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On June 4, 2015, at 1500 central daylight time, an Air Tractor Inc.
AT-602, N5035R, impacted a crawfish pond during takeoff from the south runway (1,800 feet by 75 feet, grass/turf) at Mid South Flying Service Landing Strip/Fruge Airstrip, Branch, Louisiana.
The airplane received substantial damage on impact with the pond.
The pilot was uninjured.
The airplane was registered to and operated by Richard Flying Service Inc.
under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 137 as an aerial application flight that was not operating on a flight plan.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The local flight was originating at the time of the accident.
The pilot stated that during takeoff roll, the engine power was at maximum and then "lost a significant amount of indicated torque." The engine temperature, the compressor speed went to "redline," and the engine torque decreased 25 percent from full power.
After the airplane lifted off the ground, it was unable to climb or sustain level flight.
The pilot stated that there was not sufficient time to dump the load of applicant.
The airplane left wing stalled first and the airplane impacted a pond at the departure end of the runway.
A Federal Aviation Administration Air Safety Inspector from the Baton Rouge Flight Standards District Office stated that upon his arrival at the accident site, he saw that the prevailing winds were from north to south and an American Flag, near the accident site, that was standing straight out from the north wind.
The Inspector asked the pilot, who was standing with his father, what he thought happened, and the first thing the pilot said was "The bleed valve failed while taking off!" The Inspector asked the pilot why he thought that was the case.
The pilot stated that the engine bleed valve was changed 80 hours prior to the accident flight.
The Inspector then asked the pilot why he took off downwind with 3,000 pounds of fertilizer and full fuel.
The Inspector stated that at this point the pilot got a little upset, and made the statement that he "took off from the same airstrip that morning and had no problems, this is a PT6A turbine engine, I have plenty of power to make that take-off".
The pilot reported that there was a mechanical malfunction/failure of the engine compressor bleed valve or "possibly" the fuel control.
The St Landry Parish Airport-Ahart Field (OPL), Opelousas, Louisiana located approximately 15 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, at an elevation of 75 feet mean sea level, recorded at 1455: wind – 360 degrees at 5 knots; temperature – 86 degrees Fahrenheit (F); dew point – 66 degrees F; altimeter setting – 29.98 inches of mercury.
The Lafayette Regional Airport/Paul Fournet Field (LFT), Lafayette, Louisiana located approximately 17 nautical miles southeast of the accident site, at an elevation of 42 feet mean sea level, recorded at 1453: wind – 030 degrees at 6 knots; temperature – 88 degrees F; dew point – 63 degrees F; altimeter setting – 29.98 inches of mercury.
The pilot reported that the airplane had a maximum gross weight of 12,500 pounds and at the time of the accident the airplane weight was 9,900 pounds.
The pilot reported that the fuel on board at time of the accident takeoff was 165 gallons of Jet A.
The engine was removed and shipped to Pratt & Whitney Canada where a post-accident examination of the engine was performed under the supervision of a Transportation Safety Board of Canada Senior Investigator.
The examination revealed that the engine displayed minimal impact damage, with light impact deformation of the exhaust duct, and water immersion damage.
Circumferential contact signatures were displayed by the compressor turbine, first stage power turbine vane ring, first stage power turbine shroud, first stage power turbine, second stage power turbine vane ring and interstage abradable air seal, second stage power turbine shroud, and second stage power turbine due to their making contact under impact loads and external housing deformation.
The interstage abradable air seal displayed more severe circumferential rubbing and scoring, with frictional heat discoloration and material smearing, due to contact with the air seal rotor.
Post-accident functional testing of the high pressure fuel pump, fuel control unit, compressor bleed valve, fuel heater, and fuel nozzles, and disassembly inspection of the compressor bleed valve, showed no conditions that would have precluded normal operation prior to impact.
None of the engine components displayed any indications of any pre-impact anomalies or distress.
The bleed valve displayed water immersion damage and no apparent impact damage.
The normal lock wire with lead seal to the secondary orifice plug was in place.
During installation of the unit for functional testing it was noted that the secondary exit orifice plug showed no appreciable torque.
Functional testing showed leakage at the piston damper pins, however the bleed valve closing point was normal.
Disassembly and inspection showed the condition of all components to be satisfactory.
The fuel control unit showed water immersion damage and no apparent impact damage.
Functional testing of the unit was satisfactory with minor variations not affecting normal operation including full fuel flow and normal response to power lever inputs.
According to the airplane manufacturer, the AT-602 is a restricted category aircraft and the external equipment configuration changes frequently; there is no takeoff performance data published in the aircraft flight manual.
Based upon flight test data, the takeoff distance for an AT-602 with a PT6A-60AG engine and the following parameters: temperature - 87 degrees F (31 degrees C), takeoff weight - 9,900 pounds, and field elevation - 50 feet mean sea level, the expected takeoff for these conditions is about 1,980 feet ground roll and a total distance of 3,300 feet to clear a 50-foot obstacle.
This is calculated for an aircraft with a liquid spray system and using a flat, paved runway with no wind and a conservative piloting technique.
Depending on piloting technique, it is reasonable to believe that a pilot could take off a little shorter than this.
However, with a turf runway and a 5-knot tailwind, this ground roll would be expected to increase.
If he had a large fertilizer spreader installed, then the takeoff roll would also be extended due to increased drag.
The private pilot departed on the local flight to practice touch-and-go takeoffs and landings in the experimental, amateur-built airplane.
The airplane impacted flat, open terrain just after takeoff and was consumed by a post-impact fire.
There were no witnesses to the accident.
The wreckage was confined to a small area, and the orientation of the wreckage was consistent with an aerodynamic stall and spin.
Examination of the airframe revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures.
Engine drive train continuity was established.
The propeller blades and spinner did not exhibit evidence of rotation at the time of impact.
The damage precluded a thorough examination of the engine ignition system.
The pilot's wife said that the pilot had been having ignition issues with the airplane, and described them as the engine missing or quitting entirely during high-powered run-ups.
An acquaintance of the pilot reported that the pilot had resolved the ignition problem; however, the pilot did not specify how he had done so.
There was no record that the airframe or engine had received a condition inspection in the previous 12 years, and the pilot did not hold a current flight review.
Given the orientation of the wreckage and the lack of rotational signatures on the propeller blades, it is likely that the engine experienced a total loss of power just after takeoff.
The reason for the loss of power could not be determined based on the available evidence.
Following the loss of power, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed, which resulted in exceeding the airplane's critical angle of attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall and subsequent spin.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:A total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined based on the available information, and the pilot's subsequent failure to maintain adequate airspeed, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall/spin.
On June 3, 2017, about 1630 central daylight time, an experimental amateur-built SkyStar Kitfox Series 5 airplane, N956ML, impacted terrain next to Heritage Airpark (TE86), New Berlin, Texas.
The private pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed.
The airplane was privately owned and operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Day visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site and no flight plan had been filed.
The local personal flight was originating from TE86 at the time of the accident.
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors, the pilot's wife said her husband was going to practice touch-and-go takeoffs and landings.
A witness saw the airplane taxiing for takeoff but did not see the impact.
The witness said he heard a "pop" and observed smoke.
The witness said he did not know if the "pop" was an engine backfire or the sound of impact.
There were other no witnesses to the accident.
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with airplane single and multiengine land and multiengine sea ratings.
He held an FAA third-class airman medical certificate, dated January 20, 2016, with no restrictions or limitations.
The pilot's logbook was reviewed by FAA inspectors and contained entries from November 26, 2014, to June 9, 2015.
According to the logbook, the pilot had 1,138 total hours of flight experience, of which 211 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.
His most recent last flight review was completed November 9, 2014.
On January 28, 2017, the pilot completed the ground portion of a flight review, but the flight portion was not documented.
According to FAA medical and insurance company records, the pilot estimated he had logged 1,155 total flight hours, 235 hours in the Kitfox, and 10 hours in the previous six months.
The airplane, serial number 59407-0038, was built by the pilot from a kit, and was issued a special airworthiness certificate in the experimental category on March 15, 2000.
In February 2008, the pilot installed a a Subaru EA-81 NSI RAM performance engine, serial number 244159, rated at 120 horsepower.
The last condition inspection of the airframe and engine was on April 23, 2005.
No times were listed.
Other than two entries both dated May 25, 2005, no other entries were entered in the engine logbook.
Weather observed at 1658 at Randolph Air Force Base (KRND), Universal City, Texas, located 9 miles northwest of the accident site, indicated the wind was from 190° at 6 knots, visibility was 10 miles, there were a few clouds at 20,000 feet, the temperature was 32°C., the dew point was 20°C., and the altimeter setting was 29.84 inches of mercury.
FAA inspectors examined the wreckage.
They noted that the surrounding terrain consisted of flat farmland and grassland, and was suitable for a forced landing.
All the wreckage was confined to within a 15-foot radius and the ground fire extended within a 20-foot radius from the point of impact.
The engine was skewed to the right, the left wing was trailing, the right wing was leading, and the empennage was angled to the right when viewed from the rear of the airplane.
Although post-impact fire consumed the airplane, inspectors were able to establish flight control continuity.
The engine was inverted but remained attached to the airframe.
Drive train continuity (propeller hub and gear box rotation) was established.
Two of the three propeller blades and other cowling debris were located within 10 to 15 feet of the main body of wreckage.
The propeller blades and spinner did not exhibit evidence of rotation.
The leading edges and blade tips were undamaged.
The third blade was not located.
According to the pilot's wife the pilot had been having ignition issues with the airplane.
She thought the problem had been resolved.
She described the problem as the engine missing or quitting entirely during high-powered run-ups.
She suggested that the inspectors contact a local pilot who had the same aircraft type and engine combination.
The pilot stated that the accident pilot had contacted him about his airplane's ignition problems, but later indicated that he had found a solution; he never said what the solution was; no entries were made in the engine logbook.
He said he was aware the pilot had converted the engine and had installed a dual ignition.
Damage from the post-impact fire precluded a thorough examination of the engine ignition system.
An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Travis County Medical Examiner's Office Austin, Texas.
According to the report, the pilot's death was "the result of conflagration and blunt force injuries." FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed a toxicological screen that revealed no evidence of carbon monoxide in blood, and no evidence of ethanol or drugs in urine.
Cyanide tests were not performed.