderosa forests, for example, were stable in part because low-intensity fires maintained open forests with low levels of fuel for future fires. These fires burned lightly around the bases of mature trees, leaving these trees alive and clearing the understory of brush and young trees. Scientists can easily count the regular recurrence of fires in these forests over the centuries by examining the scars left on trunks; the typical interval between fires could be as short as 5 years and rarely extended beyond 25 years. If fires are kept out of forests, however, deadwood and other fuels build up; then, when fire is sparked by lightning or some other cause, what results is a fire so large that it leaves total devastation. Such fires often kill off wildlife that might escape low-intensity fires, and they also reach the crowns of centuries-old trees, destroying them and ultimately enabling rains to erode the unprotected topsoil. Because of the relative success of fire-suppression efforts, many forests, including ponderosa forests, have now been free of fire for 50 years or longer, leaving them vulnerable to these devastating crown fires. It is therefore increasingly necessary for land managers in North America to strive to manage rather than eliminate fires; land management policies should recognize the essential role that fire plays in many ecosystems. Fire behavior depends on the complex interaction of three factors-topography, weather, and fuel—and since topography is fixed and weather is unpredictable, fuel is the only element that land managers can control. Land managers should therefore focus their efforts on fuel. A new kind of wildfire management that is designed to simulate the natural role of fire through a combination of selective harvesting and prescribed fires is the most promising method for controlling fuel. Selective timber harvesting focuses on smaller trees-markets for this smaller material do exist-leaving the larger, fire-tolerant trees on the land and thinning the forest, thereby re-creating the conditions that allow for low-intensity burns. Prescribed fire management includes both the intentional lighting of controlled burns and the policy of allowing fires set by lightning to burn when the weather is damp enough to reduce the risk of extensive damage. Once fuels are reduced by these fires, maintenance burns at 15- to 20-year intervals will be needed. When wildfires inevitably occur, they will be more easily controlled and do much less damage.

201406_1-RC_1_5

The passage provides the most support for inferring that which one of the following is true of ancient ponderosa forests?

In the last half-century, firefighters in North America have developed a powerful system for fighting wildfires using modern technology. But at the same time, foresters and ecologists are increasingly aware that too much firefighting can be worse than none at all. Over the millennia, many forest ecosystems have evolved in such a way that they are dependent on periodic fires for renewal and for limiting damage when fires do occur. Ancient ponderosa forests, for example, were stable in part because low-intensity fires maintained open forests with low levels of fuel for future fires. These fires burned lightly around the bases of mature trees, leaving these trees alive and clearing the understory of brush and young trees. Scientists can easily count the regular recurrence of fires in these forests over the centuries by examining the scars left on trunks; the typical interval between fires could be as short as 5 years and rarely extended beyond 25 years. If fires are kept out of forests, however, deadwood and other fuels build up; then, when fire is sparked by lightning or some other cause, what results is a fire so large that it leaves total devastation. Such fires often kill off wildlife that might escape low-intensity fires, and they also reach the crowns of centuries-old trees, destroying them and ultimately enabling rains to erode the unprotected topsoil. Because of the relative success of fire-suppression efforts, many forests, including ponderosa forests, have now been free of fire for 50 years or longer, leaving them vulnerable to these devastating crown fires. It is therefore increasingly necessary for land managers in North America to strive to manage rather than eliminate fires; land management policies should recognize the essential role that fire plays in many ecosystems. Fire behavior depends on the complex interaction of three factors-topography, weather, and fuel—and since topography is fixed and weather is unpredictable, fuel is the only element that land managers can control. Land managers should therefore focus their efforts on fuel. A new kind of wildfire management that is designed to simulate the natural role of fire through a combination of selective harvesting and prescribed fires is the most promising method for controlling fuel. Selective timber harvesting focuses on smaller trees-markets for this smaller material do exist-leaving the larger, fire-tolerant trees on the land and thinning the forest, thereby re-creating the conditions that allow for low-intensity burns. Prescribed fire management includes both the intentional lighting of controlled burns and the policy of allowing fires set by lightning to burn when the weather is damp enough to reduce the risk of extensive damage. Once fuels are reduced by these fires, maintenance burns at 15- to 20-year intervals will be needed. When wildfires inevitably occur, they will be more easily controlled and do much less damage.

201406_1-RC_1_6

It can be inferred from the passage that the author would be most likely to regard a policy in which all forest fires that were started by lightning were allowed to burn until they died out naturally as

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_7

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_8

The passage indicates that some countries have made use of the UNESCO doctrine in which one of the following ways?

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_9

The author asks the reader to suppose that Mali had imposed a tax on exported objects (lines 49-51) primarily in order to

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_10

The author of the passage would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about UNESCO?

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_11

The author of the passage would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about regulations governing the trade in cultural antiquities in countries like Mali?

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_12

The author of the passage would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about cultural antiquities?

The government of Mali passed a law against excavating and exporting the wonderful terra-cotta sculptures from the old city of Djenne-jeno, but it could not enforce it. And it certainly could not afford to fund thousands of archaeological excavations. The result was that many fine Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures were illicitly excavated in the 1980s and sold to foreign collectors who rightly admired them. Because these sites were looted, much of what we would most like to know about this culture—much that we could have learned had the sites been preserved by careful archaeology—may now never be known. It has been natural to condemn such pillaging. And, through a number of declarations from UNESCO and other international bodies, a protective doctrine has evolved concerning the ownership of many forms of cultural property (the "UNESCO doctrine" ). Essentially the doctrine provides that cultural artifacts should be regarded as the property of the culture. For an individual belonging to that culture, such works are, using UNESCO's terminology, part of an "artistic and cultural patrimony." Further, a number of countries have strengthened the UNESCO doctrine by declaring all antiquities that originate within their borders to be state property that cannot be freely exported.Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the government of Mali, within whose borders the Djenne-jeno antiquities are buried, be the one to regulate excavating Djenne-jeno and to decide where the statues should go. Regrettably, and this is a painful irony, regulations prohibiting export and requiring repatriation can discourage recording and preserving information about cultural antiquities, one of the key reasons for the UNESCO regulations. For example, if someone in London sells a figure from Djenne-jeno with documentation that it came out of the ground there after the regulations were implemented, then the authorities committed to the restitution of objects taken illegally out of Mali have the very evidence they need to seize the figure. Suppose that from the beginning, Mali had been helped by UNESCO to exercise its trusteeship of the Djenne-jeno terra-cotta sculptures by licensing excavations and educating people to recognize that such artifacts have greater value when they are removed carefully from the earth with accurate records of location. Suppose Mali had required that objects be recorded and registered before leaving the excavation site, and had imposed a tax on exported objects to fund acquisitions of important pieces for the national museum. The excavations encouraged by such a system may have been less well conducted and less informative than proper, professionally administered excavations by accredited archaeologists. Some people would still have avoided the rules. But would this not have been better than what actually happened?

201406_1-RC_2_13

Which one of the following is an element of the author's attitude toward foreign collectors of terra-cotta sculptures from Djenne-jeno?

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_14

The author's primary purpose in the passage is to

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_15

The primary purpose of the second paragraph of the passage is to

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_16

According to the passage, which one of the following is true?

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_17

Suppose two medical treatments are being compared in a clinical trial for their effectiveness in treating a condition. Based on the passage, which one of the following scenarios would be significantly more likely to jeopardize theoretical equipoise than clinical equipoise?

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_18

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_19

As used in line 41 of the passage, the term "community" most nearly refers to a group of people

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_20

According to the passage, which one of the following is true?

Medical practitioners are ethically required to prescribe the best available treatments. In ordinary patient-physician interactions, this obligation is unproblematic, but when physicians are clinical researchers in comparative studies of medical treatments, special issues arise. Comparative clinical trials involve withholding one or more of the treatments from at least one group of patients. Traditionally, most physicians and ethicists have agreed that in testing a new treatment on a patient population for which there exists a currently accepted treatment, the participating physicians should have no opinion as to which treatment is clinically superior-a state of mind usually termed "equipoise." Unfortunately, the conception of equipoise that is typically employed-which I will term "theoretical equipoise" -may be too strict. Theoretical equipoise exists only when the overall evidence for each of two treatment regimens is judged by each clinical researcher to be exactly balanced-an ideal hardly attainable in practice. Clinical researchers commonly have some preference for one of the treatments being tested, an intuitive preference perhaps, or one based on their interpretation and balancing of various sources of evidence. Even if researchers judged the evidence to be balanced at the start of a comparative clinical trial, such a balance would be extremely fragile, liable to be "tipped" by small accretions of evidence as the study progresses. Consequently, if the standard of theoretical equipoise is adhered to, few comparative clinical trials could commence and even fewer could proceed to completion.These difficulties associated with theoretical equipoise suggest that a different notion of equipoise should be developed, one that I will label "clinical equipoise." Clinical equipoise would impose rigorous ethical standards on comparative clinical trials without unreasonably constricting them. One reason for conducting comparative clinical trials is to resolve a current or imminent conflict in the expert clinical community over what treatment is to be preferred for patients with a given illness. It could be that the standard treatment is A but new evidence suggests that B will be superior. Medical experts may be divided as to which treatment is better, with each side recognizing that opposing experts can differ honestly in their interpretation of the evidence. The very absence of consensus within the expert clinical community is what makes clinical equipoise possible. One or more of a comparative clinical trial-s researchers may have a decided treatment preference based on their assessments of the evidence. But that is no ethical bar to participation in the trial. The clinical researchers must simply each recognize that their less-favored treatment is preferred by a sizable constituency within the medical profession as a whole.

201406_1-RC_3_21

The author's argument in the third and fourth paragraphs would be most weakened if which one of the following were true?

Passage A In 1994, Estonia became the first country to introduce a "flat tax" on personal and corporate income. Income is taxed at a single uniform rate of 26 percent: no schedule of rates, no deductions. So far eight countries have followed Estonia's example. An old idea that for decades elicited the response, "Fine in theory, just not practical in the real world," seems to be working as well in practice as it does on the blackboard. Practical types who said that flat taxes cannot work offer a further instant objection, once they are shown such taxes working, namely, that they are unfair. Enlightened countries, it is argued, have "progressive" tax systems, requiring high-income earners to forfeit a bigger share of their incomes in tax than low-income earners have to pay. A flat tax seems to rule this out in principle. Not so. A flat tax on personal incomes combines a threshold (that is, an exempt amount) with a single rate of tax on all income above it. The extent to which such a system is progressive can be varied within wide limits using just these two variables. Under the systems operating in most developed countries, the incentives for high-income earners to avoid tax (legally or otherwise) are enormous; and the opportunities to do so, which arise from the very complexity of the codes, are commensurately large. So it is unsurprising that high-income earners usually pay about as much tax under new flat-tax regimes as they would have paid under the previous codes. Passage B A lot of people don't understand graduated, as opposed to "flat," taxes. They think that if you make more money you pay a higher rate on your entire earnings, which seems unfair. Actually, graduated progressive taxes treat all taxpayers equally. Every taxpayer pays the same rate on equivalent layers of income. People in higher brackets don't pay the higher rate on their entire income, only on the portion of income over a specified amount. People, not dollars, are treated equally. All people are created equal, but not all dollars are created equal. Earnings of the working poor go almost entirely for survival expenses such as food, shelter, and clothing. At that level, every dollar is critical; even a small difference causes tremendous changes in quality of life. Middle-income earners are still very conscious of expenses, but have much greater flexibility in absorbing small fluctuations in income. Even some of the flat tax proposals recognize this, and want to exempt a primary layer from the tax system. So, since they recognize that survival dollars are different from discretionary dollars, why go suddenly from one extreme (paying no taxes) to the other (paying the top rate)? Since flat tax proposals are supposed to bring in the same total amount of tax revenue, if the working poor are going to pay less and the high-income earners are going to pay less, it is naturally going to fall on the middle class to make up the difference.

201406_1-RC_4_22

Both passages are concerned with answering which one of the following questions?

Passage A In 1994, Estonia became the first country to introduce a "flat tax" on personal and corporate income. Income is taxed at a single uniform rate of 26 percent: no schedule of rates, no deductions. So far eight countries have followed Estonia's example. An old idea that for decades elicited the response, "Fine in theory, just not practical in the real world," seems to be working as well in practice as it does on the blackboard. Practical types who said that flat taxes cannot work offer a further instant objection, once they are shown such taxes working, namely, that they are unfair. Enlightened countries, it is argued, have "progressive" tax systems, requiring high-income earners to forfeit a bigger share of their incomes in tax than low-income earners have to pay. A flat tax seems to rule this out in principle. Not so. A flat tax on personal incomes combines a threshold (that is, an exempt amount) with a single rate of tax on all income above it. The extent to which such a system is progressive can be varied within wide limits using just these two variables. Under the systems operating in most developed countries, the incentives for high-income earners to avoid tax (legally or otherwise) are enormous; and the opportunities to do so, which arise from the very complexity of the codes, are commensurately large. So it is unsurprising that high-income earners usually pay about as much tax under new flat-tax regimes as they would have paid under the previous codes. Passage B A lot of people don't understand graduated, as opposed to "flat," taxes. They think that if you make more money you pay a higher rate on your entire earnings, which seems unfair. Actually, graduated progressive taxes treat all taxpayers equally. Every taxpayer pays the same rate on equivalent layers of income. People in higher brackets don't pay the higher rate on their entire income, only on the portion of income over a specified amount. People, not dollars, are treated equally. All people are created equal, but not all dollars are created equal. Earnings of the working poor go almost entirely for survival expenses such as food, shelter, and clothing. At that level, every dollar is critical; even a small difference causes tremendous changes in quality of life. Middle-income earners are still very conscious of expenses, but have much greater flexibility in absorbing small fluctuations in income. Even some of the flat tax proposals recognize this, and want to exempt a primary layer from the tax system. So, since they recognize that survival dollars are different from discretionary dollars, why go suddenly from one extreme (paying no taxes) to the other (paying the top rate)? Since flat tax proposals are supposed to bring in the same total amount of tax revenue, if the working poor are going to pay less and the high-income earners are going to pay less, it is naturally going to fall on the middle class to make up the difference.

201406_1-RC_4_23

Both passages seek to advance their arguments by means of which one of the following?

Passage A In 1994, Estonia became the first country to introduce a "flat tax" on personal and corporate income. Income is taxed at a single uniform rate of 26 percent: no schedule of rates, no deductions. So far eight countries have followed Estonia's example. An old idea that for decades elicited the response, "Fine in theory, just not practical in the real world," seems to be working as well in practice as it does on the blackboard. Practical types who said that flat taxes cannot work offer a further instant objection, once they are shown such taxes working, namely, that they are unfair. Enlightened countries, it is argued, have "progressive" tax systems, requiring high-income earners to forfeit a bigger share of their incomes in tax than low-income earners have to pay. A flat tax seems to rule this out in principle. Not so. A flat tax on personal incomes combines a threshold (that is, an exempt amount) with a single rate of tax on all income above it. The extent to which such a system is progressive can be varied within wide limits using just these two variables. Under the systems operating in most developed countries, the incentives for high-income earners to avoid tax (legally or otherwise) are enormous; and the opportunities to do so, which arise from the very complexity of the codes, are commensurately large. So it is unsurprising that high-income earners usually pay about as much tax under new flat-tax regimes as they would have paid under the previous codes. Passage B A lot of people don't understand graduated, as opposed to "flat," taxes. They think that if you make more money you pay a higher rate on your entire earnings, which seems unfair. Actually, graduated progressive taxes treat all taxpayers equally. Every taxpayer pays the same rate on equivalent layers of income. People in higher brackets don't pay the higher rate on their entire income, only on the portion of income over a specified amount. People, not dollars, are treated equally. All people are created equal, but not all dollars are created equal. Earnings of the working poor go almost entirely for survival expenses such as food, shelter, and clothing. At that level, every dollar is critical; even a small difference causes tremendous changes in quality of life. Middle-income earners are still very conscious of expenses, but have much greater flexibility in absorbing small fluctuations in income. Even some of the flat tax proposals recognize this, and want to exempt a primary layer from the tax system. So, since they recognize that survival dollars are different from discretionary dollars, why go suddenly from one extreme (paying no taxes) to the other (paying the top rate)? Since flat tax proposals are supposed to bring in the same total amount of tax revenue, if the working poor are going to pay less and the high-income earners are going to pay less, it is naturally going to fall on the middle class to make up the difference.

201406_1-RC_4_24

Which one of the following, if true of countries that have gone from a graduated progressive tax system to a flat tax, would most support the position of passage B over that of passage A?

Passage A In 1994, Estonia became the first country to introduce a "flat tax" on personal and corporate income. Income is taxed at a single uniform rate of 26 percent: no schedule of rates, no deductions. So far eight countries have followed Estonia's example. An old idea that for decades elicited the response, "Fine in theory, just not practical in the real world," seems to be working as well in practice as it does on the blackboard. Practical types who said that flat taxes cannot work offer a further instant objection, once they are shown such taxes working, namely, that they are unfair. Enlightened countries, it is argued, have "progressive" tax systems, requiring high-income earners to forfeit a bigger share of their incomes in tax than low-income earners have to pay. A flat tax seems to rule this out in principle. Not so. A flat tax on personal incomes combines a threshold (that is, an exempt amount) with a single rate of tax on all income above it. The extent to which such a system is progressive can be varied within wide limits using just these two variables. Under the systems operating in most developed countries, the incentives for high-income earners to avoid tax (legally or otherwise) are enormous; and the opportunities to do so, which arise from the very complexity of the codes, are commensurately large. So it is unsurprising that high-income earners usually pay about as much tax under new flat-tax regimes as they would have paid under the previous codes. Passage B A lot of people don't understand graduated, as opposed to "flat," taxes. They think that if you make more money you pay a higher rate on your entire earnings, which seems unfair. Actually, graduated progressive taxes treat all taxpayers equally. Every taxpayer pays the same rate on equivalent layers of income. People in higher brackets don't pay the higher rate on their entire income, only on the portion of income over a specified amount. People, not dollars, are treated equally. All people are created equal, but not all dollars are created equal. Earnings of the working poor go almost entirely for survival expenses such as food, shelter, and clothing. At that level, every dollar is critical; even a small difference causes tremendous changes in quality of life. Middle-income earners are still very conscious of expenses, but have much greater flexibility in absorbing small fluctuations in income. Even some of the flat tax proposals recognize this, and want to exempt a primary layer from the tax system. So, since they recognize that survival dollars are different from discretionary dollars, why go suddenly from one extreme (paying no taxes) to the other (paying the top rate)? Since flat tax proposals are supposed to bring in the same total amount of tax revenue, if the working poor are going to pay less and the high-income earners are going to pay less, it is naturally going to fall on the middle class to make up the difference.

201406_1-RC_4_25

Which one of the following is a conclusion for which passage A argues but that passage B does not address?

Passage A In 1994, Estonia became the first country to introduce a "flat tax" on personal and corporate income. Income is taxed at a single uniform rate of 26 percent: no schedule of rates, no deductions. So far eight countries have followed Estonia's example. An old idea that for decades elicited the response, "Fine in theory, just not practical in the real world," seems to be working as well in practice as it does on the blackboard. Practical types who said that flat taxes cannot work offer a further instant objection, once they are shown such taxes working, namely, that they are unfair. Enlightened countries, it is argued, have "progressive" tax systems, requiring high-income earners to forfeit a bigger share of their incomes in tax than low-income earners have to pay. A flat tax seems to rule this out in principle. Not so. A flat tax on personal incomes combines a threshold (that is, an exempt amount) with a single rate of tax on all income above it. The extent to which such a system is progressive can be varied within wide limits using just these two variables. Under the systems operating in most developed countries, the incentives for high-income earners to avoid tax (legally or otherwise) are enormous; and the opportunities to do so, which arise from the very complexity of the codes, are commensurately large. So it is unsurprising that high-income earners usually pay about as much tax under new flat-tax regimes as they would have paid under the previous codes. Passage B A lot of people don't understand graduated, as opposed to "flat," taxes. They think that if you make more money you pay a higher rate on your entire earnings, which seems unfair. Actually, graduated progressive taxes treat all taxpayers equally. Every taxpayer pays the same rate on equivalent layers of income. People in higher brackets don't pay the higher rate on their entire income, only on the portion of income over a specified amount. People, not dollars, are treated equally. All people are created equal, but not all dollars are created equal. Earnings of the working poor go almost entirely for survival expenses such as food, shelter, and clothing. At that level, every dollar is critical; even a small difference causes tremendous changes in quality of life. Middle-income earners are still very conscious of expenses, but have much greater flexibility in absorbing small fluctuations in income. Even some of the flat tax proposals recognize this, and want to exempt a primary layer from the tax system. So, since they recognize that survival dollars are different from discretionary dollars, why go suddenly from one extreme (paying no taxes) to the other (paying the top rate)? Since flat tax proposals are supposed to bring in the same total amount of tax revenue, if the working poor are going to pay less and the high-income earners are going to pay less, it is naturally going to fall on the middle class to make up the difference.

201406_1-RC_4_26

The authors of the two passages would be most likely to disagree over whether

Passage A In 1994, Estonia became the first country to introduce a "flat tax" on personal and corporate income. Income is taxed at a single uniform rate of 26 percent: no schedule of rates, no deductions. So far eight countries have followed Estonia's example. An old idea that for decades elicited the response, "Fine in theory, just not practical in the real world," seems to be working as well in practice as it does on the blackboard. Practical types who said that flat taxes cannot work offer a further instant objection, once they are shown such taxes working, namely, that they are unfair. Enlightened countries, it is argued, have "progressive" tax systems, requiring high-income earners to forfeit a bigger share of their incomes in tax than low-income earners have to pay. A flat tax seems to rule this out in principle. Not so. A flat tax on personal incomes combines a threshold (that is, an exempt amount) with a single rate of tax on all income above it. The extent to which such a system is progressive can be varied within wide limits using just these two variables. Under the systems operating in most developed countries, the incentives for high-income earners to avoid tax (legally or otherwise) are enormous; and the opportunities to do so, which arise from the very complexity of the codes, are commensurately large. So it is unsurprising that high-income earners usually pay about as much tax under new flat-tax regimes as they would have paid under the previous codes. Passage B A lot of people don't understand graduated, as opposed to "flat," taxes. They think that if you make more money you pay a higher rate on your entire earnings, which seems unfair. Actually, graduated progressive taxes treat all taxpayers equally. Every taxpayer pays the same rate on equivalent layers of income. People in higher brackets don't pay the higher rate on their entire income, only on the portion of income over a specified amount. People, not dollars, are treated equally. All people are created equal, but not all dollars are created equal. Earnings of the working poor go almost entirely for survival expenses such as food, shelter, and clothing. At that level, every dollar is critical; even a small difference causes tremendous changes in quality of life. Middle-income earners are still very conscious of expenses, but have much greater flexibility in absorbing small fluctuations in income. Even some of the flat tax proposals recognize this, and want to exempt a primary layer from the tax system. So, since they recognize that survival dollars are different from discretionary dollars, why go suddenly from one extreme (paying no taxes) to the other (paying the top rate)? Since flat tax proposals are supposed to bring in the same total amount of tax revenue, if the working poor are going to pay less and the high-income earners are going to pay less, it is naturally going to fall on the middle class to make up the difference.

201406_1-RC_4_27

Which one of the following, if true, would be the most reasonable response for the author of passage B to make to the final argument of passage A?

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_1

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_2

Which one of the following is most analogous to the literary achievements that the author attributes to Dove?

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_3

According to the passage, in the U.S. there is a widely held view that

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_4

e author's attitude toward the deep rift between poetry and fiction in the U.S. can be most accurately described as one of

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_5

In the passage the author conjectures that a cause of the deep rift between fiction and poetry in the United States may be that

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_6

In the context of the passage, the author's primary purpose in mentioning Dove's experience in Germany (lines 32–C36)is to

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_7

It can be inferred from the passage that the author would be most likely to believe which one of the following?

For decades, there has been a deep rift between poetry and fiction in the United States, especially in academic settings; graduate writing programs in universities, for example, train students as poets or as writers of fiction, but almost never as both. Both poets and writers of fiction have tended to support this separation, in large part because the current conventional wisdom holds that poetry should be elliptical and lyrical, reflecting inner states and processes of thought or feeling, whereas character and narrative events are the stock-in-trade of fiction. Certainly it is true that poetry and fiction are distinct genres, but why have specialized education and literary territoriality resulted from this distinction? The answer lies perhaps in a widespread attitude in U.S. culture, which often casts a suspicious eye on the generalist. Those with knowledge and expertise in multiple areas risk charges of dilettantism, as if ability in one field is diluted or compromised by accomplishment in another. Fortunately, there are signs that the bias against writers who cross generic boundaries is diminishing; several recent writers are known and respected for their work in both genres. One important example of this trend is Rita Dove, an African American writer highly acclaimed for both her poetry and her fiction. A few years ago, speaking at a conference entitled "Poets Who Write Fiction," Dove expressed gentle incredulity about the habit of segregating the genres. She had grown up reading and loving both fiction and poetry, she said, unaware of any purported danger lurking in attempts to mix the two. She also studied for some time in Germany, where, she observes, "Poets write plays, novelists compose libretti, playwrights write novels—they would not understand our restrictiveness." It makes little sense, Dove believes, to persist in the restrictive approach to poetry and fiction prevalent in the U.S., because each genre shares in the nature of the other. Indeed, her poetry offers example after example of what can only be properly regarded as lyric narrative. Her use of language in these poems is undeniably lyrical—that is, it evokes emotion and inner states without requiring the reader to organize ideas or events in a particular linear structure. Yet this lyric expression simultaneously presents the elements of a plot in such a way that the reader is led repeatedly to take account of clusters of narrative details within the lyric flow. Thus while the language is lyrical, it often comes to constitute, cumulatively, a work of narrative fiction. Similarly, many passages in her fiction, though undeniably prose, achieve the status of lyric narrative through the use of poetic rhythms and elliptical expression. In short, Dove bridges the gap between poetry and fiction not only by writing in both genres, but also by fusing the two genres within individual works.

india1_4-RC_1_8

If this passage had been excerpted from a longer text, which one of the following predictions about the near future of U.S. literature would be most likely to appear in that text?

Passage A Did music and human language originate separately or together? Both systems use intonation and rhythm to communicate emotions. Both can be produced vocally or with tools, and people can produce both music and language silently to themselves. Brain imaging studies suggest that music and language are part of one large, vastly complicated, neurological system for processing sound. In fact, fewer differences than similarities exist between the neurological processing of the two. One could think of the two activities as different radio programs that can be broadcast over the same hardware. One noteworthy difference, though, is that, generally speaking, people are better at language than music. In music, anyone can listen easily enough, but most people do not perform well, and in many cultures composition is left to specialists. In language, by contrast, nearly everyone actively performs and composes. Given their shared neurological basis, it appears that music and language evolved together as brain size increased over the course of hominid evolution. But the primacy of language over music that we can observe today suggests that language, not music, was the primary function natural selection operated on. Music, it would seem, had little adaptive value of its own, and most likely developed on the coattails of language. Passage B Darwin claimed that since "neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least [practical] use to man they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed." I suggest that the enjoyment of and the capacity to produce musical notes are faculties of indispensable use to mothers and their infants and that it is in the emotional bonds created by the interaction of mother and child that we can discover the evolutionary origins of human music. Even excluding lullabies, which parents sing to infants, human mothers and infants under six months of agey interactions. Using face-to-face mother-infant interactions filmed at 24 frames per second, researchers have shown that mothers and infants jointly construct mutually improvised interactions in which each partner tracks the actions of the other. Such episodes last from one-half second to three seconds and are composed of musical elements—variations in pitch, rhythm, timbre, volume, and tempo.What evolutionary advantage would such behavior have? In the course of hominid evolution, brain size increased rapidly. Contemporaneously, the increase in bipedality caused the birth canal to narrow. This resulted in hominid infants being born ever-more prematurely, leaving them much more helpless at birth. This helplessness necessitated longer, better maternal care. Under such conditions, the emotional bonds created in the premusical mother-infant interactions we observe in Homo sapiens today—behavior whose neurological basis essentially constitutes the capacity to make and enjoy music—would have conferred considerable evolutionary advantage.

india1_4-RC_2_9

Both passages were written primarily in order to answer which one of the following questions?

Passage A Did music and human language originate separately or together? Both systems use intonation and rhythm to communicate emotions. Both can be produced vocally or with tools, and people can produce both music and language silently to themselves. Brain imaging studies suggest that music and language are part of one large, vastly complicated, neurological system for processing sound. In fact, fewer differences than similarities exist between the neurological processing of the two. One could think of the two activities as different radio programs that can be broadcast over the same hardware. One noteworthy difference, though, is that, generally speaking, people are better at language than music. In music, anyone can listen easily enough, but most people do not perform well, and in many cultures composition is left to specialists. In language, by contrast, nearly everyone actively performs and composes. Given their shared neurological basis, it appears that music and language evolved together as brain size increased over the course of hominid evolution. But the primacy of language over music that we can observe today suggests that language, not music, was the primary function natural selection operated on. Music, it would seem, had little adaptive value of its own, and most likely developed on the coattails of language. Passage B Darwin claimed that since "neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least [practical] use to man they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed." I suggest that the enjoyment of and the capacity to produce musical notes are faculties of indispensable use to mothers and their infants and that it is in the emotional bonds created by the interaction of mother and child that we can discover the evolutionary origins of human music. Even excluding lullabies, which parents sing to infants, human mothers and infants under six months of agey interactions. Using face-to-face mother-infant interactions filmed at 24 frames per second, researchers have shown that mothers and infants jointly construct mutually improvised interactions in which each partner tracks the actions of the other. Such episodes last from one-half second to three seconds and are composed of musical elements—variations in pitch, rhythm, timbre, volume, and tempo.What evolutionary advantage would such behavior have? In the course of hominid evolution, brain size increased rapidly. Contemporaneously, the increase in bipedality caused the birth canal to narrow. This resulted in hominid infants being born ever-more prematurely, leaving them much more helpless at birth. This helplessness necessitated longer, better maternal care. Under such conditions, the emotional bonds created in the premusical mother-infant interactions we observe in Homo sapiens today—behavior whose neurological basis essentially constitutes the capacity to make and enjoy music—would have conferred considerable evolutionary advantage.

india1_4-RC_2_10

Each of the two passages mentions the relation of music to

Passage A Did music and human language originate separately or together? Both systems use intonation and rhythm to communicate emotions. Both can be produced vocally or with tools, and people can produce both music and language silently to themselves. Brain imaging studies suggest that music and language are part of one large, vastly complicated, neurological system for processing sound. In fact, fewer differences than similarities exist between the neurological processing of the two. One could think of the two activities as different radio programs that can be broadcast over the same hardware. One noteworthy difference, though, is that, generally speaking, people are better at language than music. In music, anyone can listen easily enough, but most people do not perform well, and in many cultures composition is left to specialists. In language, by contrast, nearly everyone actively performs and composes. Given their shared neurological basis, it appears that music and language evolved together as brain size increased over the course of hominid evolution. But the primacy of language over music that we can observe today suggests that language, not music, was the primary function natural selection operated on. Music, it would seem, had little adaptive value of its own, and most likely developed on the coattails of language. Passage B Darwin claimed that since "neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least [practical] use to man they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed." I suggest that the enjoyment of and the capacity to produce musical notes are faculties of indispensable use to mothers and their infants and that it is in the emotional bonds created by the interaction of mother and child that we can discover the evolutionary origins of human music. Even excluding lullabies, which parents sing to infants, human mothers and infants under six months of agey interactions. Using face-to-face mother-infant interactions filmed at 24 frames per second, researchers have shown that mothers and infants jointly construct mutually improvised interactions in which each partner tracks the actions of the other. Such episodes last from one-half second to three seconds and are composed of musical elements—variations in pitch, rhythm, timbre, volume, and tempo.What evolutionary advantage would such behavior have? In the course of hominid evolution, brain size increased rapidly. Contemporaneously, the increase in bipedality caused the birth canal to narrow. This resulted in hominid infants being born ever-more prematurely, leaving them much more helpless at birth. This helplessness necessitated longer, better maternal care. Under such conditions, the emotional bonds created in the premusical mother-infant interactions we observe in Homo sapiens today—behavior whose neurological basis essentially constitutes the capacity to make and enjoy music—would have conferred considerable evolutionary advantage.

india1_4-RC_2_11

It can be inferred that the authors of the two passages would be most likely to disagree over whether

Passage A Did music and human language originate separately or together? Both systems use intonation and rhythm to communicate emotions. Both can be produced vocally or with tools, and people can produce both music and language silently to themselves. Brain imaging studies suggest that music and language are part of one large, vastly complicated, neurological system for processing sound. In fact, fewer differences than similarities exist between the neurological processing of the two. One could think of the two activities as different radio programs that can be broadcast over the same hardware. One noteworthy difference, though, is that, generally speaking, people are better at language than music. In music, anyone can listen easily enough, but most people do not perform well, and in many cultures composition is left to specialists. In language, by contrast, nearly everyone actively performs and composes. Given their shared neurological basis, it appears that music and language evolved together as brain size increased over the course of hominid evolution. But the primacy of language over music that we can observe today suggests that language, not music, was the primary function natural selection operated on. Music, it would seem, had little adaptive value of its own, and most likely developed on the coattails of language. Passage B Darwin claimed that since "neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least [practical] use to man they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed." I suggest that the enjoyment of and the capacity to produce musical notes are faculties of indispensable use to mothers and their infants and that it is in the emotional bonds created by the interaction of mother and child that we can discover the evolutionary origins of human music. Even excluding lullabies, which parents sing to infants, human mothers and infants under six months of agey interactions. Using face-to-face mother-infant interactions filmed at 24 frames per second, researchers have shown that mothers and infants jointly construct mutually improvised interactions in which each partner tracks the actions of the other. Such episodes last from one-half second to three seconds and are composed of musical elements—variations in pitch, rhythm, timbre, volume, and tempo.What evolutionary advantage would such behavior have? In the course of hominid evolution, brain size increased rapidly. Contemporaneously, the increase in bipedality caused the birth canal to narrow. This resulted in hominid infants being born ever-more prematurely, leaving them much more helpless at birth. This helplessness necessitated longer, better maternal care. Under such conditions, the emotional bonds created in the premusical mother-infant interactions we observe in Homo sapiens today—behavior whose neurological basis essentially constitutes the capacity to make and enjoy music—would have conferred considerable evolutionary advantage.

india1_4-RC_2_12

The authors would be most likely to agree on the answer to which one of the following questions regarding musical capacity in humans?

Passage A Did music and human language originate separately or together? Both systems use intonation and rhythm to communicate emotions. Both can be produced vocally or with tools, and people can produce both music and language silently to themselves. Brain imaging studies suggest that music and language are part of one large, vastly complicated, neurological system for processing sound. In fact, fewer differences than similarities exist between the neurological processing of the two. One could think of the two activities as different radio programs that can be broadcast over the same hardware. One noteworthy difference, though, is that, generally speaking, people are better at language than music. In music, anyone can listen easily enough, but most people do not perform well, and in many cultures composition is left to specialists. In language, by contrast, nearly everyone actively performs and composes. Given their shared neurological basis, it appears that music and language evolved together as brain size increased over the course of hominid evolution. But the primacy of language over music that we can observe today suggests that language, not music, was the primary function natural selection operated on. Music, it would seem, had little adaptive value of its own, and most likely developed on the coattails of language. Passage B Darwin claimed that since "neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least [practical] use to man they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed." I suggest that the enjoyment of and the capacity to produce musical notes are faculties of indispensable use to mothers and their infants and that it is in the emotional bonds created by the interaction of mother and child that we can discover the evolutionary origins of human music. Even excluding lullabies, which parents sing to infants, human mothers and infants under six months of agey interactions. Using face-to-face mother-infant interactions filmed at 24 frames per second, researchers have shown that mothers and infants jointly construct mutually improvised interactions in which each partner tracks the actions of the other. Such episodes last from one-half second to three seconds and are composed of musical elements—variations in pitch, rhythm, timbre, volume, and tempo.What evolutionary advantage would such behavior have? In the course of hominid evolution, brain size increased rapidly. Contemporaneously, the increase in bipedality caused the birth canal to narrow. This resulted in hominid infants being born ever-more prematurely, leaving them much more helpless at birth. This helplessness necessitated longer, better maternal care. Under such conditions, the emotional bonds created in the premusical mother-infant interactions we observe in Homo sapiens today—behavior whose neurological basis essentially constitutes the capacity to make and enjoy music—would have conferred considerable evolutionary advantage.

india1_4-RC_2_13

Which one of the following principles underlies the arguments in both passages?

Passage A Did music and human language originate separately or together? Both systems use intonation and rhythm to communicate emotions. Both can be produced vocally or with tools, and people can produce both music and language silently to themselves. Brain imaging studies suggest that music and language are part of one large, vastly complicated, neurological system for processing sound. In fact, fewer differences than similarities exist between the neurological processing of the two. One could think of the two activities as different radio programs that can be broadcast over the same hardware. One noteworthy difference, though, is that, generally speaking, people are better at language than music. In music, anyone can listen easily enough, but most people do not perform well, and in many cultures composition is left to specialists. In language, by contrast, nearly everyone actively performs and composes. Given their shared neurological basis, it appears that music and language evolved together as brain size increased over the course of hominid evolution. But the primacy of language over music that we can observe today suggests that language, not music, was the primary function natural selection operated on. Music, it would seem, had little adaptive value of its own, and most likely developed on the coattails of language. Passage B Darwin claimed that since "neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are faculties of the least [practical] use to man they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed." I suggest that the enjoyment of and the capacity to produce musical notes are faculties of indispensable use to mothers and their infants and that it is in the emotional bonds created by the interaction of mother and child that we can discover the evolutionary origins of human music. Even excluding lullabies, which parents sing to infants, human mothers and infants under six months of agey interactions. Using face-to-face mother-infant interactions filmed at 24 frames per second, researchers have shown that mothers and infants jointly construct mutually improvised interactions in which each partner tracks the actions of the other. Such episodes last from one-half second to three seconds and are composed of musical elements—variations in pitch, rhythm, timbre, volume, and tempo.What evolutionary advantage would such behavior have? In the course of hominid evolution, brain size increased rapidly. Contemporaneously, the increase in bipedality caused the birth canal to narrow. This resulted in hominid infants being born ever-more prematurely, leaving them much more helpless at birth. This helplessness necessitated longer, better maternal care. Under such conditions, the emotional bonds created in the premusical mother-infant interactions we observe in Homo sapiens today—behavior whose neurological basis essentially constitutes the capacity to make and enjoy music—would have conferred considerable evolutionary advantage.

india1_4-RC_2_14

Which one of the following most accurately characterizes a relationship between the two passages?

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_15

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_16

Which one of the following is closest in meaning to the term "strengthened" as that term is used in line 8 of the passage?

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_17

With which one of the following claims about documents placed on Web pages would the author be most likely to agree?

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_18

Based on the passage, the relationship between strengthening current copyright laws and relying on passwords to restrict access to a Web document is most analogous to the relationship between

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_19

The passage most strongly implies which one of the following?

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_20

According to the passage, which one of the following features of outgoing messages left on telephone answering machines is most relevant to the debate concerning copyright infringement?

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_21

The author's discussion of telephone answering machines serves primarily to

The World Wide Web, a network of electronically produced and interconnected (or "linked" ) sites, called pages, that are accessible via personal computer, raises legal issues about the rights of owners of intellectual property, notably those who create documents for inclusion on Web pages. Some of these owners of intellectual property claim that unless copyright law is strengthened, intellectual property on the Web will not be protected from copyright infringement. Web users, however, claim that if their ability to access information on Web pages is reduced, the Web cannot live up to its potential as an open, interactive medium of communication. The debate arises from the Web's ability to link one document to another. Links between sites are analogous to the inclusion in a printed text of references to other works, but with one difference: the cited document is instantly retrievable by a user who activates the link. This immediate accessibility creates a problem, since current copyright laws give owners of intellectual property the right to sue a distributor of unauthorized copies of their material even if that distributor did not personally make the copies. If person A, the author of a document, puts the document on a Web page, and person B, the creator of another Web page, creates a link to A's document, is B committing copyright infringement? To answer this question, it must first be determined who controls distribution of a document on the Web. When A places a document on a Web page, this is comparable to recording an outgoing message on one's telephone answering machine for others to hear. When B creates a link to A's document, this is akin to B's giving out A's telephone number, thereby allowing third parties to hear the outgoing message for themselves. Anyone who calls can listen to the message; that is its purpose. While B's link may indeed facilitate access to A's document, the crucial point is that A, simply by placing that document on the Web, is thereby offering it for distribution. Therefore, even if B leads others to the document, it is A who actually controls access to it. Hence creating a link to a document is not the same as making or distributing a copy of that document. Moreover, techniques are already available by which A can restrict access to a document. For example, A may require a password to gain entry to A's Web page, just as a telephone owner can request an unlisted number and disclose it only to selected parties. Such a solution would compromise the openness of the Web somewhat, but not as much as the threat of copyright infringement litigation. Changing copyright law to benefit owners of intellectual property is thus ill-advised because it would impede the development of the Web as a public forum dedicated to the free exchange of ideas.

india1_4-RC_3_22

According to the passage, present copyright laws

In tracing the changing face of the Irish landscape, scholars have traditionally relied primarily on evidence from historical documents. However, such documentary sources provide a fragmentary record at best. Reliable accounts are very scarce for many parts of Ireland prior to the seventeenth century, and many of the relevant documents from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus selectively on matters relating to military or commercial interests. Studies of fossilized pollen grains preserved in peats and lake muds provide an additional means of investigating vegetative landscape change. Details of changes in vegetation resulting from both human activities and natural events are reflected in the kinds and quantities of minute pollen grains that become trapped in sediments. Analysis of samples can identify which kinds of plants produced the preserved pollen grains and when they were deposited, and in many cases the findings can serve to supplement or correct the documentary record. For example, analyses of samples from Long Lough in County Down have revealed significant patterns of cereal-grain pollen beginning by about 400 A.D. The substantial clay content of the soil in this part of Down makes cultivation by primitive tools difficult. Historians thought that such soils were not tilled to any significant extent until the introduction of the moldboard plough to Ireland in the seventh century A.D. Because cereal cultivation would have required tilling of the soil, the pollen evidence indicates that these soils must indeed have been successfully tilled before the introduction of the new plough. Another example concerns flax cultivation in County Down, one of the great linen-producing areas of Ireland during the eighteenth century. Some aspects of linen production in Down are well documented, but the documentary record tells little about the cultivation of flax, the plant from which linen is made, in that area. The record of eighteenth-century linen production in Down, together with the knowledge that flax cultivation had been established in Ireland centuries before that time, led some historians to surmise that this plant was being cultivated in Down before the eighteenth century. But pollen analyses indicate that this is not the case; flax pollen was found only in deposits laid down since the eighteenth century. It must be stressed, though, that there are limits to the ability of the pollen record to reflect the vegetative history of the landscape. For example, pollen analyses cannot identify the species, but only the genus or family, of some plants. Among these is madder, a cultivated dye plant of historical importance in Ireland. Madder belongs to a plant family that also comprises various native weeds, including goosegrass. If madder pollen were present in a deposit it would be indistinguishable from that of uncultivated native species.

india1_4-RC_4_23

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

In tracing the changing face of the Irish landscape, scholars have traditionally relied primarily on evidence from historical documents. However, such documentary sources provide a fragmentary record at best. Reliable accounts are very scarce for many parts of Ireland prior to the seventeenth century, and many of the relevant documents from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus selectively on matters relating to military or commercial interests. Studies of fossilized pollen grains preserved in peats and lake muds provide an additional means of investigating vegetative landscape change. Details of changes in vegetation resulting from both human activities and natural events are reflected in the kinds and quantities of minute pollen grains that become trapped in sediments. Analysis of samples can identify which kinds of plants produced the preserved pollen grains and when they were deposited, and in many cases the findings can serve to supplement or correct the documentary record. For example, analyses of samples from Long Lough in County Down have revealed significant patterns of cereal-grain pollen beginning by about 400 A.D. The substantial clay content of the soil in this part of Down makes cultivation by primitive tools difficult. Historians thought that such soils were not tilled to any significant extent until the introduction of the moldboard plough to Ireland in the seventh century A.D. Because cereal cultivation would have required tilling of the soil, the pollen evidence indicates that these soils must indeed have been successfully tilled before the introduction of the new plough. Another example concerns flax cultivation in County Down, one of the great linen-producing areas of Ireland during the eighteenth century. Some aspects of linen production in Down are well documented, but the documentary record tells little about the cultivation of flax, the plant from which linen is made, in that area. The record of eighteenth-century linen production in Down, together with the knowledge that flax cultivation had been established in Ireland centuries before that time, led some historians to surmise that this plant was being cultivated in Down before the eighteenth century. But pollen analyses indicate that this is not the case; flax pollen was found only in deposits laid down since the eighteenth century. It must be stressed, though, that there are limits to the ability of the pollen record to reflect the vegetative history of the landscape. For example, pollen analyses cannot identify the species, but only the genus or family, of some plants. Among these is madder, a cultivated dye plant of historical importance in Ireland. Madder belongs to a plant family that also comprises various native weeds, including goosegrass. If madder pollen were present in a deposit it would be indistinguishable from that of uncultivated native species.

india1_4-RC_4_24

The passage indicates that pollen analyses have provided evidence against which one of the following views?

In tracing the changing face of the Irish landscape, scholars have traditionally relied primarily on evidence from historical documents. However, such documentary sources provide a fragmentary record at best. Reliable accounts are very scarce for many parts of Ireland prior to the seventeenth century, and many of the relevant documents from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus selectively on matters relating to military or commercial interests. Studies of fossilized pollen grains preserved in peats and lake muds provide an additional means of investigating vegetative landscape change. Details of changes in vegetation resulting from both human activities and natural events are reflected in the kinds and quantities of minute pollen grains that become trapped in sediments. Analysis of samples can identify which kinds of plants produced the preserved pollen grains and when they were deposited, and in many cases the findings can serve to supplement or correct the documentary record. For example, analyses of samples from Long Lough in County Down have revealed significant patterns of cereal-grain pollen beginning by about 400 A.D. The substantial clay content of the soil in this part of Down makes cultivation by primitive tools difficult. Historians thought that such soils were not tilled to any significant extent until the introduction of the moldboard plough to Ireland in the seventh century A.D. Because cereal cultivation would have required tilling of the soil, the pollen evidence indicates that these soils must indeed have been successfully tilled before the introduction of the new plough. Another example concerns flax cultivation in County Down, one of the great linen-producing areas of Ireland during the eighteenth century. Some aspects of linen production in Down are well documented, but the documentary record tells little about the cultivation of flax, the plant from which linen is made, in that area. The record of eighteenth-century linen production in Down, together with the knowledge that flax cultivation had been established in Ireland centuries before that time, led some historians to surmise that this plant was being cultivated in Down before the eighteenth century. But pollen analyses indicate that this is not the case; flax pollen was found only in deposits laid down since the eighteenth century. It must be stressed, though, that there are limits to the ability of the pollen record to reflect the vegetative history of the landscape. For example, pollen analyses cannot identify the species, but only the genus or family, of some plants. Among these is madder, a cultivated dye plant of historical importance in Ireland. Madder belongs to a plant family that also comprises various native weeds, including goosegrass. If madder pollen were present in a deposit it would be indistinguishable from that of uncultivated native species.

india1_4-RC_4_25

The phrase "documentary record" (lines 20 and 37) primarily refers to

In tracing the changing face of the Irish landscape, scholars have traditionally relied primarily on evidence from historical documents. However, such documentary sources provide a fragmentary record at best. Reliable accounts are very scarce for many parts of Ireland prior to the seventeenth century, and many of the relevant documents from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus selectively on matters relating to military or commercial interests. Studies of fossilized pollen grains preserved in peats and lake muds provide an additional means of investigating vegetative landscape change. Details of changes in vegetation resulting from both human activities and natural events are reflected in the kinds and quantities of minute pollen grains that become trapped in sediments. Analysis of samples can identify which kinds of plants produced the preserved pollen grains and when they were deposited, and in many cases the findings can serve to supplement or correct the documentary record. For example, analyses of samples from Long Lough in County Down have revealed significant patterns of cereal-grain pollen beginning by about 400 A.D. The substantial clay content of the soil in this part of Down makes cultivation by primitive tools difficult. Historians thought that such soils were not tilled to any significant extent until the introduction of the moldboard plough to Ireland in the seventh century A.D. Because cereal cultivation would have required tilling of the soil, the pollen evidence indicates that these soils must indeed have been successfully tilled before the introduction of the new plough. Another example concerns flax cultivation in County Down, one of the great linen-producing areas of Ireland during the eighteenth century. Some aspects of linen production in Down are well documented, but the documentary record tells little about the cultivation of flax, the plant from which linen is made, in that area. The record of eighteenth-century linen production in Down, together with the knowledge that flax cultivation had been established in Ireland centuries before that time, led some historians to surmise that this plant was being cultivated in Down before the eighteenth century. But pollen analyses indicate that this is not the case; flax pollen was found only in deposits laid down since the eighteenth century. It must be stressed, though, that there are limits to the ability of the pollen record to reflect the vegetative history of the landscape. For example, pollen analyses cannot identify the species, but only the genus or family, of some plants. Among these is madder, a cultivated dye plant of historical importance in Ireland. Madder belongs to a plant family that also comprises various native weeds, including goosegrass. If madder pollen were present in a deposit it would be indistinguishable from that of uncultivated native species.

india1_4-RC_4_26

The passage indicates that prior to the use of pollen analysis in the study of the history of the Irish landscape, at least some historians believed which one of the following?

In tracing the changing face of the Irish landscape, scholars have traditionally relied primarily on evidence from historical documents. However, such documentary sources provide a fragmentary record at best. Reliable accounts are very scarce for many parts of Ireland prior to the seventeenth century, and many of the relevant documents from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focus selectively on matters relating to military or commercial interests. Studies of fossilized pollen grains preserved in peats and lake muds provide an additional means of investigating vegetative landscape change. Details of changes in vegetation resulting from both human activities and natural events are reflected in the kinds and quantities of minute pollen grains that become trapped in sediments. Analysis of samples can identify which kinds of plants produced the preserved pollen grains and when they were deposited, and in many cases the findings can serve to supplement or correct the documentary record. For example, analyses of samples from Long Lough in County Down have revealed significant patterns of cereal-grain pollen beginning by about 400 A.D. The substantial clay content of the soil in this part of Down makes cultivation by primitive tools difficult. Historians thought that such soils were not tilled to any significant extent until the introduction of the moldboard plough to Ireland in the seventh century A.D. Because cereal cultivation would have required tilling of the soil, the pollen evidence indicates that these soils must indeed have been successfully tilled before the introduction of the new plough. Another example concerns flax cultivation in County Down, one of the great linen-producing areas of Ireland during the eighteenth century. Some aspects of linen production in Down are well documented, but the documentary record tells little about the cultivation of flax, the plant from which linen is made, in that area. The record of eighteenth-century linen production in Down, together with the knowledge that flax cultivation had been established in Ireland centuries before that time, led some historians to surmise that this plant was being cultivated in Down before the eighteenth century. But pollen analyses indicate that this is not the case; flax pollen was found only in deposits laid down since the eighteenth century. It must be stressed, though, that there are limits to the ability of the pollen record to reflect the vegetative history of the landscape. For example, pollen analyses cannot identify the species, but only the genus or family, of some plants. Among these is madder, a cultivated dye plant of historical importance in Ireland. Madder belongs to a plant family that also comprises various native weeds, including goosegrass. If madder pollen were present in a deposit it would be indistinguishable from that of uncultivated native species.

india1_4-RC_4_27

Which one of the following most accurately describes the relationship between the second paragraph and the final paragraph?

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_1

The author's statement that Soviet scholars attempted to "annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature" (line 29) means that they tried to

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_2

Which one of the following statements is LEAST supported by the passage?

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_3

Which one of the following statements about the effect of the Russian Revolution of 1917 on Russian writers is most supported by the information in the passage?

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_4

Which one of the following aspects of Tsvetaeva's career does the author appear to value most highly?

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_5

he author introduces Mayakovsky in lines 24-26 in order to provide an example of

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_6

Which one of the following is most closely analogous to Tsvetaeva's experience in the Russian countryside as that experience is described in the passage?

Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite intellectual community to which the poet Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-C1941) belonged disintegrated. The Bolsheviks—the leaders of the revolution that instituted the Soviet system of government in Russia—conducted violent reprisals against perceived political enemies, including intellectuals. Tsvetaeva saw the Bolsheviks' seizure of power as a catastrophe, and she left Moscow for the Russian countryside. Village life enriched her poetry and enhanced her awareness of what it meant to be Russian; she discovered an affinity with artisans, laborers, and farmers. Her poetic ear was opened to the colloquial Russian spoken by the villagers, as opposed to the literary Russian she was accustomed to. This linguistic encounter awakened her interest in Russian folklore and transformed her diction and meter, changes that remained with her even after she emigrated, first to Prague and later to Paris. Tsvetaeva eventually returned to Russia and it is certainly possible to quote passages from her journals out of context that show her speaking positively about the "revolutionary" spirit of poetry, or complaining bitterly of the "migr" life. She also admired Vladimir Mayakovsky, the officially sanctioned "poet of the Revolution," and wrote approvingly of Soviet children's books. But while these facts have been manipulated by Soviet scholars in an attempt to annex Tsvetaeva to Soviet literature, the fact remains that she never embraced or even reconciled herself to the Soviet system. Some Soviet scholars tried to get around this fact by claiming that Tsvetaeva rejected the revolution because she lacked political sophistication, when actually she understood its atrocities and injustices and therefore could never accept it. Other scholars, while acknowledging her opposition to the revolution, saw it as a mere result of her husband's volunteering to fight the Bolsheviks. However, it was her opposition that had influenced him to take that course; her first poems containing anti-Bolshevik sentiments were written months before the revolution. Why was Tsvetaeva more critical of the revolution than were her contemporaries? Many Russian intellectuals who endorsed the revolution experienced a psychological conflict: they had longed abstractly for revolution, but once it arrived they found themselves confronted with a reality deserving of condemnation—not to mention the political necessity of endorsing that reality. Tsvetaeva was spared this psychological conflict. While she had harbored revolutionary sentiments as an adolescent, these had long since been superseded by artistic aspirations. She could thus write about the ironies and injustices of life after the revolution from a detached viewpoint, a perspective that, in conjunction with her physical distance from Russia, allowed her to assess circumstances more honestly than her contemporaries and to produce poems that expressed what only later generations were able to see as clearly.

india3_2-RC_1_7

Which one of the following statements is most strongly supported by the information in the passage?

The liberal use of spices in cooking is commonly thought to be correlated with hot climate. Analyzing nearly 5,000 recipes published in traditional cookbooks from 36 countries, researchers confirmed that, as a rule, the hotter the country's climate, the more spices are called for in its recipes, and that many of the spices commonly used in tropical and subtropical areas are used little, if at all, in colder climates. Spice use varies in this way not only between countries, but also between regions of the same country with significant temperature differences, such as northeastern and southwestern China. Several explanations for the phenomenon have been suggested: hot spices cool people by promoting perspiration; food spoils faster in hot climates, and potent seasonings can make spoiled foods palatable; spices grow plentifully in the tropics, and people tend to eat what is locally available; and spices provide important nutrients that foods otherwise lack. But each of these explanations is flawed. The purpose of spices cannot be primarily to provide nutrients, because most are used in such tiny quantities that they contribute little of nutritive value. The "cooling" explanation fails to account for the use of spices in general since, among the multitude of prominently used spices, only hot peppers induce sweating, and even they do so only in some people. The claim that spice use originally developed to make spoiled foods more palatable is also questionable, since the practice would have been naturally discouraged by increased illness from food poisoning. Nor is agricultural convenience an adequate explanation; researchers have found no relationship between mean annual temperature and numbers of spices that grow in each country, and indeed have found that people will eschew locally grown spices while going to great lengths to obtain imported ones. A recent study suggests another pragmatic basis for the correlation: Many spices naturally contain chemicals that kill or suppress microorganisms that cause spoilage and food poisoning. Many spices that appear most often and most abundantly in recipes from hot climates—especially garlic, onion, and hot peppers—inhibit most of the bacteria species against which they have been tested. And many spices that have relatively weak antibiotic effects when used alone become much more potent when combined, for example in chili powder (typically a mixture of red pepper, paprika, garlic, cumin, and oregano). The researchers acknowledge that flavor is the obvious reason for using spices. But as they point out, the flavors of many widely used spices are not initially appealing. Rather, people have to learn to like them, which suggests that using spices is more than a matter of taste. In climates that are particularly favorable for the growth of food-borne microbes, people may have acquired and culturally maintained this preference for spicy foods ultimately because spices help cleanse foods of pathogens and thereby contribute to the health and longevity of people who consume them.

india3_2-RC_2_8

Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

The liberal use of spices in cooking is commonly thought to be correlated with hot climate. Analyzing nearly 5,000 recipes published in traditional cookbooks from 36 countries, researchers confirmed that, as a rule, the hotter the country's climate, the more spices are called for in its recipes, and that many of the spices commonly used in tropical and subtropical areas are used little, if at all, in colder climates. Spice use varies in this way not only between countries, but also between regions of the same country with significant temperature differences, such as northeastern and southwestern China. Several explanations for the phenomenon have been suggested: hot spices cool people by promoting perspiration; food spoils faster in hot climates, and potent seasonings can make spoiled foods palatable; spices grow plentifully in the tropics, and people tend to eat what is locally available; and spices provide important nutrients that foods otherwise lack. But each of these explanations is flawed. The purpose of spices cannot be primarily to provide nutrients, because most are used in such tiny quantities that they contribute little of nutritive value. The "cooling" explanation fails to account for the use of spices in general since, among the multitude of prominently used spices, only hot peppers induce sweating, and even they do so only in some people. The claim that spice use originally developed to make spoiled foods more palatable is also questionable, since the practice would have been naturally discouraged by increased illness from food poisoning. Nor is agricultural convenience an adequate explanation; researchers have found no relationship between mean annual temperature and numbers of spices that grow in each country, and indeed have found that people will eschew locally grown spices while going to great lengths to obtain imported ones. A recent study suggests another pragmatic basis for the correlation: Many spices naturally contain chemicals that kill or suppress microorganisms that cause spoilage and food poisoning. Many spices that appear most often and most abundantly in recipes from hot climates—especially garlic, onion, and hot peppers—inhibit most of the bacteria species against which they have been tested. And many spices that have relatively weak antibiotic effects when used alone become much more potent when combined, for example in chili powder (typically a mixture of red pepper, paprika, garlic, cumin, and oregano). The researchers acknowledge that flavor is the obvious reason for using spices. But as they point out, the flavors of many widely used spices are not initially appealing. Rather, people have to learn to like them, which suggests that using spices is more than a matter of taste. In climates that are particularly favorable for the growth of food-borne microbes, people may have acquired and culturally maintained this preference for spicy foods ultimately because spices help cleanse foods of pathogens and thereby contribute to the health and longevity of people who consume them.

india3_2-RC_2_9

Which one of the following does the author cite in support of the suggestion that using spices is more than a matter of taste?

The liberal use of spices in cooking is commonly thought to be correlated with hot climate. Analyzing nearly 5,000 recipes published in traditional cookbooks from 36 countries, researchers confirmed that, as a rule, the hotter the country's climate, the more spices are called for in its recipes, and that many of the spices commonly used in tropical and subtropical areas are used little, if at all, in colder climates. Spice use varies in this way not only between countries, but also between regions of the same country with significant temperature differences, such as northeastern and southwestern China. Several explanations for the phenomenon have been suggested: hot spices cool people by promoting perspiration; food spoils faster in hot climates, and potent seasonings can make spoiled foods palatable; spices grow plentifully in the tropics, and people tend to eat what is locally available; and spices provide important nutrients that foods otherwise lack. But each of these explanations is flawed. The purpose of spices cannot be primarily to provide nutrients, because most are used in such tiny quantities that they contribute little of nutritive value. The "cooling" explanation fails to account for the use of spices in general since, among the multitude of prominently used spices, only hot peppers induce sweating, and even they do so only in some people. The claim that spice use originally developed to make spoiled foods more palatable is also questionable, since the practice would have been naturally discouraged by increased illness from food poisoning. Nor is agricultural convenience an adequate explanation; researchers have found no relationship between mean annual temperature and numbers of spices that grow in each country, and indeed have found that people will eschew locally grown spices while going to great lengths to obtain imported ones. A recent study suggests another pragmatic basis for the correlation: Many spices naturally contain chemicals that kill or suppress microorganisms that cause spoilage and food poisoning. Many spices that appear most often and most abundantly in recipes from hot climates—especially garlic, onion, and hot peppers—inhibit most of the bacteria species against which they have been tested. And many spices that have relatively weak antibiotic effects when used alone become much more potent when combined, for example in chili powder (typically a mixture of red pepper, paprika, garlic, cumin, and oregano). The researchers acknowledge that flavor is the obvious reason for using spices. But as they point out, the flavors of many widely used spices are not initially appealing. Rather, people have to learn to like them, which suggests that using spices is more than a matter of taste. In climates that are particularly favorable for the growth of food-borne microbes, people may have acquired and culturally maintained this preference for spicy foods ultimately because spices help cleanse foods of pathogens and thereby contribute to the health and longevity of people who consume them.

india3_2-RC_2_10

can be inferred from the passage that the author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

The liberal use of spices in cooking is commonly thought to be correlated with hot climate. Analyzing nearly 5,000 recipes published in traditional cookbooks from 36 countries, researchers confirmed that, as a rule, the hotter the country's climate, the more spices are called for in its recipes, and that many of the spices commonly used in tropical and subtropical areas are used little, if at all, in colder climates. Spice use varies in this way not only between countries, but also between regions of the same country with significant temperature differences, such as northeastern and southwestern China. Several explanations for the phenomenon have been suggested: hot spices cool people by promoting perspiration; food spoils faster in hot climates, and potent seasonings can make spoiled foods palatable; spices grow plentifully in the tropics, and people tend to eat what is locally available; and spices provide important nutrients that foods otherwise lack. But each of these explanations is flawed. The purpose of spices cannot be primarily to provide nutrients, because most are used in such tiny quantities that they contribute little of nutritive value. The "cooling" explanation fails to account for the use of spices in general since, among the multitude of prominently used spices, only hot peppers induce sweating, and even they do so only in some people. The claim that spice use originally developed to make spoiled foods more palatable is also questionable, since the practice would have been naturally discouraged by increased illness from food poisoning. Nor is agricultural convenience an adequate explanation; researchers have found no relationship between mean annual temperature and numbers of spices that grow in each country, and indeed have found that people will eschew locally grown spices while going to great lengths to obtain imported ones. A recent study suggests another pragmatic basis for the correlation: Many spices naturally contain chemicals that kill or suppress microorganisms that cause spoilage and food poisoning. Many spices that appear most often and most abundantly in recipes from hot climates—especially garlic, onion, and hot peppers—inhibit most of the bacteria species against which they have been tested. And many spices that have relatively weak antibiotic effects when used alone become much more potent when combined, for example in chili powder (typically a mixture of red pepper, paprika, garlic, cumin, and oregano). The researchers acknowledge that flavor is the obvious reason for using spices. But as they point out, the flavors of many widely used spices are not initially appealing. Rather, people have to learn to like them, which suggests that using spices is more than a matter of taste. In climates that are particularly favorable for the growth of food-borne microbes, people may have acquired and culturally maintained this preference for spicy foods ultimately because spices help cleanse foods of pathogens and thereby contribute to the health and longevity of people who consume them.

india3_2-RC_2_11

The passage includes examples of which one of the following?

Immune systems, even in their immature states, have a vast repertoire of white blood cells called lymphocytes, one specific to each of an astronomical number of different antigens, including the body's own components, that have the potential to trigger an immune system attack. However, the immune system somehow ordinarily develops self-tolerance and does not attack the body's own tissues. The long-accepted model according to which the immune system protects the body by distinguishing self from nonself is being called into question by new research in immunology. According to the established model, called the self-nonself theory, in the fully developed immune system, lymphocytes bumping into their complementary antigens produce an immune reaction—the lymphocyte begins reproducing, cloning itself into a defending army. But before the immune system is fully developed, when a lymphocyte latches onto its matching antigen, the lymphocyte is killed off or somehow permanently suppressed. Since these antigens are presumably the body's own, the body learns in this way to tolerate itself first, after which it shifts to its mature defensive mode. Studies conducted on mice have been cited as evidence for this view of immunologic development. Unlike humans, mice are born with still developing immune systems. Newborn brown mice injected with cell samples from genetically unrelated white mice were later able to accept skin transplants from those white mice without rejecting the tissue. However, the same tolerance-building reaction failed to occur in adults. According to the self-nonself theory, the fledgling immune systems of the brown mice developed tolerance because all or most of the lymphocytes specific to the cells in the injected samples were neutralized. Recent studies, however, suggest that whether an immune system reacts to a stimulus with aggression or tolerance is not simply a matter of whether or not that system is fully developed. Researchers have discovered that newborn mice will develop immunity against small, nonlethal doses of viruses, suggesting that not all antigens encountered by immature systems are routinely tolerated. Another team of researchers has found that newborn mice injected with cell samples from unrelated mice do develop immune reactions to the antigens carried by some types of those cells, and that, conversely, under the right conditions adult mice can be induced to develop tolerance to foreign antigens. These results do not by themselves disprove the self-nonself theory, but they do undermine one of its experimental underpinnings. Some scientists have therefore put forward a promising alternative to the self-nonself theory in an attempt to account for these new experimental findings. Their theory holds that when cells are actually being damaged or destroyed by an invader, they emit danger signals. It is these signals that trigger an aggressive immune response and not the mere recognition by lymphocytes of antigens foreign to the body.

india3_2-RC_3_12

Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the author's attitude toward the alternative to the self-nonself theory mentioned in the final paragraph?

Immune systems, even in their immature states, have a vast repertoire of white blood cells called lymphocytes, one specific to each of an astronomical number of different antigens, including the body's own components, that have the potential to trigger an immune system attack. However, the immune system somehow ordinarily develops self-tolerance and does not attack the body's own tissues. The long-accepted model according to which the immune system protects the body by distinguishing self from nonself is being called into question by new research in immunology. According to the established model, called the self-nonself theory, in the fully developed immune system, lymphocytes bumping into their complementary antigens produce an immune reaction—the lymphocyte begins reproducing, cloning itself into a defending army. But before the immune system is fully developed, when a lymphocyte latches onto its matching antigen, the lymphocyte is killed off or somehow permanently suppressed. Since these antigens are presumably the body's own, the body learns in this way to tolerate itself first, after which it shifts to its mature defensive mode. Studies conducted on mice have been cited as evidence for this view of immunologic development. Unlike humans, mice are born with still developing immune systems. Newborn brown mice injected with cell samples from genetically unrelated white mice were later able to accept skin transplants from those white mice without rejecting the tissue. However, the same tolerance-building reaction failed to occur in adults. According to the self-nonself theory, the fledgling immune systems of the brown mice developed tolerance because all or most of the lymphocytes specific to the cells in the injected samples were neutralized. Recent studies, however, suggest that whether an immune system reacts to a stimulus with aggression or tolerance is not simply a matter of whether or not that system is fully developed. Researchers have discovered that newborn mice will develop immunity against small, nonlethal doses of viruses, suggesting that not all antigens encountered by immature systems are routinely tolerated. Another team of researchers has found that newborn mice injected with cell samples from unrelated mice do develop immune reactions to the antigens carried by some types of those cells, and that, conversely, under the right conditions adult mice can be induced to develop tolerance to foreign antigens. These results do not by themselves disprove the self-nonself theory, but they do undermine one of its experimental underpinnings. Some scientists have therefore put forward a promising alternative to the self-nonself theory in an attempt to account for these new experimental findings. Their theory holds that when cells are actually being damaged or destroyed by an invader, they emit danger signals. It is these signals that trigger an aggressive immune response and not the mere recognition by lymphocytes of antigens foreign to the body.

india3_2-RC_3_13

The primary purpose of the passage is to

Immune systems, even in their immature states, have a vast repertoire of white blood cells called lymphocytes, one specific to each of an astronomical number of different antigens, including the body's own components, that have the potential to trigger an immune system attack. However, the immune system somehow ordinarily develops self-tolerance and does not attack the body's own tissues. The long-accepted model according to which the immune system protects the body by distinguishing self from nonself is being called into question by new research in immunology. According to the established model, called the self-nonself theory, in the fully developed immune system, lymphocytes bumping into their complementary antigens produce an immune reaction—the lymphocyte begins reproducing, cloning itself into a defending army. But before the immune system is fully developed, when a lymphocyte latches onto its matching antigen, the lymphocyte is killed off or somehow permanently suppressed. Since these antigens are presumably the body's own, the body learns in this way to tolerate itself first, after which it shifts to its mature defensive mode. Studies conducted on mice have been cited as evidence for this view of immunologic development. Unlike humans, mice are born with still developing immune systems. Newborn brown mice injected with cell samples from genetically unrelated white mice were later able to accept skin transplants from those white mice without rejecting the tissue. However, the same tolerance-building reaction failed to occur in adults. According to the self-nonself theory, the fledgling immune systems of the brown mice developed tolerance because all or most of the lymphocytes specific to the cells in the injected samples were neutralized. Recent studies, however, suggest that whether an immune system reacts to a stimulus with aggression or tolerance is not simply a matter of whether or not that system is fully developed. Researchers have discovered that newborn mice will develop immunity against small, nonlethal doses of viruses, suggesting that not all antigens encountered by immature systems are routinely tolerated. Another team of researchers has found that newborn mice injected with cell samples from unrelated mice do develop immune reactions to the antigens carried by some types of those cells, and that, conversely, under the right conditions adult mice can be induced to develop tolerance to foreign antigens. These results do not by themselves disprove the self-nonself theory, but they do undermine one of its experimental underpinnings. Some scientists have therefore put forward a promising alternative to the self-nonself theory in an attempt to account for these new experimental findings. Their theory holds that when cells are actually being damaged or destroyed by an invader, they emit danger signals. It is these signals that trigger an aggressive immune response and not the mere recognition by lymphocytes of antigens foreign to the body.

india3_2-RC_3_14

According to the passage, which one of the following is a tenet of the model proposed as an alternative to the self-nonself theory?

Immune systems, even in their immature states, have a vast repertoire of white blood cells called lymphocytes, one specific to each of an astronomical number of different antigens, including the body's own components, that have the potential to trigger an immune system attack. However, the immune system somehow ordinarily develops self-tolerance and does not attack the body's own tissues. The long-accepted model according to which the immune system protects the body by distinguishing self from nonself is being called into question by new research in immunology. According to the established model, called the self-nonself theory, in the fully developed immune system, lymphocytes bumping into their complementary antigens produce an immune reaction—the lymphocyte begins reproducing, cloning itself into a defending army. But before the immune system is fully developed, when a lymphocyte latches onto its matching antigen, the lymphocyte is killed off or somehow permanently suppressed. Since these antigens are presumably the body's own, the body learns in this way to tolerate itself first, after which it shifts to its mature defensive mode. Studies conducted on mice have been cited as evidence for this view of immunologic development. Unlike humans, mice are born with still developing immune systems. Newborn brown mice injected with cell samples from genetically unrelated white mice were later able to accept skin transplants from those white mice without rejecting the tissue. However, the same tolerance-building reaction failed to occur in adults. According to the self-nonself theory, the fledgling immune systems of the brown mice developed tolerance because all or most of the lymphocytes specific to the cells in the injected samples were neutralized. Recent studies, however, suggest that whether an immune system reacts to a stimulus with aggression or tolerance is not simply a matter of whether or not that system is fully developed. Researchers have discovered that newborn mice will develop immunity against small, nonlethal doses of viruses, suggesting that not all antigens encountered by immature systems are routinely tolerated. Another team of researchers has found that newborn mice injected with cell samples from unrelated mice do develop immune reactions to the antigens carried by some types of those cells, and that, conversely, under the right conditions adult mice can be induced to develop tolerance to foreign antigens. These results do not by themselves disprove the self-nonself theory, but they do undermine one of its experimental underpinnings. Some scientists have therefore put forward a promising alternative to the self-nonself theory in an attempt to account for these new experimental findings. Their theory holds that when cells are actually being damaged or destroyed by an invader, they emit danger signals. It is these signals that trigger an aggressive immune response and not the mere recognition by lymphocytes of antigens foreign to the body.

india3_2-RC_3_15

What is the main purpose of the fourth paragraph?

Immune systems, even in their immature states, have a vast repertoire of white blood cells called lymphocytes, one specific to each of an astronomical number of different antigens, including the body's own components, that have the potential to trigger an immune system attack. However, the immune system somehow ordinarily develops self-tolerance and does not attack the body's own tissues. The long-accepted model according to which the immune system protects the body by distinguishing self from nonself is being called into question by new research in immunology. According to the established model, called the self-nonself theory, in the fully developed immune system, lymphocytes bumping into their complementary antigens produce an immune reaction—the lymphocyte begins reproducing, cloning itself into a defending army. But before the immune system is fully developed, when a lymphocyte latches onto its matching antigen, the lymphocyte is killed off or somehow permanently suppressed. Since these antigens are presumably the body's own, the body learns in this way to tolerate itself first, after which it shifts to its mature defensive mode. Studies conducted on mice have been cited as evidence for this view of immunologic development. Unlike humans, mice are born with still developing immune systems. Newborn brown mice injected with cell samples from genetically unrelated white mice were later able to accept skin transplants from those white mice without rejecting the tissue. However, the same tolerance-building reaction failed to occur in adults. According to the self-nonself theory, the fledgling immune systems of the brown mice developed tolerance because all or most of the lymphocytes specific to the cells in the injected samples were neutralized. Recent studies, however, suggest that whether an immune system reacts to a stimulus with aggression or tolerance is not simply a matter of whether or not that system is fully developed. Researchers have discovered that newborn mice will develop immunity against small, nonlethal doses of viruses, suggesting that not all antigens encountered by immature systems are routinely tolerated. Another team of researchers has found that newborn mice injected with cell samples from unrelated mice do develop immune reactions to the antigens carried by some types of those cells, and that, conversely, under the right conditions adult mice can be induced to develop tolerance to foreign antigens. These results do not by themselves disprove the self-nonself theory, but they do undermine one of its experimental underpinnings. Some scientists have therefore put forward a promising alternative to the self-nonself theory in an attempt to account for these new experimental findings. Their theory holds that when cells are actually being damaged or destroyed by an invader, they emit danger signals. It is these signals that trigger an aggressive immune response and not the mere recognition by lymphocytes of antigens foreign to the body.

india3_2-RC_3_16

Which one of the following experimental findings is mentioned in the passage as a challenge to the self-nonself theory?

Immune systems, even in their immature states, have a vast repertoire of white blood cells called lymphocytes, one specific to each of an astronomical number of different antigens, including the body's own components, that have the potential to trigger an immune system attack. However, the immune system somehow ordinarily develops self-tolerance and does not attack the body's own tissues. The long-accepted model according to which the immune system protects the body by distinguishing self from nonself is being called into question by new research in immunology. According to the established model, called the self-nonself theory, in the fully developed immune system, lymphocytes bumping into their complementary antigens produce an immune reaction—the lymphocyte begins reproducing, cloning itself into a defending army. But before the immune system is fully developed, when a lymphocyte latches onto its matching antigen, the lymphocyte is killed off or somehow permanently suppressed. Since these antigens are presumably the body's own, the body learns in this way to tolerate itself first, after which it shifts to its mature defensive mode. Studies conducted on mice have been cited as evidence for this view of immunologic development. Unlike humans, mice are born with still developing immune systems. Newborn brown mice injected with cell samples from genetically unrelated white mice were later able to accept skin transplants from those white mice without rejecting the tissue. However, the same tolerance-building reaction failed to occur in adults. According to the self-nonself theory, the fledgling immune systems of the brown mice developed tolerance because all or most of the lymphocytes specific to the cells in the injected samples were neutralized. Recent studies, however, suggest that whether an immune system reacts to a stimulus with aggression or tolerance is not simply a matter of whether or not that system is fully developed. Researchers have discovered that newborn mice will develop immunity against small, nonlethal doses of viruses, suggesting that not all antigens encountered by immature systems are routinely tolerated. Another team of researchers has found that newborn mice injected with cell samples from unrelated mice do develop immune reactions to the antigens carried by some types of those cells, and that, conversely, under the right conditions adult mice can be induced to develop tolerance to foreign antigens. These results do not by themselves disprove the self-nonself theory, but they do undermine one of its experimental underpinnings. Some scientists have therefore put forward a promising alternative to the self-nonself theory in an attempt to account for these new experimental findings. Their theory holds that when cells are actually being damaged or destroyed by an invader, they emit danger signals. It is these signals that trigger an aggressive immune response and not the mere recognition by lymphocytes of antigens foreign to the body.

india3_2-RC_3_17

Based on the passage, which one of the following statements can be most reasonably inferred from the self-nonself theory?

In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, intended to counter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale and leasing of housing. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982), the United States Supreme Court attempted to define for the Fair Housing Act those persons who fulfill the "standing" requirement, which holds that only those parties having a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy are warranted to bring suit. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a "tester" (an individual who, without an intent to rent or purchase a dwelling, poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of investigating rental/sales practices) has standing. The Court was also asked whether an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman originated in a class action suit filed in a local court in 1979. The plaintiffs were two testers—a black woman named Sylvia Coleman and a white man named R. Kent Willis—and HOME, a nonprofit fair housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty had engaged in discriminatory practices such as showing each tester apartments only in buildings occupied primarily by that person's racial group and telling the plaintiffs conflicting stories regarding the availability of individual apartments. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that they lacked the required standing under the act. According to the court, only a person who actually intended to rent would meet the act's requirements. The case eventually came before the United States Supreme Court, which held that Coleman and Willis, as testers, did have standing to sue. In deciding the case, the Court looked to the appropriate sections of the Fair Housing Act. Section 804(d) states that it is unlawful "to represent to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that any dwelling is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." The Court reasoned that the act "conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing." The testers had therefore suffered the exact injury made unlawful by the statute and thus it is irrelevant whether the tester intended to either rent or buy the dwelling. The Court also had to resolve whether HOME had a right to sue as an organization. The Court held that, like the individual plaintiffs, HOME had to show a direct or threatened injury caused by the defendant. HOME averred that it had been frustrated by the defendant's discriminatory practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing, and had been forced to devote significant resources to identifying and counteracting the said discriminatory practices. The Court agreed that the injury alleged by HOME was concrete and decided that the organization did have standing in this case.

india3_2-RC_4_18

Which one of the following best states the main idea of the passage?

In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, intended to counter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale and leasing of housing. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982), the United States Supreme Court attempted to define for the Fair Housing Act those persons who fulfill the "standing" requirement, which holds that only those parties having a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy are warranted to bring suit. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a "tester" (an individual who, without an intent to rent or purchase a dwelling, poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of investigating rental/sales practices) has standing. The Court was also asked whether an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman originated in a class action suit filed in a local court in 1979. The plaintiffs were two testers—a black woman named Sylvia Coleman and a white man named R. Kent Willis—and HOME, a nonprofit fair housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty had engaged in discriminatory practices such as showing each tester apartments only in buildings occupied primarily by that person's racial group and telling the plaintiffs conflicting stories regarding the availability of individual apartments. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that they lacked the required standing under the act. According to the court, only a person who actually intended to rent would meet the act's requirements. The case eventually came before the United States Supreme Court, which held that Coleman and Willis, as testers, did have standing to sue. In deciding the case, the Court looked to the appropriate sections of the Fair Housing Act. Section 804(d) states that it is unlawful "to represent to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that any dwelling is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." The Court reasoned that the act "conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing." The testers had therefore suffered the exact injury made unlawful by the statute and thus it is irrelevant whether the tester intended to either rent or buy the dwelling. The Court also had to resolve whether HOME had a right to sue as an organization. The Court held that, like the individual plaintiffs, HOME had to show a direct or threatened injury caused by the defendant. HOME averred that it had been frustrated by the defendant's discriminatory practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing, and had been forced to devote significant resources to identifying and counteracting the said discriminatory practices. The Court agreed that the injury alleged by HOME was concrete and decided that the organization did have standing in this case.

india3_2-RC_4_19

According to the passage, Havens Realty was accused by the plaintiffs in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman of doing which one of the following?

In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, intended to counter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale and leasing of housing. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982), the United States Supreme Court attempted to define for the Fair Housing Act those persons who fulfill the "standing" requirement, which holds that only those parties having a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy are warranted to bring suit. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a "tester" (an individual who, without an intent to rent or purchase a dwelling, poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of investigating rental/sales practices) has standing. The Court was also asked whether an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman originated in a class action suit filed in a local court in 1979. The plaintiffs were two testers—a black woman named Sylvia Coleman and a white man named R. Kent Willis—and HOME, a nonprofit fair housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty had engaged in discriminatory practices such as showing each tester apartments only in buildings occupied primarily by that person's racial group and telling the plaintiffs conflicting stories regarding the availability of individual apartments. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that they lacked the required standing under the act. According to the court, only a person who actually intended to rent would meet the act's requirements. The case eventually came before the United States Supreme Court, which held that Coleman and Willis, as testers, did have standing to sue. In deciding the case, the Court looked to the appropriate sections of the Fair Housing Act. Section 804(d) states that it is unlawful "to represent to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that any dwelling is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." The Court reasoned that the act "conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing." The testers had therefore suffered the exact injury made unlawful by the statute and thus it is irrelevant whether the tester intended to either rent or buy the dwelling. The Court also had to resolve whether HOME had a right to sue as an organization. The Court held that, like the individual plaintiffs, HOME had to show a direct or threatened injury caused by the defendant. HOME averred that it had been frustrated by the defendant's discriminatory practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing, and had been forced to devote significant resources to identifying and counteracting the said discriminatory practices. The Court agreed that the injury alleged by HOME was concrete and decided that the organization did have standing in this case.

india3_2-RC_4_20

The passage suggests that the local court based its decision on which one of the following beliefs concerning Coleman?

In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, intended to counter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale and leasing of housing. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982), the United States Supreme Court attempted to define for the Fair Housing Act those persons who fulfill the "standing" requirement, which holds that only those parties having a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy are warranted to bring suit. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a "tester" (an individual who, without an intent to rent or purchase a dwelling, poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of investigating rental/sales practices) has standing. The Court was also asked whether an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman originated in a class action suit filed in a local court in 1979. The plaintiffs were two testers—a black woman named Sylvia Coleman and a white man named R. Kent Willis—and HOME, a nonprofit fair housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty had engaged in discriminatory practices such as showing each tester apartments only in buildings occupied primarily by that person's racial group and telling the plaintiffs conflicting stories regarding the availability of individual apartments. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that they lacked the required standing under the act. According to the court, only a person who actually intended to rent would meet the act's requirements. The case eventually came before the United States Supreme Court, which held that Coleman and Willis, as testers, did have standing to sue. In deciding the case, the Court looked to the appropriate sections of the Fair Housing Act. Section 804(d) states that it is unlawful "to represent to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that any dwelling is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." The Court reasoned that the act "conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing." The testers had therefore suffered the exact injury made unlawful by the statute and thus it is irrelevant whether the tester intended to either rent or buy the dwelling. The Court also had to resolve whether HOME had a right to sue as an organization. The Court held that, like the individual plaintiffs, HOME had to show a direct or threatened injury caused by the defendant. HOME averred that it had been frustrated by the defendant's discriminatory practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing, and had been forced to devote significant resources to identifying and counteracting the said discriminatory practices. The Court agreed that the injury alleged by HOME was concrete and decided that the organization did have standing in this case.

india3_2-RC_4_21

According to the passage, which one of the following was central to the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman?

In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, intended to counter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale and leasing of housing. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982), the United States Supreme Court attempted to define for the Fair Housing Act those persons who fulfill the "standing" requirement, which holds that only those parties having a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy are warranted to bring suit. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a "tester" (an individual who, without an intent to rent or purchase a dwelling, poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of investigating rental/sales practices) has standing. The Court was also asked whether an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman originated in a class action suit filed in a local court in 1979. The plaintiffs were two testers—a black woman named Sylvia Coleman and a white man named R. Kent Willis—and HOME, a nonprofit fair housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty had engaged in discriminatory practices such as showing each tester apartments only in buildings occupied primarily by that person's racial group and telling the plaintiffs conflicting stories regarding the availability of individual apartments. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that they lacked the required standing under the act. According to the court, only a person who actually intended to rent would meet the act's requirements. The case eventually came before the United States Supreme Court, which held that Coleman and Willis, as testers, did have standing to sue. In deciding the case, the Court looked to the appropriate sections of the Fair Housing Act. Section 804(d) states that it is unlawful "to represent to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that any dwelling is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." The Court reasoned that the act "conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing." The testers had therefore suffered the exact injury made unlawful by the statute and thus it is irrelevant whether the tester intended to either rent or buy the dwelling. The Court also had to resolve whether HOME had a right to sue as an organization. The Court held that, like the individual plaintiffs, HOME had to show a direct or threatened injury caused by the defendant. HOME averred that it had been frustrated by the defendant's discriminatory practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing, and had been forced to devote significant resources to identifying and counteracting the said discriminatory practices. The Court agreed that the injury alleged by HOME was concrete and decided that the organization did have standing in this case.

india3_2-RC_4_22

Which one of the following is most similar to the activities and goals of testers, as they are described in the passage?

In 1968 the United States Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, intended to counter discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in the sale and leasing of housing. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982), the United States Supreme Court attempted to define for the Fair Housing Act those persons who fulfill the "standing" requirement, which holds that only those parties having a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy are warranted to bring suit. Specifically, the Court was asked to decide whether a "tester" (an individual who, without an intent to rent or purchase a dwelling, poses as a renter or purchaser for the purpose of investigating rental/sales practices) has standing. The Court was also asked whether an organization has standing to sue on its own behalf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman originated in a class action suit filed in a local court in 1979. The plaintiffs were two testers—a black woman named Sylvia Coleman and a white man named R. Kent Willis—and HOME, a nonprofit fair housing organization. The plaintiffs alleged that Havens Realty had engaged in discriminatory practices such as showing each tester apartments only in buildings occupied primarily by that person's racial group and telling the plaintiffs conflicting stories regarding the availability of individual apartments. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, holding that they lacked the required standing under the act. According to the court, only a person who actually intended to rent would meet the act's requirements. The case eventually came before the United States Supreme Court, which held that Coleman and Willis, as testers, did have standing to sue. In deciding the case, the Court looked to the appropriate sections of the Fair Housing Act. Section 804(d) states that it is unlawful "to represent to any person because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that any dwelling is not available ... when such dwelling is in fact so available." The Court reasoned that the act "conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing." The testers had therefore suffered the exact injury made unlawful by the statute and thus it is irrelevant whether the tester intended to either rent or buy the dwelling. The Court also had to resolve whether HOME had a right to sue as an organization. The Court held that, like the individual plaintiffs, HOME had to show a direct or threatened injury caused by the defendant. HOME averred that it had been frustrated by the defendant's discriminatory practices in its effort to assist equal access to housing, and had been forced to devote significant resources to identifying and counteracting the said discriminatory practices. The Court agreed that the injury alleged by HOME was concrete and decided that the organization did have standing in this case.

india3_2-RC_4_23

The passage suggests which one of the following about Havens Realty?