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41. It therefore follows from reading Article 3(1) in conjunction with Article 5 of Regulation No 857/84 that, although the Community legislature intended to grant the Member States the power to enable producers who have incurred investment obligations to enjoy the fruits of their investments (see, to that effect, Cornée and Others , paragraph 12, and Spronk , paragraph 15), the power of the Member States to grant special reference quantities for that purpose can be exercised only within the limits of the guaranteed quantity and those quantities are met from the national reserve. Contrary to Mr Piek’s submission, such a constraint may be capable of justifying a temporal limitation of the investment obligations that may be taken into account in that regard.

12 Article 3 ( 1 ) of Regulation No 857/84 provides that : "Producers who have adopted milk production development plans under Directive 72/159/EEC lodged before 1 March 1984 may obtain, according to the Member State' s decision ... if the plan is still being implemented, a special reference quantity taking account of the milk and milk product quantities provided for in the development plan ." That provision enables producers holding a milk production development plan approved under Directive 72/159/EEC to enjoy the fruits of the investments which they have made in the implementation of such a plan .

32. In that regard, it must be held that, contrary to the submission of Smart Technologies, the findings of the General Court in paragraph 31 of the judgment under appeal do not disclose a misreading of the principles established by the Court of Justice, inter alia in paragraph 45 of Audi v OHIM , in which the Court held that, in so far as the public perceives the mark as an indication of the commercial origin of goods or services, the fact that the mark is at the same time understood — perhaps even primarily understood — as a promotional formula has no bearing on its distinctive character.

22. It follows, first, that the subject-matter of the proceedings under Article 226 EC is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure governed by that provision. Accordingly, the application must be based on the same grounds and pleas as the reasoned opinion (see, Case C-287/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-5811, paragraph 18, and Case C-305/03 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] ECR I‑1213, paragraph 22).

18 It follows, first, that the subject-matter of the proceedings under Article 226 EC is delimited by the pre-litigation procedure governed by that provision. Accordingly, the application must be based on the same grounds and pleas as the reasoned opinion (see, in particular, Commission v Italy, cited above, paragraph 11).

41. Here it is to be noted that Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement is supposed to ‘prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships’.

37. According to settled case-law of the Court, the right of action available to the Member States, Parliament, the Council and the Commission, provided for in the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is not conditional on proof of an interest in bringing proceedings (see, to that effect, Italy v Council , paragraph 6; Commission v Council , paragraph 3; Case C-378/00 Commission v Parliament and Council [2003] ECR I-937, paragraph 28; Case C-370/07 Commission v Council [2009] ECR I-8917, paragraph 16; and Joined Cases C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission [2011] ECR I-9639, paragraph 36).

28. Article 230 EC draws a clear distinction between the right of action available to the Community institutions and the Member States on the one hand and that available to natural or legal persons on the other, inter alia by giving the Commission the right to bring an action for annulment in order to challenge the legality of any measure adopted jointly by the Parliament and the Council, without making the exercise of that right conditional on proof of an interest in bringing proceedings (see, to that effect, Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493, paragraph 3). Neither is exercise of that right conditional on the position taken by the Commission at the time when the measure in question was adopted (see, by analogy, as regards positions taken by representatives of the Member States sitting in Council when a regulation is adopted, Case 166/78 Italy v Council [1979] ECR 2575, paragraph 6).

43. Il convient également de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, c’est, en principe, à l’État membre de résidence qu’il incombe d’accorder au contribuable la totalité des avantages fiscaux liés à sa situation personnelle et familiale, cet État membre étant, sauf exception, le mieux à même d’apprécier la capacité contributive personnelle dudit contribuable dans la mesure où ce dernier y dispose du centre de ses intérêts personnels et patrimoniaux (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 février 1995, Schumacker, C‑279/93, Rec. p. I‑225, point 32; du 16 mai 2000, Zurstrassen, C‑87/99, Rec. p. I‑3337, point 21, et Beker, précité, point 43).

12. In this respect it is appropriate to state that under Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34, a national provision of a Member State prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product must be regarded as a category of technical regulation (see Case C-267/03 Lindberg [2005] ECR I-0000, paragraph 54).

54. It follows from Article 1(9) of Directive 83/189 that the definition of ‘technical regulation’ is divided into three categories, namely, first, the ‘technical specification’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that directive, second, the ‘other requirement’ as defined in Article 1(3) of that directive and, third, the ‘provisions … prohibiting the manufacture, importation, marketing or use of a product’ referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 1(9) of that directive.

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

22 In order to answer that question, it is appropriate first of all to note that the source of the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, as given concrete expression by Directive 2000/78, is to be found, as is clear from recitals 1 and 4 of the directive, in various international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States (see judgments in Mangold, C‑144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 74, and Kücükdeveci, C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraphs 20 and 21). It is also apparent from the Court’s case-law that that principle, now enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be regarded as a general principle of EU law (see judgments in Mangold, C‑144/04, EU:C:2005:709, paragraph 75, and Kücükdeveci, C‑555/07, EU:C:2010:21, paragraph 21).

21. In that context, the Court has acknowledged the existence of a principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age which must be regarded as a general principle of European Union law (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraph 75). Directive 2000/78 gives specific expression to that principle (see, by analogy, Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 54).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

28. According to settled case-law, a person who acquires goods for the purposes of an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4 does so as a taxable person (Case C‑97/90 Lennartz [1991] ECR I‑3795, paragraph 14; Joined Cases C‑110/98 to C‑147/98 Gabalfrisa and Others [2000] ECR I‑1577, paragraph 47; and Case C‑400/98 Breitsohl [2000] ECR I‑4321, paragraph 34), even if the goods are not used immediately for such economic activities (see, to that effect, Case 268/83 Rompelman [1985] ECR 655, paragraph 22). Contrary to what the German Government argues, the validity of those findings is in no way limited by the identity of the person whose economic activity is in question.

14 It follows from that judgment that a person who acquires goods for the purposes of an economic activity within the meaning of Article 4 does so as a taxable person, even if the goods are not used immediately for such economic activities.

40. En effet, d’une part, les effets des dispositions nationales visées dans cet avis auraient perduré aussi longtemps que les droits d’utilisation des fréquences, attribués au cours de l’année 2009 sur la base desdites dispositions, sont demeurés en vigueur. Au soutien de cette thèse, la Commission invoque la jurisprudence de la Cour en matière de manquements à la réglementation relative aux marchés publics et, notamment, l’arrêt Commission/Allemagne (C‑20/01 et C‑28/01, EU:C:2003:220), dans lequel la Cour a jugé qu’un recours est recevable lorsqu’un contrat attribué sur la base de dispositions nationales contraires au droit de l’Union n’a pas été entièrement exécuté avant le terme fixé dans l’avis motivé, quand bien même lesdites dispositions avaient elles-mêmes cessé d’être applicables avant cette date. En l’occurrence, il serait constant que ces droits d’utilisation étaient toujours en vigueur au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé.

55. It follows, however, from the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 that a difference in treatment based on age does not constitute discrimination if, within the context of national law, it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim and where the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary ( Prigge and Others , paragraph 77, and judgment of 5 July 2012 in Case C‑141/11 Hörnfeldt , paragraph 21).

21. However, it follows from the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 that differences of treatment on grounds of age are not to constitute discrimination if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment, labour-market and vocational-training policy objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

69 Where access to roads is provided, what interests the user is the possibility offered to him of making a particular journey rapidly and more safely. The duration of the use of the road is not a factor taken into account by the parties, in particular in determining the price.

22. It should be noted, in this regard, that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice extends to the interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair term’ used in Article 3(1) of the Directive and in the annex thereto, and to the criteria which the national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of the provisions of the Directive, bearing in mind that it is for that court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circumstances of the case (Case C‑137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing [2010] ECR I‑10847, paragraph 44). It is thus clear that the Court of Justice must limit itself, in its response, to providing the referring court with the indications which the latter must take into account in order to assess whether the term at issue is unfair.

44. The answer to the first and second additional questions referred is therefore that Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice extends to the interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair term’ used in Article 3(1) of the Directive and in the annex thereto, and to the criteria which the national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term in the light of the provisions of the Directive, bearing in mind that it is for that court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether a particular contractual term is actually unfair in the circumstances of the case. The third additional question referred

24 Accordingly, benefits of that type are essentially intended to supplement sickness insurance benefits to which they are, moreover, linked at the organisational level, in order to improve the state of health and the quality of life of persons reliant on care.

68. According to settled case-law, it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see Case C‑313/05 Brzeziński [2007] ECR I‑513, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

56. Accordingly, it is only exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the Community legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties (see, inter alia, Case C‑57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I‑4541, paragraph 21; Case C‑372/98 Cooke [2000] ECR I‑8683, paragraph 42; and Skov and Bilka , paragraph 51).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

11 It is true that the effect of the national provision referred to in paragraph 4 above is to subject traders to different procedural rules according to whether they supply goods within the Member State concerned or export them to other Member States. However, as the French and Austrian Governments have rightly pointed out, the possibility that nationals would therefore hesitate to sell goods to purchasers established in other Member States is too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be regarded as liable to hinder trade between Member States (see, in a different context, Case C-69/88 Krantz v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen [1990] ECR I-583, paragraph 11, Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique v Sulzer [1991] ECR I-107, paragraphs 14 and 15, and Case C-93/92 CMC Motorradcenter v Baskiciogullari [1993] ECR I-5009, paragraph 12).

11 Furthermore, the possibility that nationals of other Member States would hesitate to sell goods on instalment terms to purchasers in the Member State concerned because such goods would be liable to seizure by the collector of taxes if the purchasers failed to discharge their Netherlands tax debts is too uncertain and indirect to warrant the conclusion that a national provision authorizing such seizure is liable to hinder trade between Member States .

34. Therefore, the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive accuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess the evidence relied on. The establishment of those facts and the assessment of that evidence do not therefore, save where they are distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑449/99 P EIB v Hautem [2001] ECR I‑6733, paragraph 44, and Case C‑105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8725, paragraphs 69 and 70).

31. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the concept of force majeure must be understood as referring to unusual and unforeseeable circumstances which were beyond the control of the party by whom it is pleaded and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all due care had been exercised (Case 145/85 Denkavit België [1987] ECR 565, paragraph 11; Case C‑377/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I‑9733, paragraph 95; and Case C‑218/09 SGS Belgium and Others [2010] ECR I‑2373, paragraph 44).

44. It follows from settled case-law that the concept of force majeure must be understood, in general, in the sense of abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances, outside the control of the party relying thereupon, the consequences of which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, could not have been avoided (see, inter alia, Case 145/85 Denkavit België [1987] ECR 565, paragraph 11, and Case C‑377/03 Commission v Belgium [2006] ECR I‑9733, paragraph 95).

17 SINCE ACTUAL ACCESS TO THE MARKET OF DESTINATION IS GENERALLY SUBJECT TO THE COMPLETION OF FORMALITIES FOR RELEASE INTO FREE CIRCULATION IN THE COUNTRY OF DESTINATION , THE FACT THAT THE PRODUCT IS DESTROYED OR RE-EXPORTED BEFORE BEING RELEASED INTO FREE CIRCULATION MEANS THAT IT CANNOT , FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PAYMENT OF THE VARIABLE REFUND , BE REGARDED AS HAVING BEEN IMPORTED WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 6 ( 2 ) OF REGULATION NO 876/68 AND ARTICLE 6 ( 1 ) OF REGULATION NO 192/75 .

118. En conséquence, ainsi que la Cour l’a déjà relevé dans des circonstances similaires, même lorsque, comme en l’espèce, l’activité de liquidation et de recouvrement des impôts relève, en principe, des prérogatives de l’autorité publique, dès lors que les Communautés autonomes confient cette activité à un tiers indépendant agissant dans les conditions décrites ci-dessus, la règle de non-assujettissement prévue par l’article 4, paragraphe 5, de la sixième directive n’est pas applicable (arrêts précités Commission/Pays-Bas, point 22, et Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, point 20, ainsi que ordonnance Mihal, précitée, point 22).

20 It follows that, if a commune entrusts the activity of collecting taxes to an independent third party, the exclusion from VAT provided for by the abovementioned provision is not applicable.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

14. It should be recalled, in this connection, that the notion of proceedings ‘concerned with the registration or validity of patents’ contained in Article 16(4) of the Convention must be regarded as an independent concept intended to have uniform application in all the Contracting States (Case 288/82 Duijnstee [1983] ECR 3663, paragraph 19).

19 THUS THE TERM ' ' PROCEEDINGS CONCERNED WITH THE REGISTRATION OR VALIDITY OF PATENTS ' ' CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 16 ( 4 ) MUST BE REGARDED AS AN INDEPENDENT CONCEPT INTENDED TO HAVE UNIFORM APPLICATION IN ALL THE CONTRACTING STATES .

38 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-207/00 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4571, paragraph 27).

128. Further, the Court has ruled that, contrary to the procedure laid down in Articles 33 to 35 of the Regulation in respect of the application for a declaration of enforceability, judgments issued in accordance with Section 4 of Chapter III thereof (rights of access and return of the child) may be declared enforceable by the court of origin irrespective of any possibility of appeal, whether in the Member State of origin or in that of enforcement (Case C‑195/08 PPU Rinau [2008] ECR I‑5271, paragraph 84).

84. Moreover, it is backed up by two elements. The first is based on the words ‘any subsequent judgment which requires the return of the child’ in Article 11(8) of the Regulation, words which express the idea that, once the non‑return decision has been taken, the court of origin may be required to take one or more decisions in order to obtain the return of the child, including in situations where there is a procedural or factual impasse. The second element is of a systemic nature and rests on the fact that, contrary to the procedure laid down in Articles 33 to 35 of the Regulation in respect of the application for a declaration of enforceability, judgments issued in accordance with Section 4 of Chapter III thereof (rights of access and return of the child) may be declared enforceable by the court of origin irrespective of any possibility of appeal, whether in the Member State of origin or in that of enforcement.

75. Such inconvenience might arise from the discrepancy in the forms in which the same surname is entered for two persons constituting the same married couple (see, to that effect, Garcia Avello , paragraph 36, and Sayn-Wittgenstein , paragraphs 55 and 66).

34. As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts established by Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see,inter alia , Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, paragraph 59, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 38, and Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paragraph 18).

59 As to those submissions, it is to be remembered that, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts provided for by Article 177 of the Treaty, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of Community law, the Court of Justice is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C-125/94 Aprile v Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1995] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 16 and 17).

54. En ce qui concerne les justifications invoquées par la République d’Autriche, il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante qu’une réglementation ou une pratique nationale qui constitue une mesure d’effet équivalent à des restrictions quantitatives ne peut être justifiée que par l’une des raisons d’intérêt général énumérées à l’article 30 CE ou par des exigences impératives (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 5 février 2004, Commission/Italie, C‑270/02, Rec. p. I‑1559, point 21, et du 20 septembre 2007, Commission/Pays-Bas, C‑297/05, Rec. p. I‑7467, point 75). Dans l’un et l’autre cas, la mesure nationale doit être propre à garantir la réalisation de l’objectif poursuivi et ne pas aller au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour qu’il soit atteint (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 8 mai 2003, ATRAL, C‑14/02, Rec. p. I‑4431, point 64; du 15 mars 2007, Commission/Finlande, C‑54/05, Rec. p. I‑2473, point 38, et du 24 avril 2008, Commission/Luxembourg, C‑286/07, point 36).

43. In that regard, the Court has acknowledged, first, that the objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all may fall within the derogations on grounds of public health provided for in Article 46 EC, in so far as such an objective contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection ( Kohll , paragraph 50; Müller‑Fauré and van Riet , paragraphs 67 and 71, and Watts , paragraph 104), and, secondly, that it cannot be excluded that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying an obstacle to the principle of freedom to provide services ( Kohll , paragraph 41; Müller‑Fauré and van Riet , paragraph 73; Watts , paragraph 103, and Elchinov , paragraph 42).

50 As to the objective of maintaining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all, that objective, although intrinsically linked to the method of financing the social security system, may also fall within the derogations on grounds of public health under Article 56 of the Treaty, in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high level of health protection.

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

44. Accordingly, provided that the legal situation arising from the national transposition measures is sufficiently precise and clear and that the persons concerned are put in a position to know the full extent of their rights and obligations, transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. Likewise, as noted by the Advocate General in point 62 of her Opinion, the transposition of a directive may, depending on its content, be achieved through a general legal context, so that a formal and express re-enactment of the provisions of the directive in specific national provisions is not necessary (see Commission v Italy , paragraph 51, and Case C‑428/04 Commission v Austria [2006] ECR I‑3325, paragraph 99).

51. While it is therefore essential that the legal situation resulting from national implementing measures is sufficiently precise and clear to enable the individuals concerned to know the extent of their rights and obligations, it is none the less the case that, according to the very words of the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, Member States may choose the form and methods for implementing directives which best ensure the result to be achieved by the directives, and that provision shows that the transposition of a directive into national law does not necessarily require legislative action in each Member State. The Court has thus repeatedly held that it is not always necessary formally to enact the requirements of a directive in a specific express legal provision, since the general legal context may be sufficient for implementation of a directive, depending on its content. In particular, the existence of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render superfluous transposition by specific legislative or regulatory measures provided, however, that those principles actually ensure the full application of the directive by the national authorities and that, where the relevant provision of the directive seeks to create rights for individuals, the legal situation arising from those principles is sufficiently precise and clear and that the persons concerned are put in a position to know the full extent of their rights and, where appropriate, to be able to rely on them before the national courts (see, inter alia, Case 29/84 Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C-233/00 Commission v France , cited above, paragraph 76).

24. En ce qui concerne les taxes d’immatriculation des véhicules, il est de jurisprudence constante qu’un État membre peut soumettre à une taxe d’immatriculation un véhicule automobile immatriculé dans un autre État membre lorsque ledit véhicule est destiné à être essentiellement utilisé sur le territoire du premier État membre à titre permanent ou qu’il est, en fait, utilisé de cette façon (voir arrêt van Putten e.a., précité, point 46, ainsi que ordonnance Notermans-Boddenberg, précitée, point 26).

18. As appears particularly from the third recital in the preamble to Directive 90/435, the aim of that directive is, by the introduction of a common system of taxation, to eliminate any disadvantage to cooperation between companies of different Member States as compared with cooperation between companies of the same Member State and thereby to facilitate the grouping together of companies at Community level (Case C‑294/99 Athinaïki Zithopiïa [2001] ECR I‑6797, paragraph 25, and Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I‑11753, paragraph 103).

103. As appears particularly from the third recital in its preamble, the aim of that directive is, by the introduction of a common system of taxation, to eliminate any disadvantage to cooperation between companies of different Member States as compared with cooperation between companies of the same Member State and thereby to facilitate the grouping together of companies at Community level (Joined Cases C‑283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit and Others [1996] ECR I‑5063, paragraph 22, and Case C-294/99 Athinaïki Zithopiïa [2001] ECR I‑6797, paragraph 25).

43 Finally, with regard to the question whether an interim order requiring payment of a contractual consideration may be classified as a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 24 of the Convention, Deco-Line and the Government of the United Kingdom argue that it cannot. The German Government considers that the main proceedings appear to fall outside the definition of provisional or protective measures.

56. However, as soon as a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes a charge to tax on the income not only of resident companies but also of non-resident companies from dividends which they receive from a resident company, the situation of those non-resident companies becomes comparable to that of resident companies (see, to that effect, Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 68; Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France , paragraph 35; Amurta , paragraph 38; Commission v Italy , paragraph 52; and Commission v Spain , paragraph 51).

51. However, as soon as a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes a charge to tax on the income, not only of resident shareholders, but also of non-resident shareholders, from dividends which they receive from a resident company, the situation of those non-resident shareholders becomes comparable to that of resident shareholders ( Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation , paragraph 68; Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France , paragraph 35; Amurta , paragraph 38; and Commission v Italy , paragraph 52).

57 It is for the Court, where it exercises the power to limit the effect on past events of a declaration in preliminary ruling proceedings that a Community regulation is invalid, to decide whether an exception to that temporal limitation of the effect of its judgment is to be made in favour of the party to the main proceedings which brought an action before the national court against the national measure implementing the regulation, or whether, conversely, a declaration of invalidity applicable only to the future is an adequate remedy even for that party.

49 Second, neither Article 79(1) and (2)(c) TFEU – which provides for the development by the European Union of a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, inter alia, the prevention of illegal immigration and unauthorised residence – nor Regulation No 562/2006 rules out Member State powers in the field of combating illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, even if it is clear that Member States must adjust their laws in that field in order to ensure compliance with EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 December 2011, Achughbabian, C‑329/11, EU:C:2011:807, paragraphs 30 and 33).

30. That finding is corroborated by recital 17 of that directive, from which it is apparent that the conditions for the initial arrest of third-country nationals suspected of staying in a Member State illegally remain governed by national law. Moreover, as the French Government has observed, the objective of Directive 2008/115, namely, the effective return of illegally-staying third-country nationals, would be compromised if it were impossible for Member States to prevent, by deprivation of liberty such as police custody, a person suspected of staying illegally from fleeing before his situation could even be clarified.

21. Thus, games of chance and gaming machines such as those at issue in the main proceedings may, regardless of the detailed arrangements for their organisation, be operated by licensed public casinos, without the turnover they make from the operation of those games being subject to VAT.

24 In order to establish whether a law introducing a levy on sugar stocks, such as the Lageravgiftslag, is contrary to the provisions of Community law concerning the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector, it must be determined whether that law concerns an area for which the Community rules make exhaustive provision or interferes with the proper functioning of the mechanisms provided by the common organization of the markets, in particular through its influence on price formation or on the structure of agricultural holdings (see Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council v Lewis [1983] ECR 4083, paragraphs 23 and 31, and Case 218/85 Cerafel v Le Campion [1986] ECR 3513, paragraph 13).

23 IN THAT REGARD , IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE RULES ON THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET IN FRUIT AND VEGETABLES PROVIDE FOR AN EXHAUSTIVE SYSTEM OF QUALITY STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE PRODUCTS IN QUESTION . UNLESS THOSE RULES PROVIDE OTHERWISE , MEMBER STATES AND , A FORTIORI , BODIES SUCH AS THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL ARE THEREFORE PREVENTED FROM IMPOSING UNILATERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE QUALITY OF THE FRUIT MARKETED BY GROWERS .

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

42 Moreover, certain economic operators which have played a significant role in the procedure under Article 93(2) of the Treaty have been recognised as individually concerned by such a decision, inasmuch as they are affected in their capacity as negotiators (judgment in Van der Kooy and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 21 to 24, and CIRFS and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 28 and 30).

28 Secondly, in view of the fact that the addressee of the decision is the French Republic, and not the applicants, it should be considered whether the decision is of direct and individual concern to the applicants within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty.

19 In the present case, the entitlement of married couples to joint assessment to tax is subject to a residence condition for both spouses, which Luxembourg nationals will be able to satisfy more easily than nationals of other Member States who have settled in the Grand Duchy in order to pursue an economic activity there, the members of whose families more frequently live outside Luxembourg.

71. With regard to the second limb of the second question, according to the Court's case-law, the various grounds for refusing registration set out in Article 3 of the Directive must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them (see, to that effect, Windsurfing Chiemsee , paragraphs 25 to 27, and Philips , paragraph 77).

26 As regards, more particularly, signs or indications which may serve to designate the geographical origin of the categories of goods in relation to which registration of the mark is applied for, especially geographical names, it is in the public interest that they remain available, not least because they may be an indication of the quality and other characteristics of the categories of goods concerned, and may also, in various ways, influence consumer tastes by, for instance, associating the goods with a place that may give rise to a favourable response.

32. The mere acquisition and the mere holding of shares are not to be regarded as economic activities within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of taxable person. A mere financial holding in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property (see Case C-333/91 Sofitam [1993] ECR I-3513, paragraph 12; Case C-80/95 Harnas & Helm [1997] ECR I-745, paragraph 15; and Cibo Participations , paragraph 19).

24 As for the second submission, it is apparent from the documents in the case file, and it is not, moreover, in dispute, that all the facts in the main proceedings are confined to a single Member State. National legislation such as the SGVG, which applies without distinction to Austrian nationals and to nationals of Member States of the European Communities, may generally fall within the scope of the provisions on the fundamental freedoms established by the Treaty only to the extent that it applies to situations related to intra-Community trade (see, to that effect, Case 286/81 Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575, paragraph 9, and Case 98/86 Mathot [1987] ECR 809, paragraphs 8 and 9).

9 IN THAT REGARD , IT MUST BE STATED THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION TO THE SALE IN THE NETHERLANDS OF ENCYCLOPAEDIAS PRODUCED IN THAT COUNTRY IS IN NO WAY LINKED TO THE IMPORTATION OR EXPORTATION OF GOODS AND DOES NOT THEREFORE FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLES 30 AND 34 OF THE EEC TREATY . HOWEVER , THE SALE IN THE NETHERLANDS OF ENCYCLOPAEDIAS PRODUCED IN BELGIUM AND THE SALE IN OTHER MEMBER STATES OF ENCYCLOPAEDIAS PRODUCED IN THE NETHERLANDS ARE TRANSACTIONS FORMING PART OF INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE . IN THE VIEW OF THE QUESTION RAISED BY THE NATIONAL COURT , IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER PROVISIONS OF THE TYPE CONTAINED IN THE NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION ARE COMPATIBLE WITH BOTH ARTICLE 30 AND ARTICLE 34 OF THE EEC TREATY .

18 It is true that the terms `establishment' and `organisation' suggest the existence of an individualised entity performing a particular function. Those conditions are, however, satisfied not only by legal persons but also by one or more natural persons running a business.

53 It is, admittedly, common ground that, by making the admissibility of legal proceedings brought in the areas referred to in Article 5(1bis) of Legislative Decree No 28/2010 conditional upon the implementation of a mandatory attempt at mediation, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings introduces an additional step to be overcome before being entitled to access the courts. That condition might prejudice implementation of the principle of effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 March 2010, Alassini and Others, C‑317/08 to C‑320/08, EU:C:2010:146, paragraph 62).

62. In that regard, it is common ground in the cases before the referring court that, by making the admissibility of legal proceedings concerning electronic communications services conditional upon the implementation of a mandatory attempt at settlement, the national legislation introduces an additional step for access to the courts. That condition might prejudice implementation of the principle of effective judicial protection.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

22. Group relief under the CTA 2010 constitutes a tax advantage for the companies concerned. By speeding up the relief of the losses of loss-making companies by allowing them to be set off immediately against the profits of other group companies, that system confers a cash-flow advantage on the group (see judgments in Marks & Spencer EU:C:2005:763, paragraph 32, and Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company and Others , C‑80/12, EU:C:2014:200, paragraph 19).

32. Group relief such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a tax advantage for the companies concerned. By speeding up the relief of the losses of the loss-making companies by allowing them to be set off immediately against the profits of other group companies, such relief confers a cash advantage on the group.

42. Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 thus laying down an exception to the mechanism for reviewing the substance of unfair terms, such as that provided for in the system of consumer protection put in place by that directive, that provision must be strictly interpreted.

30 In other words, if, as regards a social security advantage, a national of a Member State can benefit from a right under a convention entered into between two Member States, and if that convention is more favourable to him than a Community regulation which became applicable to him subsequently, the right derived by him under the convention is acquired by him once and for all. Accordingly, with regard to a specific benefit, where periods of insurance or employment which form the basis of the worker's rights were completed, at least partially, during a period when only the bilateral convention was applicable, the worker's overall situation must be assessed by reference to the provisions of that convention if it is favourable to him (judgment in Kaske, cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32).

31 In other words, if, as regards a social security advantage, a national of a Member State can benefit from a right under a convention entered into between two Member States, and if that convention is more favourable to him than a rule of Community law which became applicable to him subsequently, the right derived by him under the convention is acquired by him once and for all, so that any restrictions on that right are incompatible with the provisions of Articles 48 and 51 of the Treaty.

63. In the first place, with regard to the obligation to obtain prior administrative authorisation in order to carry out vehicle inspection activities, the Court has already had occasion to point out that Directive 2009/40 does not contain any provision concerning the conditions governing access to that activity (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Portugal , C‑438/08, EU:C:2009:651, paragraph 26).

41. In those circumstances, it must be found that, even if such a board member of a capital company enjoys a degree of latitude in the performance of his duties that exceeds, in particular, that of a worker within the meaning of German law, who may be directed by the employer, as the national court has observed, as to the specific tasks that he must complete and the manner in which they must be carried out, the fact remains that the board member is in a relationship of subordination vis-à-vis that company within the meaning of the case-law cited at paragraphs 38 and 39 above (see, to that effect, the judgment in Danosa , C‑232/09, EU:C:2010:674, paragraph 49 to 51).

39. It is settled case-law that the concept of ‘worker’ for the purposes of Directive 92/85 may not be interpreted differently according to each national law and must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned. The essential feature of an employment relationship is that, for a certain period of time, a person performs services for and under the direction of another person, in return for which he receives remuneration (see, by analogy, in the context of freedom of movement for workers and the principle of equal pay for men and women, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17, and Case C‑256/01 Allonby [2004] ECR I-873, paragraph 67; and, in the context of Directive 92/85, Case C‑116/06 Kiiski [2007] ECR I‑7643, paragraph 25).

8 IT MUST IN THE FIRST PLACE BE STATED THAT THE COUNCIL IS RIGHT IN ITS CONTENTION THAT , AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS , THE SUBMISSION THAT NO REASONS WERE GIVEN FOR THE DECISION IS NOW DEVOID OF PURPOSE .

50. In that regard, the French Government has not asserted the existence of circumstances in which the contracting authority is responsible for a structure for the ‘in‑house’ management of a public service within the meaning of the Court’s case‑law (see, to that effect, Case C‑107/98 Teckal [1999] ECR I‑8121, paragraph 50, and Coname , paragraph 26). Indeed, there is no suggestion that the principal exercises over the agent a control similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and that the agent carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling public authority or authorities (see, to that effect, Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] ECR I‑1, paragraph 49).

50 In that regard, in accordance with Article 1(a) of Directive 93/36, it is, in principle, sufficient if the contract was concluded between, on the one hand, a local authority and, on the other, a person legally distinct from that local authority. The position can be otherwise only in the case where the local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities.

22. The Court has, however, held that the trade mark proprietor can oppose the offering for sale or sale of original goods bearing a trade mark and having the customs status of non-Community goods, when the offering is done and/or the sale is effected while the goods are placed under the external transit procedure or the customs warehousing procedure and this necessarily entails their being put on the market in the Community (see, to that effect Class International , paragraph 61).

79. Since the provisions of the Treaty and of the EEA Agreement on freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment and freedom movement for persons preclude the national provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph, it is not necessary to consider that legislation separately in the light of Article 56 EC on free movement of capital (see, to that effect, Commission v Portugal , paragraph 45, and Commission v Denmark , paragraph 76).

45. Since the contested legislation runs counter to the provisions of the Treaty and the EEA Agreement on freedom of movement for persons, there is no need for a separate examination of that legislation in the light of Article 56(1) EC and Article 41 of the EEA Agreement (see, by analogy, Case C-483/99 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, paragraph 56). Costs

22 The object of the Directive is to establish harmonised legal protection in the Community for the rental and lending right and certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. According to the first three recitals in its preamble, such harmonisation is intended to eliminate differences between national laws which are liable to create barriers to trade, distort competition and impede the achievement and proper functioning of the internal market. As is stated, more specifically, in the fourth, fifth and seventh recitals in the preamble to the Directive, the rental right, which, as a result of the increasing threat of piracy, is of increasing importance to the economic and cultural development of the Community must in particular guarantee that authors and performers can receive appropriate income and amortise the especially high and risky investments required particularly for the production of phonograms and films.

44. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court, in the light of the freedoms of movement, has not accepted arguments relating to the need to provide individual advice to the customer and to ensure his protection against the incorrect use of products, in the context of non-prescription medicines and contact lenses, to justify a ban on internet sales (see, to that effect, Deutscher Apothekerverband , paragraphs 106, 107 and 112, and Case C‑108/09 Ker‑Optika [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 76).

107. Looked at generally, most of those reasons are based on the possible dangers posed by medicinal products and, accordingly, on the care which must be taken with all aspects of the marketing of those products, objectives which are also those of the Community legislation in the pharmaceuticals field. Thus, and in any event, consideration of the reasons put forward to justify the prohibition on the sale by mail order of medicinal products must take into account the various provisions of Community law which may affect that issue.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

21. First of all, it should be noted that, as a general rule, the Court will refrain from considering the principle of tax neutrality with a view to ascertaining whether EU law precludes national rules which lay down time-limits within which a VAT refund must be claimed, failing which the action is time-barred (see, to that effect, Case C‑85/97 SFI [1998] ECR I‑7447, paragraphs 22 to 36; Case‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraphs 22 to 47; and Case C‑472/08 Alstom Power Hydro [2010] ECR I‑623, paragraphs 14 to 22).

31 It follows from all those considerations that the fact that a Member State has correctly implemented the provisions of Article 11A(1) of the Sixth Directive in domestic law does not deprive individuals of the possibility of relying, before the courts of that State, on the rights which they derive from those provisions and, in particular, the right to recover amounts collected by a Member State in breach of them.

65. It appears therefore appropriate to conclude that identical legal consequences must be applied to those two situations.

93 Accordingly, the importance both of the right to privacy, guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, and of the right to protection of personal data, guaranteed in Article 8 of the Charter, as derived from the Court’s case-law (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Schrems, C‑362/14, EU:C:2015:650, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited), must be taken into consideration in interpreting Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58. The same is true of the right to freedom of expression in the light of the particular importance accorded to that freedom in any democratic society. That fundamental right, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society, and is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C‑112/00, EU:C:2003:333, paragraph 79, and of 6 September 2011, Patriciello, C‑163/10, EU:C:2011:543, paragraph 31).

79. Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings are expressly recognised by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental pillars of a democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the express wording of paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under those provisions and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, to that effect, Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, paragraph 26, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, paragraph 42, and Eur. Court HR, Steel and Others v. The United Kingdom judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VII, § 101).

19 According to Article 14(1) of Regulation No 2261/84, each producer Member State is to apply a system of checks to ensure that the product in respect of which aid is granted is eligible for such aid.

55. In that connection, it must be recalled, in the first place, that EU law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their public health and social security systems (see to that effect, in particular, judgments in Sodemare and Others , C‑70/95, EU:C:1997:301, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited, and Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez , C‑570/07 and C‑571/07, EU:C:2010:300, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

43. It should first be noted that, pursuant to Article 168(7) TFEU, as clarified by the case-law of the Court and by recital 26 in the preamble to Directive 2005/36, EU law does not detract from the power of the Member States to organise their social security systems and to adopt, in particular, provisions to govern the organisation of health services such as pharmacies. In exercising that power, however, Member States must comply with EU law and, in particular, with the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms, since those provisions prohibit Member States from introducing or maintaining unjustified restrictions on the exercise of those freedoms in the healthcare sector (see, to that effect, Hartlauer , paragraph 29; Case C-531/06 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 35; and Joined Cases C-171/07 and C-172/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and Others [2009] ECR I-0000, paragraph 18).

253OTHER WAYS MAY BE DEVISED - AND ECONOMIC THEORISTS HAVE NOT FAILED TO THINK UP SEVERAL - OF SELECTING THE RULES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE PRICE OF A PRODUCT IS UNFAIR .

80. As a preliminary point, it is appropriate to observe, first, that the purpose of Article 2 of the Directive is to define the types of signs of which a trade mark may consist (Case C-273/00 Sieckmann [2002] ECR I-11737, paragraph 43), irrespective of the goods or services for which protection might be sought (see to that effect Sieckmann , paragraphs 43 to 55, Libertel , paragraphs 22 to 42, and Case C-283/01 Shield Mark [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 34 to 41). It provides that a trade mark may consist inter alia of " words" and " letters" , provided that they are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.

33. It follows that filing a sample of a colour does not per se constitute a graphic representation within the meaning of Article 2 of the Directive.

43. As regards, second, the question whether individuals are entitled to rely directly on the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the WPPT, it must be observed that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is not sufficient that they are part of the legal order of the Union. Those provisions must also appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise and their nature and broad logic must not preclude their being so relied on (see, to that effect, Demirel , paragraph 14; Case C-162/96 Racke  [1998] ECR I‑3655, paragraph 31, and Case C‑344/04 IATA and ELFAA [2006] ECR I-403, paragraph 39).

49. Consequently, goods are the subject of an ‘unlawful introduction’ into the customs territory of the Community within the meaning of Article 202 of the Customs Code where, having crossed the external land border of the Community, the goods are in that territory beyond the first customs office, without having been conveyed to that office and without having been presented to customs, with the result that the customs authorities have not been notified of the fact that those goods have been introduced by the persons responsible for compliance with that obligation ( Elshani , paragraph 26).

26. Consequently, goods are the subject of an ‘unlawful introduction’ into the customs territory of the Community within the meaning of Article 202 of the Customs Code where, having crossed the external land border of the Community, the goods are in that territory beyond the first customs office, without having been conveyed to that office and without having been presented to customs, with the result that the customs authorities have not been notified of the fact that those goods have been introduced by the persons responsible for compliance with that obligation.

39 According to the Court’s case-law on that provision, first, what is envisaged here is the situation in which bodies governed by public law engage in activities which may also be engaged in, in competition with them, by private economic operators. The aim is to ensure that those private operators are not placed at a disadvantage because they are taxed while those bodies are not (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2010, Commission v Netherlands, C‑79/09, not published, EU:C:2010:171, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).

15. It is settled case-law that recovery of unlawful aid is the logical consequence of the finding that it is unlawful and that that consequence cannot depend on the form in which the aid was granted (see, in particular, Case C-183/91 Commission v Greece [1993] ECR I-3131, paragraph 16; Case C-404/97 Commission v Portugal [2000] ECR I-4897, paragraph 38; and Case C-404/00 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-6695, paragraph 44).

16 It follows from the Court' s case-law that recovery of unlawful aid is the logical consequence of the finding that it is unlawful (see in particular Case C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, paragraph 66). That consequence cannot depend on the form in which the aid was granted.

21. Furthermore, Article 7 of Regulation No 1222/94 contains certain special provisions which are specific to the nature of the products covered by that regulation. Thus, the second sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of the aforementioned regulation provides that when goods are to be exported, the party concerned must declare the quantities of basic products, of products derived from the processing thereof, or of products assimilated to one of those two categories in accordance with Article 1(2), which have actually been used, within the meaning of Article 3(2), in the manufacture of those goods, for which a refund will be requested, or otherwise refer to that composition if it has been determined in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 3(2).

50 Moreover, with regard to judicial review of the conditions referred to in the previous paragraph, it must also be borne in mind that the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion when it is called upon to legislate in an area which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue (see, to that effect, in the sphere of the protection of health, judgments of 14 December 2004, Swedish Match, C‑210/03, EU:C:2004:802, paragraph 48, and of 12 July 2005, Alliance for Natural Health and Others, C‑154/04 and C‑155/04, EU:C:2005:449, paragraph 52; see also, to that effect, with regard to EU environmental policy, judgments of 15 December 2005, Greece v Commission, C‑86/03, EU:C:2005:769, paragraphs 87 and 88, and of 21 December 2016, Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus, C‑444/15, EU:C:2016:978, paragraph 46).

87. In accordance with the case-law of the Court (see, in particular, Case C-110/03 Belgium v Commission [2005] ECR I-2801, paragraph 61), a breach of the principle of proportionality presupposes that the Community measure imposes on those to whom it is addressed an obligation which goes further than is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the aim pursued by that measure.

43. En effet, dès lors que, aux termes de la loi de 2009, ce repos compensateur peut faire l’objet d’un report jusqu’à une semaine à compter du jour de la réalisation de la garde active, y compris lorsque le médecin a déjà travaillé pendant 24 heures consécutives sur le lieu de travail, ledit repos ne saurait être regardé comme une «période équivalente de repos compensateur», au sens de l’article 17, paragraphe 2, de la directive 2003/88, puisque, comme l’a jugé la Cour dans l’arrêt Jaeger (C‑151/02, EU:C:2003:437, point 94), une telle période doit succéder immédiatement au temps de travail qu’elle est censée compenser.

56. Inasmuch as Directive 91/439 confers on the issuing Member State exclusive competence to check that driving licences are issued in compliance with the requirements imposed by that directive, it is for that Member State alone to take appropriate measures in respect of which it is subsequently established that the holders did not satisfy those conditions (see, to that effect, the order in Da Silva Carvalho , paragraph 23, and Kapper , paragraph 48).

48. Given that Directive 91/439 confers exclusive competence on the Member State which issues a licence to ensure that driving licences are issued in compliance with the residence requirement set out in Articles 7(1)(b) and 9 of that directive, it is for that Member State alone to take appropriate measures in relation to driving licences held by persons who are subsequently shown to have failed to satisfy that requirement. Where a host Member State has good reason to doubt the validity of one or more licences issued by another Member State, it must so inform the latter under the rules relating to mutual assistance and the exchange of information contained in Article 12(3) of that directive. Should the Member State which issued the licence fail to take the appropriate measures, the host Member State may bring proceedings against the first State under Article 227 EC for a declaration by the Court that there has been a failure to comply with the obligations arising under Directive 91/439.

60. It must be borne in mind at the outset that repayment or remission of import and export duties, which may be made only under certain conditions and in cases specifically provided for, constitutes an exception to the normal import and export procedure and, consequently, the provisions which provide for such repayment or remission must be interpreted strictly. Since a lack of ‘obvious negligence’ is an essential condition of being able to claim repayment or remission of import or export duties, it follows that that term must be interpreted in such a way that the number of cases of repayment or remission remains limited ( Söhl & Söhlke , paragraph 52).

21 First, in order to assess whether a measure is attributable to the State, it is necessary to examine whether the public authorities were involved in the adoption of that measure (judgments of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 52, and of 19 December 2013, Association Vent De Colère! and Others, C‑262/12, EU:C:2013:851, paragraph 17).

52 Even if the State is in a position to control a public undertaking and to exercise a dominant influence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in a particular case cannot be automatically presumed. A public undertaking may act with more or less independence, according to the degree of autonomy left to it by the State. That might be the situation in the case of public undertakings such as Altus and SBT. Therefore, the mere fact that a public undertaking is under State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertaking, such as the financial support measures in question here, to be imputed to the State. It is also necessary to examine whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures.

55. Concerning the second limb of the first complaint, it should be noted, first of all, that the Luxembourg rules relating to periods during which the land application of certain types of fertiliser is prohibited do not apply to grassland, whereas no derogation is provided for expressly in Directive 91/676 for that type of land.

99 It is settled case-law that, for the purposes of applying Article 85(1) of the Treaty, there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition (Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1964] ECR 299, at p. 342; see also, to the same effect, Case C-277/87 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici v Commission [1990] ECR I-45; Case C-219/95 P Ferriere Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I-4411, paragraphs 14 and 15).

14 Admittedly, unlike the other language versions of Article 85, it appears from the Italian version, as a result of its use of the coordinating conjunction `e', that the agreement must have as its object and effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. However, that difference cannot cast doubt on the interpretation of Article 85 given by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 30 of the contested judgment.

65. S’agissant, ensuite, du grief de la Commission visant la pratique des autorités portugaises en matière d’inscription des ressources propres dans le cadre de la convention ATA, il convient de rappeler, d’une part, que, dans le cadre d’une procédure en manquement, il incombe à la Commission d’établir l’existence du manquement allégué, en apportant à la Cour les éléments nécessaires à la vérification par celle-ci de l’existence de ce manquement, sans pouvoir se fonder sur une présomption quelconque (voir, en ce sens, arrêts du 29 mai 2001, Commission/Italie, C-263/99, Rec. p. I-4195, point 27, ainsi que du 6 novembre 2003, Commission/Royaume-Uni, C-434/01, Rec. p. I‑13239, point 21 et jurisprudence citée).

35 Consequently, such rules deter insured persons from approaching providers of medical services established in another Member State and constitute, for them and their patients, a barrier to freedom to provide services (see Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR 377, paragraph 16, and Case C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgium [1992] ECR I-249, paragraph 31).

31 It is to be noted that provisions such as those contained in the Belgian legislation at issue constitute a restriction on freedom to provide services. Provisions requiring an insurer to be established in a Member State as a condition of the eligibility of insured persons to benefit from certain tax deductions in that State operate to deter those seeking insurance from approaching insurers established in another Member State, and thus constitute a restriction of the latter' s freedom to provide services.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

33. However, according to settled case-law of the Court, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets overriding requirements relating to the public interest in so far as that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Säger , paragraph 15; Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35; Case C‑164/99 Portugaia Construções [2002] ECR I‑787, paragraph 19; Case C‑279/00 Commission v Italy , paragraph 33; Case C‑445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I‑10191, paragraph 21; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 31).

31. However, where national legislation falling within an area which has not been harmonised at Community level is applicable without distinction to all persons and undertakings operating in the territory of the Member State concerned, it may, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on the freedom to provide services, be justified where it meets an overriding requirement relating to the public interest and that interest is not already safeguarded by the rules to which the service provider is subject in the Member State in which he is established and in so far as it is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Joined Cases C‑369/96 and C‑376/96 Arblade and Others [1999] ECR I-8453, paragraphs 34 and 35, and Portugaia Construções , paragraph 19).

27. Those aspects, raised by the case-law cited, must be taken into account in the analysis of the characteristics of the period at issue in the main proceedings. Thus, as the Advocate general observed, in point 45 of his Opinion, that analysis must cover two aspects, namely the duration of the time-limit laid down by the legislature and the mechanism adopted to start that period running.

36. However, the conditions to which the obligation to pay compensation for damage referred to in the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU is subject and, therefore, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions relating to that compensation for such damage may be based only on strictly objective criteria (see Commission v Cantina sociale di Dolianova and Others , paragraph 59).

59. The conditions to which the obligation to make good the damage referred to in the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is subject, and, therefore, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions for compensation in respect of that damage may be based only on strictly objective criteria. If it were otherwise, there would be a risk of undermining the principle of legal certainty on which the rules on limitations periods specifically rely and which require that legal rules be clear and precise in order that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).

19. En outre, il ressort des dispositions combinées des articles 44, paragraphe 1, sous c), et 48, paragraphe 2, premier alinéa, du règlement de procédure du Tribunal que la requête introductive d’instance doit contenir l’objet du litige ainsi que l’exposé sommaire des moyens invoqués et que la production de moyens nouveaux en cours d’instance est interdite à moins que ces moyens ne se fondent sur des éléments de droit et de fait qui se sont révélés pendant la procédure (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du 26 janvier 2005, Euroagri/Commission, C-153/04 P, point 40, et arrêt du 16 décembre 2010, AceaElectrabel Produzione/Commission, C‑480/09 P, Rec. p. I‑13355, point 111).

18. In order to interpret Article 33 of the Sixth Directive it must be viewed against its legislative background. To that end it is useful to recall the objectives pursued by the introduction of a common system of VAT, as outlined in the judgment in Joined Cases C‑338/97, C‑344/97 and C‑390/97 Pelzl and Others [1999] ECR I-3319, paragraphs 13 to 20.

14 According to the preamble to the First Council Directive (67/227/EEC) of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes (OJ, English Special Edition 1967, p. 14, hereinafter `the First Directive'), the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes is intended to bring about the establishment of a common market within which competition is not distorted, and whose characteristics are similar to those of a domestic market, by eliminating differences in the imposition of tax such as to distort competition and impede trade.

87. Nor can the second paragraph of Article 248 of the Treaty, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, or the Court ' s case-law on the interpretation of Community law be relied on in support of a possible principle of equality of languages. Although equal account must be taken of all the authentic versions of a text when interpreting that text, that holds good only in so far as such versions exist and are authentic. Consequently, even if an individual decision is published in the Official Journal of the European Union and is therefore translated into all the languages for the information of citizens, only the language used in the relevant procedure will be authentic and will be used to interpret that decision.

51. The Court reiterated that position, with regard to public service contracts, in the judgments in BFI Holding (paragraphs 55 and 56) and Korhonen (paragraphs 57 and 58) and, with regard to public supply contracts, in the judgment in Adolf Truley (paragraph 56). That position also applies to Directive 2004/18, which represents a recasting of the provisions of all the preceding directives on the award of public contracts which it follows (see, to that effect, Bayerischer Rundfunk , paragraph 30).

30. The questions as formulated by the national court make reference to the relevant provisions of Directive 2004/18. Given however that the facts of the case in the main proceedings fall within the scope ratione temporis of Directive 92/50, the Court’s examination and answers will relate to the corresponding provisions of Directive 92/50 in the light of certain clarifications made by Directive 2004/18. In any event, the provisions of the latter directive and their underlying principles are identical in content to the provisions and principles of the preceding directives and Directive 2004/18 represents a recasting of pre-existing provisions. Accordingly there is no reasonable justification for a different approach under the new directive.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

31. In that regard, it should be recalled from the outset that it is essential that the proprietor of a trade mark registered in one or more Member States should be able to control the initial marketing in the EEA of goods bearing that mark (see, in particular, judgments in Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss , C‑414/99 to C‑416/99, EU:C:2001:617, paragraph 33; Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel and Others , C‑324/08, EU:C:2009:633, paragraph 32; and L’Oréal and Others , C‑324/09, EU:C:2011:474, paragraph 60).

60. In the situation under consideration in the context of this question, in which the goods have at no time been put on the market within the EEA by the trade mark proprietor or with his consent, the exception set out in Article 7 of Directive 89/104 and Article 13 of Regulation No 40/94 cannot apply. In that regard, the Court has repeatedly held that it is essential that the proprietor of a trade mark registered in a Member State can control the first placing of goods bearing that trade mark on the market in the EEA (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-414/99 to C‑416/99 Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss [2001] ECR I-8691, paragraph 33; Peak Holding , paragraphs 36 and 37, and Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel and Others , paragraph 32).

103 Consequently, the ban on the export of live bovine animals cannot be regarded as a manifestly inappropriate measure.

61 In addition, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the directive, the unfairness of a contractual term must be assessed taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all of the circumstances attending its conclusion (judgments of 4 June 2009, Pannon GSM, C‑243/08, EU:C:2009:350, paragraph 39, and of 9 November 2010, VB Pénzügyi Lízing, C‑137/08, EU:C:2010:659, paragraph 42). It follows that, in that respect, the consequences of the term under the law applicable to the contract must also be taken into account, requiring consideration to be given to the national legal system (judgment of 14 March 2013, Aziz, C‑415/11, EU:C:2013:164, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).

39. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Directive provides that the unfairness of a contractual term is to be assessed taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of it.

59. Toutefois, un moyen qui constitue une amplification d’un moyen énoncé antérieurement, directement ou implicitement, dans la requête introductive d’instance doit être considéré comme recevable (voir arrêt du 15 décembre 2005, Italie/Commission, C‑66/02, Rec. p. I‑10901, point 86 et jurisprudence citée).

38. That being so, it must nevertheless be noted that the breach of that principle cannot cause the judgment under appeal to be set aside, in so far as the findings made in paragraphs 44 and 49 of that judgment as to the lawfulness of the omissions of which the Court of Auditors is accused are, in any event, well founded on another ground, set out separately in paragraph 46 of the judgment under appeal (see, to that effect, judgments in JCB Service v Commission , C‑167/04 P, EU:C:2006:594, paragraph 186, and Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission , C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 233).

186. Nonetheless, according to case-law, if the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance reveal an infringement of Community law but its operative part appears well founded on other legal grounds the appeal must be dismissed (Case C-226/03 P José Martí Peix v Commission [2004] ECR I-11421, paragraph 29).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

109 The Court has held, however, that this obligation may not go beyond production of the information that the person making the declaration may reasonably be expected to possess and obtain, with the result that it is sufficient for such information, even if incorrect, to have been provided in good faith (see the judgments in Mecanarte, cited above, paragraph 29, and in Hewlett Packard France, cited above, paragraph 29).

29 That obligation may not, however, go beyond production of the information and documents that the person liable may reasonably possess or obtain. It follows that if an economic agent produces in good faith information which, although incorrect or incomplete, is the only information which he can reasonably possess or obtain and therefore include in the customs declaration, the requirement of compliance with the provisions in force concerning the customs declaration must be considered to have been fulfilled.

23. In those circumstances, the first question falls to be examined solely in the light of Directive 2000/78.

81 As regards the second part of that ground of appeal, by which PROAS criticises the General Court for having infringed its right to a judgment within a reasonable period, it should be borne in mind that the sanction for a breach by a Court of the European Union of its obligation under the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter to adjudicate on the cases before it within a reasonable time must be an action for damages brought before the General Court, since such an action constitutes, contrary to what PROAS argues, an effective remedy. It follows that a claim for compensation in respect of the damage caused by the General Court’s failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time may not be made directly to the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, but must be brought before the General Court itself (see, inter alia, judgments of 10 July 2014 in Telefónica and Telefónica de España vCommission, C 295/12 P, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 66; of 9 October 2014 in ICF v Commission, C 467/13 P, EU:C:2014:2274, paragraph 57; and of 12 November 2014 in Guardian Industries and Guardian Europe v Commission, C 580/12 P, EU:C:2014:2363, paragraphs 17 and 18).

18. It follows that a claim for compensation in respect of the damage caused by the General Court’s failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time may not be made directly to the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal, but must be brought before the General Court itself ( Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission , EU:C:2013:768, paragraph 90).

79. It is apparent from the case-law cited above that in the situation envisaged in Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104 and Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation No 40/94, in which a third party uses a sign identical with a trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which that mark is registered, the proprietor of the mark is entitled to prohibit that use if it is liable to have an adverse effect on one of the functions of the mark, whether that be the function of indicating origin or one of the other functions.

36 Those taxes and charges are unavoidable components of the final price to be paid by the passenger in order to avail of the service proposed by the air carrier (see, by analogy, judgments of 19 July 2012 in ebookers.com Deutschland, C‑112/11, EU:C:2012:487, paragraph 14, and 18 September 2014 in Vueling Airlines, C‑487/12, EU:C:2014:2232, paragraph 36).

14. In particular, the last sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 refers to ‘optional price supplements’, which are not unavoidable, in contrast to air fares or air rates and other items making up the final price of the flight, referred to in the second sentence of Article 23(1) of that regulation. Those optional price supplements therefore relate to services which, supplementing the air service itself, are neither compulsory nor necessary for the carriage of passengers or cargo, with the result that the customer chooses either to accept or refuse them. It is precisely because a customer is in a position to make that choice that such price supplements must be communicated in a clear, transparent and unambiguous way at the start of any booking process, and that their acceptance by the customer must be on an opt-in basis, as laid down in the last sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008.

45. Those provisions are intended to ensure freedom of movement for workers by enabling their family members to join them. As the Court has noted in its case-law, the importance of ensuring the protection of the family life of nationals of the Member States and the right of residence of the members of their family has been recognised by the Community legislature (see, to that effect, particularly, Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, paragraph 38). It is in the interest of the worker and his family that, should that worker die prematurely, his family members should, as a rule, be entitled to reside in the territory of the host Member State.

16. Where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, he must, pursuant to Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of its Rules of Procedure, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted and show the errors of appraisal which, in his view, led to such distortion (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C‑219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, paragraph 50).

50. Article 225 EC, Article 51, first paragraph, of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice provide, in particular, that where the appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the Court of First Instance, he must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by that Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in his view, led to that distortion.

61. According to the travaux préparatoires in respect of that directive, that option reflects the aim of reinforcing legal certainty, by encouraging ‘diligence’ on the part of the purchaser, ‘taking the seller’s interests into account’, ‘but does not establish a strict obligation to carry out a detailed inspection of the good’ (see the explanatory memorandum to the proposal for a directive, COM(95) 520 final, p. 14).

18 In the present case, it should be recalled that the referring court is bound, as far as possible, to interpret national law in the light of EU law (see, inter alia, judgment in Pfeiffer and Others, C‑397/01 to C‑403/01, EU:C:2004:584, paragraph 113) and, in this case, the VAT Directive. Since the referring court queries the scope of a national provision the benefit of which is relied on in the main proceedings and which transposes the VAT Directive, it is not obvious that that question referred to the Court as to the interpretation to be given to that directive is irrelevant for the determination of that dispute.

113. Thus, when it applies domestic law, and in particular legislative provisions specifically adopted for the purpose of implementing the requirements of a directive, the national court is bound to interpret national law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC (see to that effect, inter alia, the judgments cited above in Von Colson and Kamann , paragraph 26; Marleasing , paragraph 8, and Faccini Dori , paragraph 26; see also Case C‑63/97 BMW [1999] ECR I‑905, paragraph 22; Joined Cases C‑240/98 to C‑244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I-4941, paragraph 30; and Case C‑408/01 Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux [2003] ECR I-0000, paragraph 21).

67. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, la motivation de l’arrêt attaqué doit faire apparaître de façon claire et non équivoque le raisonnement du Tribunal, de manière à permettre aux intéressés de connaître les justifications de la décision prise et à la Cour d’exercer son contrôle juridictionnel (voir arrêt Deutsche Telekom/Commission, C‑280/08 P, EU:C:2010:603, point 136 et jurisprudence citée).

40. It should be recalled that, according to the Court’s case-law, while, admittedly, it is true that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case C-305/01 MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring [2003] ECR I-6729, paragraph 63, and Case C-455/05 Velvet & Steel Immobilien [2007] ECR I-3225, paragraph 14), a strict interpretation cannot nevertheless restrict an exemption in a manner which is not justified by the wording of the provision in question. Such an approach would be contrary to the VAT system’s objectives of ensuring, inter alia, legal certainty (see, to that effect, SKF , paragraphs 46 and 47).

14. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the terms used to specify the exemptions provided for by Article 13 of the Sixth Directive are to be interpreted strictly, since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that VAT is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person (see, inter alia, Case C-472/03 Arthur Andersen [2005] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 24; Case C‑415/04 Stichting Kinderopvang Enschede [2006] ECR I‑1385, paragraph 13; and Case C‑89/05 United Utilities [2006] ECR I-6813, paragraph 21).

70. With regard, second, to the extent of the protection conferred on proprietors of trade marks with a reputation, it is clear from the wording of the abovementioned provisions that the proprietors of such marks are entitled to prevent the use by third parties, in the course of trade, without their consent and without due cause, of signs identical with or similar to those trade marks where that use takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark or is detrimental to that distinctive character or repute.

43 According to settled case-law, in the context of the organisation of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure must rest on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the aim and the content of the measure (see, in particular, Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council, cited above, paragraph 14 and Case C-42/97 Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-869, paragraph 36).

14. It should further be recalled that in the context of the organization of the powers of the Community the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the aim and content of the measure (see, in particular, Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867, paragraph 10, and Case C-426/93 Germany v Council [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 29).

35. According to Article 3(1) of Directive 91/414, a plant protection product may not be placed on the market and used in a Member State unless the competent authorities of that Member State have authorised the product in accordance with that directive. Article 4(1)(a) of the directive provides that a Member State may not authorise a plant protection product unless its active substances have been approved at European Union level and are listed in Annex I to the directive. The conditions for inclusion of such substances in the abovementioned annex are laid down in Article 5 of Directive 91/414 and must be the subject of a dossier satisfying the requirements of Annex II thereto.

59. Yet, since it is solely because of the exercise by the Republic of Poland of its power to tax that, irrespective of any taxation in another non-Member State, a risk of a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation may arise, Article 63 TFEU obliges that Member State, which establishes a tax exemption, with regard to dividends paid to resident traders by companies which are also resident, to accord equivalent treatment to dividends paid to traders established in non‑Member States (see, to that effect, Case C‑446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 72; Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 60; and Commission v Germany , paragraph 57).

72. As is clear from paragraph 62 of the present judgment, the obligation imposed on a resident company by national rules, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, to pay ACT when profits from foreign-sourced dividends are distributed is, in fact, justified only in so far as that advance tax corresponds to the amount designed to make up for the lower nominal rate of tax to which the profits underlying the foreign-sourced dividends have been subject compared with the nominal rate of tax applicable to the profits of the resident company.

28. As regards ‘sound and fair marketable quality’, it must be observed, first of all, that Article 13 of Regulation No 3665/87 appears in Chapter 1, entitled ‘Entitlement to refund’, of Title 2, entitled ‘Exports to non-member countries’, which shows that ‘sound and fair marketable quality’ is a material condition required for the payment of refunds.

38. Nevertheless, since no conclusive guidance arises from those reflections on the scope of the concept of an ‘extrajudicial document’, it is therefore necessary to consider other relevant material in the preparatory work leading to the adoption of Regulation No 1393/2007, and, in particular, in the context of developments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters of which it forms a part (see, to that effect, judgment in Weiss und Partner , C‑14/07, EU:C:2008:264, paragraph 50).

50. However, the interpretation of Regulation No 1348/2000 cannot be dissociated from the context of developments in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, which include that regulation, in particular Regulation No 44/2001, Article 26(3) and (4) of which expressly refers to Regulation No 1348/2000.

43 Next, as regards, the criterion of ‘a fairly large number of people’, this is intended to indicate that the concept of ‘public’ encompasses a ‘certain de minimis threshold’, which excludes from the concept groups of persons which are too small, or insignificant (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2012 in SCF, C‑135/10, EU:C:2012:140, paragraph 86).

28. Further, case-law to the effect that the change in the legal and financial relationship between a supplier of services and its customer is a specific aspect of transactions concerning transfers ( SDC , cited above, paragraph 66, and CSC Financial Services , paragraph 26) cannot be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the activities referred to in Article 13B(f) of the Sixth Directive since the objectives on which exemptions for transactions concerning transfers under Article 13B(d) of that directive are founded are not the same as those on which the exemption in Article 13B(f) of that directive are based.

66 In order to be characterized as exempt transactions for the purposes of points 3 and 5 of Article 13B, the services provided by a data-handling centre must, viewed broadly, form a distinct whole, fulfilling in effect the specific, essential functions of a service described in those two points. For `a transaction concerning transfers', the services provided must therefore have the effect of transferring funds and entail changes in the legal and financial situation. A service exempt under the Directive must be distinguished from a mere physical or technical supply, such as making a data-handling system available to a bank. In this regard, the national court must examine in particular the extent of the data-handling centre's responsibility vis-à-vis the banks, in particular the question whether its responsibility is restricted to technical aspects or whether it extends to the specific, essential aspects of the transactions.

77 However, the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction is not equivalent to an own-motion review, and proceedings are inter partes. It is, in principle, for the applicant to raise pleas in law against the contested decision and to adduce evidence in support of those pleas (see judgment of 18 December 2014, Commission v Parker Hannifin Manufacturing and Parker-Hannifin, C‑434/13 P, EU:C:2014:2456, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).

10. À cet égard, il suffit de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 14 septembre 2004, Commission/Espagne, C‑168/03, Rec. p. I-8227, point 24; du 14 juillet 2005, Commission/Allemagne, C‑433/03, Rec. p. I‑6985, point 32, et du 28 juin 2007, Commission/Portugal, C‑410/06, non publié au Recueil, point 10).

24. In accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in that Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-103/00 Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-1147, paragraph 23, and Case C-209/02 Commission v Austria [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 16). Even when the default has been remedied after the time-limit prescribed by that opinion, pursuit of the action still has an object. That object may consist in particular in establishing the basis of the liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire rights as a result of its default (see, inter alia, Case 154/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 2717, paragraph 6, and Case C-299/01 Commission v Luxembourg [2002] ECR I-5899, paragraph 11).

41. Here it is to be noted that Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement is supposed to ‘prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships’.

45. As is clear from settled case-law, the need to provide an interpretation of European Union law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the national court should define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (see, inter alia, Case C‑134/03 Viacom Outdoor [2005] ECR I‑1167, paragraph 22; Case C‑145/03 Keller [2005] ECR I‑2529, paragraph 29; and Case C‑145/10 Painer [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 46).

22. Nevertheless, according to case-law, if the Court is to be able to give helpful answers to the questions referred to it, it is necessary for the national court to define the factual and legislative context of the questions it asks or, at the very least, to explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based (order in Viacom I , paragraph 15, and the decisions cited therein).

46. By contrast, the actual certification itself requires a judicial examination of the conditions laid down by Regulation No 805/2004.

43. Nevertheless, when adopting measures to implement Community legislation, national authorities must exercise their discretion in compliance with the general rules of Community law, which include the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, Case C-313/99 Mulligan and Others [2002] ECR I-5719, paragraphs 35 and 36).

36 Consequently, a clawback measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be established and applied in compliance with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 34). Moreover, it must be proportionate to the aim pursued (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-22/94 Irish Farmers Association and Others [1997] ECR I-1809, paragraphs 30 and 31) and applied without discrimination (see, to that effect, in particular Klensch and Others, paragraph 8). Similarly, such a measure must respect fundamental rights, such as the right to property (see, to that effect, in particular Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, paragraphs 16 and 20) and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession (see, to that effect, in particular Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Neu and Others [1991] ECR I-3617, paragraph 13).

42. It follows from the foregoing that the fact that the marketing authorisation issued under a simplified procedure is personal is justified.

It follows from the above that in order to be characterised as transactions concerning transfers for the purposes of Article 13B(d)(3) of the Sixth Directive, the services at issue must, viewed broadly, form a distinct whole, fulfilling in effect the specific, essential functions of a transfer and, therefore, have the effect of transferring funds and entail changes in the legal and financial situation. In this regard, a service which is exempt under the Sixth Directive must be distinguished from a mere physical or technical supply. Accordingly, the national court must examine in particular the extent of the responsibility of the supplier of services vis-à-vis the banks, in particular the question whether that responsibility is restricted to technical aspects or whether it extends to the specific, essential aspects of the transactions (see, to that effect, judgments of 5 June 1997 in SDC, C‑2/95, EU:C:1997:278, paragraph 66, and of 28 July 2011 in Nordea Pankki Suomi, C‑350/10, EU:C:2011:532, paragraph 24).

66 In order to be characterized as exempt transactions for the purposes of points 3 and 5 of Article 13B, the services provided by a data-handling centre must, viewed broadly, form a distinct whole, fulfilling in effect the specific, essential functions of a service described in those two points. For `a transaction concerning transfers', the services provided must therefore have the effect of transferring funds and entail changes in the legal and financial situation. A service exempt under the Directive must be distinguished from a mere physical or technical supply, such as making a data-handling system available to a bank. In this regard, the national court must examine in particular the extent of the data-handling centre's responsibility vis-à-vis the banks, in particular the question whether its responsibility is restricted to technical aspects or whether it extends to the specific, essential aspects of the transactions.

20. It is otherwise where the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been acquired, without prejudice to the rights held by the holding company as shareholder (see, inter alia, judgments in Cibo Participations , C‑16/00, EU:C:2001:495, paragraph 20, and Portugal Telecom , C‑496/11, EU:C:2012:557, paragraph 33).

53. As the Court has stated on many occasions, the power to adopt implementing acts is, as a rule, conferred on the Commission and, in accordance with Article 291(2) TFEU, it is only exceptionally that that power may be reserved to the Council in ‘duly justified specific cases’ and the cases expressly provided for in Article 291(2) TFEU, which relate solely to the common foreign and security policy (see, to that effect, judgments in Parliament v Council , C‑133/06, EU:C:2008:257, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited, and Commission v Parliament and Council , C‑88/14, EU:C:2015:499, paragraph 30).

47. The Council must properly explain, by reference to the nature and content of the basic instrument to be implemented, why exception is being made to the rule that, under the system established by the Treaty, when measures implementing a basic instrument need to be taken at Community level, it is the Commission which, in the normal course of events, is responsible for exercising that power ( Commission v Council , paragraph 51).

14 FURTHERMORE, IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 4 DECEMBER 1986 ( CASE 71/85 NETHERLANDS V FNV (( 1986 )) ECR 3855 ) THE COURT HELD THAT STANDING BY ITSELF, AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVE AND CONTENTS OF THE DIRECTIVE, ARTICLE 4 ( 1 ) IS SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE TO BE RELIED UPON IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND APPLIED BY A COURT . MOREOVER, THAT ARTICLE IN NO WAY PERMITS MEMBER STATES TO RESTRICT OR PLACE CONDITIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT IN ITS PARTICULAR AREA OF APPLICATION .

19. That global assessment must, as regards the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question, be based on the overall impression created by those marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (see, in particular, in respect of Directive 89/104, SABEL , paragraph 23, and Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer , paragraph 25).

23 That global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question, must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The wording of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive - '... there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public ...' - shows that the perception of marks in the mind of the average consumer of the type of goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of the likelihood of confusion. The average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details.

27. The place where the damage occurred must not, however, be confused with the place where the event which damaged the product itself occurred, the latter being the place of the event giving rise to the damage. By contrast, the ‘place where the damage occurred’ (see Mines de potasse d'Alsace , paragraph 15, and Shevill and Others , paragraph 21) is the place where the event which gave rise to the damage produces its harmful effects, that is to say, the place where the damage caused by the defective product actually manifests itself.

32 As far as that question is concerned, it is settled case-law that Article 2(4) is specifically and exclusively designed to authorise measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of social life. It authorises national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men (Kalanke, paragraphs 18 and 19, Marschall, paragraphs 26 and 27, and Case C-158/97 Badeck and Others [2000] ECR I-1875, paragraph 19).

27 It thus authorizes national measures relating to access to employment, including promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with men (Kalanke, paragraph 19).

189. Finally, Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive must, so far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with international law, in particular taking account of the Berne Convention and the Copyright Treaty. The Copyright Directive is intended to implement that treaty which, in Article 1(4), obliges the Contracting Parties to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention. The same obligation is, moreover, laid down in Article 9(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (see, to this effect, SGAE , paragraphs 35, 40 and 41 and the case-law cited).

18. As a preliminary point, it must be observed that, in accordance with Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38, the acquisition of a right of permanent residence by family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State is dependent, in any event, on the fact that, first, the Union citizen himself satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 16(1) of that directive and, secondly, that those family members have resided with him for the period in question (see Case C‑529/11 Alarape and Tijani [2013] ECR, paragraph 34).

34. If Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38 is to apply, it is clear that the acquisition of a right of permanent residence by family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State is dependent, in any event, on the fact that, first, the Union citizen himself satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 16(1) of that directive and, secondly, those family members have resided with him for the period in question.

55 However, although the interest of the proper administration of justice may justify the imposition of a financial restriction on the access by a person to a remedy, that restriction must however retain a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aim sought to be achieved (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 December 2010, DEB, C‑279/09, EU:C:2010:811, paragraphs 47 and 60).

34. La Commission soutient que Nature-Balance cherche à remettre en cause les appréciations factuelles effectuées par le Tribunal. À supposer même que l’argumentation de Nature-Balance soit recevable, elle ne serait pas fondée. La Commission fait valoir que, aux fins de l’article 116 de la directive 2001/83, doit être regardé comme «nouveau» tout élément considéré comme tel par la communauté médicale (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Artegodan/Commission, C‑221/10 P, EU:C:2012:216, points 103 et 104). En l’occurrence, avant la saisine du comité des médicaments à usage humain, le médicament en cause n’aurait pas été examiné au niveau de l’Union aux fins d’une recherche des risques que comportait pour la santé publique son utilisation dans le traitement des tensions musculaires douloureuses. Ce serait donc à juste titre que le Tribunal a pu considérer comme nouveaux les risques pris en compte par ce comité. – Appréciation de la Cour

103. In that respect, the existence of a consensus within the medical community regarding a development of the assessment criteria of the therapeutic efficacy of a medicinal product and the questioning, within that community and following that development, of the therapeutic efficacy of that medicinal product constitute — in the same way as the identification of scientific data or new information — concrete and objective factors capable of acting as a basis for the finding of a negative benefit/risk assessment of that medicinal product.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

32. According to settled case-law, provisions of European Union law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union. Where there is divergence between two language versions of a European Union legal text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, inter alia, Case C‑89/12 Bark EU:C:2013:276, paragraph 40, and Case C‑309/11 Commission v Finland EU:C:2013:610, paragraph 49).

40. Moreover, where there is divergence between two language versions of a European Union legal text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (see, to that effect, Case C‑510/10 DR and TV2 Danmark [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 45).

13. The Commission argues in its first plea that the Council did not have the power to adopt the contested decision, and its reasoning in that respect is in two stages.

15. To assess the scope of application of the Treaty within the meaning of Article 12 EC, that article must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Treaty on citizenship of the Union. Citizenship of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to receive the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (Case C‑184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‑6193, paragraphs 30 and 31, Case C‑148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraphs 22 and 23, and Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 31).

23. That status enables nationals of the Member States who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy within the scope ratione materiae of the EC Treaty the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for (see, in particular, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, paragraph 31, and D'Hoop , cited above, paragraph 28).

57. In those circumstances, these infringement proceedings, within the limits thus defined, may be declared admissible. On the other hand, in so far as it relates to 2005 and the period following 2007, the action must be dismissed as inadmissible.

43. Second, the Court has already held that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of EU law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional means (see, inter alia, Simmenthal , paragraphs 21 and 24; Case C‑187/00 Kutz‑Bauer [2003] ECR I‑2741, paragraph 73; Joined Cases C‑387/02, C‑391/02 and C‑403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I‑3565, paragraph 72; and Case C‑314/08 Filipiak [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 81).

24THE FIRST QUESTION SHOULD THEREFORE BE ANSWERED TO THE EFFECT THAT A NATIONAL COURT WHICH IS CALLED UPON , WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS JURISDICTION , TO APPLY PROVISIONS OF COMMUNITY LAW IS UNDER A DUTY TO GIVE FULL EFFECT TO THOSE PROVISIONS , IF NECESSARY REFUSING OF ITS OWN MOTION TO APPLY ANY CONFLICTING PROVISION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION , EVEN IF ADOPTED SUBSEQUENTLY , AND IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO REQUEST OR AWAIT THE PRIOR SETTING ASIDE OF SUCH PROVISION BY LEGISLATIVE OR OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS .

29. The Commission did not, however, immediately implement that proposal, but initiated, in August 1999, a new procedure extended on that occasion to imports of sugar and of mixtures of sugar and cocoa coming from all the OCTs. According to the Commission, the tendency of imports to increase at prices below the intervention price, noted in June in respect of Aruba, had been confirmed as regards all the OCTs.

37. In any event, the Court has already ruled that, where one or other of Directives 89/48 or 92/51 is applicable, a public body in a Member State which is bound to comply with the rules laid down in the relevant directive can no longer require that a candidate’s qualifications be granted official recognition by the competent national authorities (Case C‑234/97 Fernández de Bobadilla [1999] ECR I-4773, paragraph 27).

27 Finally, where one or other of Directives 89/48 or 92/51 is applicable, a public body in a Member State which is bound to comply with the rules laid down in the relevant directive can no longer require that a candidate's qualifications be granted official recognition by the competent national authorities.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

25. In the case in the main proceedings, it must be pointed out, as did the national court, that, in accordance with settled case-law, the sale of shares does not in itself constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the Sixth Directive and does not therefore fall within its scope (see, inter alia, Case C-155/94 Wellcome Trust [1996] ECR I‑3013, paragraphs 33 to 37; EDM , paragraphs 57 to 62; and Kretztechnik , paragraph 19).

34 Now, the Trust manages the assets it holds, consisting in part of its shareholding in the Foundation and of other financial instruments. Its investment activities, as described above, consist essentially in the acquisition and sale of shares and other securities with a view to maximizing the dividends and capital yields which are destined for the promotion of medical research.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

18. It is settled case-law of the Court that provisions which are in the nature of exceptions to a principle must be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Case C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others [1995] ECR I-4515, paragraph 23; Case C-83/99 Commission v Spain [2001] ECR I-445, paragraph 19; and Case C-41/09 Commission v Netherlands [2011] ECR I-831, paragraph 58).

58. It must be added that, according to settled case-law, provisions which constitute a derogation from a principle must be interpreted strictly (see, inter alia, Case C‑399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others [1995] ECR I‑4515, paragraph 23, and Case C‑492/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 35). To permit a reduced rate of VAT to be applied to every supply of a horse would be to interpret point 1 of Annex III broadly.

25. In the light of the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that a substance which does not have any therapeutic effect of its own and which is used to obtain a certain pharmaceutical form of the medicinal product is not covered by the concept of ‘active ingredient’, which in turn is used to define the term ‘product’.

19 Pecuniary charges under a general system of internal taxation applying systematically to domestic and imported products according to the same criteria, on the other hand, are covered by Article 95 et seq. of the Treaty (Celbi, cited above, paragraph 11). Those provisions prohibit a Member State from directly or indirectly imposing on the products of other Member States any internal taxation in excess of that imposed on similar domestic products or of such a nature as to afford protection to other domestic products, and therefore the criterion for the application of Article 95 is whether or not those charges are discriminatory or protective (see in particular Case C-17/91 Lornoy and Others v Belgium [1992] ECR I-6523, paragraph 19).

11 In the case of a general system of internal charges applying systematically to domestic and imported products according to the same criteria, the provisions of Article 95 of the Treaty must apply. That article prohibits Member States from directly or indirectly imposing on the products of other Member States any internal taxation in excess of that imposed on similar domestic products or of such a nature as to afford protection to other domestic products. The applicability of the provision in question therefore depends on whether or not the internal taxation measure is discriminatory or protective (see, in particular, Case C-17/91 Lornoy and Others v Belgium [1992] ECR I-6523, paragraph 19).

108. La Cour a également souligné, dans une jurisprudence constante, que la pratique décisionnelle antérieure de la Commission ne sert pas de cadre juridique pour les amendes en matière de concurrence et que des décisions concernant d’autres affaires ont un caractère indicatif en ce qui concerne l’existence de discriminations (voir arrêt du 24 septembre 2009, Erste Group Bank e.a./Commission, C‑125/07 P, C‑133/07 P, C‑135/07 P et C‑137/07 P, Rec. p. I‑8681, point 233 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

29. Furthermore, the Court has already held that where a Member State has a system for preventing or mitigating a series of charges to tax or economic double taxation for dividends paid to residents by resident companies, it must treat dividends paid to residents by non-resident companies in the same way (see, to that effect, Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063, paragraphs 27 to 49; Manninen , paragraphs 29 to 55, and Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11673, paragraph 55).

35. That is not the case here, however. As the order for reference shows, both dividends distributed by a company established in Finland and those paid by a company established in Sweden are, apart from the tax credit, capable of being subjected to double taxation. In both cases, the revenue is first subject to corporation tax and then – in so far as it is distributed in the form of dividends – to income tax in the hands of the beneficiaries.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

92. On the other hand, national provisions which apply to shareholdings acquired solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking must be examined exclusively in light of the free movement of capital ( Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 35; Accor , paragraph 32; and Scheunemann , paragraph 23).

32. It has already been held in that regard that national legislation intended to apply only to those shareholdings which enable the holder to exert a definite influence on a company’s decisions and to determine its activities falls within the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment (see Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraph 37, and Case C‑81/09 Idrima Tipou [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 47). However, national provisions which apply to shareholdings acquired solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking must be examined exclusively in light of the free movement of capital ( Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 35 and case-law cited).

40. Consequently, the answer to the first question is that term ‘public postal services’ in Article 13A(1)(a) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted to cover operators, whether they are public or private, who undertake to provide, in a Member State, all or part of the universal postal service, as defined in Article 3 of Directive 97/67. The second and third questions

38 The Court has held, however, that Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 relates not only to the situation where a Turkish worker is in active employment but also to the situation where he is incapacitated for work, provided that his incapacity is only temporary, that is to say it does not affect his fitness to continue exercising his right to employment granted by that decision, albeit after a temporary break in his employment relationship (see Bozkurt, cited above, paragraphs 38 and 39).

39 It follows that Article 6 of Decision No 1/80 covers the situation of Turkish workers who are working or are temporarily incapacitated for work. It does not, on the other hand, cover the situation of a Turkish worker who has definitively ceased to belong to the labour force of a Member State because he has, for example, reached retirement age or, as in the present case, become totally and permanently incapacitated for work.

61. Aux fins de statuer sur le bien-fondé du recours de la Commission, il importe de rappeler, à titre liminaire, que l’existence des restrictions à la liberté d’établissement ainsi qu’à la libre prestation des services visées respectivement aux articles 49 TFUE et 56 TFUE sont constituées par des mesures qui interdisent, gênent ou rendent moins attrayant l’exercice de ces libertés (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 29 mars 2011, Commission/Italie, C-565/08, non encore publié au Recueil, point 45 et jurisprudence citée).

47. It must however be added that, in accordance with settled case-law, consumer protection may constitute a legitimate objective in the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the free movement of goods (see Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 8, and Case C‑441/04 A-Punkt Schmuckhandel [2006] ECR I‑2093, paragraph 27).

27. In that regard, consumer protection may constitute a justification for the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings, on the twofold condition that the prohibition is appropriate to ensure the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

92. For the purpose of answering the question as reformulated, it should be pointed out that the Court has already held that the principles of equal treatment and transparency of tender procedures imply an obligation on the part of contracting authorities to interpret the award criteria in the same way throughout the procedure (see, to that effect, in particular SIAC Construction , paragraph 43).

43 This obligation of transparency also means that the adjudicating authority must interpret the award criteria in the same way throughout the entire procedure (see, along these lines, Commission v Belgium, cited above, paragraphs 88 and 89).

63. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that Article 11(1) of Directive 92/85 provides only for minimum protection with respect to the pay of pregnant workers covered by Article 5 thereof. None of the provisions of that directive prevents the Member States or, where appropriate, management and labour from providing for the maintenance of all the pay components and supplementary allowances to which the pregnant worker was entitled before her pregnancy and her temporary transfer to another job.

38 It must however be added that the question whether the operation of approved centres does in practice lead to discrimination against imported bovine semen should be assessed in the light of Article 30 of the EC Treaty. It is for the referring court to determine the relevant facts (see Case C-323/93 Centre d' Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077, paragraph 39).

39 The question whether the operation of the approved centres, so far as the conditions for storing semen are concerned, entails in practice discrimination against the imported product is one of fact which the national court must determine.

44 In that connection, it must be stated that the investigations carried out following the adoption of the reasoned opinion, as well as the deliberations of the municipal council, led the Commission, for the purposes of bringing the action, to the conclusion that the Italian Republic had still not complied with that opinion, even after expiry of the time-limit prescribed for compliance therewith.

77. According to settled case-law, the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with European Union law but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of an instrument of secondary legislation which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the European Union legal order or with the other general principles of European Union law (see, to that effect, Case C‑101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR I‑12971, paragraph 87, and Case C‑305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I‑5305, paragraph 28).

28. On that point, the Court has consistently held that, if the wording of secondary Community law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the EC Treaty rather than to the interpretation which leads to its being incompatible with the Treaty (see Case 218/82 Commission v Council [1983] ECR 4063, paragraph 15, and Case C‑135/93 Spain v Commission [1995] ECR I‑1651, paragraph 37). Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with Community law but also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of wording of secondary legislation which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order or with the other general principles of Community law (Case C‑101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR I‑12971, paragraph 87).

32 Although there are admittedly disadvantages to having different courts ruling on various aspects of the same dispute, the plaintiff always has the option of bringing his entire claim before the courts either of the defendant' s domicile or of the place where the publisher of the defamatory publication is established.

83. It must be observed that the framework established by Directive 77/799 for cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States does not exist between those authorities and the competent authorities of a non-Member State where that State has not entered into any undertaking of mutual assistance ( Commission v Italy , paragraph 70; Établissements Rimbaud , paragraph 41; and Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen , paragraph 66).

70. In this case, it should first be noted that the framework of cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States established by Directive 77/799 does not exist between the latter and the competent authorities of a non-member State when the latter has not entered into any undertaking of mutual assistance.

60 The Court has also held that, provided that the conditions for recourse to Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis are fulfilled, the EU legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be made (judgments in British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, C‑491/01, EU:C:2002:741, paragraph 62; Arnold André, C‑434/02, EU:C:2004:800, paragraph 32; Swedish Match, C‑210/03, EU:C:2004:802, paragraph 31; and Germany v Parliament and Council, C‑380/03, EU:C:2006:772, paragraph 39).

50. As for the presence of organised crime, the Commission states that, even if it were to be proved, that could be no justification for the failure of the Italian Republic to comply with its obligations under Directive 2006/12 (see Case C‑263/05 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I‑11745, paragraph 51).

51. Lastly, as regards the observations made by the Italian Republic at the hearing regarding the fact that persons described as acting ‘on the fringes of the law’ operate in the waste management sector, it is sufficient to point out that that fact – even were it assumed to be established – cannot justify the failure by that Member State to respect its obligations under the Directive.

50. It must be recalled that paragraph 15 of its commitments required Lagardère to appoint a trustee who, among other conditions, was ‘to be independent of Lagardère and Éditis’.

39. In this regard it is sufficient to observe that according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, in particular, Case C‑423/00 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I‑593, paragraph 14, and Case C‑433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I‑6985, paragraph 32).

32. Suffice it in this regard to point out that, according to settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-110/00 Commission v Austria [2001] ECR I-7545, paragraph 13, and Case C-310/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-1969, paragraph 7).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

60. It should be noted in this connection that, even if — in order to ensure full compliance with the Court’s judgment — the penalty payment should be payable in its entirety until such time as the Member State has taken all the measures necessary to bring to an end the failure to fulfil obligations established, nevertheless, in certain specific cases, a penalty which takes account of the progress that the Member State may have made in complying with its obligations may be envisaged (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission v Spain , EU:C:2003:635, paragraphs 43 to 51; in Commission v Italy , EU:C:2011:740, paragraphs 47 to 55; and in Commission v Belgium , EU:C:2013:659, paragraphs 73 and 74).

47. To determine the form of the penalty payment, account must be taken of the special character, adduced by the Italian Republic, of the operations for recovery of the aid paid under the scheme that was declared incompatible with the common market by Decision 2000/128.

53. Admittedly, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, such an infringement is not capable of bringing about the annulment of that judgment, and a substitution of grounds must be made (see, to that effect, judgment in Comitato ‘Venezia vuole vivere’ and Othe rs v Commission , C‑71/09 P, C‑73/09 P and C‑76/09 P, EU:C:2011:368, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited).

26 As the Court has held in De Weerd, née Roks, and Others at paragraph 28, Directive 79/7 leaves intact the powers reserved by Articles 117 and 118 of the EC Treaty to the Member States to define their social policy within the framework of close cooperation organized by the Commission, and consequently the nature and extent of measures of social protection, including those relating to social security, and the way in which they are implemented. In exercising that competence, the Member States have a broad margin of discretion (Nolte, paragraph 33, and Megner and Scheffel, paragraph 29).

29 The Court observes that, in the current state of Community law, social policy is a matter for the Member States (see Case C-229/89 Commission v Belgium [1991] ECR I-2205, paragraph 22). Consequently, it is for the Member States to choose the measures capable of achieving the aim of their social and employment policy. In exercising that competence, the Member States have a broad margin of discretion.

45. In that respect, it is for the Council to balance the particular interest to be protected by non-disclosure of the document concerned against, inter alia, the public interest in the document being made accessible in the light of the advantages stemming, as noted in recital 2 of the preamble to Regulation No 1049/2001, from increased openness, in that this enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system.

69. However, as the Court has already held and in so far as Directive 2009/28 had already entered into force at the time of the facts in the main proceedings, the interpretation of that directive sought by the referring court must be regarded as being useful to that court (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑261/07 and C‑299/07 VTB-VAB and Galatea [2009] ECR I‑2949, paragraphs 29 to 41).

34. In this case, it is not obvious that the present question referred is irrelevant in the light of the decision which the national court is called upon to take.

38. Par exception, une telle mesure peut être admise au titre de l’un des motifs énoncés à l’article 52 TFUE ou justifiée, conformément à la jurisprudence de la Cour, par des raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général (voir, par analogie, arrêts Engelmann, précité, points 51 et 57 ainsi que jurisprudence citée, et du 10 mai 2012, Duomo Gpa e.a., C‑357/10 à C‑359/10, point 39 ainsi que jurisprudence citée). À ce dernier égard, il ressort de la lecture combinée des points 51 et 57 de l’arrêt Engelmann, précité, qu’il n’y a pas lieu de distinguer les circonstances objectives et les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général. En effet, de telles circonstances doivent constituer, en dernière analyse, une raison impérieuse d’intérêt général.

119 An undertaking may thus have participated directly in all the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, in which case the Commission is entitled to attribute liability to it in relation to that conduct as a whole and, therefore, in relation to the infringement as a whole. Equally, the undertaking may have participated directly in only some of the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, but have been aware of all the other unlawful conduct planned or put into effect by the other participants in the cartel in pursuit of the same objectives, or could reasonably have foreseen that conduct and have been prepared to take the risk. In such cases, the Commission is also entitled to attribute liability to that undertaking in relation to all the forms of anticompetitive conduct comprising such an infringement and, accordingly, in relation to the infringement as a whole (see judgment of 24 June 2015, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce , C‑293/13 P and C‑294/13 P, EU:C:2015:416, paragraph 158 and the case-law cited).

158. An undertaking may thus have participated directly in all the forms of anti-competitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, in which case the Commission is entitled to attribute liability to it in relation to that conduct as a whole and, therefore, in relation to the infringement as a whole. Equally, the undertaking may have participated directly in only some of the forms of anti-competitive conduct comprising the single and continuous infringement, but have been aware of all the other unlawful conduct planned or put into effect by the other participants in the cartel in pursuit of the same objectives, or could reasonably have foreseen that conduct and have been prepared to take the risk. In such cases, the Commission is also entitled to attribute liability to that undertaking in relation to all the forms of anti-competitive conduct comprising such an infringement and, accordingly, in relation to the infringement as a whole (judgment in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens , C‑441/11 P, EU:C:2012:778, paragraph 43).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

35. According to settled case‑law, the conditions required of comparative advertising must be interpreted in the sense most favourable to it ( Toshiba Europe , paragraph 37, Pippig Augenoptik , paragraph 42 and Lidl Belgium , paragraph 22).

22. The second preliminary point to note is that, given the objectives of the Directive and in particular the fact that, as the second recital in the preamble to Directive 97/55 points out, comparative advertising helps to demonstrate objectively the merits of the various comparable products and thus stimulate competition between suppliers of goods and services to the consumer’s advantage, it is settled case-law that the conditions required of comparative advertising must be interpreted in the sense most favourable to it (Case C-112/99 Toshiba Europe [2001] ECR I‑7945, paragraphs 36 and 37, and Case C-44/01 Pippig Augenoptik [2003] ECR I‑3095, paragraph 42; see also Case C-59/05 Siemens [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 22 to 24). Order in which the questions are to be examined

30. Consequently, it is established that the Austrian compensatory supplement must be regarded as being non-contributory within the meaning of Article 4(2a) of Regulation No 1408/71.

42. If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component (see Case C-36/98 Spain v Council [2001] ECR I-779, paragraph 59; Case C-211/01 Commission v Council [2003] ECR I‑8913, paragraph 39; and Case C-338/01 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑4829, paragraph 55).

39. If examination of a Community measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of these is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component whereas the other is merely incidental, the act must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component (see, to that effect, inter alia Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-939, paragraphs 19 and 21, and Case C-36/98 Spain v Council [2001] ECR I-779, paragraph 59).

25 In that regard it must be pointed out first of all that the schemes in question are the result either of an agreement between workers and employers or of a unilateral decision taken by the employer . They are wholly financed by the employer or by both the employer and the workers without any contribution being made by the public authorities in any circumstances . Accordingly, such schemes form part of the consideration offered to workers by the employer .

62. It follows that a contracting authority is not exempt from using the procedures for the award of public works contracts provided for by the Directive, on the ground that it plans to conclude the contract concerned with a second contracting authority (see, by analogy, Teckal , paragraph 51; Case C-94/99 ARGE [2000] ECR I-11037, paragraph 40; and Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau [2005] ECR I-1, paragraph 47). Furthermore, that finding does not affect the obligation on the latter contracting authority to apply in its turn the tendering procedures laid down in the Directive (see, by analogy, Teckal , paragraph 45).

40 It is also relevant to point out that the Court considered a similar question in its judgment in Case C-107/98 Teckal v Comune di Viano [1999] ECR I-8121, concerning Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 1). It ruled that that directive is applicable where a contracting authority, such as a local authority, plans to conclude in writing, with an entity which is formally distinct from it and independent of it in regard to decision-making, a contract for pecuniary interest for the supply of products, whether or not that entity is itself a contracting authority.

19. By way of exception to that principle, measures tainted by an irregularity whose gravity is so obvious that it cannot be tolerated by the Community legal order must be treated as having no legal effect, even provisional, that is to say they must be regarded as legally non-existent. The purpose of this exception is to maintain a balance between two fundamental, but sometimes conflicting, requirements with which a legal order must comply, namely stability of legal relations and respect for legality ( Commission v BASF and Others , paragraph 49, and Chemie Linz v Commission , paragraph 94).

18. According to settled case-law, in order to determine whether a body making a reference is a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, which is a question governed by European Union law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes , whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, inter alia, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23; Case C-53/03 Syfait and Others [2005] ECR I-4609, paragraph 29; Case C-246/05 Häupl [2007] ECR I-4673, paragraph 16; and the order of 14 May 2008 in Case C-109/07 Pilato [2008] ECR I-3503, paragraph 22).

23 In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 61/65 Vaassen (neé Göbbels) [1966] ECR 261; Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons unkown [1987] ECR 2545, paragraph 7; Case 109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, paragraphs 7 and 8; Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others [1994] ECR I-1477; and Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-3361, paragraph 9).

33. Il y a lieu de relever qu’il ressort du libellé de l’article 7, paragraphe 1, du règlement n° 207/2009 qu’il suffit que l’un des motifs absolus de refus énumérés à cette disposition s’applique pour que le signe en cause ne puisse être enregistré comme marque communautaire (voir, en ce sens, arrêt DKV/OHMI, C‑104/00 P, EU:C:2002:506, point 29).

44. While it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value to be attached to the items of evidence adduced before it, and while it cannot be required to give express reasons for its assessment of the value of each piece of evidence presented to it, in particular where it considers that evidence to be unimportant or irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute (Case C‑237/98 P Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I‑4549, paragraphs 50 and 51), the Court of First Instance is none the less obliged to provide reasons which will allow the Court to exercise its judicial review. Those reasons must make it possible for the Court to review any distortion of the evidence submitted to the Court of First Instance (Case C‑198/03 P Commission v CEVA and Pfizer [2005] ECR I‑6357, paragraph 50).

51 As the Advocate General has observed in point 11 of his Opinion, the Court of First Instance cannot, subject to its obligation to observe general principles and the Rules of Procedure relating to the burden of proof and the adducing of evidence and not to distort the true sense of the evidence, be required to give express reasons for its assessment of the value of each piece of evidence presented to it, in particular where it considers that that evidence is unimportant or irrelevant to the outcome of the dispute.

27. In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that, unlike Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive, which is designed to apply only if there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, Article 5(2) of the Directive establishes, for the benefit of trade marks with a reputation, a form of protection whose implementation does not require the existence of such a likelihood. Article 5(2) applies to situations in which the specific condition of the protection consists of a use of the sign in question without due cause which takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark (see Case C-425/98 Marca Mode [2000] ECR I-4861, paragraphs 34 and 36).

34. At paragraphs 39 to 51 of that judgment, the Court considered whether the old Federal Law on the remuneration of civil servants engendered discrimination within the meaning of Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 and concluded that it did, on the ground that the allocation of a basic pay step to civil servants upon recruitment according to their age went beyond what was necessary to attain the legitimate aim pursued by that law.

51. In such cases, as the Court observed in paragraph 77 of Hennigs and Mai (EU:C:2011:560), it follows that the allocation, on the basis of age, of a basic pay step to a civil servant upon his appointment goes beyond what is necessary for achieving the legitimate aim, relied on by the Ger man Government, of taking account of the professional experience acquired by that civil servant before he is appointed.

130 As regards the applicability of Article 52 of the Treaty in this case, it should be pointed out that that provision, which the Republic of Austria is charged with infringing, applies in the field of air transport.

25. First, concerning fees where the standard rates are defined on the basis of the costs borne by the competent authorities over a given period of time, it should be noted that the amount of those costs is already taken into account when determining those rates. In addition, as the Court has already ruled, a standard fee by its very nature exceeds the actual cost of the measures which it is intended to finance in certain cases and is lower than that cost in other cases (Case C‑270/07 Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I‑1983, paragraph 32).

32. It follows that that fee must, first, not exceed the amount of the actual costs and, secondly, take into account all those costs, none of which may be excluded. It cannot therefore take the form of a ‘standard’ fee in the sense in which the Commission construes that term since, as the Court held in paragraph 52 of Stratmann and Fleischversorgung Neuss , a standard fee by its very nature exceeds the actual cost of the measures which it is intended to finance in certain cases and is lower than that cost in other cases.

26. Article 10a of Directive 2001/83 therefore has the effect of exempting the applicant from one of the requirements laid down in Article 8 of the directive for obtaining a MA under Article 6 thereof. Accordingly, a medicinal product for which the MA was granted pursuant to Article 10a of the directive, the applicant for that authorisation having availed himself of the derogation under that provision and also having fulfilled all the other requirements laid down in Article 8 of the directive, must be regarded as a medicinal product authorised under Article 6 of the directive, in accordance with the provision of Article 8 thereof.

58. The Court has already held in that regard that the establishment of a measure as restrictive as a monopoly must be accompanied by a legislative framework suitable for ensuring that the holder of the said monopoly will in fact be able to pursue, in a consistent and systematic manner, the objective thus determined by means of a supply that is quantitatively measured and qualitatively designed by reference to the said objective and subject to strict control by the public authorities ( Stoß and Others , paragraph 83).

83. The fact remains, however, that the establishment of a measure as restrictive as a monopoly, which can be justified only in order to ensure a particularly high level of consumer protection, must be accompanied by a legislative framework suitable for ensuring that the holder of the said monopoly will in fact be able to pursue, in a consistent and systematic manner, the objective thus determined by means of a supply that is quantitatively measured and qualitatively planned by reference to the said objective and subject to strict control by the public authorities. The alleged ineffectiveness of monopolies such as those at issue in the main proceedings having regard to the transnational environment generated by the internet

27 IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE CONSIDERATIONS , ORIGINATING IN THE SCHEME OF REGULATION NO 3017/79 THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DECIDE WHETHER COMPLAINANTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION .

22. In such circumstances, the national rules on itinerant sales relate to the free movement of goods. In that regard, the Court has already had occasion to rule on the compatibility with Articles 28 EC to 30 EC of various national provisions regulating marketing methods (see, in particular, Case 382/87 Buet and EBS [1989] ECR 1235, paragraphs 7 to 9; Case C-239/90 Boscher [1991] ECR I‑2023, paragraphs 13 to 21; Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst [2000] ECR I‑151, paragraphs 29 to 31, and Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, paragraph 39).

21 It follows that legislation of the kind referred to by the national court cannot be justified by mandatory requirements relating to the protection of consumers and, consequently, that it is incompatible with Article 30 of the Treaty.

17 As for the models whose normal value was constructed, Brother contends that the administrative, general and other expenses should have been calculated on the assumption that the product was to be exported .

73. The Court has also had occasion to explain that, construed in the light of that case-law and of the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must be respected where national legislation falls within the scope of EU law. In other words, the applicability of EU law entails the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter (see, to that effect, Åkerberg Fransson , paragraphs 20 and 21).

21. Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

29. À cet égard, la date de référence pour apprécier l’existence d’un manquement au titre de l’article 260, paragraphe 1, TFUE est celle de l’expiration du délai fixé dans la lettre de mise en demeure émise en vertu de cette disposition (arrêts du 11 décembre 2012, Commission/Espagne, C‑610/10, point 67, et du 25 juin 2013, Commission/République tchèque, C‑241/11, point 23).

67. As Article 260(2) TFEU removed from infringement proceedings the stage relating to the issuing of a reasoned opinion, as has been pointed out in paragraph 43 above, the reference date which must be used for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations is that of the expiry of the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice issued under that provision.

21 The practical difficulties which the Commission and the United Kingdom claim would preclude the implementation of a system of charging the clawback which provides for the amount of the premium to be exactly equal to that of the clawback cannot alter that conclusion.