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4441506 | page content | {
"char_count": "2891",
"citations": "115 N.H. 545",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7235",
"first_page": 545,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7235\nCatherine Jordan, by her Mother and Next Friend, Jean C. Baker v. Dennis R. Jordan\nSeptember 30, 1975\nSweeney, Sweeney Sullivan (Mr. Kevin F. Sullivan orally) for the plaintiff.\nThe defendant did not file a brief.",
"id": "4441506",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "546",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Catherine Jordan, by her Mother and Next Friend, Jean C. Baker v. Dennis R. Jordan",
"name_abbreviation": "Jordan v. Jordan",
"parties": "Catherine Jordan, by her Mother and Next Friend, Jean C. Baker v. Dennis R. Jordan",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "473"
} |
4439270 | page content | {
"char_count": "17306",
"citations": "115 N.H. 445",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7212",
"first_page": 445,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 7212\nRonald D. Daniels, Jr. v. Richard D. Hanson & a. Richard Strickford & a. v. Richard D. Hanson & a.\nJuly 31, 1975\nPerkins & Brock and McSwiney, Jones Semple (Mr. Harold W. Perkins II and Mr. Carroll F. Jones orally) for the plaintiffs Ronald D. Daniels, Jr., and for Richard Strickford, Charles Denningham and Larry Thomas, intervenors.\nStebbins Bradley and Daniel J. Connolly (Mr. Connolly orally) for defendant John Noble.\nRichard A. Hampe, county attorney, by brief and orally for Albert M. Ayotte, Edna McKenna and Peter Spaulding, county commissioners.\nRichard D. Hanson, county treasurer, filed no brief.",
"id": "4439270",
"judges": "Grimes, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "453",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Ronald D. Daniels, Jr. v. Richard D. Hanson & a.; Richard Strickford & a. v. Richard D. Hanson & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Daniels v. Hanson",
"parties": "Ronald D. Daniels, Jr. v. Richard D. Hanson & a. Richard Strickford & a. v. Richard D. Hanson & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "2850"
} |
4439243 | page content | {
"char_count": "4108",
"citations": "115 N.H. 375",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7139",
"first_page": 375,
"head_matter": "Cheshire\nNo. 7139\nState of New Hampshire v. James E. Day\nJune 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Thomas D. Rath, assistant attorney general ( Mr. Rath orally), for the State.\nBell & Kennedy and Joyce A. Wilder (Ms. Wilder orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439243",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "377",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. James E. Day",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Day",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. James E. Day",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "702"
} |
4439161 | page content | {
"char_count": "6034",
"citations": "115 N.H. 385",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-15",
"docket_number": "No. 7254",
"first_page": 385,
"head_matter": "Request of Governor and Council\nNo. 7254\nOpinion of the Justices\nJuly 15, 1975\nThe following resolution was adopted by the Governor and Council on June 25, 1975, and filed with the supreme court on June 26, 1975:\n“WHEREAS, under RSA 12-A:3 the Commissioner of Resources and Economic Development ‘shall nominate for appointment by the governor and Council... a director of economic development . . . [who] shall serve subject to the provisions of RSA 4: V;\n“WHEREAS, under RSA 4:1 ‘the appointing authority of such official may petition the governor and council for his removal’;\n“WHEREAS, the Commissioner of Resources and Economic Development has concluded that the present Director of Economic Development should be removed from office;\n“WHEREAS, the provisions of RSA 4:1 govern the procedure in accordance with which any such removal must be executed;\n“WHEREAS, the question has arisen whether ‘the appointing authority’ of the Director of Economic Development, within the meaning of RSA 4:1, is the Commissioner of Resources and Eco nomic Development or the Governor and Council;\n“WHEREAS, if proceedings under RSA 4:1 should be initiated against the Director of Economic Development, the Governor and Council wish proceedings thereof to be consonant with the applicable statutes as well as with their obligations to afford due process of law to any respondent in a proceeding brought under RSA 4:1, and\n“WHEREAS, this question is an important one with significance for the operation of the executive branch of the government, and thus creates, by its pendency before the Governor and Council, a solemn occasion;\n“NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Governor and Council ask the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court for their opinion in answer to the question, who is the “appointing authority,” within the meaning of RSA 4:1, of the Director of Economic Development;\n“AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Secretary of State transmit forthwith ten copies of this resolution to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.”\nThe following answer was returned:",
"id": "4439161",
"judges": "Frank R. Kenison",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "388",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Opinion of the Justices",
"name_abbreviation": "Opinion of the Justices",
"parties": "Opinion of the Justices",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "962"
} |
1307124 | page content | {
"char_count": "12811",
"citations": "64 N.H. 380",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1887-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 380,
"head_matter": "The Mayor of Manchester v. Smyth.\nThe court will not interfere by injunction to prevent the violation of a city building ordinance designed to furnish security against fire, when it appears that the threatened violation will not constitute a nuisance by increasing the danger from fire.\nBill in Equity, for an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding further with the work of raising and enlarging a building in Manchester, in violation of the following ordinance of the city: “No person shall ei-ect, or cause to be erected, any building exceeding ten feet in height, nor shall any building now or hereafter erected be raised or enlarged, unless the walls of the same shall be built of iron, brick, or stone, with the roof of slate, iron, or other incombustible material,within the following limits,” etc. Facts found by the court. The original building — a dwelling-house — was built in 1845 of wood, a little more than two stories high, with a square roof covered with shingles. The plates on which the rafters rested were about two feet above the floor of the attic, which consisted of a single finished room lighted from the roof, with an unlighted recess used for storage on each of its four sides. In order to obtain additional and better lighted rooms, the defendant has removed the old roof, extended the outer walls upward on each side of the building from five to seven feet, put on or begun to put on a flat gravel concreted' roof, which at its highest point is four inches higher and at its lowest point twenty inches lower than the highest point of the old roof. This is the raising and enlarging complained of. The interior is now wholly unfinished. If the building is completed according to the defendant’s design, the danger from fire will be in some respects increased and in others diminished; but, on the whole, considering the interior and exterior exposure of the building itself and that of adjacent buildings, it will be neither increased nor diminished.\nThe defendant waives all objections to the form of the proceedings, and contends (1) that the ordinance is not authorized by the statute (G. L., c. 48. s. 10.) or by any provision of the city charter; (2) that if authorized, it is invalid so far as it applies to buildings erected prior to the date of the charter and to the enactment of the statute; and (8), that if'valid the raising and enlarging are not and will not be when completed a violation of it, inasmuch as the danger from fire will not be increased.\nSulloway & Topliff, for the plaintiff.\nThe finding of the court, that, on the whole, the danger from fire will neither be increased nor diminished, is of no consequence. That is a matter with which the court has nothing to do. It is not a question of fact to be determined by the court, but one of which the city council have the sole, absolute, and final determination (1 Dill. Mun. Corp., 3d ed., .s. 328, Hiñe v. New Haven, 40 Conn. 478), and this discretion cannot be judicially interfered with. 1 Dillon, s. 94; State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17; Gras Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa 509; St. Louis v. Boffin ger, 19 Mo. 15; 1 Dillon (3d ed.), s. 475; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Fay, Petitioner, 15 Pick. 243; Parks \"v. Boston, 8 Pick. 218 ; Danielly v. Cabaniss, 52 Ga. 211; Sheridan v. Colvin, 78 111. 237; Western Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 81 Penn. St. 175, 185; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gras Go., 66 Ind. 896; 1 Dillon (3d ed.), note 1, p. 401; The May- or Council of Monroe v. Hoffman, 29 La. Ann. 651; 39 Am. Rep. 345; 2 Dillon, s. 832, and cases cited.\n“Whenever matters have been intrusted by law to the judgment and discretion of municipal officers or boards, equity will not revise or control the exercise of their discretion in the absence of fraud.” High Inj. (2d ed.), s. 1270 ; ib., s. 1240.\n“It is well settled, and indeed admitted by the plaintiff, that this court, sitting as a court of equity, has no superintendence of inferior tribunals.” Lane v. Morrill, 51 N. H. 423; Kelsey v. King, 32 Barb. 410; People v. Mayor, 32 Barb 102; McKinley v. Freeholders, 29 N. J. Eq. 164; Andrews v. Knox Co., 70 111. 65; Swett v. City of Troy, 62 Barb. 680 ; Phelps v. Watertown, 61 Barb. 121; Fitzgerald v. Harms, 92 111. 372; High Ex. Leg. Rem., ss. 42, 325, 418, and cases cited.\nWhile it is as a proposition true that the legislature is alone competent to make laws, it is as well settled and universally conceded that it is competent for the legislature to delegate to municipal corporal ions the power to make by-laws and ordinances, which have all the force in favor of municipalities, and against persons bound thereby, of laws passed by the legislature of the state. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (3d ed.), s. 308; Heland v. Lowell, 3 Allen 407; Church v. City, 5 Cow. 538; St. Louis v. Boffinger, 19 Mo. 13, 15 ; St. Louis v. Bank, 49 Mo. 574 ; McDermott v. Board of Police, 5 Abb. Pr. 422; Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 111. 533; Des Moines Gras Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa 508; 24 Am. Rep. 756; State v. Try on, 39 Conn. 183; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gras Co., 66 Ind. 396; Starr v. Burlington, 45 Iowa 87.\n“ The by-law has the same effect within its limits and with respect to the persons upon whom it lawfully operates as an act of parliament has upon the subjects at large.” Lord Abinger, in Hopkins v. The Mayor, 4 M. & W. 621, 640; Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. N S. 586; The Queen v. Osier, 32 U. C. Q. B. 324.\nThe common-law doctrine is, that a corporation, aggregate for municipal purposes, is nothing more nor less than “an intrusting the people of a place with the local government thereof.” Cuddon v. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 192; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 334; People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44,88; Brinekerhoff v. Board of Education, 37 How. Pr. 499.\nThe power to make by-laws is incidental to the very existence of corporations, and without any grant it may make all appropriate by-laws. “ For of common right every corporation may make a by-law concerning any franchise granted to them, because it coircerns the welfare of the body politick and is included in the very act of incorporation. And that is to the body politick as reason is to the body natural to govern themselves, and if a franchise be granted to a corporation it is under a trust that the corporation shall manage it well, which cannot be done but by a by-law.” City of London v. Vanacleer, 1 Ld. Ray. 496 ; Norris v. Staps, Hobart 211.\nAnd such by-laws when made are as binding as any public law of tbe state. Anacosta Tribe v. Mur bach, 13 Md. 91; Cummings v. Webster, 43 Me. 192.\nOrdinances and by-laws are not void because they prohibit what otherwise might lawfully be done. A legal restraint may be imposed on a few for the benefit of the many. 1 Dill. Mum. Corp., s. 326.\n“ The establishment of limits within the denser portion of cities and villages, within which buildings constructed of inflammable material shall not be erected or repaired, may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been sustained notwithstanding this result.” Cool. Con. Lim. 740; King v. Davenport, 98 111. 305; Iiespublica v. Duqvet, 2 Yeates 493 ; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403 ; Brady v. North- Western Ins. (Jo., 11 Mich. 425; Monroe v. Hoffman, 29 La. An. 651.\nA municipal corporation may by ordinance provide that buildings shall not be erected of wood or other inflammable material. Wood Nuis., s. 741; Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige 261; Douglass v. Com., 2 Rawle 262; Brady v. Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., ss. 143, 405; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 352.\nThe city council, the only legally constituted tribunal to determine the question, considered the rights of the defendant and the public, and decided that the use to which the defendant proposes to put the property would endanger the public safety, and by the ordinance in question declared it to be a nuisance.\nIn matters of this character, designed to protect the public, like .a house held out as one of ill-fame, it is none the less a nuisance that there has been no act of prostitution. A man who erects a pig-sty under his neighbor’s window could hardly excuse himself by showing that he intended to keep it clean and inoffensive. A man residing in a populous town might desire very much to have his child sick with small-pox cared for in his own house, but it would not be an answer sufficient to prevent removal that he would ■use his utmost endeavors, and take the greatest precaution, to prevent the spread of the disease. The law would not wait for the disease to spread No more, in this case, should it wait for the irreparable mischief of a conflagration to settle by practical demonstration whether the city council or the court are right in their opinion as to whether the danger from fire will or will not be increased by the proposed change.\nThe ground of jurisdiction of courts of equity in cases of nuisance is their ability to give a more complete and perfect remedy than is attainable at law, in order to prevent irreparable mischief, and also to suppress oppressive and vexatious litigation. They can interpose, where courts of law cannot, to restrain and prevent nuisances which are threatened, or are in progress, as well as to abate those already existing, and by a perpetual injunction the remedy is made complete through all future time.\nWhen the injury may be irreparable, as loss of health, trade, or pormanant ruin to property may or will ensue from the wrongful act of erection, in every such case courts of equity will interfere by injunction. Sto. Eq. Jur., s. 926; Webber v. Gage, 39 N. H. 186 ; West Point Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703; Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 41 Md. 529; Schurmeier v. St. Paul, ¿•c., R. R. Co., 8 Minn. 113; Wilson v. City of Mineral Point, 39 Wis. 160; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., ss. 925, 926; Eden Inj. 286; Jer. Eq. Jur., s. 310; People v. St. Louis, 10 111. 372; Hoole v. Attorney- General, 22 Ala. 190; Attorney-General v. Gas Co., 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 639; Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 87; Zabriskie v. Railroad Co., 2 Boas. 314; Jersey City v. Hudson, 2 Beas. 420; Attorney-General v. Brown, 9 C. E. Green 89; Wood Nuis., c. 25; Burnham v. Kempton, 44 N. H. 94, 95,\nTowns may maintain a bill in equity, and courts will aid them by injunction in enforcing their by-laws. Winthrop v. Farrar, 11 Allen 398; Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315.\n“ No solid reason, in the author’s judgment, exists why in proper cases a municipal corporation may not resort to a court of equity to aid it in enforcing its public duties to preserve the health and property of the inhabitants.” 1 Dill. Mun. Gorp , s. 405.note; Wood Nuis., s. 770, note 4, where the English cases are collected, and ss. 771, 772.\nCross & Taggart, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307124",
"judges": "Smith and Clark, JJ., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "384",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "The Mayor of Manchester v. Smyth",
"name_abbreviation": "Mayor of Manchester v. Smyth",
"parties": "The Mayor of Manchester v. Smyth.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "2270"
} |
1307105 | page content | {
"char_count": "2418",
"citations": "64 N.H. 406",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1887-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 406,
"head_matter": "Haverhill Iron Works v. Hale.\nA bill in equity may be inserted as a declaration in a writ of summons, and may be served upon the defendant by giving him a duly attested copy of the writ and declaration.\nIn Equity. The bill was inserted in the place of a declaration in a writ of summons and attachment. The officer’s return of service is that he “summoned the within named William Hale, as within, commanded, by this day giving to him an attested copy of this writ and complaint.” The defendant, appearing specially, moves that the bill be dismissed for want of legal service.\nFrink & Batchelder, for the defendant.\nS. C. Eastman, for the plaintiffs.",
"id": "1307105",
"judges": "Carpenter, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "407",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Haverhill Iron Works v. Hale",
"name_abbreviation": "Haverhill Iron Works v. Hale",
"parties": "Haverhill Iron Works v. Hale.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "440"
} |
1307288 | page content | {
"char_count": "11774",
"citations": "64 N.H. 598",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1888-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 598,
"head_matter": "Benton v. McIntire.\nA deed is not defeated by a manifestly erroneous statement of a monument, when the remaining description is sufficiently certain to locate the land.\nWrit oe Entry. Trial by the court. The plaintiff owns a piece of land in Lancaster village, out of which, previous to his acquiring his title, a lot, now owned by the defendant, had been conveyed by deed with the following description: “A certain piece or parcel of land with the buildings thereon, situated on the easterly side of Main street in Lancaster village, bounded and described as follows, viz.: Commencing at the north-west corner of the plot deeded by Jacob E. Stickney to the said N. Gr. Stickney, and run ning easterly perpendicular with the northerly line of said plot 21] feet, thence southerly 21] links to Bailey’s northerly line, thence westerly parallel with the first mentioned line 21] feet to the south-east corner of said plot deeded by J. E. Stickney to the said N. G. Stickney, thence northerly to the bound begun at. Meaning to convey the plot where the back shop stands and the land between it and the first mentioned line, together with the right of way to the rear of said building.”\nThe description by courses and distances, as contained in the deed, is not an intelligible description of any land, and the plaintiff contended that that portion of the description should be wholly rejected, and resort should be had to the phrase “meaning to convey the plot where the back shop stands,” and that this phrase should be construed to mean “ the land covered by the back shop,” which could bo located. The defendant contended that there is manifestly an erroneous description of the bound begun at in the deed, and that upon applying the description to the back shop lot it is apparent that the place of beginning should read at the “north-east corner” instead of the “ north-west corner ” of the plot deeded by Jacob E. Stickney, as it is in the deed; and being so construed, and rejecting that part of the description which is manifestly erroneous, the deed gives an intelligible description of a piece of land extending about seven feet’further east than the back shop extended. The court adopted this construction of the deed, and ordered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff excepted.\nThe plot of land deeded by Jacob E. Stickney to N. G. Stickney referred to is described in the deed of Jacob E. Stickney to N. G. Stickney as follows: “Commencing at a tamarack tree on the easterly side of Main street in Lancaster village, 14] feet north from the north-west corner of F. Smith’s lot which he now occupies, thence easterly 2 rods 22] links, thence south through the centre of the building which I, J. E. Stickney, occupy as an office 21] links to Frank Smith’s northerly line, thence west 2 rods 22] links on said line to the road, thence north 21] links to the tamarack tree aforesaid, meaning to convey that place and the buildings now occupied by the said N. G. Stickney as a shoe store.”\nOssian Ray (W. Heywood with him), for the plaintiff.\nI. The description of the land conveyed is in two parts, — an attempted particular description by metes and bounds, and a general description. The case finds that the particular description “ is not an intelligent description of any land.” If the particular description stood alone, the deed would be void for uncertainty. But there is a general description, viz., “meaning to convey tlie plot where the back shop stands,” etc., “ together with the right of way,” etc. This part of the description is intelligible and ascertainable.\nII. The plaintiff contends that the “ elementary and obvious rule of construction ” to be applied here is the same as laid down in 2 Devlin on Deeds, s. 1041, where it is held that when “the particular description by metes and bounds is so uncertain that it is impossible to ascertain by reference to such description the particular parcel of land granted by the deed,” the general description will prevail. ■\nSawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. 241, is directly in point. Bigelow, J., on page 246, says, — “ By reason of some unexplained error, the metes and bounds in that part of the description which applies to the demanded premises are wholly uncertain, and it is impossible to ascertain by them the precise land granted by the deed. It is not a case, therefore, of two inconsistent descriptions, in which the general must yield to the particular, but of an uncertain and impossible description, which must be controlled by an intelligible though general description, given by a reference to the grantor’s title by partition.” See, also, Peaslee v. Glee, 19 N. H. 276; Bla v. Card, 2 N. H. 175; Bott v. Burnell, 11 Mass. 163.\nIII. Wells v. Company, 47 N. H. 235, 252, 261, 262, is an authority in our favor, that the starting-point cannot be changed from the north-west to the north-east corner. Bartlett, J., there says,— “ The starting-point for ascertaining the bounds of Sargent’s Purchase is the north-east corner of Dorcas Eastman’s Grant, and the authorities already cited are decisive that in this action at law it cannot be shown that the word ‘ north-east ’ was inserted in the deed by mistake for ‘ north-west.’ ” This ruling was approved in the same case, 48 N. H. 491, 509, 510, 539, 540.\nIV. The defendant’s contention “ that there is manifestly an erroneous description of the bound begun at in the deed ” — Stickney to Stickney — is unsound. Omitting the word “perpendicular,” which is meaningless, and the word “ south-east ” in the third course, which is manifestly an error (Thompson v. Bla, 60 N. H. 562), the whole description is apparently well enough until applied to the ground by an actual survey. Then it is seen to be an entirely different plot from the one “ where the back shop stands,” described in the next clause of the deed. The unintelligibility of the description is not manifest nor apparent upon reading the deed, and only becomes so when an attempt is made to run out the land described. By applying the familiar rule, that monuments shall control courses and distances to the third call or course, viz., “ thence westerly parallel with the first mentioned line 21 i feet to the south-east corner of said plot,” the particular description, it will be seen at a glance, conveys nothing.\nV. In the court below, the case of Thompson v. Bla, supra, was relied upon as an authority for rejecting the last clause of the description in the deed Stickney to.Stickney, viz., “meaning to convey the plot where the back shop stands, and the land between it and the first mentioned line, together with the right of way to said building.” We submit that our case is not governed by the rule there laid down. In Thompson v. Bla the error in the deed was apparent on the face of the deed. There the description was, “beginning at the north-westerly corner of the premises, thence west,” etc. Clark, J., says “ the error consists in describing the place of beginning as the north-westerly instead of the north-easterly corner of the lot. To begin at the north-westerly corner of a lot of land and run west on a line of the same lot, is an impossibility. Taking the whole description, it is manifest that the point of beginning is the north-easterly corner of the lot; and rejecting the word north-westerly, which is evidently erroneous, the remaining description is sufficiently certain.” Hence the ruling of the court below was erroneous. Coburn v. Coxeter, <51 N. H. 158.\nVI. The explanation of this unintelligible description is outside the record, and immaterial now. When an attempt to reform the deed shall be made, what the parties really intended to convey will be clearly shown.\nLadd & Fletcher, for the defendant.\nA glance at the annexed diagram of the premises is necessary to an understanding of the case. If w\"e take for a starting-point the north-east corner (B) of the plot before conveyed by J. E. Stickney to N. G. Stickney, everything is plain and intelligible. The description goes around the plot B E F C which J. E. Stickney then owned, and is exactly what was intended to be conveyed.\nIf we take for a starting-point the north-west corner (A), the description carries us, first, to G, on the north line of the plot before conveyed; then across the plot which the grantee already owned, and which was covered by his shoe shop, to (H) ; and then comes the requirement of a mathematical impossibility, namely, “thence westerly 211 feet to the south-east corner,” etc., — that is, westerly from IT to C — a manifest impossibility. The result is, that, if we take the literal language of the deed, no land is described.\nIf we should begin with the third point described in the deed, that is, the south-east corner of the plot deeded by J. E. Stickney to N. G. Stickney, and follow the lines back in the opposite direction from that in which they are put down in the deed, the clerical mistake of writing north-west for north-east becomes manifest, and the description goes upon the ground without difficulty. In whatever way the description be looked at, it is very plain that the mistake is simply a mistake in writing the deed, and such as does not leave the least doubt as to the exact land the parties intended to convey, and understood was conveyed, by the deed.\nThompson v. FUa, 60 N. II. <562, is in point, and is a more striking, although no more cogent, authority for the defendant than the great number of other cases where the same doctrine of construction is applied, for no other reason than because its facts were almost identical with those in this case.\nEXPLANATION OP DIAGRAM.\nABCD, the plot conveyed by Jacob E. Stickney to N. G. Stickney by first deed — shoe\nB E F C, the plot intended to be conveyed to 3ST. G. Stickney by second deed (first deed recited in the case).\nAG GH HD, three lines of the plot conveyed by second deed, according to the literal terms of the description; that is, commencing at the “ N. W.” corner, etc., except that the third line, HD, by the call of the deed, must terminate at the south-east comer O, instead of at the south-west corner D.\nL E F M, plot claimed by the plaintiff, as now understood.\nA I K D, portion covered by old building at time of first deed.\nA L M D, portion covered by present building.",
"id": "1307288",
"judges": "Clark, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "602",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Benton v. McIntire",
"name_abbreviation": "Benton v. McIntire",
"parties": "Benton v. McIntire.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "2044"
} |
1307222 | page content | {
"char_count": "12243",
"citations": "64 N.H. 510",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1888-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 510,
"head_matter": "Beede v. Lamprey.\nIn trover for trees carelessly but not wilfully cut by the defendant oil the plaintiff’s land, the measure of damages is the value of the trees immediately after they are severed from the realty.\nTrover, for two hundred spruce logs. The defendant was defaulted, with the right to be heard as to the assessment of damages. Facts found by the court. The parties own adjoining timber lots in Moultonborough. The defendant, while engaged in an operation on his own lot,- negligently, but without malice, cut over the line dividing the lots, and cut down, trimmed, hauled to and deposited in the lake at Melvin Village in Tuftonborough, and thence towed to his saw-mill the trees in question, which facts constitute the cause of action. The question whether the measure of damages is the value of the stumpage, or the value of the logs when cut and trimmed, or when deposited in the lake, or when delivered at the mill, was reserved.\nE. A. & C. B. Hibbard, for the plaintiff.\nJewell & Stone, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307222",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "514",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Beede v. Lamprey",
"name_abbreviation": "Beede v. Lamprey",
"parties": "Beede v. Lamprey.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "2214"
} |
4440305 | page content | {
"char_count": "4697",
"citations": "115 N.H. 370",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7082; No. 7201",
"first_page": 370,
"head_matter": "Cheshire\nNo. 7082\nJean P. Niles & a. v. Florence K. Healy & a. Same v. New Hampshire State Liquor Commission & a. Katherine T. Kane v. New Hampshire State Liquor Commission Donald P. Ayotte v. Liquor Commission of the State of New Hampshire\nRockingham\nNo. 7201\nJune 30, 1975\nStebbins & Bradley and Michael L. Stive and Blair C. Wood( Mr. Stive orally) for plaintiffs Jean P. Niles and Nathaniel W. Niles.\nHoward B. Lane for plaintiff Katherine T. Kane, filed no brief.\nShaines, Madrigan & McEachern and Sanford Roberts ( Mr. Roberts orally) for plaintiffs Donald P. Ayotte and Vickie L. Ayotte.\nDevine, Miltimet, Stahl & Branch for defendant Katherine T. Kane, filed no brief.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Charles G. Cleaveland, assistant attorney general ( Mr. Cleaveland orally), for the defendant Liquor Commission.\nSulloway, Hollis, Godfrey & Soden and John G. Ransmeier (Mr. Ransmeier orally) for Robert L. Lavoie and Norma B. Lavoie intervenor s.\nVincent J. Nardi II for intervenor Walter Collins, filed no brief.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Roger G. Burlingame, assistant attorney general, by brief for intervenor State of New Hampshire.",
"id": "4440305",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "372",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Jean P. Niles & a. v. Florence K. Healy & a.; Same v. New Hampshire State Liquor Commission & a.; Katherine T. Kane v. New Hampshire State Liquor Commission; Donald P. Ayotte v. Liquor Commission of the State of New Hampshire",
"name_abbreviation": "Niles v. Healy",
"parties": "Jean P. Niles & a. v. Florence K. Healy & a. Same v. New Hampshire State Liquor Commission & a. Katherine T. Kane v. New Hampshire State Liquor Commission Donald P. Ayotte v. Liquor Commission of the State of New Hampshire",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "777"
} |
4439461 | page content | {
"char_count": "3973",
"citations": "115 N.H. 367",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7071",
"first_page": 367,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7071\nMarie Hanson & a. v. Bernard Manning & a.\nJune 30, 1975\nMcLane, Graf, Greene £s? Brown and Arthur G. Greene ( Mr. Greene orally) for the plaintiffs.\nLeo R. Lesieur, by brief and orally, for defendant Manning.",
"id": "4439461",
"judges": "Duncan J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "369",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Marie Hanson & a. v. Bernard Manning & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Hanson v. Manning",
"parties": "Marie Hanson & a. v. Bernard Manning & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "682"
} |
4440196 | page content | {
"char_count": "10807",
"citations": "115 N.H. 520",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7095",
"first_page": 520,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7095\nState of New Hampshire v. Charles W. Dean\nSeptember 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and John L. Ahlgren, assistant attorney general (Mr. Ahlgren orally), for the State\nNew Hampshire Legal Assistance, Public Defender Service (James E. Duggan), by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4440196",
"judges": "Grimes, J., dissented in part and concurred in part; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "525",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Charles W. Dean",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Dean",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Charles W. Dean",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1782"
} |
4439662 | page content | {
"char_count": "6364",
"citations": "115 N.H. 662",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7170",
"first_page": 662,
"head_matter": "Durham District Court\nNo. 7170\nState of New Hampshire v. James L. Miller, Jr.\nNovember 28, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Gregory H. Smith, assistant attorney general (Mr. Smith orally), for the State.\nJames Koromilas, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4439662",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "665",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. James L. Miller, Jr.",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Miller",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. James L. Miller, Jr.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1078"
} |
6756280 | page content | {
"char_count": "7446",
"citations": "2 N.H. 238",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 238,
"head_matter": "GEORGE WALKER vs. JOSEPH HAM.\nAn officer is not liable to a penalty for taking fees, on account of services, for which no fees are enumerated in the fee bill. But where he takes excessive fees for such services, he is liable to refund the excess in an action for money had and received.\nA penalty is incurred only when he takes more than the prescribed amount for particular services, for which fees are given in the fee bill.\nThe sum allowed for the service of a writ is a compensation for leaving a summons, for a bare arrest, or for a seizure of property and the return of the writ; but not for any extraordinary expense in the commitment of the body, or in the removal and care of the property.\nThis was an action of debt fora penalty of $50, which, it was alleged, had been incurred by the defendant as an officer in taking too large fees for the service of a writ of attachment.\nAt the trial here in February, A. D. 1820, it appeared, that the writ was served April 27th, 1819, and that the fees charged for “ travel,” “ service,” and “bail,” were in conformity to the fee-bill; but, in the return, there was also a distinct charge of three dollars for “ extraordinary trouble,” which appeared to hare been occasioned in keepers, delay to commit, &c., and which, on a settlement of the action before its entry in court, was paid by the present plaintiff to the defendant.\nOn these facts the plaintiff consented to become non-suit, with leave to move to set it aside, and be allowed a new trial.\nJ. Woodman, counsel for the plaintiff’.\nEastman and Mason, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 N. H. Laws 123,134\n(2) 1 N. H. Laws 139,\n(3) 2 N. H. Laws 251,",
"id": "6756280",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "241",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "GEORGE WALKER vs. JOSEPH HAM",
"name_abbreviation": "Walker v. Ham",
"parties": "GEORGE WALKER vs. JOSEPH HAM.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1314"
} |
6756474 | page content | {
"char_count": "2868",
"citations": "2 N.H. 291",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 291,
"head_matter": "BENJAMIN THOMPSON vs. JAMES WILSON.\n¿I an inhabitant of this state gave a negociable note to B. an inhabitant of Massa* chusetts, who, having made his will and appointed C. his executor, died • C. having proved the will in a probate court of Massachusetts, and there taken upon himself the burthen of executing the will, by endorsement ordered the contents of the note to be paid to D. who brought an action upon the note against A, here : it was held that 0. the executor had no interest in the note and could not transfer it by endorsement, and that the endorsee could maintain no aGtion upon it\nThis was an action of assumpsit upon a note of hand made by Wilson, dated January 24, 1816, for $400, payable to Hough Clark or order on demand, and endorsed to the plaintiff by Benjamin Humphreys, the executor of the last wili of Clark, who is deceased.\nThe cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon a statement of facts as follows. Hough Clark was an inhabitant of Massachusetts, where the note was made ; and where, having made his will, and appointed Humphreys his executor, he died. Humphreys caused the will to be proved and allowed in a probate court of Massachusetts, and took upon himself the burthen of executing it. The note came into the hands of Humphreys,?l% executor, and he after-wards, by endorsement, ordered the contents of it to be paid to the plaintiff. Clark’s will has never been filed and recorded, nor has administration of his estate been granted to any person in this state. The parties agreed that if upon these facts, the court should be of opinion, that the plaintiff could maintain the action, then the defendant to be defaulted, otherwise the plaintiff to become nonsuit.\nAtherton, for the plaintiff.\nEd. Parker, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756474",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "293",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "BENJAMIN THOMPSON vs. JAMES WILSON",
"name_abbreviation": "Thompson v. Wilson",
"parties": "BENJAMIN THOMPSON vs. JAMES WILSON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "513"
} |
6756868 | page content | {
"char_count": "8538",
"citations": "2 N.H. 402",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 402,
"head_matter": "JAMES GORDON vs. JOSIAH HAYWOOD.\nA conveyance of land without consideration, is not void as to creditors, if after-wards, without notice and for a valuable consideration, the land pass into the hands of a bona Jide purchaser.\nLand may pass by force of the word “ quit\" in a deed. How far husband and wife must join in a deed to pass their respective interests in her land.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which the demandant counted upon his own seisin of a tract of land in Nottingham-West, and upon a disseisin by the tenant.\nThe cause was tried here at October term, 1820, upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence, that one Win. Smith, being seized of the demanded premises, in 1805, conveyed the same to one P,, who, at the same time, conveyed the same premises to Sally Smith, wife of the said William Smith. There was no consideration for the said conveyance to P., except the conveyance of the land to the wife. After this, on the 18th November, 1805, the said William and Sally made and delivered to one Asa Davis a deed, as follows :\n“ Know, &c. that I Sally Smith, &c. in consideration of “ $100, to me paid by Asa Davis, &c. have given, &c. to the “ said Asa Davis, his heirs and assigns, a certain tract of “ land, (describing the demanded premises.) To have and “ to hold the said granted premises, &c. to him the said Da- “ vis, his heirs and assigns, to their only proper use and “ benefit forever. And I, the said Sally Smith, do hereby “ covenant, &e. (here were inserted the usual covenants.) “ And that I, William Smith, &c. for and in consideration of “ one dollar, to me paid by Asa Davis, &c. for myself, my “ heirs, &c. quit unto him, the said Asa Davis, all my right “ and title to the above premises, against the lawful claims “ of any persons by or under me.\n“ SALLY SMITH, & seal.\n“WILLIAM SMITH,” & seal.\nIt appeared, that Davis was a bona fide purchaser of the land for an adequate consideration, and that his estate in the land had been duly conveyed to the demandant.\nOn the part of the tenant, it appeared in evidence, that previous to the year 1805, the said William Smith was in debted to the tenant, who, after the conveyances above-mentioned, having recovered judgment against the said William, Smith for his said debt, caused his execution to be extended upon the demanded premises, as the property of the said Smith.\nA verdict was taken for the demandant, subject to the opinion of the court upon the foregoing case.\nLawrence and Abbot, for the demandant.\nAtherton and French, for the tenant.\n18 John. 79, Jackson vs. Soot.",
"id": "6756868",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "405",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JAMES GORDON vs. JOSIAH HAYWOOD",
"name_abbreviation": "Gordon v. Haywood",
"parties": "JAMES GORDON vs. JOSIAH HAYWOOD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1547"
} |
6756156 | page content | {
"char_count": "1369",
"citations": "2 N.H. 215",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 215,
"head_matter": "PETER BLOOD vs. BETSEY DARRAH, Administratrix.\nIn an action of assumpsit against an executor or administrator, “ never promised within six years,” Is a good plea, if the testator or intestate at the time of his decease was liable, and the action commenced within two years from his decease, that matter should be replied to tire plea.\nThis was an action of assumpsit. The first count was upon a note dated Feb. 26, 1810, for $98, payable by the defendant’s intestate to the plaintiff on demand,with interest.\nThe second count was upon a note dated March 2, 1808, for $6, payable by the intestate to the plaintiff on demand with interest.\nTo these counts the defendant pleaded that the said causes of action did not accrue to the plaintiff at any time within six years next before the commencement of this action.\nTo which plea there was a general demurrer.\nLawrence, for the plaintiff.\nFarley, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756156",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "216",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "PETER BLOOD vs. BETSEY DARRAH, Administratrix",
"name_abbreviation": "Blood v. Darrah",
"parties": "PETER BLOOD vs. BETSEY DARRAH, Administratrix.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "242"
} |
6757255 | page content | {
"char_count": "3353",
"citations": "2 N.H. 475",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 475,
"head_matter": "ENOCH CLEMENTS vs. JOHN SWAIN, executor of JOHN SWAIN, deceased.\nIt is not a good plea in bar to an action against an executor or administrator, that the action was commenced within a year after proving the will or taking letters of administration; but such matter should be pleaded in abatement.\nIt is not a good plea in bar that the defendant is administrator, and not executor.\nIf one who is sued as executor de son tort, take administration after the commencement of the suit, he cannot plead in abatement that he is administrator and not executor.\nAssumpsit. The defendant pleaded in bar, 1st, that said John deceased died intestate, and after the commencement of this action, to wit, on the 2d of September, 1821, administration of the goods and estate of the said John, deceased, was granted to him by the judge of probate, &c.\n2d. That one year had not elapsed since the death of the said John deceased.\nTo the first plea the plaintiff replied, that before -.-the granting of administration as aforesaid, the defendant was executor of his own wrong, &c. To this replication, the defendant demurred. And to the second plea, the plaintiff demurred.\nBarker, for the plaintiff.\nJ. H. Woodman, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 N. H. Laws III.",
"id": "6757255",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "477",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ENOCH CLEMENTS vs. JOHN SWAIN, executor of JOHN SWAIN, deceased",
"name_abbreviation": "Clements v. Swain",
"parties": "ENOCH CLEMENTS vs. JOHN SWAIN, executor of JOHN SWAIN, deceased.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "594"
} |
6756884 | page content | {
"char_count": "4096",
"citations": "2 N.H. 407",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 407,
"head_matter": "HANNAH COLMAN, adm'x. vs. DAVID C. CHURCHILL, Plaintiff in review.\nWhere judgment was rendered in an action of trover in favor of the plaintiff, who died immediately after judgment, it was held that, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s death, the action was subject to a review by the defendant, who was at liberty to sue out a writ of review against the plaintiff’s administratrix within a year after the plaintiff's death.\nThis was a review, brought by Churchill, of an action of trover, commenced by William Colman, Hannah C.V intestate, in which judgment was rendered here at April term, 1820, against Churchill. The writ of review was sued out and prosecuted at October term here, 1820.\nE. Webster and Noyes, for the administratrix,\nmoved the court to quash the wrb of review ; 1st, because final judgment having Iron rendered in the life time of W. Colman, the original pkdntifT, no writ cf review against an administrator, is in such case given by statute. 2d1y, because if a writ of review lies against the administratrix at a proper time. this is brought within one year after the death of W. Colman, which appears on the face of the writ, he having in April recovered the .judgment which is attempted to be reviewed at the next October term.\n(I) 1 N. H. Laws 108.\n(2) 1 N. H. Laws 162.\n(S) 2 N. H. Laws 221.",
"id": "6756884",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "409",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "HANNAH COLMAN, adm'x. vs. DAVID C. CHURCHILL, Plaintiff in review",
"name_abbreviation": "Colman v. Churchill",
"parties": "HANNAH COLMAN, adm'x. vs. DAVID C. CHURCHILL, Plaintiff in review.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "721"
} |
6757432 | page content | {
"char_count": "15593",
"citations": "2 N.H. 532",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 532,
"head_matter": "SAMUEL RUNNELS vs. MOSES BULLEN.\nA. granted to B. by deed one half of a mill dam, with the privilege of taking the water from any part of tlie half gtanted ; it was held that the deed passed the right to the use of one half of the water only, and that case aright be ed against the grantee ior taking more tiran one half the water to tire injury oí the grantor\nCase for opening sluice ways in a certain dam in Turkey river, in Concord, and diverting the water from the plaintiff’s mills.\nThe cause was tried here at September term, 1822, upon tbe general issue, and a verdict taken for the defendant, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case :\nIn July, 1818, one Frederick Rumíela being seized of the dam, mentioned in the declaration, and of the land under and adjacent to it, and ot a clothier’s mill worked by water from the pond made by the said dam. and standing on the south side of the said Turkey river, demised to one Amos Frye “ a certain parcel of land, situate in said Concord, on “ the northerly side of Turkey river, nearly opposite to “ the clothiers works belonging to the said Runnels, being “ the place where Kendall's saw mill formerly stood, be- “ ginning at the intersection with said river of the road “ leading from said Concord to Dunbarton, thence down “ said river about four rods, thence northerly about two “ rods, thence easterly about four rods to the road aforesaid, “ and on said road about two and a half rods to the place “ of beginning, with the privilege of erecting and continu- “ ing thereon a grist mill, and any other bhilding neccs- “ sarily connected therewith ; also, the building standing “ on said river opposite to said parcel of land, now occupied “ for carding wool ; also, the privilege of taking water at “ all times from said mill pond immediately above said “ clothier’s works, and from which said works are suppli- “ ed, sufficient for carrying any carding machinery in said “ building ; and also the privilege of taking water as aforesaid ' for the purpose of carrying such grist mill as may “ be erected on said parcel of land whenever there shall be “ more than a sufficiency in said mill pond for carrying the w clothier’s works aforesaid, or whenever the water may “ be taken without injury to said works,” to hold for the term of ten years, at an annual rent of $38, the said Frederick to keep said dam in repair at his own expense.\nFrye, soon after the above mentioned lease was made, erected a grist mill upon the land leased, and continued to occupy the premises until January 19,1821, when the said Frederick conveyed to him by deed “ a certain piece of land “ situate in said Concord, on the northerly side of Turkey “ river, whereon the said Frye’s grist mill now stands, be- “ ginning at an old elm stump on the westerly side oí the “ road leading from Concord to Dunbarton, and on the “ northerly side of said river, thence northerly adjoining “ said road about two and a half rods to a stone wall, thence “ westerly the general course of said wall six and a half “ rods to a stake and stones, thence turning southerly about “ five rods into said river, thence up said river, including “ the grist mill on the premises and the northerly half of the “ mill dam, to the place of beginning, containing about “ twenty-four square rods of land and water, more or less ; “ also, the privilege of taking the water from any part of “ said northerly half of the mill dam, for the use of the said “ Frye, his heirs and assigns ; also, the privilege of clearing, “ deepening and widening the said river, not exceeding “ thirty feet through said Runnels'1 land above the aforesaid “ road.”\nOn the same 19th January, 1821, Frye conveyed the same premises to the defendant, and on 11th June, 1821, the said Frederick conveyed the land and mills on the south side of the river to the plaintiff. After this, the defendant hoisted the gates and opened the sluice ways, and kept them hoisted and opened when not necessary for turning the machinery situate on his portion of the dam, and thereby deprived the plaintiff of the water necessary for his mills.\nS, Fletcher, for the plaintiff.\nR. Bartlett, for defendant.",
"id": "6757432",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "539",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SAMUEL RUNNELS vs. MOSES BULLEN",
"name_abbreviation": "Runnels v. Bullen",
"parties": "SAMUEL RUNNELS vs. MOSES BULLEN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "2877"
} |
6755423 | page content | {
"char_count": "10174",
"citations": "2 N.H. 97",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 97,
"head_matter": "BENJAMIN FARMER vs. JOSEPH STEWART et al.\nWhere a submission is made to arbitrators by a written agreement, a surety in the agreement need not be notified of the sitting of the arbitrators.\nThe owners of land, over which a highway is contemplated, have a right to object to the acceptance of the report of a committee laying it out; and a forbearance of this right by them is a good consideration fora promise.\nThe judgment, accepting such report, is no bar to an action on a promise made a® aforesaid to pay such sum in damage as arbitrators may award over and above what was assessed in the report. Each owner may sustain a separate action for the specific sum awarded to him.\nThis was assumpsit.\nThe declaration' contained two counts, both of which were founded on a special agreement in writing.\n, They contained allegations that the agreement was executed August 29th, 1818; and (after reciting that a committee, appointed to lay out a highway in the towns of South Hampton and Newtown, had made a report, which had been returned, and was to be considered at the court of common pleas then in session ; and that the plaintiff, with others, being owners of land over which the highway was laid out, and being dissatisfied with the damages awarded them, had appeared to oppose the acceptance of the report;) the counts farther alleged, that in consideration said owners would withdraw their objections, the defendants promised- to pay them such sums as A. B. C., referees chosen for that purpose, should decide that the respective owners ought to receive in damages over and above the sums awarded in the report of the committee, and also to pay the expenses of the referees, if it was adjudged by them that the owners of the land ought to receive any thing more than what had been awarded by the committee.\nIt was then alleged! that the plaintiff and the other owners withdrew their objections, that the report of the committee was accepted, and, after due notice and hearing, that A. B. $• C. awarded to the plaintiff a certain sum above what was awarded by the committee.\nThe action was brought to recover that sum alone ; and, at the trial here, in February, 1819, on the general issue, the aforesaid allegations were all proved, except notice to the defendants of the sitting of the referees.\nIn respect to this it appeared, that Tilton, one of the defendants, being on the face of the written agreement only a surety for its performance, received no notice, of their sitting, but the others were duly notified and attended.\nA verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on the sufficiency oí the notice, and on such other points as might arise in the consideration of the above facts.\nIchabod Bartlett, counsel for the plaintiff.\nTilton ⅜- J. Smith, for the defendants.\n17 John. 58.",
"id": "6755423",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "102",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "BENJAMIN FARMER vs. JOSEPH STEWART et al.",
"name_abbreviation": "Farmer v. Stewart",
"parties": "BENJAMIN FARMER vs. JOSEPH STEWART et al.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1816"
} |
6756818 | page content | {
"char_count": "7421",
"citations": "2 N.H. 392",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 392,
"head_matter": "ROCKINGHAM,\nSEPTEMBER TERM, 1821.\nEPHRAIM FARNUM vs. THE TOWN OF CONCORD.\nOf the liability of towas for injuries resulting from defects in roads and bridges.\nTins v«xs an action of\" the case brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of a horse alleged to have been drowned in consequence of the neglect of the inhabitants of Concord to repair a highway, which they were by law bound to keep in repair- The cause was tried here at February term, 1820, upon the general issue, when a verdict was taken for the defendant, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following facts.\nThe highway in question is on the west bank of Merrimack river in the town of Concord,and is, at the place, where the accident happened, about twenty-four feet wide, and the common travelled path is in the centre of the highway. Previous to the 12th May, 1819, there had been a hole in the east side of the travelled path three or four feet deep and about a foot over, and at the same time there was on the west side of the highway nearly opposite to the hole on the east side a hollow place of considerable extent. The distance between the hole on the east and the hollow on the vTesi side of the highway was about twelve feet. On the said 12th May, 1819, the river had arisen so as to overflow the road in this place from one and a half to two feet deep, and Mr. Kent, in whose possession the horse was, coming to the place with the horse in a chaise, and observing the road overflowed and the water very turbid, so that no part of the road could be seen, procured a boy to conduct him through the water, and the hoy conducting him a little too much to the west, the horse plunged into the hollow place on that side of the road, and was drowned.\n(1) N. H. ws 389.\n(2) 4 Mass. Rep.-423.\n(3) 11 East 60-",
"id": "6756818",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "395",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "EPHRAIM FARNUM vs. THE TOWN OF CONCORD",
"name_abbreviation": "Farnum v. Town of Concord",
"parties": "EPHRAIM FARNUM vs. THE TOWN OF CONCORD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1387"
} |
6756453 | page content | {
"char_count": "2375",
"citations": "2 N.H. 287",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 287,
"head_matter": "ROGER E. PERKINS vs. JOSEPH WEBSTER.\nJt. corve ved fo B, by deed “a certain piece of land, the whole of lot No. *• exet-pr 50 acres deeded to S. P the lot to contain 200 acres by measure, be-vidi <⅝ *V 50 acres this was hsid to be mere description, and not to amount to a covenant that the lot contained 200 acres besides the 50 acres.\nThis was an action of covenant broken. The plaintiff alleged, in his declaration, that the defendant, by deed, dated March 26, 1817, conveyed to the plaintiff a tract of land in Springfield, being the whole of lot No. 20, excepting 50 aCres conveyed to S. Webster, and in and by the same dee* covenanted with the plaintiff, that the said lot should am - did contain two hundred acres by measure, besides the fifty acres conveyed to J. Webster, when, in fact, the said lot contained only 153 acres, besides the 50 acres.\nThe defendant craved oyer of the deed, and had it. In the deed, the defendant conveyed to the plaintiff “ a certain “ piece of land, the whole of lot No. 20, in the north di- “ vision of said Springfield, except 50 acres as deeded to “ S. Webster, &c., the lot to contain two hundred acres by “ measure, besides the fifty acres above mentioned.” The deed contained the usual covenants of seisin,-&c.\nThe defendant then demurred, and shewed for cause of demurrer, that the deed did not contain the covenant alleged. The plaintiff joined in demurrer.\nJ. Harris, for the plaintiff.\nR. Fletcher, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756453",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "288",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ROGER E. PERKINS vs. JOSEPH WEBSTER",
"name_abbreviation": "Perkins v. Webster",
"parties": "ROGER E. PERKINS vs. JOSEPH WEBSTER.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "425"
} |
6756314 | page content | {
"char_count": "11249",
"citations": "2 N.H. 246",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 246,
"head_matter": "SAMUEL MORRIL vs. MATTHIAS HAINES.\nA representative in the state legislature is a “ state officer.”\nIf, at a bailotting for such representative, the check, fist be not used, the person, who puts in more than one vote at one and the same bailotting, incurs no penalty.\nThis was debt icr the penalty of $30, for that the defendant, on the 9ih ot March, A. D. 1819, at Epsom, in this county, put in more than one vote at the same bailotting for a person to represent that town in the general court the then current year.\nThe defendant pleaded nil debet, and at the trial here, September term, 1819, though the plaintiff admitted that the votes were not delivered to the moderator in person, and the check list not used, yet evidence, that the defendant voted as alleged in the declaration, was permitted to go to the\nOT* ■ '\n' A verdict was found for the {'laintiff, subject to the ©pinion of the court on the admissibility of the above testimony.\nThere was, also, a motion to set aside the verdict oa account of a supposed omission by the clerk to swear one of the jurors. But the decision on the other point renders the repon, of that one unnecessary.\nLawrence and J. Smith, counsel for the plaintiff.\nStale and Mason, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756314",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "251",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SAMUEL MORRIL vs. MATTHIAS HAINES",
"name_abbreviation": "Morril v. Haines",
"parties": "SAMUEL MORRIL vs. MATTHIAS HAINES.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1953"
} |
6755791 | page content | {
"char_count": "6101",
"citations": "2 N.H. 160",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 160,
"head_matter": "DAVID SILVER vs. JAMES KENDRICK.\nCourts lean against the rejection of testimony for slight variances from the declaration.\nThough declarations fora false affirmation and declarations on express contracts must be special, they need not contain the precise words used in the affirmation or contract, unless they purport to contain them.\nA description of the legal effect of the words is sufficient; and the declaration contains the legal effect of them where the words omitted would not, under the evidence in the case, vary the construction of the affirmation, if those words were inserted.\nThis was an action on the case.\nThe declaration contained two counts. The first one alleged, that on the 1st of January, A. D. 1818, the plaintiff, by request of the defendant, purchased of him a note which was signed by C. and D., and made payable to the defendant in the sum of $75, and that the defendant then falsely affirmed, the said C. and D. were persons in good credit, when in fact they were poor and the note of no value.\nThe second count resembled the first one, except in the statement of the manner in which the price of the note was paid.\nAt the trial here in May, A. D. 1319, on the general issue, the plaintiff proved, that C. and D. were insolvent and that the note was purchased as stated in the declaration, except the false affirmation was, that “ C. and D. were in .as good credit, as Col. A. B.” who the defendant admitted, was a man of property.\nStill the defendant objected, that this evidence was inadmissible on account of its variance from the declaration, but it was suffered to go to the jury, and a verdict was there by consent taken for the plaintiff for the amount of the note subject to the future opinion of the court on the competency of the above evidence.\nHutchinsm, counsel for the plaintiff.\nBell, for the defendant.\n(1) Yelv. 19 b, note‘\n(2) 4 D. & E. 558\n(3) 8 John. 26.-14 ditto 400.-6 563.",
"id": "6755791",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "163",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "DAVID SILVER vs. JAMES KENDRICK",
"name_abbreviation": "Silver v. Kendrick",
"parties": "DAVID SILVER vs. JAMES KENDRICK.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1082"
} |
6757492 | page content | {
"char_count": "2782",
"citations": "2 N.H. 554",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 554,
"head_matter": "GEORGE PHELPS vs. JONATHAN SINCLAIR.\nAn agent is a competent witness for his principal, although his testimony may tend to discharge himself.\nWhere goods are delivered by Jl to B to sell, and B delivers them to a third per» son to sell, such third person has so lien upon the goods for his charges in relation to the goods.\nTrover for eight saddles. The cause was tried here at November term, 1822, upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence, that the saddles were the property of the plaintiff, and that in November, 1817, he delivered them to one Joel Jones, of Middleton, in Connecticut, to sell and account with the plaintiff for the proceeds; that in the same November, Jones delivered the saddles to Thomas Hall, jun. of Bath, in this county, and took a receipt, as follows : “Mid• “ dleton, Nov. 10, 1817. Received of George Phelps, of He- “ bron, by the hands of Joel Jones, eight new man saddles, “ which I promise to account for to said Jones when sold, in “ such property as I may receive for the saddles, he, the said “ Jones, paying reasonable charges.\n“THOMAS HALL, Jr.”\nThese facts were proved by the testimony of Jones. It also appeared in evidence that the defendant, being a deputy sheriff, and having an execution against Hall, took the saddles as HalPs property and sold them. It also appeared, that at the time the saddles were taken by the defendant, there was due to Hall $5 for transporting the saddles from Middleton to Bath, which he had charged to Jones.\nThe defendant objected to the competency of Jones as a witness, on the ground of interest; and he also contended, that Hall had a lien upon the saddles for what was due to him, and a right of possession ; so that the plaintiff could not maintain this action. The court overruled these objections, and a verdict having been returned for the plaintiff, the defendant moved for a new trial.",
"id": "6757492",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "555",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "GEORGE PHELPS vs. JONATHAN SINCLAIR",
"name_abbreviation": "Phelps v. Sinclair",
"parties": "GEORGE PHELPS vs. JONATHAN SINCLAIR.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "499"
} |
6757237 | page content | {
"char_count": "1636",
"citations": "2 N.H. 473",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 473,
"head_matter": "STRAFFORD,\nSEPTEMBER TERM, 1822.\nPARKER PLUMER vs. AMOS A. BREWSTER.\nA deputy sheriff; who has arrested a person upon mesne process, may, ⅛ this state» become the bail of such person.\nThis was an action upon the case for an escape, against the defendant, sheriff of the county of Grafton, and was submitted to the decision of the court, upon a case stated in substance as follows :■\nThe plaintiff having sued out a writ against one B. Hail, delivered the same to J. Sinclair, a deputy of the defendant ; and Sinclair, having arrested Hoi!, became his bail, and suffered him to go at large.\nEmerson, for the plaintiff.\n%uncy and L. B. Walker, for ihc defendant.",
"id": "6757237",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "474",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "PARKER PLUMER vs. AMOS A. BREWSTER",
"name_abbreviation": "Plumer v. Brewster",
"parties": "PARKER PLUMER vs. AMOS A. BREWSTER.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "292"
} |
6755063 | page content | {
"char_count": "10765",
"citations": "2 N.H. 31",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 31,
"head_matter": "CHARLES H. ATHERTON versus STEPHEN JOHNSON.\nWhere a town owns a lot of land, and, by vote, .assents to a proposed exchange of it, tiie title to the land does not thereby pass, nor is the town afterwards estopped to claim the title.\nPossession of land, by consent of the true owner, is not adverse possession ; bat whether the possession was taken and retained by such consent, or under any other circumstances, indicating a possession notadverse, is a question of fact If a widow and her minor children retain possession of land, which was occupied by their father, it is presumed to be in their behalf; but this presumption may be rebutted by other facts.\nThe confiscation acts, passed by the legislature durisg our revolution, are binding.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which the demandant counted on his own seisin of lot No. 9, in the 3d range of lots in Dunbarton.\nThe tenant entered a disclaimer as to part of the premises, and pleaded the general issue as to the residue.\nAt the trial here, April term, 1818, it appeared in evidence, that the premises were originally granted by the Masonian proprietors to Starkstown, now Dunbarton, for a school lot; that in A. D. 1761, William Stark proposed to exchange lot No. 12, in the same town, for these premises; and thereupon, that the proprietors of the town voted “ to “ exchange the said lot No. 9 in the 3d range for lot No. - 12 in the 4th range with Wm. Stark, provided he would “ purchase the said lot No. 12 for the proprietors, to lay for “ a school lot forever.”\nAbout this time Wm. Stark entered into possession of lor No. 9, cleared a portion of it, erected a log house, and resided there till, in A. D. 1776, he fled to the British troops, then waging war with the United States.\nWm. Stark did not purchase lot No. 12 till Aug. 26, 1765, when it ivas conveyed to him and his heirs by John Stark. In December of the same year, the Masonian proprietors voted to confirm the proposed exchange. But no other evidence whatever was offered of any conveyance of lot No. 9, by the proprietors of the town to Wm. Stark, or of lot No. 12. by Wm. Stark, to the town.\nIt further appeared, that when Wm. Stark fled to the enemy he left upon the premises his wife and five minor children, viz. Man/, James, Stephen, Thomas, and William; that in A. D. 1778, the legislature of New-Hampshire con fiscated all the estate of Stark, on account of his being a refugee, and prohibited bis return ; that they inventoried and took possession of his estate, including therein lot No. 12, but not No. 9 ; that Stark died in A. D. 1779 ; that his widow and children, before mentioned, continued to reside on lot No. 9, till about A. D. 1 780, when Mary married and removed ; that Thomas and Stephen left it about A. D. 1786, and the younger children at a period still later ; that the widow, though rc-marrying, did not remove from the premises till A, D. 1812; that in A. D. 1795, the legislature passed an act to vest in Thomas, William, Mary, and Stephen all their father’s estate, on condition they gave good security to pay his just debts ; that Stephen took out letters of administration, and gave such security ; and that he inventoried this lot No. 9, and in A. D. 1797, as well as in A. D. 1800, he and some of the other children, together with the mother, conveyed a part of this lot as if jointly interested in fee, though from other evidence it seemed she had often claimed a separate and sole interest in fee in the whole lot.\nIn 1797, the town of Dunbarton brought a writ of entry against her alone for the whole lot, and judgment was eventually rendered in her favor. In A. D. 1809, also, she was disturbed in her possession by Thomas, and having commenced a writ of entry against him, recovered judgment, Oct. term, 1810. But early as 1802, Stephen conveyed an undivided fifth of lot No. 9 ; and in 1808, Thomas conveyed another fifth, and the demandant claimed under those conveyances.\nThe tenant claimed under the town of Dunbarton, which, in April, A. D. 1812, having procured a guardian to be appointed over the widow as a spendthrift, obtained license and sold this lot as her property.\nOn these facts, a verdict for two-fifths of the premises in issue was by consent taken for the demandant, subject to further advisement. The cause having been continued nisi, judgment was rendered at Grafton, May Term, 1819.\nAtherton, for himself.\nJ. Smith, for the tenant.",
"id": "6755063",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "36",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "CHARLES H. ATHERTON versus STEPHEN JOHNSON",
"name_abbreviation": "Atherton v. Johnson",
"parties": "CHARLES H. ATHERTON versus STEPHEN JOHNSON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1950"
} |
6755910 | page content | {
"char_count": "9109",
"citations": "2 N.H. 175",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 175,
"head_matter": "NATHANIEL W. ELA vs. THOMAS CARD et al.\nThe execution of a deed by femes covert, unless they are joined in it by their hus* bands, also, is not binding, except the deed be a release of dower.\nThe declaration on a deed of covenant, thus executed by some of the covenantors, is good, though it omit to count against those femes covert as defendants.\nÁ clear general description of the premises in a deed, is not controlled by any subsequent expression of doubtful import in respect to any particular.\nIf a covenant of seisin be broken as to part of the land conveyed, the amount recovered for the breach will be such a proportion of the whole consideration and interest, as the value of that part bears to the value of the whole.\nThis was an action of covenant.\nThe declaration alleged, that the defendants, on the 25th of October, A. D. 1808, and also P. K. and E. F. then femes covert, executed to the plaintiff a deed of lot No. 14, in Ossi-pee, and among other things covenanted, that they were seized in fee of said lot, when in fact they were not.\nAn issue having been joined on a plea of general performance, it was tried here February term, A. D. 1819 ; when the deed mentioned in the declaration was duly proved, and appeared not to have been executed by the husbands of P. K. and E. F.\nThe description of the land conveyed, was “ the whole “ lot No. 14, containing 500 acres by lot or grant, be “ the same more or less; which lot was the original right of “ Thomas Wallingford, Esq.”\nIt further appeared, that a series of deeds from Walling-ford to the defendants existed, containing a similar description of the premises; that W. was one of the sixteen Maso* nian proprietors ; that Ossipee, being within their grant, and on the 3d of March, A. D. 1775, being divided among them, lot No. 14 was drawn to his right or share; but that, on the same occasion, a vote passed, declaring, that “ each “ proprietor, to whose right or share any of the said 500 acre “ lots shall be drawn, shall hold in severalty only 400 acres “ thereof, and that the remaining 100 acres belonging to each “of said lots, shall continue in common and undivided, to 44 be disposed of for the encouragement of settlers, or any 44 other purpose the proprietors may think proper.”\nA committee of four persons was then apppointed to put settlers on the 100 acre lots undivided, in such manner as might be deémed best, and were also empowered to execute deeds of the same to the settlers.\nThe undivided 100 acres in lot No. 14, was sot occupied till the year A.D. 1800, and no deed of it was ever executed, except a deed by two of the committee in 1799.\nUnder that deed, it was now claimed adversely to the plaintiffs, and was worth about $225.\nUpon these facts a verdict was taken for the plaintiff for $22 12, subject to be amended or set aside according to the future opinion of the court.\nEastman, counsel for the plaintiff.\nCrosby, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 Ma,i Rep (1) X Chitt. PI. 479. — 15 John. 483.—",
"id": "6755910",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "179",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NATHANIEL W. ELA vs. THOMAS CARD et al.",
"name_abbreviation": "Ela v. Card",
"parties": "NATHANIEL W. ELA vs. THOMAS CARD et al.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1652"
} |
6755708 | page content | {
"char_count": "12306",
"citations": "2 N.H. 142",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 142,
"head_matter": "ISAAC BISSELL, jr. vs. ZIBA HUNTINGTON.\nAfter an attachment of property, if the sheriff deliver it to a third person onhis receipt to account for the same, and the engagement is not fulfilled, the sheriff ought, in an action upon the receipt, to take judgment for the full value of the property.\nIf the property has not been returned to the debtor, and the sheriff takes judgment for less than its value, he is liable to the debtor in a special action on the case for the deficiency.\nBut he is not liable to him in an action of trover, if the debtor assented to the receipt of the property, and no tortious act has been committed upon it. Such assent justifies the sheriff in a delay to account for the property, till judgment is recovered against the veceipter ; and if then he still delays to endorse it upon the creditor’s execution, a remedy exists for the debtor, but it is not trover.\nThe acts of a sheriff, when performed in good faith, are to reeeive the most favourable construction.\nThis was trover for two horses.\nThe action was commenced August 15th, 1817, and at the trial here November term, A. D, 1818, it appeared in evidence, that the defendant was a deputy sheriff, and in February 1816, by a writ of attachment against the present plaintiff, in favor of one Davenport, seized and moved the horses in controversy. On the same day of the attachment, the horses were at BisselPs request delivered to James Poole, and his receipt taken for the safe custody and re-deli very of them to the present defendant on demand.\nThe writ of attachment against Bissell was prosecuted to judgment, and at the November term of this court in A. D. 1816, the sum of $130 recovered.\nThe property, which had been attached, was then duly demanded of Poole ; but, not being delivered, a suit was instituted against him in February 1817, upon the receipt and judgment recovered at the May term of the same year.\nAs one of the horses, however, had before judgment, been returned by Poole to Bissell; and as the whole amount of the claim on which they were attached, had them become only |134 22, the present defendant took judgment against Pooh only to that amount, though it was now admitted, that the horse, which remained in Poole’s custody, was actually worth over $150.\nIt also appeared, that the defendant neglected to discharge the execution against Bissell, till January A. D. 1818 ; but it had always been in his custody and no attempt made to collect it of Bissell.\nWhether the money had actually been paid by Poole to the present defendant till that time, or whether the creditor had previously been settled with by Pooh or by the deputy sheriff, did not appear.\nOn these facts a verdict was taken by consent for the defendant, subject to future consideration.\nW. Smith & J. Smith, for the plaintiff.\nJ. Bell, for the defendant.\n(1) J N. H. Rep. 292.",
"id": "6755708",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "147",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ISAAC BISSELL, jr. vs. ZIBA HUNTINGTON",
"name_abbreviation": "Bissell v. Huntington",
"parties": "ISAAC BISSELL, jr. vs. ZIBA HUNTINGTON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "2187"
} |
6756190 | page content | {
"char_count": "12443",
"citations": "2 N.H. 218",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 218,
"head_matter": "MARY LOVELL vs. WILLIAM BRIGGS and another.\nIf an Administrator or guardian sell* under license, an estate, which belongs to their intestate or ward, and became the purchasers themselves, the sale is not fox 'that cause void.\nBut, if the sale was unfaithful, or the price inadequate, they may be made to answer for the true fame of the estate, when they render an account in the probate office, or by an action upon their bonds.\nIf they purchase such estate of an heir or ward, after the heir or ward become adult, and are otherwise competent to sell, the administrator or guarnían are not liable, either ia their accounts or upon their bonds, to answer for any inadequacy of price ; but, in such case, circumstances more slight will warrant a jury ia the presumption, that there was actual fraud m the purchase.\nThe subsequent conduct of the administrator ia respect to this and other estate of the intestate is competent evidence to show his intent in such a purchase.\nThis was an action of debt. The declaration contained three counts on three separate decrees of the court of probate in this county, against the defendant, Briggs, as administrator on the estate of Timothy Lovell. Lewis R. Morris was also named as a co-defendant and joint administrator; but residing ia the state of Vermont, no service of the writ had been made upon him.\nThe defendant, Briggs, pleaded nil debet, on which issue was joined, and a trial had here, May term, A. D. 1819.\nThe decrees, when offered in evidence, appeared to have been made against Briggs alone: for which cause he contended, that Morris ought not to have been joined as a co-defendant, and, therefore, moved that the plaintiff be non-suited. This was refused.\nThe three decrees amounted to something more than $20,000 ; and as the plaintiff was admitted to be the widow of said Timothy Lovell, who died intestate and without issue, she rested her case here as being entitled, under our statute of distribution, to one half the amount of the decrees.\nThe defendant then proved, that on the 31st of March, Á. D. 1814, prior to these decrees, the plaintiff executed to him a deed of bargain and sale, and also a deed of release of all her interest of every description in the estate of her deceased husband.\nTo the admission of these deeds the plaintiff objected on two grounds. Firs', that every purchase of intestate property by the administrator of it, is, in law, void ; and secondly, that the deeds were in fact obtained by misrepresentation and fraud.\nThe first objection was overruled. J\n⅜ Under the second objection, much testimony was offered concerning the inadequacy of the consideration paid by the defendant to the plaintiff; concerning the truth of his representations, and, also, concerning his conduct in the course of the purchase.\nThe plaintiff offered to show, likewise, the conduct of Briggs, after the purchase, in relation to her interest and the interest of the other heirs in the intestate estate, as evidence of fraud : but the testimony, being deemed irrelevant, was rejected.\nThe jury found a verdict for the defendant; and it was received, subject to future consideration upon the questions raised in the progress of the cause.\nJ. H. Hubbard and J. C. Chamberlain, counsel for the plaintiff.\nBriggs, per se, and J. Smith.",
"id": "6756190",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "223",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "MARY LOVELL vs. WILLIAM BRIGGS and another",
"name_abbreviation": "Lovell v. Briggs",
"parties": "MARY LOVELL vs. WILLIAM BRIGGS and another.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "2148"
} |
6755117 | page content | {
"char_count": "5949",
"citations": "2 N.H. 39",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 39,
"head_matter": "JOHN H. SUMNER vs. SAMUEL STEWARD.\nA replevin hond is valid, though made payable to the sheriff, his representatives and assigns. Such bond may have but one “ surety,” and not purport to secure 4‘ charges,” if it secure the 4‘ cost and damage.”\nAn obligation to an officer and his “ successor” does not, without a statute, enable the successor to sue in his own name. s\nThe sheriff, in the execution of civil process, is, to many purppses, agent for both parties ; and a replevin bond, taken in his name, hut duly prosecuted by some other party in interest, cannot be released by the sheriff.\nThis was an action of replevin, to which the defendant pleaded in abatement, that the writ was served without taking a bond pursuant to the statute.\nThe plaintiff, in his replication, took issue on that fact.\nUpon inspection the return was found to state nothing ⅛ relation to the bond ; but the parties agreed, that the officer might amend it so as to make the whole bond a portion of his return ; and this being done, the sufficiency of the bond, was questioned for the following reasons\ni. It was not made payable to the defendant in the writ, nor to the sheriff and his successors, but to the sheriff, his representatives and assigns.\n2. It was signed by only one surety; and,\n3. It purported to secure payment of 44 cost and damage,” without any mention of “ charges.”\nJ. H. Hubbard <¾- Jarvis, counsel for the plaintiff.\nG, B. Upborn, counsel for the defendant.\n(1) 1 N. H. Laws 413.\n(2) 1 N. H. Laws 98 .\nis John. 439, Gibbs v. Buel.",
"id": "6755117",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "42",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOHN H. SUMNER vs. SAMUEL STEWARD",
"name_abbreviation": "Sumner v. Steward",
"parties": "JOHN H. SUMNER vs. SAMUEL STEWARD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1053"
} |
6757004 | page content | {
"char_count": "3989",
"citations": "2 N.H. 427",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 427,
"head_matter": "JONATHAN LEIGHTON vs. WILLIAM PERKINS.\nWhere A. conveys land to B. with a covenant of warranty, and B. conveys the sanie.land to C. with a covenant of warranty,a release by C. o£A,'s covenant, i« hi law a release of B.'s covenant, and such release makes A, a competent, witness for V, in a writ of entry, brought by the latter to recover the land.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which the demandant counted upon his own seisin of one acre of land in Dover, in this county, and upon a disseisin by the tenant.\nThe cause was tried here at February term, 1821, upon the general issue. It was admitted that one Tobias Tuttle, being seized of the demanded premises, on the 23d day of January, 1816, made and executed a deed in common form, to convey the same premises to one Thomas Tuttle, in fee, with warranty,and that Thomas Tuttle,on the 19th April,1816, by deed duly executed, conveyed the demanded premises, to the demandant, with warranty. It was also admitted that the tenant, having sued out a writ against Tobias Tuttle, caused the demanded premises to be attached, by virtue of the same writ, on the 6th April, 1816, and having after-wards obtained a judgment against Tobias Tuttle, caused his execution to be extended upon the demanded premises.\nThe demandant called Tobias Tuttle as a witness to prove the consideration of the said conveyance, from Tobias to Thomas Tuttle. The tenant’s counsel objected that Tobias was interested in the event of the suit, becahse in ease the tenant prevailed, he would be liable to the demandant, on bis covenant of warranty, whereupon the demandant made and executed a release of the covenant of warranty, in the deed made by Tobias to Thomas Tuttle. The tenant’s counsel still objected that a- release of the covenant by the de-mandant, did not make Tobias a competent witness ; but he was admitted by the court, and the jury having returned a verdict in favor of the demandant, the tenant moved the court to grant a new trial, on the ground that Tobias Tuttle was an incompetent witness.\nCrosby and Masm, for the demandant.\nHodgdon, C. Woodman and I. Bartlett, for the tenant.",
"id": "6757004",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "428",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JONATHAN LEIGHTON vs. WILLIAM PERKINS",
"name_abbreviation": "Leighton v. Perkins",
"parties": "JONATHAN LEIGHTON vs. WILLIAM PERKINS.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "721"
} |
6756922 | page content | {
"char_count": "3339",
"citations": "2 N.H. 416",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 416,
"head_matter": "SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL vs. THOMAS HALL.\nIn a writ of entry, when the tenant pleads the general issue, as to an undivided part of the demanded premises, and as to the residue undivided disclaims, and the demandant replies to the disclaimer, that the tenant entered into the part disclaimed, &c., upon which issue is joined; if the jury find the issue upon the plea of disclaimer, in favor of the demandant, he will be entitled to costs.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which the demandants counted upon their seisin of lot No. 4, in the eighth range of lots in Concord, in this county.\nThe tenant pleaded as to sixty-nine undivided parts of the said lot, into seventy parts divided, that he «never disseized ; andas to one-seventieth part, he disclaimed.\nThe demandants joined the general issue, and as to the part disclaimed they replied, that at the time of the commencement of the action, the tenant held, and since hath held the same part of the demanded premises in manner and form as by their said writ is supposed, and this they prayed might be inquired of by the country, and the tenant did the like.\nThe cause was tried here at November term, 1819, when the jury found by their verdict, “ that the said Thomas, at the time of the commencement of this suit, did hold, and since hath held, the said seventieth part of said demanded premises in manner and form as the demandants in their replication have alleged, and as to the residue that the said Thomas did not disseize in manner and form,” &c.; and the question was, whether the demandants were entitled to costs.\nP. R. Freeman, for the demandants.\n,/. Smith, for the tenant.",
"id": "6756922",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "417",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL vs. THOMAS HALL",
"name_abbreviation": "Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Hall",
"parties": "SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL vs. THOMAS HALL.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "605"
} |
6755451 | page content | {
"char_count": "6681",
"citations": "2 N.H. 102",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 102,
"head_matter": "THE TOWN OF EXETER vs. THE TOWN OF STRATHAM.\nThe return of a warrant constitutes a part of the warning out of a pauper.\nWhere a law was repealed before the warrant was returned, or the year’s residence completed, which was necessary to gain a settlement, the warning out was held to be valid, if conformable to the aew laws though it was defective under the old law.\nA general law, whose operations may change the existing settlements of paupers* is not unconstitutional.\nThis was assumpsit for relief furnished to Clarissa Hall.\nIt was admitted, that on the 8th of June, A. D. 1792, the father of the pauper had his settlement in Exeter. At that time, he and his family removed to Stratham, from which town, on the 2d of July, A. D. 1792, they were warned to depart, by a warrant, dated June 2d, 1792, and returned in ’March, A. D. 1793, but in which was no mention of the time they had resided in Stratham.\nThey returned to Exeter in September, 1794; but acquired no new settlement after their return.\nUpon these facts, the parties agreed, that a verdict for a stipulated sum should be entered for the plaintiffs, or a gen eral verdict for the defendants, as tie court on consideration might think proper.\nJ. Smith, counsel for the plaintiffs.\nMason, for the defendants.\n(i)is.H. Rep‘13\n(2) i N. h.\n(3) i N. H. (⅜) i n. h. Laws s@‘\n(4) i ?? H. ReP- 263’Bow VS. ftottmg-ham\n(5) i n. h, Rep' u",
"id": "6755451",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "105",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THE TOWN OF EXETER vs. THE TOWN OF STRATHAM",
"name_abbreviation": "Town of Exeter v. Town of Stratham",
"parties": "THE TOWN OF EXETER vs. THE TOWN OF STRATHAM.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1181"
} |
6755164 | page content | {
"char_count": "5744",
"citations": "2 N.H. 48",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 48,
"head_matter": "GRAFTON,\nMAY TERM, 1819.\nELIZABETH JOHNSON vs. WILLIAM MORSE.\nA parol assignment of dower was valid at common law, even without livery of seisin. But such an assignment must be accepted by the widow, or it does not bind her.\nOur statute on the assignment of dower, introduces no new form of assignment. Whether a new one is made necessary by the statute of frauds ? qu.\nThis was a writ of dower, to which the tenant pleaded, that within thirty days after demanded, he had assigned to the widow her dower in the premises to her satisfaction.\nAn issue was taken on the fact of the assignment; and at the trial here, November term, 1818, it appeared in evidence, that the tenant and her agent seasonably agreed upon the particular portion of the premises, which should constitute the assignment, and erected boundaries or monuments; but no conveyance was executed. The agent testified, that he did not intend to accept the assignment without a conveyance, though other witnesses swore, that nothing was at that time mentioned in respect to one.\nThe agent afterwards called on the tenant for a conveyance, and was told, that none would be executed, as the tenant had concluded, on advice of counsel, to waive all which had been done, and to refuse to the demandant her dower.\nThe tenant took the crops the ensuing season, and after a new demand, the present suit was instituted.\nA verdict was taken by consent for the demandant, subject to further consideration on the above testimony.\nJ. Smith ⅜- fV. Smith, counsel for the demandant.\nR. Fletcher, for the tenant.\n(l)liiH. Laws 187.\n(2) 14 Mass. Rep. \"m*3'",
"id": "6755164",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "50",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ELIZABETH JOHNSON vs. WILLIAM MORSE",
"name_abbreviation": "Johnson v. Morse",
"parties": "ELIZABETH JOHNSON vs. WILLIAM MORSE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1018"
} |
6756857 | page content | {
"char_count": "2029",
"citations": "2 N.H. 401",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 401,
"head_matter": "NEW-LONDON vs. SUTTON.\nA person, who has only a ri\"ht m equity to re'íí^tn land in the town where he. dutdK cannot g,ain a set) kan cm in the town by paying o'1 t'oo taxes assessed, upon his poll and estate lor the term oi four years, unless his right in equity to redeem be o* the value ot $150.\nAssumpsit for the su] port of a pauper, alleged to have a settlement in Sutton.\nThe cause was tried here at April term, 1821, upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence, that the pauper removed to Sutton in the year 1810 ; that he resided there until the year 1816, paying all taxes assessed upon his poll and estate ; that at the time of his removal to Sutton, he was seized of an undivided moiety of a tract of land in Sutton, the value of the whole of which tract was ff 50 ; and that on the 30th September, 1813, the pauper and Ms co-tenant conveyed the land in fee and in mortgage to secure the payment of $700, no part of which has ever been paid.\nA v erdict was taken for the defendants, subject to the opinion of the court upon the foregoing case.\nJ. Smith and H. B. Chase, for the plaintiffs.\nNoyes, for the defendants.\n(1)1 N. H Laws 362.",
"id": "6756857",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "401",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NEW-LONDON vs. SUTTON",
"name_abbreviation": "New-London v. Sutton",
"parties": "NEW-LONDON vs. SUTTON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "384"
} |
6757118 | page content | {
"char_count": "5636",
"citations": "2 N.H. 443",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 443,
"head_matter": "JACOB THRASHER vs. DAVID HAINES, jun.\nA. and B. haying a controversy respecting certain accounts between them, agreed to refer the same to arbitrators; C. appeared before the arbitrators at the hearing as B.’s agent, and assisted in managing the case. The arbitrators made a report in favor of A., who procured a judgment upon the same report, sued out an execution, and caused the execution to be extended upon land which B. had conveyed to C, and then brought a writ of entry against C. to recover the land : it was held, that C. was not estopped by the judgment to shew that there was nothing due from B. to A.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which Thrasher demanded a farm in Deerfield, in this county, and counted upon his own seisin within twenty years, and upon a disseisin by the tenant.\nThe cause was tried here at February term, 1820, upon the general issue.\nIt was admitted, that one Jonathan Eastman was once seized of the demanded premises. The demandant shewed the record of a judgment in his favor against the said East- than, rendered bj this court at December term, 1813, in the county of Cheshire, upon a report of referees lor ¿1478 83 debt, and $125 18 costs, and the copy of an execution, issued upon said judgment, and duly extended upon the demanded premises in February, 1814. •\nThe tenant’s title was a deed from Eastman to him, dated July 23, 1811 ; and he proved, that the consideration of the conveyance was a bond given by Haims to Eastman, with condition, that Haims should naainiáin Emtman and his wife during their natural lives.\nThe demandant introduced evidence to shew, that the conveyancé from Eastman to Haines was fraudulent and void as respected creditors ; and Haims offered to prove, that, at the lime of the recovery by the demandant against Eastman, Thrasher had not in fact any subsisting debt against Eastman. But the demandant proving that Haines was present, and acting as the agent of Eastman before the referees, 'the Court rejected the evidence offered by Haines to impeach the judgment, and the jury returned a verdict for the demandant.\nHaines' counsel moved the court to grant a new trial, on the ground, that the evidence rejected ought to have been admitted.\nCults, Smith and Mason, for the tenant.\nSullivan and Bartkii, for the demándánt.",
"id": "6757118",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "446",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JACOB THRASHER vs. DAVID HAINES, jun",
"name_abbreviation": "Thrasher v. Haines",
"parties": "JACOB THRASHER vs. DAVID HAINES, jun.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "999"
} |
6757295 | page content | {
"char_count": "5576",
"citations": "2 N.H. 488",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 488,
"head_matter": "THEODORE MOSES vs. MARY RANLET, adm'x. of HENRY A. RANLET.\nWhen a claim against an insolvent estate is secured by a mortgage of land, the commissioners should allow the whole claim, and not deduct first the value of the land, and allow only the residue of the claim.\nThis was an appeal from the report of the commissioners, on the estate of Henry A. Runlet, deceased and insolvent.\nThe claim of the plaintiff was founded on a note from said Henry to Teresa Orne, for $3184 78, secured by a mortgage of real estate. The note and mortgage had both been duly assigned to the plaintiff, and the land described in the mortgage was not equal in value to the amount of the note. When the plaintiff exhibited his claim to the commissioners, the ad- rainistratrix contended, that the value of the land should first be deducted from the whole amount of the note, and only the balance allowed in their report. On the contrary, the plaintiff contended for an allowance of the whole note in their report, and his right after receiving a dividend on the whole, to hold the mortgage as security for what should then remain unpaid. The commissioners adopted the latter course, whereupon the defendant filed her objections, and the plaintiff was compelled under the statute, to prosecute his claim here by way of appeal,\nJ. Smith, for the plaintiff.\nSullivan, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 N. H. Laws 213.",
"id": "6757295",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "491",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THEODORE MOSES vs. MARY RANLET, adm'x. of HENRY A. RANLET",
"name_abbreviation": "Moses v. Ranlet",
"parties": "THEODORE MOSES vs. MARY RANLET, adm'x. of HENRY A. RANLET.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "983"
} |
6756362 | page content | {
"char_count": "17559",
"citations": "2 N.H. 255",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 255,
"head_matter": "MOSES BULLEN vs. FREDERICK RUNNELS.\nA deefl, which describes the premises as “ a certain part of a stream of water,” and mentions the two termini of the rt part,” was held to pass a right to use the whole water which flows between those termini.\nWhether all the interest in the soil beneath the water passes for every purpose, or only so far as is necessary for a due enjoyment of the water, yet the interest is of such a character, that it cannot be conveyed witiiout a deed duly executed , and recorded.\nA bond between the original parties to the deed first mentioned, which bond was not recorded, nor known to a subsequent grantee of the premises, fe inadmissible evidence to vary the construction of the deed, or to abridge the rights acquired under it.\n•Occupation of water within certain boundaries for twenty years, is presumptive evidence of an original grant of a right thus to use the water.\nWhere a right exjsta to use a certain quantity of water, a change in the mode and objects of the use, without increasing the quantity, is no violation of the right.\nThis was an action on the case for obstructing and diverting water from the mills of the plaintiff.\nAt the trial here, on the general issue, in September, A.D» 1819, it appeared in evidence, that the proprietors of Pena-cook, now Concord, in A.D. 1732, made a conveyance “of <4 the whole stream of Turkey river.” All this stream, from its source to its junction with the Merrimack, was within their boundaries.\nt/ndcr that grant mills were soon erected upon the margin, of the stream, at a place where the plaintiff'now owns mills and land, derived by conveyances from the original grantee of the whole stream of Turkey river,”\nIt further appeared, that th.e defendant ow*ed land and mills, situated nearer the source of said river ; and, to turn his machinery, claimed a right to use all the water, which-, •'here flowed in said river.\nIn May, A. D. 1780, one Flanders, (under whom the plain till holds, by a subsequent conveyance, executed a deed) to one Dimand, oí t4 a certain part of a stream cut Turkey li fiver, so called: viz, beginning at the mouth of Great Tur- :: key pond, and so extending to the head of the lesser pond that within those terra ini Dimond soon erected mills, where the defendant’s are now situated ; and that for about forty years past Dimond and his grantees, including the defendant, have both claimed and used the water in said stream to turn their machinery.\nThe plaintiff objected, that by the deed t® Dimond nothing passed ; or if any thing passed, it was only a fractional portion of the water between the termini mentioned ; and in aid of this construction, he offered in evidence a bond of the same date from Dimond and Flanders.\nBut the court, under an impression that something passed by the deed, and that the nature and extent of the interest ■which passed, could not be limited or varied in respect to the defendant by a writing, set acknowledged or recorded as a conveyance, nor its existence known to him, admitted the deed to go to the jury, and rejected the bond.\nThe plaintiff then offered evidence, that during the last twenty years he and his grantors had claimed and exercised the right to limit those, who owned the defendant’s mills, in the use of the water, whenever it was wanted for the mills of the plaintiff; and on this point in the case was allowed, but declined, to read the bond before mentioned.\nHe also offered evidence, that till A. D. 1814, only a fulling and a saw mill were erected at the upper mill .site, and that the defendant then built a grist, mill, and raised his dam, and thus threw the water over a surface so much greater, that an unusual portion of it was evaporated, and altogether diverted from the lower mills. But. concerning the increased height of the dam, and the use @f more water than usual by the defendant, the evidence was contradictory ; and the whole case was submitted to the jury, with directions, that the deed to Dimond passed a right to use all the water in Turkey river, within the termini named j that this right, however, might be restricted by a settled usage for twenty years; that if such an usage existed, and the defendant had recently brokers its bounds, he was liable . but that the erection of new mills, or an alteration of the old ones, without raising his dam, was not an injury for which the plaintiff could recover. :\nThe jury returned a verdict for the defendant, subject to future advisement on the various questions arising ⅛ the case.\nJ, Smith and M. Kent, counsel for the plaintiff.\nS. Fletcher, for the defendant.\n(1) 2 Bl. Com. 402.",
"id": "6756362",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "263",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "MOSES BULLEN vs. FREDERICK RUNNELS",
"name_abbreviation": "Bullen v. Runnels",
"parties": "MOSES BULLEN vs. FREDERICK RUNNELS.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "3176"
} |
6757504 | page content | {
"char_count": "4453",
"citations": "2 N.H. 555",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 555,
"head_matter": "THE TOWN OF BATH vs. THE TOWN OF HAVERHILL.\nif a town appoint a person to the office of hogreeve, who is a minor, the town cannot afterwards object to his competency.\nQuaere, whether a minor is competent to fill any elective office in this state.\nThis was an action of assumpsit for relief furnished to John Hacket and family, who were alleged to be paupers.\nAt the trial here, in May A. D. 1 822, the parties agreed, that said John was the illegitimate son of one Esther Simpson, and was born in Haverhill, on the 10th of April. A. D. 1790.\nWhen about eight months old, he was taken to Bath, and continued in the family of one John Charles an adopted child till A. 1). 1810. No indenture or written agreement existed in respect to the pauper; and on the 21st of September, A. D. 1809, he was legally married, and, though a minor, was in March, A. D. 1810, elected by the town of Bath to the office of hogreeve, was duly sworn to perform the duties of it, and continued there during the year.\nThe parties further agreed, that a default or nonsuit should be entered, according to the opinion of the court as to the settlement of John Hacket.\nGoodall, counsellor the plaintiffs.\nBell, for tbe defendants.\n(1) 1 N. H. Rep. 261,\n(2) 1 N. H, Laws 362.\n(3) 1 N. H. Laws 240.\n(4) 1 N. H. Laws362,363.\n(S) i n. H. Laws4°7.\n(6) l N. H. Laws 254.",
"id": "6757504",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "558",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THE TOWN OF BATH vs. THE TOWN OF HAVERHILL",
"name_abbreviation": "Town of Bath v. Town of Haverhill",
"parties": "THE TOWN OF BATH vs. THE TOWN OF HAVERHILL.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "811"
} |
6757349 | page content | {
"char_count": "2336",
"citations": "2 N.H. 506",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 506,
"head_matter": "JAMES WALLACE vs. BENJAMIN ROGERS.\nWhere A. sold to B. several bags of hops, and gave a bill of parcels, stating th# number of bags, the weight, price, &c.> with these words, tl the hops are war- “ ranted to be first qualityin an action by B. against A. for a false warranty of the hops ; it was held, that A, was not precluded by the bill of parcels frora-shewing, that the hops were warranted, only in case they were carried by B. to a particular place.\nCase for a false warranty of certain hops sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, December 15, 1818.\nThe cause was tried here at October term, 1821rupon the general issue. The plaintiff gave in evidence to the jury a bill of parcels, signed by the defendant, specifying the number of bags, the weight, and the price, with these words, “ the hops are warranted to be first quality and then introduced evidence to shew, that part of the hops were refuse, and the rest second quality.\nThe defendant then introduced testimony to prove, that at the time the contract was made and the hops sold, it was agreed, that if the plaintiff should send the hops to Charles-town, in Massachusetts, to be inspected, the defendant should warrant them to be of the first quality ; but if sent to Canada or to New-York, then they were not to be considered as warranted. To the admission of this testimony,, the plaintiff objected, but it was admitted by the court, and the jury having returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff moved the court to grant a new trial.\nWallace, for the plaintiff.\nB. M, Farley, for the defendant.",
"id": "6757349",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "507",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JAMES WALLACE vs. BENJAMIN ROGERS",
"name_abbreviation": "Wallace v. Rogers",
"parties": "JAMES WALLACE vs. BENJAMIN ROGERS.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "424"
} |
6756264 | page content | {
"char_count": "4712",
"citations": "2 N.H. 236",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 236,
"head_matter": "THE STATE vs. BENJAMIN THOMPSON.\nA petition was presented to the court of common pleas, founded upon the statute of February 8, 1791, sec. 5, praying an abatement'of taxes, upon which petition the court ordered an abatement to be made ; it was held, that the order must be presumed to have been founded upon the facts stated in the petition, and that a want of jurisdiction in the court to abate upon the facts stated, was a good ground for granting a certiorari.\nA rule was obtained at September term, in this county, 1819, calling on Thompson to shew cause why a certiorari should not issue to the common pleas in this county, commanding them to certify the proceedings upon a petition of Thompson, praying an abatement in the taxes assessed upon him in 1817, in the town of Durham.\n(1) 1 N. H. Laws 259-\nIt appeared, that his petition was founded on the 5th section of the act of February 8, 1791,(1) which authorizes the selectmen to abate any taxes of any person applying for the same, provided sufficient reason for such abatement be shewn; and if the selectmen refuse to make such abatement, the person conceiving himself aggrieved by any tax, may apply, by way of petition, to the court, &c. who are empowered to make such order on the premises as justice may require. Provided the court shall not have power to abate any taxes, excepting as to such articles and matters as the selectmen having the power of valuing, shall, in the judgment of the court, have overvalued. And Thompson alleged in his petition, that on or about the third day of April, 1817, he exhibited to the selectmen of Durham a true and perfect inventory of all his personal estate, liable by law to taxation in Durham that year, and was ready to make oath to the truth of the inventory thus exhibited. Yet the selectmen doomed him in the sum of $14,118 of money at interest, and bank stock more than was exhibited in the inventory, and more than he possessed ; by means whereof he was taxed that year $300 more than he ought to have been taxed. The order of the court of common pleas was, “ that the sum of “ ‡50 in the assessment of the said Benjamin Thompson's “ taxes, in his said petition mentioned, be and hereby is “ abated.”\nIch. Bartlett, for the state.\nMason, for Thompson.\n(1) 2 Burrows \\ win. Bl.\n(2) 5 mass. Rep 420.",
"id": "6756264",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "238",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THE STATE vs. BENJAMIN THOMPSON",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Thompson",
"parties": "THE STATE vs. BENJAMIN THOMPSON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "840"
} |
6756679 | page content | {
"char_count": "4071",
"citations": "2 N.H. 347",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 347,
"head_matter": "DANIEL EMERSON vs. NUTTER BROWN.\nA scire facias against bail, which contains no allegation that nótica was giren t» the bail, as required by the statute of 1818, cap. 35, is bad on demurrer.\nThis was a scire facias, in which Emerson alleged that by the consideration of the justices of the court of common picas, holden at Portsmouth, in this county, on the third Tuesday of January, 1819, he recovered judgment against Isaac Brovin for $13 78 debt, and $12 85 costs of suit, as by the record appears; that execution issued on said judgment, and was delivered to J.B. V., a deputy sheriff, to be levied in due form, who made his return non esf inventus there- “ upon, and returned the same into the said court of common “ pleas, holden at Exeter, on the third Tuesday of August, “ 1819, when and where the same was returnable. And the 11 said Daniel averred, that tbe said Isaac did, during the 4 time said writ of execution was in force, avoid, &c., so 4 that he could not be arrested. And whereas Nuli.tr Brown, 4 &c. became bail not only for the appearance of the said “ Isaac, but for his satisfying the judgment, &o. ; the sheriff u was commanded to make known to said Nailer that he 4 appear, &c. and shew cause why the plaintiff should not 4 have execution against him for his said debt and costs,” &c.\nTo this scire facias, Broim demurred, and the plaintiff' joined in demurrer.\nTenney, for the plaintiff.\nClaggeit, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 N. H. Laws 116.",
"id": "6756679",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "349",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "DANIEL EMERSON vs. NUTTER BROWN",
"name_abbreviation": "Emerson v. Brown",
"parties": "DANIEL EMERSON vs. NUTTER BROWN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "738"
} |
6757168 | page content | {
"char_count": "4600",
"citations": "2 N.H. 456",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 456,
"head_matter": "DOROTHY WENDELL vs. DARIUS BLANCHARD et a.\nPossession of land is evidence of title to be left to a jury.\nA disseisin, which disables the disseisee to maintain trespass for acts done upon the land afterthe disseisin until he re-enters, must be an actual dispossession and holding out of the disseisee.\nTrespass quart clausum fregit. The declaration alleged, that the defendants on the first day of November, 1819, and on divers other days between that day and the first day of June, 1820, broke and entered the plaintiff’s close in Springfield, in this county, and cut trees, &c.\nThe cause was tried here at October term, 1821, upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence, that John Wendell, from whom the plaintiff derived her title in 1802, caused the lot, in which the trespass was alleged to be done, to be surveyed ; and the plaintiff in 1816, by a memorandum in writing, leased a part of the same lot. It also appeared, that the said John Wendell was the lawful owner of several proprietors’ shares in said town of Springfield.\nOn the part of the defendants, it was proved, that in 1815 one Powars entered into the said lot, and made maple sugar upon it in the winters of 1816, 1817, 1818 and 1819 ; and that the defendants entered under Powars and cut the trees. It also appeared, that the lot was wild and uncultivated.\nThe court instructed the jury, that the entry and survey of the lot in 1802 by John Wendell, were evidence of title sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain the action, unless rebutted by better evidence of title on the part of the defend ants. That as the defendants had offered no evidence of a title except the entry of Powars in 1815 ; and as that was after the entry by John Wendell, it could not be deemed better evidence of title than that offered by the plaintiff; that the plaintiff having proved a prior possession, must be considered as having made out a title to the land against these defendants.\nThe court also instructed the jury, that as the lot was wild and uncultivated, and as Powars entered only to make sugar, he could not be considered as having a possession that would preclude the plaintiff from maintaining this action.\nThe jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants moved the court to grant a new trial, on the ground that the jury had been misdirected by the court.\nDpham, for the plaintiff.\nJ. H. Hubbard, for the defendants.\n(1) 12 Joh», 183.",
"id": "6757168",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "458",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "DOROTHY WENDELL vs. DARIUS BLANCHARD et a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Wendell v. Blanchard",
"parties": "DOROTHY WENDELL vs. DARIUS BLANCHARD et a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "821"
} |
6756797 | page content | {
"char_count": "6777",
"citations": "2 N.H. 387",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 387,
"head_matter": "NATHANIEL ADAMS vs. THOMAS FRENCH.\nAn action of covenant for rent does not lie against one in possession of land without some privity of contract. But the evidence to charge one as assignee in such action may be presumptive and consist of acts and admissions without any express indenture. An estate for years may be set off by appraisers upon an execution. The occupant of land is bound by the admissions of the person, under whom he entered, made before his entry.\nThis was an action ©f covenant, for that on the 28th day of May, A. D. 1802, the plaintiffs and others, since deceased, being grantees in trust to the society for propagating the gospel in foreign parts, of certain land ⅛ Orford belonging to said society, demised the same to W. & W. for ninety-nine years, at $15 per year for the first twenty years, and for the residue of the term at $20 a year; that the said lessees entered, and, June 5th, 1812, assigned what remained of the term to the defendant; and that thereupon the defendant entered and has occupied the premises, but not paid the plaintiff any rent accruing therefrom since his entry.\nThe defendant pleaded in bar, that the premises were not assigned to him by the original lessees.\nIssue was joined on this plea, and at the trial here, Nov. A. D. 1820, it was admitted, that the original lessees in A. D. 1812 had ceased to occupy the premises and that the defendant had entered and since leased them to third persons as his property, which third persons had remained on them under him.\nThe plaintiff offered to prove, also, that in Á.D. 1810,a judgment was recovered by him against one Jonathan French, as assignee of the term for rent thereon ; and that in A. D. 1812. the defendants extended an execution in his behalf against said Jonathan on said premises as the property of said Jonathan, and that in said extent be acknowledged a delivery to himself of seisin and possession. But this evidence was rejected as incompetent to prove the issue; and a verdict was taken for the defendant by consent, subject to be set aside, and a verdict entered for the plaintiff for the amount of the rent, if the evidence and admissions aforesaid were found on advisement to be sufficient to warrant it.\nP. R. Freeman, for the plaintiff.\nJ. Smith and Britton, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756797",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "389",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NATHANIEL ADAMS vs. THOMAS FRENCH",
"name_abbreviation": "Adams v. French",
"parties": "NATHANIEL ADAMS vs. THOMAS FRENCH.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1211"
} |
6757413 | page content | {
"char_count": "10698",
"citations": "2 N.H. 525",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 525,
"head_matter": "JACOB ELLIOT vs. JOHN SLEEPER.\nWhere a mortgage was given to secure the payment of a note of hand, and after-wards the note win taken up and a new note given in lieu of it ; it was held that the mortgage was not tlieseby discharged.\nWhere in a deed of conveyance, one, who signs, seals, and delivers the deed, is not named as a grantor, he is still bound as a grantor by the above acts.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which the demandant counted upon his own seisin of a tract of land in Chester, in this county, and upon a disseisin by the tenant.\nThe cause was tried here, at September term, 1820, upon the general issue, and a verdict taken for the tenantf subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case.\nOn the 16th December, 1813, the demandant, being seized of the demanded premises, in consideration of $4000, conveyed the same premises and another tract of land in Chester, to Mary Brown, wife of Nathaniel Brown, in fee. On the same day, a deed of mortgage was executed by the said Mary and Nathaniel Brown, in the following words :\n“ Know all men by these presents, that I, Mary Brown, of “ New bury port, in the county of Essex, and commonwealth “ of Massachusetts, wife of Nathaniel Brown, of said town, “ county and state, tallow-chandler, for and in consideration “ of the sum of two thousand dollars, to me in hand before “delivery hereof well and truly paid, by Jacob Elliot, of “ Chester, in the county of Rockingham, and state of New- “ Hampshire, gentleman, the receipt whereof I do hereby “ acknowledge, have given, granted, bargained, sold, and by “ these presents do give, grant, bargain, sell, alien, enfeoff, “ convey and confirm unto the said Jacob Elliot, a certain “ parcel of land,” (describing the demanded premises, one of the tracts conveyed as above, by said Elliot to said Mary,) “ to have and to hold said granted premises, with all the pri- “ vileges and appurtenances, to him the said Jacob Elliot, “ his heirs and assigns, to his only proper use and benefit for- ‘‘ ever. And I the said Mary Brown, my heirs, executors “ and administrators, do hereby covenant., grant, and agree “to and with the said Jacob Elliot, his heirs and assigns, that “ until the delivery hereof, I am the lawful owner of said “ premises, and am seized and possessed thereof in my own “ right in fee simple, and have full power and lawful authority to grant and convey the same in manner aforesaid; “ that the said premises are free and clear of all and every “ incumbrance whatsoever. And that 1 and my heirs, exec- “ utors and administrators, shall and will warrant the same “ to the said Jacob Elliot, his heirs and assigns, against the “lawful claims and demands of any person or persons “ whomsoever. The condition of the above obligation is “ such, that if the said Mary Brown pay or cause to be paid “ to the said Jacob Elliot, a note of hand, bearing date with “ this obligation, for the above mentioned sum of two thou- “ sand dollars, within ten years, then this obligation to be “ void, otherwise to remain in full force.\n“ Chester, December 16, 1813.\n“ MARY BROWN and seal.\n“ NATHANIEL BROWN and seal.\n“ Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of us,\n“ Benjamin Evans,\n“ Henry Sweetser.\n“ Rockingham, ss. Chester, Dec. 16, 1813. Then per- “ sonally appeared Mary Broten and Nathaniel Brown, and “ acknowledged the within instrument by them subscribed, “to be their free act and deed.\n“ Before HENRY SWEETSER, J. P.”\n■At the time of making the deed above mentioned, a note for $2000 was given to Elliot. This note was afterwards taken up, and a new note given for the same sum and the interest up to the date of the last mentioned note.\nThe tenant was in possession under a deed from Nathaniel Brown and wife, of a subsequent date.\nFrench, for the demandant.\nMason and Kent, for the tenant.",
"id": "6757413",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "530",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JACOB ELLIOT vs. JOHN SLEEPER",
"name_abbreviation": "Elliot v. Sleeper",
"parties": "JACOB ELLIOT vs. JOHN SLEEPER.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1936"
} |
6757458 | page content | {
"char_count": "2982",
"citations": "2 N.H. 546",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 546,
"head_matter": "CHESHIRE,\nMAY TERM, 1823.\nDAVID WHITE vs. JAMES L. DEMARY et al.\nTwo cannot fee made jointly liable for a tort, unless they did the injury jointly. Where property is bailed to two, a demand on one alone will not subject the other to an action sounding ex delictu.\nA-demand at the house of one is insufficient, unless under such circumstances as t® raise a presumption of actual notice to him before the commencement of the action.\nThis was trover for certain articles of personal property, which had been seized by the plaintiff, as a deputy sheriff, and delivered to the defendants, on their giving a receipt engaging to return them on demand. One of the defendants was defaulted, there having been a personal demand on him and a neglect to restore the property. The other defendant pleaded the general issue, and at the trial herein October, A. D. 1 822, it did not appear in evidence that any demand had been made on him or any attempt: to make one except going to his house once in his absence for the purpose of demanding the property. As the plaintiff did not choose to take judgment against the person defaulted, the court ordered a nonsuit, with leave to move to set it aside.\nL. Chamberlain, counsel for the plaintiff.\nWalker, for the defendants.",
"id": "6757458",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "547",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "DAVID WHITE vs. JAMES L. DEMARY et al.",
"name_abbreviation": "White v. Demary",
"parties": "DAVID WHITE vs. JAMES L. DEMARY et al.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "542"
} |
6756890 | page content | {
"char_count": "2518",
"citations": "2 N.H. 409",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 409,
"head_matter": "CHESHIRE,\nOCTOBER TERM, 1821.\nSAMPSON DRURY vs. JOSHUA LELAND.\nWhere an estate has been represented insolvent, and the administrator appeals from a decision of the commissioners allowing the claim of a creditor, if a less sum is allowed the creditor in this court than was allowed by the commissioners, the administrator is entitled to costs.\nIn this case, the commissioners appointed by the judge of probate to examine the claims against the estate of E. . Sherman, deceased, which had been represented insolvent by Leland, the administrator, allowed Drury, on bis claims against the estate, $291 28. Leland signified to Drury Ills objections to the sum allowed, and Drury filed his declaration upon his demands in this court, in pursuance of the statute of February 11, 1791.\nThe cause was tried here at May term, 1821, when the jury returned a verdict in favor of Drury, and assessed his damages at $255 69. Each party moved the court for costs, and the question was whether either, and if either, which was entitled to costs?",
"id": "6756890",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "410",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SAMPSON DRURY vs. JOSHUA LELAND",
"name_abbreviation": "Drury v. Leland",
"parties": "SAMPSON DRURY vs. JOSHUA LELAND.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "425"
} |
6755292 | page content | {
"char_count": "9919",
"citations": "2 N.H. 71",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 71,
"head_matter": "MARY BICKFORD, administratrix of JOHN BICKFORD, vs. JOSEPH DANIELS.\nAn administratrix may sustain a writ of entry to foreclose a mortgage to her intes*\n‘W hen writings are offered as evidence of a mortgage, the question whether they amount to a mortgage or an absolute conveyance, must be settled on common law principles,\nA wmitig of defeazance, never delivered to the grantor in a deed, but deposited with a third person tobe delivered on a condition, which the grantor never performed, does not. render the deed a mortgage.\nspecial non est factum is an unnecessary pleaand when the demandant does not count on a mortgage, the question, whether his title is or is not by a mortgage, can always be raised by a plea or suggestion, alleging that his title is only by mortgage, and to this the demandant will demur or join issue.\nThis was a writ of entry.\nThe demandant counted on the seisin of her intestate as in fee and in mortgage, by means of a deed from the tenant, bearing date June 1st, 1804, and a defeazance from the intestate of the same date, with a condition, that the deed should be void on payment of $1083, in three years.\nThe tenant pleaded the general issue, and, also, specially, that the defeazance was never executed by the intestate.\nAt the trial here, Feburary term, A. D. 1819, the deed and the signature of the defeazance were duly proved — but the subscribing witness to the defeazance farther testified, that the defeazance had never been in possession of the tenant, and, by express agreement of the parties, never was to be delivered to the tenant, unless he performed its condition.\nBoth parties wished that if the money was not paid at the time stipulated, the deed should not become a mortgage ; and hence the intestate deposited the defeazance with the witness till the expiration of three years ; when, the money not having been paid, the defeazance was returned to the intestate’s representative.\nOn this evidence a verdict was taken for the tenant, subject to further advisement.\nW. K. Atkinson. E. Smith, <&■ Sullivan, counsel for the de-mandant.\nMason ⅜- J. Smith, for the tenant.\n19 John. Rep. 300»",
"id": "6755292",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "78",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "MARY BICKFORD, administratrix of JOHN BICKFORD, vs. JOSEPH DANIELS",
"name_abbreviation": "Bickford v. Daniels",
"parties": "MARY BICKFORD, administratrix of JOHN BICKFORD, vs. JOSEPH DANIELS.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1762"
} |
6756587 | page content | {
"char_count": "9763",
"citations": "2 N.H. 310",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 310,
"head_matter": "SOCIETY FOR PROPAGATING THE GOSPEL vs. JEHU YOUNG.\nWhere plaintiffs sue as a corporation, and the general Issue is pleaded, they may still be required to prove their incorporation.\nA power of attorney, unless to convey real estate, need not be acknowledged or recorded.\nA jury may from slight circumstances presume, that a proprietary meeting was duly convened, when the intervening lapse of time has been twenty years.\nIn a partition among proprietors of land, though one of them be misnamed, yet if, from all the proceedings, he can be identified, he is entitled to recover the share, which seems to have been intended for him.\nAn individual or corporation, beside their true names, may have, and take by, a name of reputation.\nA jury must decide, whether the description of a party in a partition, when not repugnant, was intended for the demandant.\nThis was a writ of entry for lot No. 6, in the 11th range, in Concord, in this county. The action was commenced December 29th, 1809, and the demandants counted on their own seisin within thirty years. The tenant pleaded a disclaimer as to one-seventieth undivided and never disseized as to the residue.\nAt the trial here, November term, J819, the demandants were required to prove their incorporation ; and as evidence of it they offered a writing, which purported to be an official copy oi their charter, and it was sworn to be a true copy by a Mr. Hall, who had compared it with the original. The objections to the necessity for this testimony on the one hand, and to its sufficiency on the other hand, were both overruled.\nThe demandants next proved, that, in August, A. D. 1763, the town of Concord was duly granted by the governor and council for the province of New-Hampshire in seventy shares or rights ; one which was designated as a “ glebe for the -! church of England, as by law established and another “ for the society for propagating the gospel in foreign parts.”\nIt appeared, also, that in July, A. D. 1799, a meeting of the proprietors was warned and holden with the view of making partition of the land among them. The evidence to show the legality of this meeting was admitted, subject to two exceptions. 1st. Edward Little, who petitioned for it in behalf of one-fourteenth of the proprietors, derived his authority under a power of attorney, neither acknowledged nor recorded. 2d. The advertisements, to notify the meeting, though duly published in the New-Hampshire Gazette, were not directly proved to have been posted up in Concord, except by the affidavit of a man now dead, and which affidavit was not certified in legal form. But at the same time it appeared, that a partition was made at that meeting, and that most of the town had been since settled and occupied in conformity to it.\nThis partition purported to be among all of the proprietors, and extended to the greater part of the town. The whole number of seventy rights was written down in a perpendicular line from No. 1 to No. 70 ; then the name of a distinct proprietor purported to be written against each number; and then against each proprietor the lots designated for his share. Against one of these seventy numbers was written “ Glebe “ lots”; and three lots of land, which was the usual quantity to a right, .were described opposite. Against another number was written “ Church of England lots,” and opposite to it were also described three lots of land, one of which constitutes the premises now demanded. Against none of the numbers was written either “ glebe for the church of Eng- « lancf as by law established,” or “ the society for propaga t- “ ing the gospel in foreign parts.”\nThe demandants proved, that when their charter was granted in the 13th Wm. 111., many of its members were the highest dignitaries in the church of England ; and they offered to show by reputation, that all its , members since had belonged to that church; that the tenets of that church were propagated by the society, and that hence it was sometimes called “ the church of England society.” They contended, therefore, that “ the church of England lots” in the partition were intended for them.\nThe reputation above mentioned, not being denied by the tenant, a verdict was by consent taken for the demandants, subject to future advisement upon the different questions presented in the case.\nP. R. Freeman, counsel for the demandants.\nSwan, for the tenant.\n(1)1 Phil.Ev. Ca. 263.Ea’",
"id": "6756587",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "314",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SOCIETY FOR PROPAGATING THE GOSPEL vs. JEHU YOUNG",
"name_abbreviation": "Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Young",
"parties": "SOCIETY FOR PROPAGATING THE GOSPEL vs. JEHU YOUNG.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1689"
} |
6756443 | page content | {
"char_count": "7507",
"citations": "2 N.H. 284",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 284,
"head_matter": "HILLSBOROUGH,\nOCTOBER TERM, 1820.\nSAMUEL GREELY vs. DAVID STEELE.\nWhet© there existed in a town only one right of land belonging to a person hy the name of Ray ; and that right was sold for taxes under the description of both the Christian and the Christopher Ray right, but wax described in the eosYer-anee as the right which had been owned hy Christopher Ray, when in fact the former owner was Christian Ray, the title was still held to pass.\nThis was an action of covenant, founded on a deed from the defendant to the plaintiff, made January lUh, 1804; and which deed contained the usual covenants, and purported to convey the right of land originally belonging to Christopher Ray, in the town of Harwich, in the state of Vermont. The breaches assigned were of the covenants of seisin, and of lawful right to convey.\nThe defendant pleaded, that he teas seized, &c.: on which, issue being joined, he produced, at the trial here, October term, 1819, the following evidence. First, a copy of the charter of Harwich, dated August 28th, A. D. 1761, in which there was only one grantee of the name of Ray, and he was described by the name of Christian Ray.\nIt further appeared, that no person of the name of Ray bad ever been known to claim this right, nor was it understood who the grantee was. or where he lived.\nOn the 10th of November, 1797, the legislature of Vermont passed an act, “ assessing a tax of one cent on each acre of land in the state, for the support of government,” &c. At that time, the Ray right, with many others in Har-wick, was undrawn and unlocated. The constables in the several towns were empowered to collect the tax ; and one Pekg, being then in that office in Harwich, duly notified, and on the 20th of June, 1798, sold for $3 18, a right under the description of the Christopher Ray right. It was purchased by Gideon Taber, and at an adjournment of the sale on the 7th July, 1798, a right was again sold, for the same sum, to the said Tabor, but was described as the Christian Ray right. Only one sum of |3, 18 was paid by Tabor, and only one deed executed by the collector of the Ray right, and in that it was described as the right, of which Christopher Ray was original proprietor. Tabor, and his intermediate grantees down to the defendant, all, save one, who described it as the Christian Ray right, conveyed it under the same terms as the defendant used in his deed to the plaintiff.\nIn October, A. D. 1807, the proprietors of Harwich duly made partition, and in their proceedings, called this the right of Christian Ray. Neither the plaintiff, nor his grantees have ever been disturbed in the enjoyment of this right, by any person claiming under Christian or Christopher Ray.\nBut it did appear on the part of the plaintiff, that in A. D. 1790, a deed by some collector had been made of Christian Ray’s right for payment of the taxes, and in A.D. 1809, that another deed of it had been executed by some one, who was not shown to have either title or possession of the land.\nOn these facts it was agreed, that judgment should be entered according to the opinion of the court.\nFrench and Atherton, counsel for the plaintiff.\nSmith, for the defendant.\n18 John. 79, 81, Jackson vs. Loomis.",
"id": "6756443",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "287",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SAMUEL GREELY vs. DAVID STEELE",
"name_abbreviation": "Greely v. Steele",
"parties": "SAMUEL GREELY vs. DAVID STEELE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1369"
} |
6757272 | page content | {
"char_count": "3316",
"citations": "2 N.H. 479",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 479,
"head_matter": "JEREMIAH H. WOODMAN, Adm’r. vs. DAVID BARKER.\nWhere A. gaye a note payable to JB. aad C., and B. haying died, C. received the contr-nts of the note, in an action by B.'s administrator against C. to recover one hrdf Use money; it was held, that C. could not set off claims which he had Rgfñrst- £hV escale.\nWhen (wo in the cciirss aí business receive a note payable to them, jointly, and one dies, the odiev shail roc have ihc whole by survivorship.\nAssumpsit for money had and received by the defendant to the use of the piafrffíf, administrator of the goods and estate of J. P, H. deceased.\nThe cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts.\nPrevious to the decease of the plaintiff’s intestate, one D. Foss had given a note for $114, payable to the said J, P. H. and the defendant, in which note the said J. P, H. and the defendant had each an equal interest; the amount of which note the defendant has since the decease of the said J. P. H. received of the said Foss. The estate of the said J. P. H. is insolvent and is indebted to the defendant in the sum of $500.\nD. Barker, jr, for defendant.\nWoodman, for himself.",
"id": "6757272",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "480",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JEREMIAH H. WOODMAN, Adm'r. vs. DAVID BARKER",
"name_abbreviation": "Woodman v. Barker",
"parties": "JEREMIAH H. WOODMAN, Adm’r. vs. DAVID BARKER.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "616"
} |
6756131 | page content | {
"char_count": "5706",
"citations": "2 N.H. 212",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 212,
"head_matter": "MATTHEW BRYANT vs. CHRISTOPHER RITTERBUSH AND WIFE.\nThe endorser of a note of hand is a competent witness to prove the note paid before he endorsed it.\nWhen a note has once been paid, it ceases to be negotiable.\nThis was an action of assumpsit upon a note of hand made by the now wife of Ritterbush, when sole, and by one Samuel Roby, dated February 22, 1812, for $100, payable in three years, with interest annually, to Ezra Baldwin, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff.\nThe cause was tried here at October terna, 1819, upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence, that the note was given for money advanced by Baldwin to the makers, on a contract by which the makers agreed to deliver to Baldwin a certain quantity of hops annually for five years ; and the $100 was to go to the payment of the hops, to be delivered the third year. Ritterbusfds wife was the mother of Samuel Roby, and both lived upon the same farm. And when the third year arrived, they delivered to Baldwin hops sufficient to fulfil the contract, and pay the note. The farm, on which the hops grew, belonged to the mother, but Samuel, the son, transacted the business for himself and his mother ; and when he and Baldwin settled at the end of the third year, Samuel being embarrassed in his circumstances, and Bryant, the present plaintiff, being interested wifh Baldwin in the hop contract, and holding another note against Samuel alone for $50, that note was, with SamuePs assent, can-celled, and this note delivered to Bryant, in order that he might have the mother as surety for his debt. The note was endorsed by Baldwin in such a manner as not to make him liable asan endorser, and he was admitted as a witness for the defendant, to testify as to some of the facts upon which the defence rested. The note was not endorsed at the time the plaintiff received it, but was subsequently endorsed by Baldwin.\nA verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiff', subject to the opinion of the court upon the case above stated.\nE. Parker, for the plaintiff.\nAtherton, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756131",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "215",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "MATTHEW BRYANT vs. CHRISTOPHER RITTERBUSH AND WIFE",
"name_abbreviation": "Bryant v. Ritterbush",
"parties": "MATTHEW BRYANT vs. CHRISTOPHER RITTERBUSH AND WIFE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1039"
} |
6756904 | page content | {
"char_count": "2409",
"citations": "2 N.H. 412",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 412,
"head_matter": "JABEZ KELLOGG vs. DAVID C. CHURCHILL.\nRepelvin cannot be maintained against a sheriff for property by him taken on execution from the possession of the judgment debtor.\nThis was replevin for a mare, waggon and harness.\nThe cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts.\nThe defendant, being a deputy of the sheriff of this county, and having in his hands an execution in favor of one Bellows against Isaac Morey, took the articles mentioned in the plaintiff’s writ from the possession of Morey, by virtue of the said execution; and it was agreed, that if the court should be of opinion that the action, could not under these circumstances be maintained, the plaintiff should become nonsuit.\nPhelps, counsel for the plaintiff.\nBell, for the defendant.\n(1) 15 John,. Rep. 403.\n(2) 14 John oS.\n(3) 15 John. 401.",
"id": "6756904",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "413",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JABEZ KELLOGG vs. DAVID C. CHURCHILL",
"name_abbreviation": "Kellogg v. Churchill",
"parties": "JABEZ KELLOGG vs. DAVID C. CHURCHILL.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "424"
} |
6756547 | page content | {
"char_count": "3427",
"citations": "2 N.H. 303",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 303,
"head_matter": "STEPHEN SMITH vs. THOMAS DODGE\nIn a conveyance of land, when the deed refers to monuments actually erected by the parties as the boundaries thereof, the land will pass according to the monuments, however the distance between, them may be mistaken in the deed.\nThis was an actiou_of covenant broken. The plaintiff alleged in his declaration, that the defendant by deed, dated November 1, 1817, conveyed to him a tract of land in Concord, in this county, bounded as follows — “ Beginning at a “ dry white pine tree, the northwest corner of the lot, thence “ south 26 degrees west 133 rods to a stake and stones, “ thence south 64 degrees east 179 rods to a small birch tree w spotted, thence north 26 degrees east 133 rods to a stake “ and stones, thence north 64 degrees west 179 rods to the “ bounds first mentionedand in and by said deed covenanted with the plaintiff that he was seized of the said tract in his own right in fee simple ; when in fact, as the plaintiff alleged, he was not so seized. The defendant pleaded that he was seized, upon which issue was joined.\nThe cause was tried here at May term, 1820, when it appeared in evidence, that previous to the making of the deed mentioned in the declaration, the defendant had conveyed to one B. Bailey a part of the original lot, lying on the south side, and to one W. Dodge another tract, part of the same lot, and adjoining the part conveyed to Bailey. These tracts conveyed to W. Dodge and Bailey contained 100 acres. Before the said deed was made the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to purchase the residue of the original lot, and directed a surveyor to measure off the 100 acres conveyed as aforesaid to W. Dodge and Bailey, and then measure the residue of the lot, and make out a draft of a deed of it. The surveyor accordingly measured off the 100 acres, and then measured the residue, and found it amounted to ninety-six acres.\nThe following plan is a representation of the several parcels of the original lot. The parties, before the deed was made, erected and agreed upon monuments at C and D; but when the surveyor drew the deed, he, by mistake, took the distances between A and E, and B and F, instead of the distances between A and C, and B and D, and the distances thus taken by the surveyor were inserted in the said deed, so that if the length of chain between the monuments is to prevail, the deed includes the tract sold to W. Dodge,\nThe court directed the jury, that if they believed that the parties erected monuments at the corners of the 96 acres, as the boundaries of the lot to be conveyed, those monuments must prevail, and be considered as the boundaries of the land conveyed ; and as it was not disputed that the defendant was seized of the 96 acres, they must, if they believed the monuments to have been so erected, return a verdict for the defendant.\nThe jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff moved the court to grant a new trial, on the ground that the jury had been misdirected.\nJ. C. Chamberlain, for the plaintiff.",
"id": "6756547",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "304",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "STEPHEN SMITH vs. THOMAS DODGE",
"name_abbreviation": "Smith v. Dodge",
"parties": "STEPHEN SMITH vs. THOMAS DODGE",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "620"
} |
6757405 | page content | {
"char_count": "5260",
"citations": "2 N.H. 522",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 522,
"head_matter": "JEREMIAH BAILEY vs. JOHN MARCH.\nA tenant in a real action may, to disprove the demandant’s seisin, shew a title in a iiiird person.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which demandant counted upon his own seisin of, ⅜ tract of land in Eaton, and upon a disseisin by the tenant. Teste of the writ, July 26, 1821.\nThe cause was tried here, upon the general issue, at September term, 1822, and a verdict taken for the tenant, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case :\nIt was admitted by the parties, that one Joseph Ham being seized on the 6th July, 1796, conveyed the demanded premises to one Giles Richards, by deed. The demandant then produced the deed of Giles Richards, dated January 4, 1803, conveying the same premises to Samuel Morey ; deed of Morey to John Clark, dated June, 1809 ; a deed of John Clark to Charles Clark, dated June, 1819; anda deed of Charles Clark to the demandant, dated January 7, 1818.\nThe tenant then produced the deed of Giles Richards, dated March 2, 1797, conveying the premises to Samvel So- % and David Stearns; a deed from Samuel Soky to Josiah Batchelder, dated June 6, 1821; a deed of Jason Sherman, administrator of J. Batchelder, under a license from the judge of probate, to Colman Colby, dated August 28, 1822, and a deed from Colby to the tenant, dated August 28, 1822. The demandant objected to the admission of these deeds in evidence, on the ground that it was incompetent for the tenant to shew in this action a title acquired since the commencement of the suit; but the court admitted the deeds as competent evidence to disprove the demandant’s seisin.\nI. Bartlett, for demandant.\nMason, for the tenant.\n(1) 13 Mass. Rep. 472.",
"id": "6757405",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "524",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JEREMIAH BAILEY vs. JOHN MARCH",
"name_abbreviation": "Bailey v. March",
"parties": "JEREMIAH BAILEY vs. JOHN MARCH.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "968"
} |
6756690 | page content | {
"char_count": "5176",
"citations": "2 N.H. 349",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 349,
"head_matter": "JOHN ROLLINS vs. THOMAS AMES.\nIt is a good cause of challenge to favor, if a juror has before the trial heard the principal witnesses of one party, and, as a magistrate, at his request taken their depositions.\nBut for this cause after verdict the court will not order a new trial, unless the other party and his counsel make affidavit, that they were ignorant of this cause of challenge at the time of the trial.\nThis was an action of trover.\nla the course of the trial here, February, 1819, on the general issue, certain depositions were introduced on the part of the plaintiff, which had been taken before a magistrate by the name of Martin.\nA verdict being found for the plaintiff, a motion was made by the defendant for a new trial, on the ground that Martin, who took the depositions, was also foreman of the petit jury to whom the cause was submi'red.\n(1) Co. Litt. 157.\n(2) 3 Bac. Ab. 11 Juries,” E.\n(3) Salk. 152.-Co. Litt. 155, b\nThe principal counsel filed an affidavit of his ignorance of this fact, till after the jury were about to retire; but the counsel, originally employed by the defendant, and the party, either declined or omitted to do the same.\nStevens, for the plaintiff.\nAtkinson and Ichabod Bartlett, for the defendant.\n19 John» Rep« 115»",
"id": "6756690",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "351",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOHN ROLLINS vs. THOMAS AMES",
"name_abbreviation": "Rollins v. Ames",
"parties": "JOHN ROLLINS vs. THOMAS AMES.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "919"
} |
6757482 | page content | {
"char_count": "2548",
"citations": "2 N.H. 552",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 552,
"head_matter": "GRAFTON,\nMAY TERM, 1823.\nDANIEL EATON vs. DAVID SLOAN.\nWhen a plaintiff, who lives within the state, when the action is commenced, dies-while the action is pending, the endorser of the writ is discharged.\nThis was scire facias against Sloan,• as endorser of a writ in an action broughtby William Tarlton against Eaton, and was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts.\nOn the 13th November, 183G, Tarlton sued out a writ against Eaton, which writ was endorsed by Sloan, duly served and entered at the court of common pleas, February term, 3 817, in this county, from which court the action was brought by appeal to this court, previous to May term here, 3 319. Tarlton died, and at that term Polly Tarlton his ad-ministratrix, was duly admitted to prosecute,and at May term here, 1820, Eaton recovered judgment against the said Polly Tarlton, administratrix as aforesaid, for his costs taxed at $100 72, sued out execution against the goods, chattels or land of the said William, in the hands of the said Polly, delivered the same execution to an officer, who made return as follows:\n“■ Grafton, sx. November term, 1820, superior court. I “ have made diligent search for the property of the within “ named defendant, and not being able to find any, I return “ this execution in no part satisfied.”\nAnd it was agreed, that if the court should be of opinion upon the above facts, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, then the defendant to be defaulted ; otherwise the plaintiff to become nonsuit.\nNoyes, for the plaintiff.\nBell, for the defendant.\n(1) 1N-H. Laws 100.",
"id": "6757482",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "553",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "DANIEL EATON vs. DAVID SLOAN",
"name_abbreviation": "Eaton v. Sloan",
"parties": "DANIEL EATON vs. DAVID SLOAN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "443"
} |
6755597 | page content | {
"char_count": "9340",
"citations": "2 N.H. 126",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 126,
"head_matter": "CHESHIRE BANK vs. JONATHAN ROBINSON.\nThough in debt on bond, the issue of non est factum is found for the plaintiff, yet, if from other pleadings it appears that the condition of the bond has been fulfilled, the defendant is entitled to judgment.\nUnder a submission of “ all demands,” the parties and referees may ©r may not investigate and settle the damages, which will afterwards probably accrue on an indemnifying bond. Hence a plea in bar to an action for such damages is good, if it aver, that they were actually investigated and settled fey the referees, and judgment rendered on their report.\nIf a replication to a general plea of performance omits to assign any particular breach, it if bad on special demurrer.\nThis was debt on a bond.\nThe defendant craved oyer, which being had, it contained a. condition, that if the defendant should pay to the plaintiffs the bills and claims, which existed against the Bank on the 10th of November, A. D. 1813, the payment to be made as at the end of each year thereafter their amount should become known and be discharged by the Bank, the bond was to be void.\nThe defendant then pleaded first, non est factum ; on which issue was joined and a verdict returned for the plaintiffs.\nSecondly, actio non ; because on the 22d of August, 1815, the plaintiffs being indebted to the defendant in the sum of $20,@00 money had and received, the defendant instituted an action of assumpsit against them for the recovery of it, and such proceedings were had upon the action, that an agreement was made by the parties at October term of this court, A. D. 1815, to refer the claim then in suit with all other demands between them by a rule of court, and that this agreement was fulfilled, a report made, and judgment rendered thereon in favor of the present defendant at May term, 1816. The defendant then averred, that the bond now in suit was actually submitted to the referees, and all the damages which could accrue thereon, were included in their report.\nThe plaintiffs replied, that after judgment .on the above report, bills and claims to the amount of $3,000 were discharged by them, which the defendant had not repaid in conformity to the condition of his bond. The defendant rejoined, that all the bills and claims discharged by the Bank, “ before the reference and the date of the writ,” were submitted and had been considered in the award.\nTo this rejoinder there was a general demurrer.\nThirdly,, the defendant pleaded in bar a performance of the conditions of the bond.\nThe plaintiffs replied, generally, that the defendant had neglected to pay the amount of $1898 35, which in bills and claims, had been discharged by ihem since the award.\nTo this replication the defendant filed a special demurrer, assigning for cause the want of any specific breach, and of a denial that the whole amount discharged since the award was not considered and adjusted by the referees.\nThere were also & fourth plea, replication, rejoinder and demurrer, which so nearly resembled the second plea and its appendages, as to present the same point.\nJ. H. Hubbard and Alexander, counsel for the plaintiffs.\nCooke and J. G. Chamberlain, for the defendant.",
"id": "6755597",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "130",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "CHESHIRE BANK vs. JONATHAN ROBINSON",
"name_abbreviation": "Cheshire Bank v. Robinson",
"parties": "CHESHIRE BANK vs. JONATHAN ROBINSON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1619"
} |
6757376 | page content | {
"char_count": "5075",
"citations": "2 N.H. 513",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 513,
"head_matter": "THE STATE vs. THE TOWN OF CAMPTON.\nA bridge, though erected by individuals, yet if dedicated to the public and «sed freely by them so long as to evince its public usefulness, must be repaired by them.\nThe duty to repair is now devolved altogether upon towns, and in no cases upon counties.\nThis was an indictment for not repairing a bridge, in the town of Campion, across the Pemigewasset river.\nAt the trial here under the general issue in November, 1821, it appeared in evidence, that the bridge in dispute was erected about the year A. D. 1789, by the subscriptions of individuals; that a large public road passed near it; that it ivas used without toll by all travellers till about the year A. D. 1801, when a rise in the river mostly destroyed it; that in Á. D. 1802, the town of Campion contributed $300 to erect a new bridge, which was also used freely by the public and repaired from time to time by said town till about 4 years since; that then at the sole expense of the town it was rebuilt, and in October, 1820, again mostly destroyed by an unusual rise of water in the river, and that a beidge in this place was much needed and had been very useful in facilitating travel.\nOn these facts a verdict was taken against the town, subject to future consideration.\nSullivan, for the state.\nKayes, for the town.",
"id": "6757376",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "515",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THE STATE vs. THE TOWN OF CAMPTON",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Town of Campton",
"parties": "THE STATE vs. THE TOWN OF CAMPTON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "919"
} |
6755811 | page content | {
"char_count": "5691",
"citations": "2 N.H. 163",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 163,
"head_matter": "ROSS COON vs. BARNARD BRICKETT.\nIf a lease contain a condition for the re-entry of the lessor on non-payment of rent; and, after a formal re-entry for non-payment, the rent in arrear is paid and accepted, the forfeiture is waived.\nyVhether rent, when secured by note, must he demanded on the land, before the lessor can re-enter for its non-payment ? gu.\nThis was trespass quart clausum, for that the defendant, on the 9th of September, 1818, entered a certain close in Haverhill, and carried awaj a quantity of garden vegetables, which, with the close, were alleged to be the property of the plaintiff.\nAt the trial here, in May, 1819, on the general issue, it appeared, that the title of the close was in the plaintiff, and the vegetables were removed while he was in possession.\nBut the defendant proved, that, April 1st, 1817, the plaintiff demised to him the close for five years, at a rent of $50 a quarter, the payment of which was to be made at the end of each quarter, by taking up a note for that sum, as twenty notes, payable, as the rent became due, were then executed ; and it was further stipulated, that on a failure to pay the rent quarterly, the plaintiff might re-enter, and the lease should become void.\nThe defendant entered under the lease, and remained in possession till August 17th, 1818, when he left the premises, and the quarter’s rent due in July, 1818, not having been paid, the plaintiff took possession of the house, and claimed to hold it for non-payment of the rent. The plaintiff, however, did not prove that a demand for that quarter’s rent was made at the time it became, due, or upon the premises : and it further appeared, that before the defendant removed the vegetables sued for, he offered payment o' the rent for that quarter? which payment was accepted, and the note given up.\nGn these facts a verdict tras, by consent, returned for the plaintiff, subject to further advisement.\nNelson, counsel for the plaintiff.\nBell, for the defendant.\n(1)Co.Litt, gó 22oT&c.",
"id": "6755811",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "165",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ROSS COON vs. BARNARD BRICKETT",
"name_abbreviation": "Coon v. Brickett",
"parties": "ROSS COON vs. BARNARD BRICKETT.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1005"
} |
6756216 | page content | {
"char_count": "6022",
"citations": "2 N.H. 225",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 225,
"head_matter": "RICHARD CURRIER et al. Appellants, vs. DELIVERANCE GREEN, Appellee.\nA. an administratrix, having obtained license to sell the real estate of her intestate, whose estate had been represented insolvent, employed B. as her agent to sell the real estate at auction ; the lands were sold for less than their value, and B. had become interested in the purchase ; it was held that A. was chargeable in the settlement of the account of hex administration with the full value of the land.\nThis was an appeal from a decree of the judge of probate in this county, allowing the appellee’s account as admin-istratrix on her late husband’s estate. The estate of the intestate had been represented as insolvent, and the adminis-tratrix had been licensed by the judge of probate to sell the real estate for the payment of the debts. In pursuance of the license, the real estate had been sold, and the adminis-tratrix had charged herself with $421, as the amount of the proceeds of the sale. But it appeared in evidence, that although only $421 were bid at the auction, of which due notice was given, yet the agent and attorney of the admin-istratrix, by a previous contract with the purchaser, in which it was agreed that the purchaser should bid off the land, and if it should be sold at a less sum than $500, the difference between the sum at which it should be struck off and the $500, should be divided between them, the agent of the administratrix to have two-thirds of that difference, and the purchaser one-third, received in fact of the purchaser $473 67. There was no evidence, however, that the ad-ministratrix had any knowledge of this contract between her agent and the purchaser, or that she received of the agent any thing more than the $421. It also appeared from the evidence, that $500 was a fair price for the land ; and that the agent of the, administratrix actually conducted this suit.\nFletcher, for Currier et al.\nNoyes, for Green.",
"id": "6756216",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "227",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "RICHARD CURRIER et al. Appellants, vs. DELIVERANCE GREEN, Appellee",
"name_abbreviation": "Currier v. Green",
"parties": "RICHARD CURRIER et al. Appellants, vs. DELIVERANCE GREEN, Appellee.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1080"
} |
6757058 | page content | {
"char_count": "5934",
"citations": "2 N.H. 432",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 432,
"head_matter": "NATHAN B. FOLSOM vs. JOSEPH CHESLEY.\nA mere seizure of property on an execution does not divest the title of the judgment debtor.\nAfter such a seizure, if the officer sell and return the proceeds of the property on a different and subsequent execution, it is no bar or satisfaction to the first execution.\nFor an-y wrong thus sustained by the debtor or creditor, a remedy exists against the officer; hut that remedy, when resorted to by the creditor, is only collateral to his original claim against the debtor.\nThis was debt upon a judgment, rendered in the state of Massachusetts. The defendant pleaded null tell record and payment.\nAt the trial here in September, A. D. 1821, the plaintiff produced a record corresponding with the declaration. -\nOn the other hand, the defendant proved, that his property was attached, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the plaintiff’s claim, by the officer who served the original writ on which the judgment now in suit was rendered ; that it remained in his custody till he received the execution ; and that said property had since been sold by said officer on this or other claims against the debtor, but had improperly been first applied in discharge of those other claims.\nThe court directed the jury, that this evidence was not competent to prove payment; and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court upon the question, whether the said testimony was competent to prove a payment.\nFarrar, for the plaintiff.\nJch. Bartlett, for the defendant.",
"id": "6757058",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "435",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NATHAN B. FOLSOM vs. JOSEPH CHESLEY",
"name_abbreviation": "Folsom v. Chesley",
"parties": "NATHAN B. FOLSOM vs. JOSEPH CHESLEY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1052"
} |
6757338 | page content | {
"char_count": "7872",
"citations": "2 N.H. 501",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 501,
"head_matter": "JOHN WASON vs. RUFUS SEVERANCE.\nSelectmen may grant a license to keep tavern for any term less than a year.\nSelectmen have no authority to license a shop keeper to keep tavern in his shop.\nA license to keep tavern in a particular house wii) not render legal a sale of spirit at any other place, than the house and its appendages, unless it be to persons who are guests at the tavern.\nThis was an action of debt; the declaration was as fol* lows :\n“ For that the said Severance, at Chester aforesaid, on the M tenth day of March, 1818, sold and delivered to one T. F. “ brandy, by retail, that is, in a less quantity than one gallon, sold, delivered, and carried away, at one and the same “ time, to wit, one gill, without a license to exercise the busi- “ ness of a taverner, or retailer, first had and obtained in “ writing from the selectmen of said Chester, the town “ where said Severance did then belong, for which he the “ said Severance took and received of him the said F. the “ sum of eight cents, contrary to the form of the statute in “ such case made and provided, &c.; whereby the said “ Severance has forfeited f6 66,” &c.\nThe defendant pleaded nil debet, upon which issue was joined. The cause was tried at August term of the common pleas in this county in 1820, when the jury returned a special verdict as follows. “ The jury find that the said R. “ Severance on the 10th March, 1818, sold one gill of bran-' “ dy to Thomas F. for the price of eight cents, in Chester, “ in said county ; that the brandy aforesaid was sold at a “ certain bench, about eleven rods from James Severance’s “ house and shop in said Chester; that the said Rufus Sev- “ trance in selling said gill of brandy, acted as the servant “ and by the employment of James Severance, of said Cl.es- “ ter, and that the said James Severance had from the select* “ men of said Chester a license, which was duly recorded “ in the town records in said Chester, February 23, 1818, “ in the following form, to wit.\nu Rockingham, ss. To the town clerk of Chester, James “ Severance, gentleman, of said Chester, is hereby licensed “ to keep an open tavern at his house and shop on the 10th “ day of March next, it being the day the annual town meet- “ ing is held in Chester, and likewise at the adjournment if “ there should be any.\nW. G. } Selectmen M. H. > ’of J. J. U.) Chester.\na Chester, February 23, 1818.”\nJ¡. Kent and Mason, for defendant.\nFrench and J. Smith, for plaintiff.",
"id": "6757338",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "504",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOHN WASON vs. RUFUS SEVERANCE",
"name_abbreviation": "Wason v. Severance",
"parties": "JOHN WASON vs. RUFUS SEVERANCE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1423"
} |
6755141 | page content | {
"char_count": "12246",
"citations": "2 N.H. 42",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 42,
"head_matter": "EDWARD HOUGHTON vs. LEWIS PAGE.\nAsy interest on money loaned, was, at common law, unlawful.\nBut that principle of the common law is not applicable to our state of society; and, by any part of the common law in force here, no rate of interest is unlawful, unless so great as to become unconscionable.\nA contract, made in Massachusetts by its Own citizens, and there to he performed, and whose whole consideration was interest over six per cent, per annum on another contract, must be governed by the lex loci contractus, and is void by the statute of that state against usury.\nSuch contract, though void by a penal statute only, cannot be enforced here.\nThis was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note, payable to Thomas Mason, or order, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff.\nA? the trial here, October tejan, 1818, under the general issue, it appeared in evidence, that Thomas Mason was still the party in interest, and that he and the defendant had long been inhabitants of the state of Massachusetts.\nThe note, also, was executed in that state to secure a sum of money, which the jury found was composed altogether of interest over the rate of six per cent, per annum, on another contract between these parties ; that the rate of interest agreed to be paid on said contract was twelve per cent.; and that no part of this note being in truth for agency or other services, it was, by a penal statute of Massachusetts, wholly usurious and void.\nA verdict was then entered for the defendant, under the direction of the court ; and the plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground that the contract was void by means of a penal statute only, and that such a statute of another state could not be enforced here.\nThe action stood continued nisi for advisement ; atid afterwards at Grafton, May term, 181.9, judgment was rendered.\nJ. C. Chamberlain <V Allen, counsel for the plaintiff.\nKimball 8? Wilson, for the defendant.\n(i)rw&.m\n(¾) j n. h. Laws 287.",
"id": "6755141",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "48",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "EDWARD HOUGHTON vs. LEWIS PAGE",
"name_abbreviation": "Houghton v. Page",
"parties": "EDWARD HOUGHTON vs. LEWIS PAGE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "2154"
} |
6756555 | page content | {
"char_count": "3225",
"citations": "2 N.H. 305",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 305,
"head_matter": "SAMUEL RANKIN vs. AARON NETTLETON.\nA prisoner made application in writing to two justices of the quorum to he discharged from prison upon taking the poor debtor’s oath, and the justices, on the hack of the application, made an order appointing a time and place of hearing and directing notice to be given to the creditor — a copy of the application and order delivered to the creditor’s attorney, was held to be sufficient notice, although the person who attested and delivered the copy was not an officer.\nThis was an action of debt upon a bond. The defendant craved oyer of the bond, and also of the condition, which was in substance that George Comstock, who had been committed to the prison in Charlestown, in the county of Cheshire, on the 18th January, 1817, on an execution in favor of Rankin, should continue a true prisoner within the limits of said prison yard without committing any escape until legally discharged. The defendant then pleaded that said Comstock did continue a true prisoner within said limits until the 24th of February, 1817, when upon a hearing before two justices of the quorum, he was duly discharged in pursuance of the acts for the relief of poor debtors. The plaintiff replied, that no notice of the said hearing before the said justices was given to him or his attorney, and the pleadings ended in an issue upon the notice.\nThe cause was tried here at May term, 1819, when it appeared in evidence that a copy of Comstock's application to the justices, with a copy of their order thereon, appointing the time and place of hearing, and directing notice to be given to Rankin, was delivered to Rankin's attorney - more than fifteen days before the day appointed for the hearing, by Asahel Hunt, who made return on the back of the original application that he had given Rankin's attorney an attested copy of the application and order. To the truth of which return, Hunt made oath before a justice of the peace.\nA verdict was taken for the plain tiff,subject to the opinion of the court upon the sufficiency of the notice.\nGoodall, for the plaintiff.",
"id": "6756555",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "306",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "SAMUEL RANKIN vs. AARON NETTLETON",
"name_abbreviation": "Rankin v. Nettleton",
"parties": "SAMUEL RANKIN vs. AARON NETTLETON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "587"
} |
6757445 | page content | {
"char_count": "2981",
"citations": "2 N.H. 541",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 541,
"head_matter": "PHILIP GRANT vs. JAMES W. HAZELTINE.\nIt is an unsettled question in this state whether an attorney has a lien for his cost. But if he has, it cannot prevail against the defendant, unless he notfies the de», fendant before a settlement with the plaintiff, that he intend» to insist upon his lien.\nThis was trover for a horse.\nAt the trial here, April term, 1822, on the general issue, it appeared in evidence, that one Joseph Grant employed the defendant, an attorney of this court, to bring an action of as- sumpsit against the present pía in till. The action was com menced, but before being entered, the parties to it settled, and the present plaintiff paid said Joseph the balance due. him. The defendant having no notice of the settlement, en tered the action, took judgment by default, sued out execution and caused the horse in dispute to be levied on j but before the sale, said Joseph released the judgment and informed the officer and the present defendant of that fact.— But the defendant still directed the horse to be sold on the execution,on the ground that neither his cost nor the officer’s fees had been paid.\nA verdict was taken for the plaintiff, .subject to the opinion of the court on the above case.\nB. M. Farley, counsel for the plaintiff.\nJ. Haseltine and R. Fletcher, for defendant.",
"id": "6757445",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "543",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "PHILIP GRANT vs. JAMES W. HAZELTINE",
"name_abbreviation": "Grant v. Hazeltine",
"parties": "PHILIP GRANT vs. JAMES W. HAZELTINE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "538"
} |
6756538 | page content | {
"char_count": "2734",
"citations": "2 N.H. 301",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 301,
"head_matter": "AMOS HORN vs. BENJAMIN SWETT.\nWhen a creditor causes his execution to be extended upon the lands of his debtor, and the appraisers in valuing the lands, by mistake, estimate them at less than their value, the debtor has no remedy to correct the mistake, but by redeeming the lands.\nThis vías assumpsit for $200, money had and received, and for $200, money paid, laid out and expended.\nThe cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts. The plaintiff', Horn, on the 3d of Sept. 1804, conveyed a certain house and house lot in Haverhill, in this county, to one David How, in mortgage to secure the payment of $307 24 and interest, in one year from that date. The defendant, Swett, having obtained an execution against Horn, on the 13th February, 1816, caused it to be duly extended upon a part of the mortgaged premises, subject to How’s said mortgage. The officer who made the extent applied to Horn to give him information as to the amount of the incumbrances upon the land ; but Horn refused to give any information on the subject. The appraisers, in valuing the land, took fee amount of the incum-brance from the record of How’s deed in the register’s office, and they over estimated the incumbrance about $90, a payment made by Horn to How eight or ten years before, being wholly unknown to them and to the defendant, and of course estimated Horn’s right in equity to redeem at about $90 less than they would have done, had the said payment by Horn to Hozo been known to them. And it was agreed, that if the court should be of opinion, upon the foregoing facts, that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, the defendant should be defaulted, otherwise the plaintiff to become nonsuit.\nSloan, for the plaintiff.\nJ. Bell, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756538",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "302",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "AMOS HORN vs. BENJAMIN SWETT",
"name_abbreviation": "Horn v. Swett",
"parties": "AMOS HORN vs. BENJAMIN SWETT.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "499"
} |
6756516 | page content | {
"char_count": "4300",
"citations": "2 N.H. 298",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 298,
"head_matter": "DAVID C. CHURCHILL vs. JOSHUA WARREN.\nA mere seizure of property on execution does not divest the title of the judgment debtor.\nWhen such seizure is made of sufficient property to satisfy an execution against one joint and several debtor, arid the property is before sale returned by agreement of the parties, this constitutes no bar to a recovery against the other debtor.\nThis was an action of assumpsit on a receipt, made jointly and severally by the defendant and Robert Turner, for fifteen tons of hay. Said hay was attached in A. D. 1818, on a writ in favor of William Davison, jun, against said Warren, on which judgment was finally rendered against said Warren, February term of the common pleas, A. D. 1820.\nIn February, A. D. 1819, an action on the receipt was commenced against Turner alone, and judgment recovered against him, Nov, term, 1819. At May term, 1820, “it is ad- “ milted by the parties, that the execution against said Tur- “ ner was levied on the personal property of said Turner on “ the 27th of Dec. 1819, and the property put under the care “ of Abel Kent ; that the property was advertised for sale “ by the officer, but was never removed, and the sale de- “ layed from time to time, by the request of said Turner, till “ on the 10th of February, A. D. 1820, by his request the “ execution was taken back from the officer by the plaintiff’s “ attorney, under an agreement that the said Turner should “ pay the same soon, and pay what the officer should tax for “ his fees; the property having never in fact been removed “ from said Turner, and still remains with him. It is now “ submitted to the court, whether the levy of said execution, “ the attorney of the plaintiff having taken the same back “ before any sale, by request of said Turner, is such a satis- “ faction and discharge of the same is will bar the present “ action,” &c. &c.\nA verdict having been taken by consent for the plaintiff for an agreed sum, it was further stipulated, that according to the opinion of the court on the above question, judgment should be entered thereon, or the verdict be set aside, and the plaintiff become nonsuit.\nFletcher and Britton, counsel for the plaintiff.\nSmith and Bell, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 Bara. & Ald. 157.",
"id": "6756516",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "300",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "DAVID C. CHURCHILL vs. JOSHUA WARREN",
"name_abbreviation": "Churchill v. Warren",
"parties": "DAVID C. CHURCHILL vs. JOSHUA WARREN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "774"
} |
6756648 | page content | {
"char_count": "15068",
"citations": "2 N.H. 333",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 333,
"head_matter": "JOSEPH L. WILLIE vs. EZRA GREEN.\nA. loaned B. $500 upon a usurious contract. After the money had been loaned several years, the interest was cast at 12 per cent, and added to the principal, and $200 in cash was paid, and the residue of the principal and interest, cast as aforesaid was \"paid in negotiable notes of a third person. It was held that the illegal interest might be recovered back by B> in an action for money had and received.\nA contract to pay more than six per cent, for past forbearance is illegal\nThis was an action of assumpsit for $200 money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff’s use. The cause was tried here at February term, 1820, upon the general issue,when it appeared in evidence, that on the 25th February, 1813, the defendant loaned to the plaintiff $500, for which the defendant received a note of hand signed by the plaintiff and one David Willie, the payment of which was secured by mortgage of a tract of land belonging to the plaintiff. At the time of this loan, it was agreed between the parties that the plaintiff should pay the defendant interest upon the $500, at the rate of 12 per cent, until the same should be repaid. In the year 1818, the defendant commenced actions on the note, and on the mortgage, and obtained judgment in both suits against the present plaintiff. On the 22d June, 1819, the defendant, having his executions upon the judgments, went to the plaintiff to procure payment. Willie, not having money to pay the debt and costs, which then amounted to $669 73, it was agreed between the parties and one John Reynolds, that Reynolds should purchase the land which had been mortgaged by the plaintiff to the defendant, and pay the defendant $200 in cash, and give him negotiable notes for the residue of the sum due to him from the plaintiff. When this agreement was made, Green insisted that interest should be allowed to him according to the first contract, and it was cast accordingly, and found to amount with the debt and costs to about $913. Green, however, agreed to take $900. The land was conveyed to Reynolds, who paid the defendant $200, and gave him negotia-' ble notes for the residue of the $900, and these were received by Green in satisfaction of his claims upon Willie.— 1 he present action was brought to recover back the interest thus received by Green above six per cent., and a nonsuit was offered'-to be entered, subject to the opinion of the court upon the above facts.\nEastman and Ichabod Bartlett, for the plaintiff.\nHodgdon and Mason, for the defendant.\n(1) 1 Saund. 294, Ferrai vs. Sheer.\n(2) 1 N. H. Laws 286.",
"id": "6756648",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "339",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOSEPH L. WILLIE vs. EZRA GREEN",
"name_abbreviation": "Willie v. Green",
"parties": "JOSEPH L. WILLIE vs. EZRA GREEN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "2762"
} |
6755088 | page content | {
"char_count": "7843",
"citations": "2 N.H. 36",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 36,
"head_matter": "CHESHIRE.\nMAY TERM, 1819.\nABEL PARKER, Judge of Probate, vs. DAVID COLCORD.\nAn action is “ pending” after it is entered. An action is commenced after the writ is served, however it may be after the. writ is sued out. An action pending is not discontinued, till the agreement to discontinue be entered on the record ; and when entered, the discontinuance does not relate back to the date of the agreement.\nIf a subsequent action be commenced, while a prior one between the same parties and for the same cause of action is pending, the pendency of the prior one may be pleaded in abatement, though discontinued before the plea was pleaded,\nIn actions on probate bonds, the judge of probate is the only party, plaintiff, and the bond the only pause of action, which can be recognized before judgment.\nThis was an action of debt, on an administration bond, executed by the defendant, and others, for his faithful administration of the estate of Daniel Noyes.\nAt May term, 1818, the defendant pleaded the pendency of a former suit against him on the same bond when this action was instituted, and also alleged, that at the time of the plea, the former suit was still pending.\nThe plaintiff replied, that the bond was executed by the defendant and Nancy Noyes — -jointly administering on said estate ; that their letters of administration had been revoked ;, that Jonathan Weare, the guardian of the heirs of said Daniel, had caused the first action on the bond.to be instituted,. but before the commencement of the present action, which was in behalf of Mesheck Weare, administrator & bo-nis non of said Daniel, the said Jonathan and the defendant had agreed to, a discontinuance of the first suit, which, in pursuance of their agreement, and before the entry or pleadings in the present action, urns discontinued and dismissed. To this replication the defendant filed a general demurrer.\nJ?. Fletcher ⅜ J. H. Hubbard, counsel for the plaintiff.\nUpham, for the defendant.\n(1)2 Hawk. 1. 2. chap. 26, s. 62-2 John. Rep. 346, ditto 42-1 John Re. 342-Cr. El. 677 Burr. 960.\n(2) 11 John. Rep. 197, 472-12 do. 181. 1 Wils. 144.- 4 Reevs Hist. 12.\n(3) 2 Lev. 13. 1 B. & P. 137-1 Hen. Bl. 694.\n(4) 5 Mass. R. 180.-2 Chitt Pl. title \"A statement.\"\n(5) 1 Hamp. Rep. 370.\n(6) 1 Leon. 105.-3 Mau. and et al. vs. Buckpoltz.\n(7) 1 Wm. Bl. 21.\n(g) Ld. Rav, 1015‘",
"id": "6755088",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "39",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ABEL PARKER, Judge of Probate, vs. DAVID COLCORD",
"name_abbreviation": "Parker v. Colcord",
"parties": "ABEL PARKER, Judge of Probate, vs. DAVID COLCORD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1384"
} |
6756332 | page content | {
"char_count": "8053",
"citations": "2 N.H. 251",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 251,
"head_matter": "BENNING W. SANBORN vs. THE TOWN OF DEERFIELD.\nWhere a town is indebted te several individuals, and the debts are due, and of such a character that they should be paid, the town is liable to a selectman, who discharges them in behalf of the town. -\nIf part of them are due to one selectman, and he pays the residue to the other creditors, and receives a negotiable note from the two remaining selectmen to the amount of all the debts, which note one of the two afterwards pays, that one may recover the amount from the town in an action in his own name alone.\nSelectmen are general agents for towns, in respect to pecuniary matters, and unless restrained by a special vote are warranted in paying any existing debts of the town, which are of a character requiring immediate payment.\nThis was assbmpsit for money paid and expended.\nAt the trial here, February term, 1810, n was agreed by the parties that Benf Sanborn, Thomas Burbank and the plaintiff, were the selectmen of Deerfield for the year 1817, That Thomas Burbank had a claim against said town for certain services, and also for certain debts, partly contracted that year and partly the year before, which he had paid in behalf of the town : that the plaintiff and Benj. Sanborn,, as selectmen of Deerfield, executed a promissory negotiable note to said Burbank for the amount of his claim, which note being afterwards negotiated and sued, the promissors notified the town of the fact, but, no defence being made, judgment was recovered against them in their private capacity, and the whole amount of it .paid by the preseat pla'.'íi!)': and íhst a verdict should be taken for the plain-till', for the amount of claims which Burbank paid, and which were due from the town, including his own demand, subject to the opinion of the court on the above facts.\nAfter evidence in support of those claims, a verdict was taken for their amount, under the agreement above stated.\nHoar and Mason, for the defendants.\nCults and Smith, for the plaintiff.\n(1) 1 V. H. Laws '¿10.\n(2); pí. H. Laws Sil!.\n3 Bara. & AJ& 1, Broughton vs. Salford Water Works.",
"id": "6756332",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "255",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "BENNING W. SANBORN vs. THE TOWN OF DEERFIELD",
"name_abbreviation": "Sanborn v. Town of Deerfield",
"parties": "BENNING W. SANBORN vs. THE TOWN OF DEERFIELD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1389"
} |
6757438 | page content | {
"char_count": "5295",
"citations": "2 N.H. 539",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 539,
"head_matter": "HILLSBOROUGH,\nAPRIL TERM, 1823.\nELI CURTIS vs. JOHN CARSON.\nWhete in an action of trespass for an assault and battery, the defendant pleaded son assault dtrn*sn$, and the plaintiff re plied de injuria sua propria absque tali causa, &e. upon which issue was joined; it was held to be competent to the plaintiff to shew that the assault, which the defendant made, was outrageous and unflé-cessary to his defence.\n• Tins was an action of trespass for an assault, and battery. The defendant pleaded son assault demesne. The plaintiff replied de injuria sua propria absque tali causa, &c.;, oa which issue was joined.\nThe cause was tried here at October term, 18-22, when it appeared in evidence, that the plaintiff in fact made the first assault, but it ivas clearly proved by the plaintiff, that the heating of which he complained was excessive and out of all proportion to the offence committed. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, on the ground that the plaintiff ought not, as the pleadings stood, to have been permitted to shew that the beating was excessive.",
"id": "6757438",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "541",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ELI CURTIS vs. JOHN CARSON",
"name_abbreviation": "Curtis v. Carson",
"parties": "ELI CURTIS vs. JOHN CARSON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "945"
} |
6756464 | page content | {
"char_count": "5767",
"citations": "2 N.H. 289",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 289,
"head_matter": "THOMAS M. BENDEN vs. PETER MANNING\nla an action of assumpsit, although the breach of the promise is a misfeasance injurious to the plaintiff, j^et a consideration for the promise must be alleged in the declaration, and must be proved as alleged.\nThis was a writ of error to the court of common pleas in this county. The original action was assumpsit brought by Manning against Benden, in which Manning alleged in his first count, “ that whereas the said Peter Manning hereto- “ fore, &c., at the special instance and request of the said “ Thomas, retained and employed him the said Thomas, he “ then and there being a tailor, in the way of his business u of a tailor, to make a coat for the said Peter of great “ value, in consideration thereof, and in consideration of a “ certain reasonable reward, to wit, the sum of $4 04, to the “ said Thomas, in that behalf paid; lie the said Thomas then “ and there undertook and faithfully promised the said Peter ⅛ to make said coat in a skilful, careful, and proper manner; “ and although the said Thomas then and there received ⅛ sufficient cloth, &c., yet the said Thomas, not regarding “ his said promise, &c., but contriving and intending to in* “ jure the safd Peter in this behalf, did not, nor would make “ said coat in a skilful and proper manner, but wholly neg- “ lected so to do ; and on the contrary thereof, he the said “ Thomas so unskilfully, carelessly, negligently and improp- “ erly made said coat, that by and through the mere un- “ skilfulness, &c., of the said Thomas in that behalf, the “ said coat was greatly damaged, &c., and the said Benden “ then and there cut and made said coat too small across the “ back, and so close under the~arms, that it cannot be worn “ without great pain,” &c.\nThere was a second count founded upon the breach of a promise to cut a pair of pantaloons in a skilful and proper manner.\nBenden pleaded that he never promised in manner and form, &c., and put himself upon the country, and Manning did the like. /\nThe cause was tried in the common pleas, at February term, 1819. The only evidence which Manning offered to the jury to prove the consideration of Benden’s promises stated in thedeclaration,was the pa yrnent of Benden’s bill for making the clothes, amounting to $4 04, after the coat was made and delivered to Manning. Benden’s counsel objected that this evidence did not prove the consideration as alleged in the declaration ; but the court instructed the jury, that the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to prove the consideration as alleged ; and the jury having returned a verdict for Manning, Benden’s counsel filed a bill of exceptions,,and brought this writ of error.\nAtherton, for the plaintiff in error,\nFletcher and Means, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756464",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "291",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THOMAS M. BENDEN vs. PETER MANNING",
"name_abbreviation": "Benden v. Manning",
"parties": "THOMAS M. BENDEN vs. PETER MANNING",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1012"
} |
6755351 | page content | {
"char_count": "17296",
"citations": "2 N.H. 79",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 79,
"head_matter": "ROCKINGHAM,\nSEPTEMBER TERM, 1819.\nJONATHAN L. WHITING vs. RICHARD BRADLEY.\nIf a sheriff, by mistake, sell the personal property of A. on an execution against B., which property had been consigned to B., and Users return the execution satisfied to the amount of the sale, B. is still a competent witness for A. in an action against the sheriff.\nThe return of a sheriff, when erroneous by mistake, may, in certain cases, be amended or vacated, and in some cases may be contradicted.\nUnder our statute iff February 15. 1791, a creditor, whose execution has been levied on either personal or real estate, which did not belong to the judgment debtor, may, by scire facias, obtain a new execution for the amount thus levied.\nThis action was trover fora quantity of merchandize,and was tried here, on the general issue, February term, A. D. 1818.\nWm. West was offered as a witness, and, at the request of the defendant, being sworn upon the voir dire, answered, that he was not interested in the event of this suit, unless made so by the following facts.\nThe property described in the writ was deposited with him by the plaintiff, to be sold on commission. The defendant, being a deputy sheriff, afterwards received a writ of attachment against West in favor of one Tucker, and thereupon, though notified of the plaintiff’s interest, seized and removed the property in dispute. After judgment, it was sold, and the proceeds returned by him in part satisfaction on the back of the execution.\nThe witness further stated, that an adjustment had since been made between the plaintiff and him, that exonerated him, from any liability for the goods ; but the terms of the adjustment, or the nature of the discharge, were not particularized.\nOn this disclosure, the witness was allowed to be sworn in chief, and a verdict being found for the plaintiff, a motion for a new trial was made by the defendant, on the ground, that West was an incompetfBt witness.\nGreen, counsel for the plaintiff.\nThom $• Mason, for the defendant.\n(3) 31 Jotl$V 181.\n(2) 1 N. H. Rep. 189 Chesley vs. St. Clair.\n10 Joins. Rep. 246, Bank vs. Minthorn.",
"id": "6755351",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "87",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JONATHAN L. WHITING vs. RICHARD BRADLEY",
"name_abbreviation": "Whiting v. Bradley",
"parties": "JONATHAN L. WHITING vs. RICHARD BRADLEY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "3058"
} |
6756046 | page content | {
"char_count": "7946",
"citations": "2 N.H. 193",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 193,
"head_matter": "GEORGE HILTON vs. ANDREW BURLEY.\nIn assumpsit on an account annexed for liquor sold by retail to a ” townsman,” though the defendant plead the general issue ; yet the plaintiff cannot, under our statute of June 14th, 1791, recover more than twenty shillings.\nAn item, also, “ for rent,” without some description of the premises and the length of the occupation, cannot be recovered. Nor can a general credit on such aw account be applied, at the trial exclusively to the payment of the liquor over twenty shillings in value, or to the payment of the rent.\nWhen a debtor makes a payment, without directing to what claim it shall heap» plied, the various rules, which govern the application.\nThis was assumpsit on an account annexed for $81 17 ; many items in which were for spirit sold in small quantities to the defendant, and one item was “ for rent.” A general credit was given for $20.\nAt the trial here in September, A. D. 1819, on the general issue, the plaintiff and defendant being inhabitants of the same town, and the former an inn-kceper, an objection was made to a recovery of more than 20 shillings for the spirit, and of any thing for rent. On the contrary, the plaintiff contended, that if this objection prevailed to any extent, the general credit ought to be applied exclusively to the items against which it prevailed ; and thereupon a verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiff, subject to be amended, according to the future opinion of the court upon the above points.\nTenney, counsel for the plaintiff.\nTilton, for the defendant.\nI N. H. w* 375.\n(2) Fairbanks ts. Antrim, ante.\nTaunt. 597.-2 Bam. & Aid. 47. — 1 Merivale ST2, cited.",
"id": "6756046",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "197",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "GEORGE HILTON vs. ANDREW BURLEY",
"name_abbreviation": "Hilton v. Burley",
"parties": "GEORGE HILTON vs. ANDREW BURLEY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1430"
} |
6757151 | page content | {
"char_count": "2270",
"citations": "2 N.H. 453",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 453,
"head_matter": "WILLIAM HARTSHORN vs. AMOS HUBBARD.\nWhere it appeal s by necessary implication from the terms of the condition of a mongage, rhet the understanding of the parties must have been, that the mortgager should remain in possession of the land, the mortgagee cannot maintain a. writ of entry to recover the land, until the condition be broken, or waste be\nThis was a writ of entry, and was tried here at October term, 1821, and a verdict taken for the tenant, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case :\nThe tenant being seized of the demanded premises on the 8th February, 1814, conveyed the same to the demandant, to hold in fee and in mortgage. The condition of the mortgage was, among other things, that the tenant, Hubbard, should “ carry on and improve the said farm in a husband-11 like manner, during the natural life of the said William “ and his present wife and, also, “ deliver to the said “ William and his wife one half of all the yearly produce of “ said farm.” Hubbard has been in possession of the demanded premises ever since the said conveyance, and has done and performed every thing by him to be done and performed, up to this time, according to the said condition.",
"id": "6757151",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "454",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "WILLIAM HARTSHORN vs. AMOS HUBBARD",
"name_abbreviation": "Hartshorn v. Hubbard",
"parties": "WILLIAM HARTSHORN vs. AMOS HUBBARD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "405"
} |
6757263 | page content | {
"char_count": "3720",
"citations": "2 N.H. 477",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 477,
"head_matter": "STEPHEN NEAL vs. JOHN BAKER, Executor.\nWhen an action is brought against an executor deson tort, if the estate with which ho bas intermeddled be insolvent, it is no defence that he has paid debts to . double toe amount of the assets by him received.\nAssumpsit against the defendant, as executor of Lois Ra-ker. deceased. The cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following case :\nZw»> Po\\er died on 1st January, 1820, intestate. Since ¾ ':h >•> t.m * ¡he defendant has, without taking administration oi li ; ⅛, ite lawfully upon himself, received of her estate nr.f effe.-ts property to the amount of f 100, the whole of which and as much more he has already applied, to the payment of ihe just debts of the said Lois, whose estate is insolvent.\nAnd it was agreed, that if the court, upon these facts, should be of opinion that the defendant was not Hable as executor de son tort, the plaintiff be nonsuit; otherwise judgment to be rendered for the plaintiff for the amount of his debt.\nFreeman, for the plaintiff.\nBarker, for the defendant.\n(1) 2 D. & E. Priest.",
"id": "6757263",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "478",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "STEPHEN NEAL vs. JOHN BAKER, Executor",
"name_abbreviation": "Neal v. Baker",
"parties": "STEPHEN NEAL vs. JOHN BAKER, Executor.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "681"
} |
6756117 | page content | {
"char_count": "8424",
"citations": "2 N.H. 208",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 208,
"head_matter": "JOHN HUSE vs. JOHN GRIMES.\nError lies upon a judgment rendered under the statute of June 21, 1797, author-king justices of the peace to make an agreement between parties to refer their demands,\nThe statute limiting the bringing of writs of error to three years where judgments have been rendered in any real or personal action, extends to judgments rendered on the report of referees made in pursuance of the statute of June 21, 1797, although the latter was passed posterior to the former,\n^ This is a process brought to reverse or avoid a judgment of the court of common pleas, rendered September term, 1815, upon a report of referees, made under a rule entered into before a justice of the peace, pursuant to the statute of June 21, 1797.\nThe defendant pleads, that the writ or suit was not brought or commenced within three years after the rendition of the judgment. To which plea the plaintiff demurs.. .-~\n¿The first section of the act under which the rule was granted, is as follows :\n“ That when any persons who may have a dispute of what “ nature soever, shall agree to have the dispute determined “ by referees mutually chosen by the parties for the purpose, “ it shall and may be lawful for the person or persons male* “ ing the demand in the action, to make out a particular “ statement thereof, under his or their hands in writing, and “ to lodge the same with some one justice of the peace of “ the county in which either of the parties dwell; and the “ said justice of the peace, on application of the parties for “ the purpose, shall make out an agreement, to be annexed “ to the aforesaid demand, and to be by them or their “ lawful agents or attorneys subscribed and acknowledged “ in substance as follows.” (Here follows the form of the agreement and acknowledgment.)\nThe third section of the act says, u that the determina- “ lion of the referees, who may be appointed agreeably to this “ act, shall be made known to the next judicial court to be “ holden in and for the county in which the justice of the “ peace may have lived at the time he issued the agreement “ as aforesaid, and the said court to whom the report of the “ referees may be made’ as aforesaid, shall have cognizance “ thereof in the same way and manner, and the same doings “ shall be had thereon as though the same had been made “ by referees appointed by a rule of the same court.”\nJustice Woodbury having been of counsel, did not sit in this cause.\nT. Broten, for plaintiff.\nJ. Walker, for defendant]",
"id": "6756117",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "212",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOHN HUSE vs. JOHN GRIMES",
"name_abbreviation": "Huse v. Grimes",
"parties": "JOHN HUSE vs. JOHN GRIMES.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1486"
} |
6757107 | page content | {
"char_count": "1528",
"citations": "2 N.H. 442",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 442,
"head_matter": "NATHANIEL BROWN vs. JOHN MILTIMORE.\nNontenure is in this state a plea in abatement and not ⅛ bar.\nThis was a writ of entry. The tenant pleaded nontenure special in bar of the action. To this plea the demandant demurred, and the tenant joined in demurrer.\nThom, for the tenant,\ncited Clark vs. Goodwin, 14 Mass. Rep. 239. — 2 Saund. 44, note 4. — 13 Mass. Rep. 439, Prescott vs. Hutchinson.\nFrench, for the demandant,.\ncited Parker vs. Murphy, 12 Mass. Rep. 485. — Keith vs. Swan, 11 ditto 216,-Booth 28. —Rastall's Entries 225, 381, 404, 539.",
"id": "6757107",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "443",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NATHANIEL BROWN vs. JOHN MILTIMORE",
"name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Miltimore",
"parties": "NATHANIEL BROWN vs. JOHN MILTIMORE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "282"
} |
6757231 | page content | {
"char_count": "7224",
"citations": "2 N.H. 470",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 470,
"head_matter": "TOWN OF RUMNEY vs. TOWN OF ALLENSTOWN.\nWhen a town relieves a pauper belonging to another town, in order to make the town to which the pauper belongs liable, notice of the sums expended must be given within ninety days from the time when the relief mentioned ia the no-toe was afforded.\nAssumpsit for money expended in the support of several paupers alleged to have their settlement in the town of Al-lenstown.\nThe cause was tried here at November term, 1821, upon the general issue,when the plaintiffs, in order to prové notice to Allenstown, as required by the statute, produced a copy of the notice, which was as follows :\n•* STATE OF ÑEW-HAMPSHIRE.\n*• Grafton, ss. To the selectmen or overseers of the poor of th$ town of Allenstown, &c. Greeting.\n“You are hereby notified, that Betsey Johnson, &c. are “persons poor, &c. that the town of Allenstown is charge- « able for the maintenance of said paupers, and that the se«lectmen of said Rumney, for the relief and support of «the said paupers, have expended the following sums, to wit: “1818, March 10. To paid W. Caldwell, for the relief and support of E. P.\nJohnson, as per bill, $30 13\n«1818, March, 10. Paid D. Avery as per bill for\nsupport of Lewis Johnson, 20 00 “1818, March, 10. Paid T. Lord for support of\nI. W. Johnson, 25 00\n$75 13\nc ¶¾ 1\nD G j Selectmen.\n“ Rumney, March 11,1S18.:!\nWhich notice was served March 30, 1818, and returned to the office of the clerk of the court of common pleas in Rockingham county, March 31,1819.\nBut it appearing in evidence, that part of the $75 13, mentioned in the notice, was paid for relief furnished the paupers more than ninety days before the notice was given to Allenstown, the court directed a nonsuit to be entered, subject to the opinion of the court upon the legality of the notice*\n(1) 1. H. Laws, 359.",
"id": "6757231",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "473",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "TOWN OF RUMNEY vs. TOWN OF ALLENSTOWN",
"name_abbreviation": "Town of Rumney v. Town of Allenstown",
"parties": "TOWN OF RUMNEY vs. TOWN OF ALLENSTOWN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1290"
} |
6756736 | page content | {
"char_count": "9595",
"citations": "2 N.H. 369",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 369,
"head_matter": "CHESHIRE,\nMAY TERM, 1821.\nTHE PROPRIETORS OF CLAREMONT vs. SAMUEL CARLTON.\nWhen lands are described in a deed as bounded on a river, the centre of the stream is to be considered as the houndary.\nIf an island be situated in the river, and is nearest that bank where the premises lie, it nasses to the grantee.\nParol declarations of former owners of the premises are incompetent to contradict this construction of the deed.\nBut it ‘is competent to show by parol evidence* that the quantity of water was such on each side of the island as to bo calied by the name of the river; and then as a latent ambiguity it may be explained by other testimony what the parties proba-* bly intended by the expression used in the deed.\nThis was a writ of entry to recover a portion of an island in Sugar river, in Claremont.\nAt the trial here, May term, A. D. 1819, on the general issue, it was admitted, that the demandants were by charter the original grantees of the land in dispute; that lot No. 46, in said town, was bounded south on Sugar river ; that this island was on the north side of said river, directly opposite said lot; and that the tenant owns all the land demanded, which originally passed by a conveyance of said lot bounded as aforesaid.\nThe demandants then offered to prove, that when lot No. 46 was surveyed, the southern monuments of it were erect* ed on the north margin of the river; that about thirty years since the owner of said lot made no claim to the island, and showed the above monuments as his boundary ; and that the intervening owners, who had been numerous, never claimed the island till a part of this lot became, the property ot the tenant’s grantors, in February, A, D. 1810.\nThey, also, offered to prove, that this lot in A. J}, 1798, was equally divided north and south, and that in A. D. 1810, S. Fiske, owner of one half, quitclaimed all his right in this island to one Steward, and that in A. D. 1817, Steward conveyed it to the tenant, as “ an island in Sugar river, “ situated between S. Fiske1 s land and Bill Barnes’ land.1’ The land south of Sugar river and opposite this island was common land, belonging to the proprietors till about eighteen years since, when it was conveyed to said Barnes, bounding him to the centre of the south branch of the river ; and that now the tenant owns no land whatever north or south of the river contiguous to the island. About thirty years since, this and other islands were surveyed by the proprietors, and have since been claimed by them, but not cultivated till recently. The quantity of land in the island, or the exact width of the river in this place, did not appear.\nAll this last testimony was objected to as incompetent, and being excluded by the court, a verdict was taken for the defendant, subject to farther consideration on the points presented,\nJ. H. Hubbard and Sumner, for the demandants.\nUpham, for the tenant.",
"id": "6756736",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "373",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THE PROPRIETORS OF CLAREMONT vs. SAMUEL CARLTON",
"name_abbreviation": "Proprietors of Claremont v. Carlton",
"parties": "THE PROPRIETORS OF CLAREMONT vs. SAMUEL CARLTON.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1757"
} |
6756655 | page content | {
"char_count": "3713",
"citations": "2 N.H. 340",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 340,
"head_matter": "JONATHAN LADD vs. LOWELL KINNEY.\nIf an endorser of a note, who has not had regular notice of the non-payment by the maker,- does, with a full know)edge of the fact, make a subsequent promise to pay, it is a waiver of the want of due notice.\nThis was an action of assumpsit against Kenney, as endorser oí a note of hand made by Hazen Lawrence, dated March 14, 1816, for $40, payable to Kenney or order in sixty days with interest, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff.\nThe cause was tried here at September term, 1820, upon the general issue, when it appeared in evidence, that the note was endorsed by the defendant to the plaintiff before it became due ; that the plaintiff and Lawrence both resided in Meredith, in this county, and that Kenney resided in Salem, in Massachusetts. The plaintiff presented the note to Lawrence for payment in due season, and Lawrence refused to pay it. No notice was proved to have been given to Kenney that Lawrence had refused to pay, until more than a month afterwards, when Kenney, being at Meredith, was informed by the plaintiff that the note was not paid, upon which Kenney said that he would see Lawrence, and have the note paid before he returned to Salem.\nThe court instructed the jury, that the notice of the nonpayment of the note by Lawrence, given by the plaintiff to the defendant at Meredith, was not seasonable notice. ; but that if they were satisfied that the defendant then undertook to see the note paid, it was in law a waiver of any irregularity in tifo notice, and the defendant was liable.\nThe jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved the court for a new trial, on the ground of a misdirection to the jury.\nWalker, for the plaintiff.\nMoody, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756655",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "341",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JONATHAN LADD vs. LOWELL KINNEY",
"name_abbreviation": "Ladd v. Kinney",
"parties": "JONATHAN LADD vs. LOWELL KINNEY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "680"
} |
6755500 | page content | {
"char_count": "10383",
"citations": "2 N.H. 111",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 111,
"head_matter": "JAMES WALLACE vs. DAVID HOLMES.\nWhere assumpsit is brought on a promise to pay money, whenever judgment shall be recovered by the plaintiff in an action then pending against a third person, the declaration is sufficiently specific, if it describe the consideration of the promise to have been a return to that third person of property to a certain amount, which had been attached in that action.\nThe declaration need not enumerate eaoh article returned ; nor need it contain an express averment that the claim in that action was just, or that the writ issued from a particular court, if it allege, that judgment was afterwards recovered upon itbv the plaintiff in a particular court to which the writ was made returnable.\nNor is it necessary, in such case, that the declaration should set out the judgment “ as of record,” or allege notice of it to the present defendant, or state the purpose, to which the money, now sought to be recovered, is intended to be appropriated.\nThis was an action of assumpsit.\nThe declaration alleged, that on the 18th of February, 1812, the “ shop-goods and household furniture” of one Robert Holmes, to the value of $188 25, were, by a writ of attachment against him in favor of the present plaintiff, returnable at the court of common pleas in this county, September term, 1812, seized to respond the judgment which might be obtained against said Robert; that on the 13th of April, A. D. 1812, the present defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would re-deliver to said Robert the goods aforesaid, promised the plaintiff to return to him the same goods on demand, or pay him, when he should obtain judgment in said action the sum off 188 25 ; that the plaintiff thereupon re-delivered said goods to said Robert and discharged his attachment upon them ; that the action against said Robert was prosecuted and judgment recovered against him, February term, 1814, for the sum of $308 88, of which $8168 still remains unsatisfied, and that the defendant, though particularly requested on the 21st of March, A. D. 1818, had never paid said sum.\nTo this declaration the defendant filed a special demurrer for the following causes.\n1st. That the description of the property attached was not sufficiently specific.\n2d. That the court, from which the writ of attachment issued, was not particularized,\n3d. That the claim against Robert Holmes is not alleged to have been a just debt.\n4th. That the judgment against him is not set out as of record.\n5th. That no demand is alleged.\n6th. That no notice of the judgment to the present defendant is alleged.\n7th. That it is not alleged, that the sum now sought to be recovered will be applied to the discharge of the judgment against Robert Holmes.\nShatluck ⅜- J. Smith, counsel for the plaintiff.\nR. Fletcher & Means, for the defendant.\n(1) Lawes’ PL 56, — Burr. 2455.\n(2) Willes 120, Kettell vs. BromselL\n(3) Stiles 71.— 2 Saund. 74, b.\n(4) 2 Lii Ray. 991, Thornton vs. Bernard.\n(5) Cowp. 682, Rex vs. Horne.",
"id": "6755500",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "115",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JAMES WALLACE vs. DAVID HOLMES",
"name_abbreviation": "Wallace v. Holmes",
"parties": "JAMES WALLACE vs. DAVID HOLMES.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1802"
} |
6756716 | page content | {
"char_count": "10928",
"citations": "2 N.H. 359",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 359,
"head_matter": "BENJAMIN PIERCE vs. WILLIAM READ et al.\nIn ibis state debt does not lie upon a bail bond.\nThis was a writ of error, brought to reverse a judgment of the court of common pleas in this county. The original action was debt upon a bond, brought by Pierce, in which the defendants craved oyer of the bond, which was as follows : “ Know all men, &c. that we W. R., D. S.,N. K. and J. K, S “ all of Amherst, &c. are held, &c. to B. Pierce, Esq., sher- “ iff of said county of Hillsborough, in the sum of $20, &c. “ Given under our hands and seals this 22dday of February, “ 1810.” They also craved oyer of the condition, which was as follows : “ The condition of this obligation is such, “ that if F. B., now in Amherst jail, on a writ in favor of “ Charles Tuttle, which writ is returnable before S. C,, Esq. “ on Monday 26th March next, &c., shall abide the order “ and judgment of court on said process, without making any “ avoidance on the same, then the above obligation to be “ void.” Which being read and heard, the defendants pleaded in bar, 1st. that judgment was rendered in the suit mentioned in the condition of the said bond on the 26th March. 1810, and that this suit was not commenced within one year from the time of the rendition of said judgment. 2d. “ that “ final judgment was rendered against the principal, March “ 26, 1810, but that the execution, which issued on said “ judgment, was not returned to said justice within one year “ from the time of issuing the same.”\nTo these pleas there was a general demurrer and joinder in demurrer, and the court below rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.",
"id": "6756716",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "363",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "BENJAMIN PIERCE vs. WILLIAM READ et al.",
"name_abbreviation": "Pierce v. Read",
"parties": "BENJAMIN PIERCE vs. WILLIAM READ et al.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "2007"
} |
6756416 | page content | {
"char_count": "3008",
"citations": "2 N.H. 282",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 282,
"head_matter": "NATHANIEL MORRILL vs. ORLANDO A. MORRILL.\nWhere a testator gave to one of his sons “ $150, one-third payable in one, one-third •' m *\\¾and one-third ia three years after his decease,to he paid at the rate of ** and in proportion to likely six feet oxen at $50 per yoke,” it was held to be agilt of the rakte of a yoke of oxen at the respective times when the payments were to he made ; and such oxen being, at the time the first payment became doe, worth $70fh was held that the legatee was entitled to that sum.\nThis was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover a legacy given to the plaintiff in the will of his father, Oliver Morrill.\nThe cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon a statement of facts agreed to by the parties, in substance as follows. Oliver Morrill, the father of these parties, made his will, whereby, among other things, he bequeathed to the plaintiff $150; one-third part to be paid in one, one-third part in two, and one-third part in three years after his death; “ to be paid at the rate of and in proportion to likely six feet “ oxen, at $50 per yoke and appointed the defendant his executor. The said Oliver died in June, 1817, and the defendant caused the said will to be duly approved and allowed, and took upon himself the burthen of executing the same. And there is in the hands of the defendant, as executor. sufficient personal estate to pay all debts and legacies.\nIn June, 1818, when one-third of the said legacy became due, the plaintiff demanded the same of the defendant. Such oxen as are mentioned in the will were, at the lime of the said demand, and also at the time of making the will, and still are worth $70 per yoke. The plaintiff demanded the delivery of such a yoke of oxen, or the payment of their value, to wit, $70. The defendant tendered $50 in satisfaction of said third part of said legacy, and now brings the same sum into court, an 1 offers it to the plaintiff, but lie refuses to accept it. And it was agreed by the parties, that if the court should bo of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover more tfcar. ,rm $50, ⅛-n the defendant to be defaulted, otherwise the ukmtiffdo become nonsuit.\n.'\"•.bee?», for Use plaintiff.\nSu//.-.mi, for the defendant.",
"id": "6756416",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "283",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NATHANIEL MORRILL vs. ORLANDO A. MORRILL",
"name_abbreviation": "Morrill v. Morrill",
"parties": "NATHANIEL MORRILL vs. ORLANDO A. MORRILL.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "565"
} |
6756379 | page content | {
"char_count": "11303",
"citations": "2 N.H. 263",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 263,
"head_matter": "THE TOWN OF CONCORD vs. THE TOWN OF GOFFSTOWN.\nWhen a marriage takes place between a female pauper of one town and a male pauper of another town, the settlement of the female is changed to the latter town, if the paupers entered into the marriage contract without force, fraud, bribery, or any undue influence on the part of the former town.\nAfter the contract is made, the banns published, and the female has charged the male pauper with being father of an illegitimate child, of which she is pregnant, it is not a fraud or any other offence for the selectmen of the town in which tlie female is settled to advise concerning the solemnization of the contract and to go (ora minister to perform the ceremony.\nSemb. that if the selectmen had procured the contractor marriage and with, an intent to change the settlement of the female, the settlement would thereby have become changed, although the selectmen themselves might be liable to an indictment.\nThis was assumpsit for relief furnished to one Susan Johonnoll, between the 1st of August and the 4th of December, A. D. .18-18.\nAt the trial here, September term, A, D. 1819, the «only question was concerning the settlement of said Susan.\nOn the part of the plaintiffs, it was proved, that the pauper, March 26th, 1812, married William Johonnatt, who was then settled in Goffstown, and has since died, without obtaining any different settlement.\nOn the contrary, the defendants proved that before the marriage of said Susan, her settlement was in Concord , that both she and said William were then poor; that he was a black and infirm in health ; that she was not then supported at the expense of Concord, but had at a former period received some relief as a pauper ; that said Susan and William became acquainted with each other, and early as September, A.D. 1811, caused their intention of marriage to be published bj the town clerk of Concord ; that the celebration of it being deferred, and in March 181¾, she being pregnant,and having charged said William as the father of the child, the selectmen of Concord sent to Goffstown for said William to give indemnity for the support of the child : that said William accordingly came to Concord, and proposed to fulfil his promise of marriage ; that one of the selectmen, without any conference with his fellows and without any instructions from the town of Concord, but as he testified, at the request of the person, in whose house said Susan then resided, called upon a ministerio perform the marriage ceremosy ; that the minister hesitated to perform it in consequence of the want of a certificate of the publication of banns in Goffstown, but something being said as to indemnifying him, though the selectman testified that he made no agreement to do it, the marriage was solemnized.\nOn these facts, the parties by consent, took a verdict for the defendants, subject to future consideration on the operation of said marriage in respect to the settlement of the pauper.\nS. Fletcher, for the plain lifts.\nSmith, for the defendants.\n(1) 1 N. H. taws 362.",
"id": "6756379",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "268",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THE TOWN OF CONCORD vs. THE TOWN OF GOFFSTOWN",
"name_abbreviation": "Town of Concord v. Town of Goffstown",
"parties": "THE TOWN OF CONCORD vs. THE TOWN OF GOFFSTOWN.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1942"
} |
6757332 | page content | {
"char_count": "3294",
"citations": "2 N.H. 499",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 499,
"head_matter": "ELIPHALET MERRILL AND SALLY HIS WIFE vs. SHERBURNE SANBORN et a.\nA testator among other descendants left seven grand-children, the children of a deceased son ⅞ in his will, he mentioned two of these grand-children, and also their father ; it was held that the presumption of law was, the other five grandchildren were not omitted through forgetfulness.\nThis was a writ of entry, in which the demandants counted upon their own seisin in right of the wife of one undivided twenty-eighth part of a farm, lying partly in Chester, and partly in Poplin, in this county, and upon a disseisin by the tenants.\nThe cause was submitted to the decision of the court upon the following facts : John Hoit, senior, on the 23d February, 1815. made his will, at which time be bad two daughters, Molly Sanborn and Betsey Dowse, in full life, and seven grand-children, the children of his son John, deceased, viz. Sally Merrill, Joseph C. Hoit, Peter G. Hoit, Jv'ancy Bean, John Hoit, Moses Hoit, and Dorothy Neal ; and two grand children, the children of his daughter. Hannah Fitts, viz. Sally Roby and Betsey Fitts. The said will contained the following clauses.\n“ I give to my grandson Joseph C. Hoit, that gore of land i% on which his house now stands, and whicn I bought, &c.; “ likewise one half the orchard and the land it stands on, “ that I bought, «fee.; likewise one acre of land, &c. which “ was part of his father’s estate.\n1 N. H. ws 138.\n“ Item. I give to my grandson, Peter G. Hoil, $50, to be “ paid,’’ &c.\n“ Item. I give and bequeath to my daughter, Molly San- “ born, one third of my estate, both personal and real, &c. w during her natural life ; and my will is. that after her de- “ cease, to be equally divided among her children and their K heirs.”\n“ ítem. 1 give to Betsey Dowse, my daughter, the one “ third of my estate, &c. during her natural life ; and my “ will is, that the one half of that third, &c. after her de- “ cease, to be equally divided among her children and their s£ heirs.”\n“ Item. I give to Sally Roby and Betsey Fitts, my grand- “ daughters, the one third of my estate, &c. and their “ heirs, tobe equally divided between them.”\nJohn Hoil, the elder, died, and his will was proved in solemn form, January 18, 1819.\nThe question submitted to the decision of the court was, whether the children of the testator’s son John, who were not named in the will, were entitled to a share in the testator’s estate, under the 3d section of the act for the settling of testate estates ?(1)\nSullivan, for the demandants.\nFrench, for the tenants.",
"id": "6757332",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "501",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ELIPHALET MERRILL AND SALLY HIS WIFE vs. SHERBURNE SANBORN et a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Merrill v. Sanborn",
"parties": "ELIPHALET MERRILL AND SALLY HIS WIFE vs. SHERBURNE SANBORN et a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "587"
} |
6756593 | page content | {
"char_count": "4444",
"citations": "2 N.H. 315",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 315,
"head_matter": "JOHN SAWYER vs. DANIEL B. WHITTIER.\nIn an action against a sheriff for a false return, the particular damage resulting to the plaintiff from the falsity of the return must be alleged In the declaration 5 and the want of such allegation is not aided by a verdict, but judgment must be arrested.\nThis was an action of the case. The plaintiff alleged in his declaration, that J. Kimball and D. Tewksbury, by the consideration of the justices of the court of common pleas in this county, holden on the first Tuesday of September, 1814, recovered judgment against the plaintiff for $367 46 damage,and $9 16 costs of suit, as by the record, &c. and that said K. $• T. on the 19th September, 1814, sued out-execution in due form of law, directed &c., and among other things commanding that of the goods, chattels, or lands &c. and returnable to said court on the last Tuesday of February,1815 ; andón the 7th October 1814,the said K. $r T. delivered the same writ of execution to the defendant, then, and long afterwards a deputy sheriff under T. A, Edson, sheriff, &c. to be executed ; and on the same day the said Daniel B. extended the said execution upon a tract of land of said Sawyer, lying m Grafton and bounded, &c., and thereafterwards the said D. B. Whittier, wickedly intending to injure and defraud the plaintiff, made return of said execution to said court of common pleas on the last Tuesday of February, 1815, with a false return of his doings therein endorsed on said execution in the words and figures' following, viz., &c. The whole return was set out, and among others’contained these words ; “ Samuel Gile was ap- “ pointed and chosen appraiser by the said Sawyer, the debt- “ or.” It was then averred that in truth and in fact, he the said Sawyer did not choose or appoint the said Samuel Gile an appraiser, as the said Daniel B. in his return of his doings on said writ has alleged, but tbe said Daniel falsely made the said return, that the said Samuel Gile was appointed and chosen an appraiser by the said Sawyer, which is to the damage, &c.\nThe cause was tried here at May term, 1819, on the general issue, and a verdict returned for the plaintiff with $150 damages.\niff Fl'icher, for die defendant, moved arrest of judgment.\nP. Woifes, tor the plaintiff,\n(1) Cro. Eliz. «52.",
"id": "6756593",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "316",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOHN SAWYER vs. DANIEL B. WHITTIER",
"name_abbreviation": "Sawyer v. Whittier",
"parties": "JOHN SAWYER vs. DANIEL B. WHITTIER.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "802"
} |
6755262 | page content | {
"char_count": "10435",
"citations": "2 N.H. 66",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-09",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 66,
"head_matter": "JOHN B. ODIORNE vs. JONATHAN COLLEY.\nMere naked possession, without some kind of property, will not enable a person to maintain trover.\n‘To constitute a valid attachment of personal estate, it must be taken into the possession, or be placed under the control of the officer.\nWhile such an attachment subsists, the property cannot be duly attached by another officer; but a second attachment should, in sueh case, be made by the first officer.\nIf the property has been delivered to a receipter, and he assent to the doings of the second officer, the second attachment is still invalid.\nThis was trover for a quantity of merchandize.\nThe cause was tried in this county, at February term, A. D. 1819, under the general issue.\nIt appeared in evidence, that on the 17th June, 1817, a writ of attachment was sued out by Wells and others, vs. one Hay ford, and, on the 30i.h of the same month, was delivered to the present plaintiff, then a deputy sheriff, to be served.\nThe plaintiff immediately proceeded to the residence of Hay ford, and there ascertained, that, on the 2d of June, A. D. 1817, the defendant being also a deputy sheriff, had attached the goods of Hay ford, which are the subject of the present fiction, and, after removing them to the house of one Gilman, had delivered them into his custody, and taken his receipt to return them on demand, or pay their value.\nThe plaintiff then called on Gilman, and requested him to detain the goods for the benefit of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant, which Gilman verbally promised to do ; and the plaintiff thereupon made a return on the writ in his hands, that he had attached the goods subject toa prior attachment by the defendant.\nThe attachment, made by the defendant, was upon two writs, which were duly entered, August term, 1817 ; but on one of them there became a nonsuit, and on the other, though judgment was recovered, yet no execution was sued out till more than thirty days afterwards.\nA new suit was commenced by the party, who became non-suit, and, on the 14th of August, 1817, before the thirty days above mentioned had expired, the same goods were again attached upon it by the defendant: were removed from Gil-man's custody ; his receipt cancelled ; and the possession of the goods has since been withheld from the plaintiff.\nOn these facts a verdict, bj consent, was taken for the plaintiff, for the value of the goods, subject to the opinion of the court on further advisement.\nThe cause having been continued nisi, judgment was rendered in Rockingham, September term, A. D. 1819.\nClagge.it $• J. Smith, counsel for the plaintiff.\nM'Intire, (of Maine,) $• Mason, for the defendant.\nRep! m*'\n16 John 288.",
"id": "6755262",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "70",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JOHN B. ODIORNE vs. JONATHAN COLLEY",
"name_abbreviation": "Odiorne v. Colley",
"parties": "JOHN B. ODIORNE vs. JONATHAN COLLEY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1822"
} |
6756899 | page content | {
"char_count": "2825",
"citations": "2 N.H. 410",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 410,
"head_matter": "GRAFTON,\nNOVEMBER TERM, 1821.\nLIFE YOUNG vs. CYRUS BERKLEY.\nIn an action between the endorsee and the maker of a note, if it appear that the endorsee is a b&najide holder of the note without notice, the maker cannot be permitted to setup usury as a defence.\nAssumpsit upon a note of hand for $200, made by the defendant and payable to John Young, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff.\nThe cause was tried here at May term, 1821, upon the general issue. The plaintiff having proved the making and endorsement of the note, the defendant proposed to prove, that $28 80, part of the sum mentioned in the note, was illegal interest reserved upon the residue of the $200, and it was contended by his counsel, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only $,171 20, and interest. But it appearing that the note was bona fide endorsed to the plaintiff before it was discredited, the court rejected the evidence, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court upon the admissibility of the evidence thus rejected.\nBel!, for the plaintiff.\nGoodall, for the defendant.\n(1)1 N. H. Laws 286.",
"id": "6756899",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "412",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "LIFE YOUNG vs. CYRUS BERKLEY",
"name_abbreviation": "Young v. Berkley",
"parties": "LIFE YOUNG vs. CYRUS BERKLEY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "518"
} |
6757453 | page content | {
"char_count": "6283",
"citations": "2 N.H. 543",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-04",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 543,
"head_matter": "THOMAS BOWERS vs. JAMES JEWELL.\nThe court decide on the materiality of any alteration in a written instrument ; but whether made by consent, or with fraudulent motive*, must be settled by the jury- ,.\n,. An immaterial alteration by the promisee of a note does not vitiate it.\nAn alteration of the date of a note from A. D. 1809, to 1819, though the note was in truth executed in AD. 1819, is material.\nConsent to an alteration may be either implied or express.\nThis was assumpsit on a promissory note, dated September 10th, 1819, for $21 25 payable in one year with interest..\nThe cause was tried here October term, 1322, on the general issue, when it appeared in evidence that the note was actually made on the day it purported to be dated, but in fact was originally written as of the date of September 10th, A. D. 1809, and had since been altered to A. D. 1819. There was no express evidence of the knowledge or consent of the maker to the alteration. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to future consideration on the above facts.\nAbbot and French, counsel for the plaintiff.\nB. M. Farky, for the defendant,",
"id": "6757453",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "546",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "THOMAS BOWERS vs. JAMES JEWELL",
"name_abbreviation": "Bowers v. Jewell",
"parties": "THOMAS BOWERS vs. JAMES JEWELL.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1137"
} |
6755738 | page content | {
"char_count": "9152",
"citations": "2 N.H. 148",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1819-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 148,
"head_matter": "COOS BANK vs. SAMUEL BROOKS.\nWhen a debtor owns in land, set off under an extent, a less interest than thru which was appraised and returned, all the interest, which he actually owned will pass to the creditor.\nIn our statute, eiviníí; a new execution where the “ estate” extended did not belong ?a the iuiL1 ofnt debtor, the word, “ estate,” means as well the quantity of inter* o'* in the In >d as the land itself; and a scire facías lies for a new execution Jm ' !• 'bin ..nice in value between the “ estate” setoff, and the “estate” actu-ad'- oi-iul by the debtor, whether that difference arise from a total failure of tub* h ' ay pa t of the land, or from a partial failure in the quantity of interest s-’t off in me land.\nTais was a scire facias to obtain a new execution on a judgment, rendered between these parties, October term, 1810.\nIt was alleged, that the original execution had been levied in part on personal, and in part on real estate, then supposed to belong to the defendant; but that the title to a part of the real estate, which had been set off in fee simple, had altogether failed, and that the plaintiffs had since been evicted.\nThe defendant pleaded first, that the title to the real estate described, did, at the time of the extent, belong to him in fee simple ; and secondly,that the plaintiffs had not since been evicted.\nThe issues thus tendered were joined, and at the trial here, November term, 1810, the following facts appeared in evidence.\nEarly as June 24th, 1797, the defendant executed a mortgage deed of that parí of the real estate now in controversy, to James Cutter and Jonathan Amory, to secure the payment of $928 72 in three years ; that, when the extent was made, there still remained due on the mortgage about $500 ; that the mortgage deed, though on record, was probably not known to the plaintiffs or the appraisers ; that the land was estimated at its full value and set off in fee simple ; that David Webster, the general agent of the plaintiffs in other concerns, but who in this instance acted on his private account, proceeded sometime after the extent, to purchase of Cutler and Amory their interest in the premises, and having entered and foreclosed the equity of redemption, released his title for a valuable consideration to the present plaintiffs.\nOn this evidence a verdict was taken by consent for the plaintiffs, for the sum at which this part of the real estate thus extended was appraised, subject to be set aside or amended according to the future opinion of the court on the whole case.\nBell, counsel for the plaintiffs.\nSwan, for the defendant.\n(1) 3 Man], k Sehv. 392, Isherwood vs. Oldknow.\n(2) Perk. Con. sec 114 — 13 John.412— 7 Cran. 35.— 14 Mass. Rep. 407.\n(3) Noy 142, Gray vs. Poriscoe,\n(4) 11 Mass, Rep. 226, Warren vb. Child.",
"id": "6755738",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "152",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "COOS BANK vs. SAMUEL BROOKS",
"name_abbreviation": "Bank v. Brooks",
"parties": "COOS BANK vs. SAMUEL BROOKS.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1654"
} |
6756912 | page content | {
"char_count": "5232",
"citations": "2 N.H. 413",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 413,
"head_matter": "WILLIAM NEELSON vs. CALEB SANBORNE.\nA. gives B. a note of hand, and afterwards C. signed an agreement on the back of the note as follows, “ I guarantee the payment Of the contents of the within, “ note to B., the one half within six months, and the other half within twelve ‘‘ months;” it was held, that this \"was a sufficient memorandum of the agreement within the statute of frauds.\nAssumpsit. B. Stevens and M. Hall gave the plaintiff a note of hand in the following words : “ Ryegate, August 28, 1818. For value received, we the subscribers jointly and severally promise to pay William Neelson, of Ryegate, seventy-eight dollars by the first day of March next.” And the defendant signed an agreement on the back of the note, as follows : “ Barnet, Aug. 26, 1819. I guarantee the payment of the contents of the wdthin note to William Neelson, the one half wdthin six months, and the other half within twelve months.” And upon this the action was founded.\nThe cause was tried here upon the general issue, at May term, 1821, when the court being of opinion that as this was a contract to pay the debt of another, not only the promise, but the consideration also upon which the promise was founded, must be in writing; directed the jury that no action could be maintained upon the promise, no consideration being expressed in the memorandum of the contract, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.\nThe plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the ground that the jury had been misdirected in a matter of law.\nGoodall, for the plaintiff.\nBell, for the defendant.\n(l) 1 N. H. •Laws 178.",
"id": "6756912",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "415",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "WILLIAM NEELSON vs. CALEB SANBORNE",
"name_abbreviation": "Neelson v. Sanborne",
"parties": "WILLIAM NEELSON vs. CALEB SANBORNE.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "911"
} |
6757510 | page content | {
"char_count": "2847",
"citations": "2 N.H. 557",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 557,
"head_matter": "JAMES TIBBETS vs. JACOB KIAH.\nA writ will not abate, on the ground, that the name of the defendant is spelt differently in the writ from his manner of spelling it, provided both modes of spelling have the same sound.\nThis was assumpsit on an account annexed.\nThe defendant pleaded in abatement that he “ was known and called by the surname of Currier, and not Kiah.” The plaintiff replied that the defendant “ was called and known as well by the name of Jacob Kiah, as by the name of Jacob Currier,” and an issue being joined on this fact, it was found for the plaintiff, under a direction from the court, that however the defendant might spell his name, yet if it was pronounced according to the spelling used by the plaintiff, he was entitled to their verdict.\nA motion was made for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection,\nP. Walker, counsel for the plaintiff.\njV. Rogers, for the defendant. -\n(1) Shep. T. 55.",
"id": "6757510",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "559",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "JAMES TIBBETS vs. JACOB KIAH",
"name_abbreviation": "Tibbets v. Kiah",
"parties": "JAMES TIBBETS vs. JACOB KIAH.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "511"
} |
6757356 | page content | {
"char_count": "2739",
"citations": "2 N.H. 507",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-10",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 507,
"head_matter": "REBECCA SHEPHERD vs. JONATHAN HOWARD.\nWhere A. conveyed a tract of land to B. m 1805, and m 1810, A. being still living, his wife by a separate deed released her right of dower in the land, it was held that the wife was estopped by the deed from demanding her dower after A.'s death.\nThis was a writ of dower. The tenant pleaded in bar a release by deed made by the demandant of her right of dower in the demanded premises. The demandant craved oyer of the deed of release, which was as follows :\n“ Know all men, &c. that I Rebecca Shepherd, wife of Jona-u than Shepherd, &c. in consideration of one dollar to me “ paid by Thomas Melville, &c. do by these presents relinquish, “ release, and quitclaim to the said Melville all my right and “ title of dower in and to certain premises conveyed by said “ Jonathan Shepherd to said Thomas Melville, by deed, dated “ March 2d, 1805, &e.\n“ In testimony whereof, I the said Rebecca Shepherd, wife “ of the said Jonathan, as aforesaid, do hereby set my hand, “ &c. this 10th day oí December, 1810.”\nShe then replied that the said instrument was net her deed, upon which issue was joined.\nThe cause was tried here at October term, 1821, and a verdict taken for the tenant, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case.\nOn the 2d March, 1805, Jonathan Shepherd, the demand-ant’s late husband, by deed of that date, conveyed the land in which the said Rebecca now claims her dower, io otic Thomas Melville, in fee and in mortgage, and on the 10th December, 1810, the demandant, then being the wife of the said Jonathan Shepherd, made the instrument set out in the replication. The tenant, is in possession under a title derived from the said Thomas Melville, and the right in equity, which the said Jonathan Shepherd had to redeem the land, has been foreclosed.\nAtherton, for the plaintiff.\nE. Parker, for the defendant.",
"id": "6757356",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "508",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "REBECCA SHEPHERD vs. JONATHAN HOWARD",
"name_abbreviation": "Shepherd v. Howard",
"parties": "REBECCA SHEPHERD vs. JONATHAN HOWARD.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "499"
} |
6756975 | page content | {
"char_count": "5900",
"citations": "2 N.H. 422",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1822-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 422,
"head_matter": "STRAFFORD,\nFEBRUARY TERM, 1822.\nNATHANIEL HAYES vs. BENJAMIN BENNETT, jun.\nWhen a submission to arbitrators by a rale before a j«slice of the peace describes the subject matter as “ a controversy under two hundred dollars,” without any farther specification, it is void for uncertainty.\nBut the statute, which empowers justices of the peace to make rales and render judgment on reports in such submissions, is not unconstitutional.\nThis was a writ of error, brought to reverse a judgment rendered upon a report of referees by a justice of the peace.\nIt appeared from the papers in the case, that on a certain day, the parties appeared before the magistrate, and in writing stated, that having “ a controversy between them under “ $200” in amount, they agreed to refer it to A., B, and C., and requested the magistrate to make a rule in conformity with their agreement. He accordingly made the rule, and described the subject submitted, in the same manner in which it was described in the agreement.\nA report was afterwards made to him in favor of Bennettr and judgment having been rendered upon it, this writ of error was brought to reverse that judgment.\nEastman, counsel for the plaintiff.\nWoodman and J» Smith, for the defendant,\nLaws 20, 8». (l) l E H.",
"id": "6756975",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "425",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "NATHANIEL HAYES vs. BENJAMIN BENNETT, jun",
"name_abbreviation": "Hayes v. Bennett",
"parties": "NATHANIEL HAYES vs. BENJAMIN BENNETT, jun.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "977"
} |
6756605 | page content | {
"char_count": "5750",
"citations": "2 N.H. 317",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1820-11",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 317,
"head_matter": "ZIBA HUNTINGTON vs. JOSHUA BLAISDELL et al.\nTo constitute a valid attachment of personal property, the officer must \"nave all the articles within his power.\nBut he need not touch all the articles, if he have the pow^r to tmrh ams control all,and is engaged in making the seizure of all. In addition to this, in nm*f y >‘o cecd to inventory all the articles soon as, under the cm umstancc®, i« practicable ; and then remove or leave them in the actual custody of some agent\nThis was trespass de, bonis asportatis for a quantity of household furniture. The defendants pleaded 1st, not guilty, and 2dly, that Blaisdell, as a deputy sheriff', and the other defendants, as his assistants, took and removed the furniture as the property of one Luther Delano,against whom Blaisdell had a writ of attachment in favor of Josiah Barnes. The plaintiff’ joined the general issue, and to the special plea replied, that the title to the furniture at the time of the removal was in him and not in Delano.\nOn the trial here in November, A.D. 1819, it appeared in evidence, that both of the principal parties in this case were deputy sheriffs ; that on the day of the alleged trespass, each having precepts against Delano, rode with considerable speed towards his house ; that the plaintiff first obtained admission into it, and then gave notice that he attached all the furniture therein; that he immediately laid bis hands on some of it, and proceeded to make out an inventory of the whole; that while thus engaged, not having locked the doors of the house, Blaisdell entered, and before Huntington had reached a chamber where was the property named in the writ, proceeded to take and remove from that chamber by virtue of the precepts in his possession, all the articles described.\nThere was some evidence, however; that one bed -was taken by Blaisdell from a different apartment, and the fact as to which person first entered the chamber being questioned, it was submitted to the jury and found for the defendants.\nA general verdict was then, by consent, taken for the plaintiff for the value of the furniture, subject to future consideration.\nBell, counsel for the plaintiff.\nMopes and Blaisdell, for the defendants.\n(1) 1 Salk. “Arrest.”\n(2) 13 Mass. Rep. 128.\n(3) Bac. Ab. “Distress D.\n(4) is John, y 13 Mass. Rep. 116.",
"id": "6756605",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "319",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "ZIBA HUNTINGTON vs. JOSHUA BLAISDELL et al.",
"name_abbreviation": "Huntington v. Blaisdell",
"parties": "ZIBA HUNTINGTON vs. JOSHUA BLAISDELL et al.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "1041"
} |
6756622 | page content | {
"char_count": "4621",
"citations": "2 N.H. 322",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1821-02",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 322,
"head_matter": "STRAFFORD,\nFEBRUARY TERM, 1821.\nBARNARD HOIT vs. JOHN MOLONY.\nWhen the ad damnum in a writ is left blank, the defect is not cured by a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.\nWhere the court has general jurisdiction of a cause, and a verdict is found for more than the sum demanded, a remittitur may be entered as to the excess, and judgment taken for the residue, or the verdict may be set aside, and leave then given to amend.\nBut when no damages are demanded, and the court have no jurisdiction, unless the ad damnum exceed fifty dollars, no amendment can be allowed, and notwith~ standing a verdict, the proceedings must be quashed.\nThe sum demanded and not the sum in dispute determines the jurisdiction of this court in personal actions.\nThis was trover for a quantity of household furniture. The action was commenced in this court, and, September term, A. D. 1820, a verdict found for the plaintiff for $77. The defendant moved an arrest of judgment, on the ground that the ad damnum in the writ had never been filled up. On the other hand, the plaintiff contended that this defect was cured by the verdict, or if not cured, that he was entitled to remedy the defect by an amendment.\nAtkinson and Ick, Bartlett, counsel for the plaintiff.\nPerkins, for the defendant.\n(1) Yelv. 45, note, Persivalvs- sPencer*\n(2) 1 N. H. Laws 99.",
"id": "6756622",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "324",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "BARNARD HOIT vs. JOHN MOLONY",
"name_abbreviation": "Hoit v. Molony",
"parties": "BARNARD HOIT vs. JOHN MOLONY.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "843"
} |
6757475 | page content | {
"char_count": "3723",
"citations": "2 N.H. 550",
"court": "New Hampshire Superior Court",
"decision_date": "1823-05",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 550,
"head_matter": "STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE vs. S. A. PEARSON et al.\nA complaint for a forcible entry, most allege that the complainant was seized of the premises, or possessed thereof for a term of years, and that the entry was with a strong hand.\nThis was a writ, of certiorari, commanding two justices of the peace in this county to certiiy their doings upon a certain process of forcible entry and detainer, had before them upon the complaint of Thomas S. Tillotson. The complaint, upon which the justices had proceeded, was as follows :\n“ To W, L. and J. B. esquires, &c. complains T, S. Til- “ lotson, that S. A. Pearson and Benjamin Stephenson, or the ;i fourth day of March last past, with force and arms did “ forcibly and unlawfully enter into, and upon, a certain \"tract or parcel of land together with a store thereon standing, lying and being situate in Lancaster aforesaid, “ &c.; and him the said Thomas S. Tillotson with force and u arms as aforesaid, the said 5. /I. Pearson ⅜- B. Stephenson, “ did expel and unlawfully put out of possession and occupation of the premises aforesaid, and with force and arms5 “ as aforesaid, do unlawfully hold the possession of the same “ from him, th^ said T. S. Tillotson.”\nThe respondents being found guilty by a jury, were ordered by the justices to pay a fine and costs, &c. ; whereupon, they brought up the record by this certiorari, and moved the court to quash the proceedings for defects in the complaint.",
"id": "6757475",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "552",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:12:45.367212+00:00",
"name": "STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE vs. S. A. PEARSON et al.",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Pearson",
"parties": "STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE vs. S. A. PEARSON et al.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "2",
"word_count": "677"
} |
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