sakharamg/AviationCorpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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The right side collective head was damaged from impact forces.
With power off, the throttle was rolled with no binding, ratcheting, or kinking.
No binding was felt in the manual emergency throttle when moved from minimum to maximum.
All electrical connections were good.
The engine examination revealed that the gas generator turned freely when manually rotated; there was no binding.
The free turbine turned freely by hand; continuity was confirmed to the main rotor transmission.
The transmission shaft between the engine and main transmission was intact with no visible damage.
Continuity through the reduction gearbox, as well as the accessory gearbox, was confirmed.
The pilot's helmets were scratched and abraided during the accident.
It was noted that the issued RCSD flight helmets were MSA Gallet model LH250, which had been selected for use by the department without a documented selection process.
The damaged helmets were taken out of service.
After completing the unit evaluation of available replacement helicopter helmets, RCSD decided to issue to a different model.
There are no FAA standards for helicopter helmet protection so it is up to the individual pilot or organization to determine what safety standards are best for them.
The US military, through the US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratories (USAARL), has studied numerous crash scenarios and the biodynamics involved in rotary wing accidents.
They determined the best combination of mission effectiveness, impact protection, user comfort, and weight to develop helmet specifications.
The current US military standard is referred to as Military Specification (MilSpec) FNS/PD 96-18.
At this time, there is only one military helmet manufactured to these safety standards.
There is one commercial version that is manufactured that allows slightly higher impact forces.
There are no commercial equivalent specifications to these military specifications.
This is in contrast to the ANSI 290.1 specification for motor vehicular use, or the Snell standards for race car helmets.
No known agencies exist that have accumulated the body of biodynamics and physiological data that USAARL used in development of the current military specifications.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Prior to the accident, all RCSD pilots obtained their private and commercial pilot certificates from outside vendors.
The PUI was the first to obtain only the private pilot from the outside vendor, and then work on the commercial certificate with an RCSD instructor.
The outside vendor had a syllabus, so the student could prepare for the next flight.
The FI had a lesson plan, but the student would not know what the next flight was to include until the preflight briefing.
There was no standard operating procedures (SOP) manual, training manual, or Safety Management System (SMS) in place.
The RCSD did have a policy and procedures manual that stated that all training should be done with an FI on board.
The first part of the flight was to complete 0.5 hours of simulated instrument time.
The crew did that, and flew back to the home base airport.
While on the ground without shutting down, the FI briefed the simulated governor failure maneuver.
The brief noted that once in the manual mode, the PUI would need to slide a red button to the forward position to be able to control the twist grip, which would be stiff.
The FI would be on the controls since it would be the PUI's first attempt.
The FI had done about 20 governor failure simulations previously with no issues, and they were doing the procedure from memory.
The PUI acknowledged an understanding of the procedure and that the FI would be on the controls to assist if needed.
The FI went to manual mode just as the helicopter entered downwind.
The helicopter was configured for training mode with a training pilot flying.
The helicopter was also set up for patrol, as they were going to use the helicopter for patrol after the training.
Even on training missions, the helicopter had to be available for high priority calls.
Immediately after liftoff, the FI was in contact with dispatch regarding a photo mission.
He continued to talk to dispatch through the downwind leg, and stopped when they turned the helicopter onto final approach.
Post-Accident Changes Following the accident, the RCSD sent the PUI back to the vendor for commercial pilot certificate completion.
RCSD implemented a computer-based SMS system for their operations.
Pilots were to attend yearly factory simulator training.
RCSD sent two pilots to the Airbus Maintenance Test Pilot course, and will continue to send one per year.
RCSD purchased helicopter rated helmets.
The RCSD Safety Officer organized a yearly safety stand-down.

The accident flight was the airplane’s first flight with a newly installed engine.
The pilot executed a normal takeoff and, during initial climbout, the engine began to overheat.
Subsequently, engine power diminished and the pilot made a forced landing into the trees at the end of the runway.
Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.
Due to the extensive fire damage of the automobile engine, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:A loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.
On September 1, 2009, about 1314 central daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Hahn R-W22 Tiger Moth Replica, N318JT, lost engine power and collided with trees at Smyrna Airport (MQY), Smyrna, Tennessee.
The airline transport-rated pilot received minor injuries.
The airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces, and post crash fire.
The flight was operated as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and no flight plan was filed.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The flight was originating at the time of the accident.
The pilot stated that this was the airplane’s first flight with a newly installed engine.
The owner of the airplane informed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that the engine was purchased from a local salvage yard, and that it was taken from a 1997 Geo Metro.
The pilot stated that he taxied to the end of runway 32, which is 8037 feet long.
He said that during the initial climbout, he was conducting engine and instruments checks when he noticed that the engine began to overheat.
Subsequently the engine power diminished, and the airplane only climbed to approximately 200-300 feet agl.
The pilot said that at that time he was unable to maintain altitude and therefore he made a forced landing in the trees at the end of the runway.
A post crash fire ensued and the airplane was totally consumed by the fire.
The pilot did not report any flight control malfunctions prior to the accident.
Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed that the airplane collided with trees at the end of the runway.
The airframe and flight control system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.
Due to the extensive fire damage of the automobile engine, the reason for loss of engine power could not be determined.

The pilot conducted a downwind takeoff on the local banner-tow flight.
The airplane subsequently picked up the banner on a downwind low approach.
A witness reported that the engine sounded normal.
An eyewitness reported the airplane was not gaining much altitude and that the banner was very close to being dragged in crops on departure.
A witness near the accident site said that the banner got caught in the corn while the airplane was maneuvering.
Another witness saw the banner separate from the airplane before the airplane banked and went into a dive.
The pilot was trained in and endorsed for banner towing operations and emergencies.
However, his logbook did not contain an endorsement for a flight review.
The local wind was 11 knots gusting to 20 knots.
A wreckage examination revealed no preimpact anomalies.
The propeller blades exhibited chordwise abrasion and leading edge nicks consistent with an engine producing power at the time of impact.
A global positioning system unit showed that, after the airplane picked up the banner, it made a tight downwind turn to the left and headed northeast during its climbout.
The data showed the airplane then turned to the south and subsequently descended.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control while performing low-level banner towing operations with a gusting wind.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT On September 2, 2010, about 0921 central daylight time, a Cessna 150L, N10128, operated by Drake Aerial Enterprises, LLC, and piloted by a commercial pilot, sustained substantial damaged when it collided with terrain near Boone, Iowa.
The airplane was conducting banner tow operations under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The pilot sustained fatal injuries.
The local banner tow flight departed the Boone Municipal Airport (BNW), near Boone, Iowa, about 0907.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was on file.
A witness at the fixed base operator (FBO), who saw the airplane depart from runway 15, stated that the airplane never gained much altitude and its banner looked like it was "very close" to dragging on the ground.
The witness watched the airplane turn east and then back north with not much of an altitude change.
The witness and two others went up in an airplane and spotted the wreckage.
The banner was north of the aircraft and according to the witness, it appeared that "the aircraft went almost straight down because there was not much corn disturbed." Another witness at the FBO stated that he observed the takeoff.
He heard the initial takeoff and the approach to the banner.
The engine "sounded normal." A witness near the accident site reported that the banner was "dipping" in the wind and all of sudden, it "got caught in the corn." Within two to three seconds the "plane nose dived straight down into the field." Another witness near the accident site stated that the airplane "seemed to be struggling to gain altitude as he headed north from the airport.” The witness saw the airplane turn to the east and continued to appear to "struggle.” The airplane turned back west and its altitude did not increase.
After the airplane turned around the banner appeared to "fall off as if he cut it loose." Shortly after that the plane turned south.
The witness said that the plane then banked hard to its left and its "nose went straight down." Deputies from the Boone County Sheriff’s Office found the wreckage in a cornfield north of 200th Street between S and R Avenues.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION The 24-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument ratings.
According to copies of his logbook, the most recent entry was dated August 23, 2010.

The right side collective head was damaged from impact forces.

With power off, the throttle was rolled with no binding, ratcheting, or kinking.

No binding was felt in the manual emergency throttle when moved from minimum to maximum.

All electrical connections were good.

The engine examination revealed that the gas generator turned freely when manually rotated; there was no binding.

The free turbine turned freely by hand; continuity was confirmed to the main rotor transmission.

The transmission shaft between the engine and main transmission was intact with no visible damage.

Continuity through the reduction gearbox, as well as the accessory gearbox, was confirmed.

The pilot's helmets were scratched and abraided during the accident.

It was noted that the issued RCSD flight helmets were MSA Gallet model LH250, which had been selected for use by the department without a documented selection process.

The damaged helmets were taken out of service.

After completing the unit evaluation of available replacement helicopter helmets, RCSD decided to issue to a different model.

There are no FAA standards for helicopter helmet protection so it is up to the individual pilot or organization to determine what safety standards are best for them.

The US military, through the US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratories (USAARL), has studied numerous crash scenarios and the biodynamics involved in rotary wing accidents.

They determined the best combination of mission effectiveness, impact protection, user comfort, and weight to develop helmet specifications.

The current US military standard is referred to as Military Specification (MilSpec) FNS/PD 96-18.

At this time, there is only one military helmet manufactured to these safety standards.

There is one commercial version that is manufactured that allows slightly higher impact forces.

There are no commercial equivalent specifications to these military specifications.

This is in contrast to the ANSI 290.1 specification for motor vehicular use, or the Snell standards for race car helmets.

No known agencies exist that have accumulated the body of biodynamics and physiological data that USAARL used in development of the current military specifications.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Prior to the accident, all RCSD pilots obtained their private and commercial pilot certificates from outside vendors.

The PUI was the first to obtain only the private pilot from the outside vendor, and then work on the commercial certificate with an RCSD instructor.

The outside vendor had a syllabus, so the student could prepare for the next flight.

The FI had a lesson plan, but the student would not know what the next flight was to include until the preflight briefing.

There was no standard operating procedures (SOP) manual, training manual, or Safety Management System (SMS) in place.

The RCSD did have a policy and procedures manual that stated that all training should be done with an FI on board.

The first part of the flight was to complete 0.5 hours of simulated instrument time.

The crew did that, and flew back to the home base airport.

While on the ground without shutting down, the FI briefed the simulated governor failure maneuver.

The brief noted that once in the manual mode, the PUI would need to slide a red button to the forward position to be able to control the twist grip, which would be stiff.

The FI would be on the controls since it would be the PUI's first attempt.

The FI had done about 20 governor failure simulations previously with no issues, and they were doing the procedure from memory.

The PUI acknowledged an understanding of the procedure and that the FI would be on the controls to assist if needed.

The FI went to manual mode just as the helicopter entered downwind.

The helicopter was configured for training mode with a training pilot flying.

The helicopter was also set up for patrol, as they were going to use the helicopter for patrol after the training.

Even on training missions, the helicopter had to be available for high priority calls.

Immediately after liftoff, the FI was in contact with dispatch regarding a photo mission.

He continued to talk to dispatch through the downwind leg, and stopped when they turned the helicopter onto final approach.

Post-Accident Changes Following the accident, the RCSD sent the PUI back to the vendor for commercial pilot certificate completion.

RCSD implemented a computer-based SMS system for their operations.

Pilots were to attend yearly factory simulator training.

RCSD sent two pilots to the Airbus Maintenance Test Pilot course, and will continue to send one per year.

RCSD purchased helicopter rated helmets.

The RCSD Safety Officer organized a yearly safety stand-down.

The accident flight was the airplane’s first flight with a newly installed engine.

The pilot executed a normal takeoff and, during initial climbout, the engine began to overheat.

Subsequently, engine power diminished and the pilot made a forced landing into the trees at the end of the runway.

Examination of the airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.

Due to the extensive fire damage of the automobile engine, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:A loss of engine power for undetermined reasons.

On September 1, 2009, about 1314 central daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Hahn R-W22 Tiger Moth Replica, N318JT, lost engine power and collided with trees at Smyrna Airport (MQY), Smyrna, Tennessee.

The airline transport-rated pilot received minor injuries.

The airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces, and post crash fire.

The flight was operated as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, and no flight plan was filed.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

The pilot stated that this was the airplane’s first flight with a newly installed engine.

The owner of the airplane informed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector that the engine was purchased from a local salvage yard, and that it was taken from a 1997 Geo Metro.

The pilot stated that he taxied to the end of runway 32, which is 8037 feet long.

He said that during the initial climbout, he was conducting engine and instruments checks when he noticed that the engine began to overheat.

Subsequently the engine power diminished, and the airplane only climbed to approximately 200-300 feet agl.

The pilot said that at that time he was unable to maintain altitude and therefore he made a forced landing in the trees at the end of the runway.

A post crash fire ensued and the airplane was totally consumed by the fire.

The pilot did not report any flight control malfunctions prior to the accident.

Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed that the airplane collided with trees at the end of the runway.

The airframe and flight control system components revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction.

Due to the extensive fire damage of the automobile engine, the reason for loss of engine power could not be determined.

The pilot conducted a downwind takeoff on the local banner-tow flight.

The airplane subsequently picked up the banner on a downwind low approach.

A witness reported that the engine sounded normal.

An eyewitness reported the airplane was not gaining much altitude and that the banner was very close to being dragged in crops on departure.

A witness near the accident site said that the banner got caught in the corn while the airplane was maneuvering.

Another witness saw the banner separate from the airplane before the airplane banked and went into a dive.

The pilot was trained in and endorsed for banner towing operations and emergencies.

However, his logbook did not contain an endorsement for a flight review.

The local wind was 11 knots gusting to 20 knots.

A wreckage examination revealed no preimpact anomalies.

The propeller blades exhibited chordwise abrasion and leading edge nicks consistent with an engine producing power at the time of impact.

A global positioning system unit showed that, after the airplane picked up the banner, it made a tight downwind turn to the left and headed northeast during its climbout.

The data showed the airplane then turned to the south and subsequently descended.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control while performing low-level banner towing operations with a gusting wind.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On September 2, 2010, about 0921 central daylight time, a Cessna 150L, N10128, operated by Drake Aerial Enterprises, LLC, and piloted by a commercial pilot, sustained substantial damaged when it collided with terrain near Boone, Iowa.

The airplane was conducting banner tow operations under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The pilot sustained fatal injuries.

The local banner tow flight departed the Boone Municipal Airport (BNW), near Boone, Iowa, about 0907.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was on file.

A witness at the fixed base operator (FBO), who saw the airplane depart from runway 15, stated that the airplane never gained much altitude and its banner looked like it was "very close" to dragging on the ground.

The witness watched the airplane turn east and then back north with not much of an altitude change.

The witness and two others went up in an airplane and spotted the wreckage.

The banner was north of the aircraft and according to the witness, it appeared that "the aircraft went almost straight down because there was not much corn disturbed." Another witness at the FBO stated that he observed the takeoff.

He heard the initial takeoff and the approach to the banner.

The engine "sounded normal." A witness near the accident site reported that the banner was "dipping" in the wind and all of sudden, it "got caught in the corn." Within two to three seconds the "plane nose dived straight down into the field." Another witness near the accident site stated that the airplane "seemed to be struggling to gain altitude as he headed north from the airport.” The witness saw the airplane turn to the east and continued to appear to "struggle.” The airplane turned back west and its altitude did not increase.

After the airplane turned around the banner appeared to "fall off as if he cut it loose." Shortly after that the plane turned south.

The witness said that the plane then banked hard to its left and its "nose went straight down." Deputies from the Boone County Sheriff’s Office found the wreckage in a cornfield north of 200th Street between S and R Avenues.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION The 24-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument ratings.

According to copies of his logbook, the most recent entry was dated August 23, 2010.