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48. As the Court has held on numerous occasions, first, the first paragraph of Article 7 has direct effect in the Member States and, second, the employment-related rights that that provision confers on Turkish nationals necessarily mean that a concomitant right of residence in the host Member State must be acknowledged to exist (see, inter alia, Case C‑303/08 Bozkurt [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 31, 35 and 36, and also Case C‑484/07 Pehlivan [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraphs 39 and 43).

36. Once the conditions set out in the first paragraph of Article 7 of Decision No 1/80 are satisfied, that provision confers on the family member of a Turkish worker a right of his own of access to the labour market in the host Member State and, concomitantly, the right to continue to reside in that State.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

21. It is settled case-law that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under European Union law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission. The subject-matter of the action brought under Article 258 TFEU is, therefore, delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article. Accordingly, the action cannot be founded on any objections other than those stated in the pre-litigation procedure (see, inter alia, Case C‑152/98 Commission v Netherlands [2001] ECR I‑3463, paragraph 23).

23 It is settled case-law that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one hand, to comply with its obligations under Community law and, on the other, to avail itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission. The subject-matter of an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty is, therefore, delimited by the pre-litigation procedure provided for by that article. Accordingly, the action cannot be founded on any objections other than those stated in the pre-litigation procedure (see, to that effect, Case 51/83 Commission v Italy [1984] ECR 2793, paragraph 4, Case C-206/96 Commission v Luxembourg [1998] ECR I-3401, paragraph 13, and Case C-392/96 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I-5901, paragraph 51).

21. Le choix, par le législateur de l’Union, du terme «caractéristique» met en exergue le fait que les signes visés par ladite disposition ne sont que ceux qui servent à désigner une propriété, facilement reconnaissable par les milieux intéressés, des produits ou des services pour lesquels l’enregistrement est demandé (voir arrêt Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol/OHMI, EU:C:2011:139, point 50).

27. Second, the protection of public health is one of the overriding reasons in the general interest which can justify restrictions on the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty such as the freedom of establishment (see, inter alia, Hartlauer , paragraph 46).

46. Moreover, the protection of public health is one of the overriding reasons in the general interest which can, under Article 46(1) EC, justify restrictions of freedom of establishment.

68. The extent of the information relating to the price will be established on the basis of the nature and characteristics of the product, but also on the basis of the medium of communication used for the invitation to purchase and having regard to additional information possibly provided by the trader.

51. A cash-flow disadvantage which arises from a cross-border situation can form a restriction on a fundamental freedom where such a disadvantage does not arise in a purely national situation (see, to that effect, judgments in Metallgesellschaft and Others , C‑397/98 and C‑410/98, EU:C:2001:134, paragraphs 44, 54 and 76; X and Y , C‑436/00, EU:C:2002:704, paragraphs 36 and 37; Rewe Zentralfinanz , C‑347/04, EU:C:2007:194, paragraphs 26 to 30; National Grid Indus , C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraphs 36 and 37; DMC , C‑164/12, EU:C:2014:20, paragraphs 40 to 43; and Commission v Germany , C‑591/13, EU:C:2015:230, paragraphs 55 to 61).

36 First, as regards type A share transfers, the national provision at issue in the main proceedings entails a difference in treatment in refusing to the transferor the benefit of deferring capital gains tax made on shares transferred at undervalue, with a consequential cash flow disadvantage for him, where the transferee company in which the transferor has a holding is established in another Member State. Therefore, refusal of the tax advantage in question on the ground that the transferee company in which the taxpayer has a holding is established in another Member State, is likely to have a deterrent effect on the exercise by that taxpayer of the right conferred on him by Article 43 EC to pursue his activities in that other Member State through the intermediary of a company.

54 As to the second part of this plea, it should be observed that the Court of First Instance has unlimited jurisdiction when it rules on the amount of fines imposed on undertakings for infringements of Community law and that it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the Court of First Instance in the matter (Ferriere Nord v Commission, cited above, paragraph 31).

25 In that respect, the Court has consistently held that the concept of worker has a specific Community meaning and must not be interpreted narrowly. It must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned. In order to be treated as a worker, a person must pursue an activity which is effective and genuine, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary. The essential feature of an employment relationship is that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration. By contrast, the nature of the legal relationship between the worker and the employer is not decisive for the purposes of determining whether a person is a worker within the meaning of Community law (see, as regards Article 48 of the Treaty, in particular, Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg [1986] ECR 2121, paragraphs 16 and 17; Case 197/86 Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 3205, paragraph 21; Case C-357/89 Raulin [1992] ECR I-1027, paragraph 10; and, as regards Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80, Günaydin, paragraph 31, and Ertanir, paragraph 43).

10 It should be recalled at the outset that the Court has consistently held that the concept of worker has a Community meaning and must not be interpreted in a restrictive manner. Nevertheless, in order to be regarded as a worker, a person must perform effective and genuine activities to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be purely marginal and ancillary. The essential characteristic of an employment relationship is that for a certain period a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration (see in particular the judgment in Case 197/86 Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 3205, paragraph 21). In this context, the nature of the legal relationship between the employee and the employer is not decisive in regard to the application of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty (see the judgment in Case 344/87 Bettray v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1989] ECR 1621, paragraph 16).

11 THAT GENERAL PROVISION , HOWEVER , WHICH APPEARS IN TITLE II OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 , HEADED ' ' DETERMINATION OF THE LEGISLATION APPLICABLE ' ' , APPLIES ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF PROVISION TO THE CONTRARY IN THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE VARIOUS CATEGORIES OR BENEFITS WHICH CONSTITUTE TITLE III OF THE SAME REGULATION .

56. In Intel Corporation , the Court confirmed its case-law to the effect that the existence of a link between the marks at issue must, like the existence of a likelihood of confusion, be assessed globally, account being taken of all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include not only the degree of similarity between the conflicting marks, but also the degree of the earlier mark’s distinctive character and the strength of its reputation (see Intel Corporation , paragraphs 41 and 42 and the case-law cited).

41. The existence of such a link must be assessed globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case (see, in respect of Article 5(2) of the Directive, Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux , paragraph 30, and adidas and adidas Benelux , paragraph 42).

99. In so doing, the General Court rejected the argument of Inalca and Cremonini that that damage was ongoing in nature until the delivery of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma in 2005. It stated that the non-material damage alleged, even if it were accepted that it continued up to that date, materialised in full when Inalca and Cremonini and their directors were implicated in those proceedings in 1999 and in 2000. Referring to the characteristics that damage must possess in order to be classified as ‘ongoing damage’, as set out in paragraphs 56 and 57 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that the non-material damage alleged could not be treated as ongoing damage.

102. In accordance with settled case-law, the purpose of the multiplier for deterrence and the taking into consideration of the size and global resources of the undertaking in question resides in the impact sought on that undertaking, and the sanction must not be negligible in the light, particularly, of its financial capacity (see, to that effect, Case C‑413/08 P Lafarge v Commission [2010] ECR I‑5361, paragraph 104, and the order of 7 February 2012 in Case C‑421/11 P Total and Elf Aquitaine v Commission , paragraph 82).

104. It must be emphasised in this regard that the size and global resources of the undertaking in question being taken into consideration in order to ensure that the fine has sufficient deterrent effect resides in the impact sought on that undertaking, and the sanction must not be negligible in the light, particularly, of its financial capacity.

92. Afin de répondre à l’argumentation avancée, il convient de relever, à titre liminaire, que la Commission bénéficie d’un large pouvoir d’appréciation pour ce qui est de la méthode de calcul des amendes en cas de violation des règles de l’Union en matière de concurrence. Cette méthode comporte différents éléments de flexibilité permettant à la Commission d’exercer son pouvoir d’appréciation en conformité avec les dispositions de l’article 23, paragraphes 2 et 3, du règlement n° 1/2003 (voir arrêt du 3 septembre 2009, Papierfabrik August Koehler e.a./Commission, C‑322/07 P, C‑327/07 P et C‑338/07 P, Rec. p. I‑7191, point 112 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

26 In that regard, it should be remembered that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15) can be invoked by a Member State in order to obtain from the competent authorities of another Member State all the information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer himself to produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not the deduction requested should be allowed (see Bachmann and Commission v Belgium, cited above, at respectively paragraphs 18 and 20 and paragraphs 11 and 13).

11 As regards the effectiveness of fiscal control, it is to be observed that Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (Official Journal 1977 L 336, p. 15, hereinafter referred to as "the Directive") may be invoked by a Member State in order to check whether payments have been made in another Member State where, as in this case, it is necessary, in order correctly to assess the income tax, to take account of those payments (Article 1(1)).

42. En troisième lieu, les difficultés auxquelles serait confrontée l’ACICL peuvent être surmontées par d’autres mécanismes visant à compenser les difficultés financières de celle-ci, comme l’obtention d’une aide juridictionnelle (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 22 décembre 2010, DEB, C‑279/09, Rec. p. I‑13849, points 59 et 60, ainsi que, par analogie, arrêt Agrokonsulting-04, précité, point 50).

49. In that context, it is clear from the case-law of the Court that the ‘standstill’ clause precludes a Member State from adopting any new measure having the object or effect of making the establishment and, as a corollary, the residence of a Turkish national in its territory subject to stricter conditions than those which applied at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned (see Savas , paragraph 69, and Abatay and Others , paragraph 66).

69 It should also be noted that the standstill clause in Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol precludes a Member State from adopting any new measure having the object or effect of making the establishment, and, as a corollary, the residence of a Turkish national in its territory subject to stricter conditions than those which applied at the time when the Additional Protocol entered into force with regard to the Member State concerned.

19. The mere acquisition and holding of shares in a company is not to be regarded as an economic activity, within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder the status of a taxable person. The mere acquisition of financial holdings in other undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property (see, inter alia, judgments in Cibo Participations , C‑16/00, EU:C:2001:495 paragraph 19, and Portugal Telecom , C‑496/11, EU:C:2012:557, paragraph 32).

44 At the same time, it should be pointed out that a system of undistorted competition, as envisaged in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators. That would not be the case if an undertaking which markets terminal equipment were entrusted with the task of drawing up the specifications for such equipment, monitoring their application and granting type-approval in respect thereof (France v Commission, paragraph 51, and RTT v GB-Inno-BM, paragraph 25).

25 A system of undistorted competition, as laid down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators. To entrust an undertaking which markets terminal equipment with the task of drawing up the specifications for such equipment, monitoring their application and granting type-approval in respect thereof is tantamount to conferring upon it the power to determine at will which terminal equipment may be connected to the public network, and thereby placing that undertaking at an obvious advantage over its competitors (judgment in Case C-202/88, paragraph 51).

28 Accordingly, the fact that a brand name is presented in a conspicuous manner does not mean that it is likely to cause confusion or mislead the persons to whom it is addressed, even if it contains a word that has been designated by the rules in question as information which may be used in the appellation of a quality wine psr.

41 In paragraphs 47 to 53 of Gloszczuk and paragraphs 50 to 56 of Barkoci and Malik, the Court addressed the question of the compatibility of the restrictions which the immigration legislation of the host Member State imposes on the right of establishment, and not the question of the interpretation of the expression economic activities as self-employed persons used in those Association Agreements. The Court there rejected the argument that, since the right of establishment provided for by those Agreements is equivalent to the right of establishment governed by Article 52 of the Treaty, application by the competent authorities of the host Member State of the national immigration rules requiring Polish and Czech nationals to obtain leave to enter or reside is in itself liable to render ineffective the rights granted to such persons by Article 44(3) of the Association Agreement between the Communities and Poland or Article 45(3) of the Association Agreement between the Communities and the Czech Republic.

50 It must be pointed out that, according to the case-law established in the context of the interpretation of both the provisions of the Treaty and those of the agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (OJ 1973 C 133, p. 1), the right to the same treatment as nationals in regard to establishment, as defined by Article 45(3) of the Association Agreement, in wording similar or identical to that of Article 52 of the Treaty, does indeed mean that a right of entry and residence are conferred, as corollaries of the right of establishment, on Czech nationals wishing to pursue activities of an industrial or commercial character, activities of craftsmen, or activities of the professions in a Member State (see Royer, cited above, paragraphs 31 and 32, and Case C-37/98 Savas [2000] ECR I-2927, paragraphs 60 and 63).

222 The interdependence of the two objectives pursued by the directive means that the EU legislature could legitimately take the view that it had to establish a set of rules for the placing on the EU market of tobacco products with characterising flavours and that, because of that interdependence, those two objectives could best be achieved at EU level (see, by analogy, judgment in Vodafone and Others, C‑58/08, EU:C:2010:321, paragraph 78, and Estonia v Parliament and Council, C‑508/13, EU:C:2015:403, paragraph 48).

28 In that context, the Court has stated that the decisive factor for the purposes of the application of Regulation No 1408/71 is that there must be a direct and sufficiently relevant link between the provision in question and the legislation governing the branches of social security listed in Article 4 of Regulation No 1408/71 (judgments of 18 May 1995, Rheinhold & Mahla, C‑327/92, EU:C:1995:144, paragraph 23; 15 February 2000, Commission v France, C‑34/98, EU:C:2000:84, paragraph 35; 15 February 2000, Commission v France, C‑169/98, EU:C:2000:85, paragraph 33; and 26 February 2015, de Ruyter, C‑623/13, EU:C:2015:123, paragraph 23).

33 As the Court has held, in particular in Case C-327/92 Rheinhold & Mahla [1995] ECR I-1223, paragraph 15, Article 4 determines the matters covered by Regulation No 1408/71 in terms which make it clear that the national social security schemes are subject in their entirety to the application of the rules of Community law. At paragraph 23 of that judgment the Court stated that the decisive factor for the purposes of applying Regulation No 1408/71 is that there must be a link between the provision in question and the legislation governing the branches of social security listed in Article 4 of Regulation No 1408/71, and that that link must be direct and sufficiently relevant.

35 It should be borne in mind in this regard that one of the objectives of Directive 87/101 was to give priority to the processing of waste oils by regeneration. That objective, expressed in the second recital in the preamble to Directive 87/101, is inspired by the fact that regeneration is the most rational way of re-using waste oils in view of the energy savings which can be achieved.

65. National legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which applies without distinction to Italian nationals and to nationals of other Member States, is generally likely to fall within the scope of the provisions on freedom to provide services established by the Treaty only to the extent to which it applies to situations related to intra-Community trade (see, to that effect, Case 286/81 Oosthoek’s Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575, paragraph 9, and Case C‑6/01 Anomar and Others [2003] ECR I‑8621, paragraph 39).

39. As for the second objection, it must be acknowledged that all the facts in the main proceedings are confined to a single Member State. However, national legislation such as Decree-Law No 422/89, which applies without distinction to Portuguese nationals and to nationals of other Member States, may generally fall within the scope of the provisions on the fundamental freedoms established by the Treaty only to the extent that it applies to situations related to intra-Community trade (see, to that effect, Case 286/81 Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575, paragraph 9, and Case 98/86 Mathot [1987] ECR 809, paragraphs 8 and 9, and Reisch and Others , cited above, paragraph 24).

27. The same is true of the fact that the cooking wine and cooking port are unsuitable for consumption as beverages.

19 The first point to be noted is that since the judgment in Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I-3461, paragraph 26, the Court has consistently held that Article 6(1) of Decision No 1/80 has direct effect in the Member States and that Turkish nationals who satisfy its conditions may therefore rely directly on the rights which the three indents of that provision confer on them progressively, according to the duration of their employment in the host Member State (see, most recently, Case C-36/96 Günaydin v Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR I-5143, paragraph 24, and Case C-98/96 Ertanir v Land Hessen [1997] ECR I-5179, paragraph 24).

26 It follows from the foregoing considerations that it must be stated in reply to the second question submitted by the Raad van State that Article 2(1)(b ) of Decision No 2/76 and/or Article 6(1 ) of Decision No 1/80 and Article 7 of Decision No 2/76 and/or Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 have direct effect in the Member States of the European Community . The third question

61 More generally, it observed that whenever it fell to be determined whether a procedural provision of national law was less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions, the national court must take into account the role played by that provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any special features of that procedure before the different national courts (Levez, paragraph 44).

45. More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of EU provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the European Commission may even have contributed (see, inter alia, Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , paragraph 60, and Mednis , paragraph 43).

43. More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of EU provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the European Commission may even have contributed (see, inter alia, Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others , paragraph 60).

41 To restrict the application of Article 13(2)(f) of Regulation No 1408/71 to the situation where all occupational activity has definitively ceased would thus amount to depriving that provision of part of its substance.

38. It is settled case‑law that the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑336/03 easyCar [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraph 21 and the case‑law cited; and judgment of 5 March 2009 in Case C‑556/07 Commission v France , paragraph 50).

50. Or, il est de jurisprudence constante que la détermination de la signification et de la portée des termes pour lesquels le droit communautaire ne fournit aucune définition doit être établie conformément au sens habituel en langage courant de ceux-ci, tout en tenant compte du contexte dans lequel ils sont utilisés et des objectifs poursuivis par la réglementation dont ils font partie (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêt du 10 mars 2005, easyCar, C‑336/03, Rec. p. I‑1947, point 21 et jurisprudence citée).

7 As regards the argument of the Netherlands Government that Directive 95/47 is already observed in the Netherlands in practice although it has not yet been fully implemented in Netherlands law, suffice it to observe that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as constituting the proper fulfilment of a Member State's obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-159/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4007, paragraph 32). This is all the more true of mere practices of economic operators.

63 Admittedly, it is also an objective of the return procedure envisaged by the 1980 Hague Convention and Regulation No 2201/2003 that one of the parents cannot strengthen his or her position on the issue of custody with respect to the child by evading, by a wrongful act, the jurisdiction of the courts that are as a matter of principle designated, according to the rules laid down in particular by that regulation, to give a ruling on parental responsibility with respect to that child (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 December 2009, Detiček, C‑403/09 PPU, EU:C:2009:810, paragraph 49, and of 9 October 2014, C, C‑376/14 PPU, EU:C:2014:2268, paragraph 67).

49. The recognition of a situation of urgency in a case such as the present one would run counter to the aim of Regulation No 2201/2003 to deter the wrongful removal or retention of children between Member States (see, to that effect, Case C‑195/08 PPU Rinau [2008] ECR I‑5271, paragraph 52). To accept that a measure involving a change of parental responsibility could be taken under Article 20(1) of Regulation No 2201/2003 would amount, by consolidating a factual situation deriving from wrongful conduct, to strengthening the position of the parent responsible for the wrongful removal.

En premier lieu, s’agissant des arguments de la requérante tirés d’une dénaturation des éléments de preuve, il convient de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence constante, il résulte de l’article 256 TFUE, ainsi que de l’article 58, premier alinéa, du statut de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne que le pourvoi est limité aux questions de droit. Le Tribunal est, dès lors, seul compétent pour constater et apprécier les faits ainsi que les éléments de preuve pertinents. L’appréciation de ces éléments et de ces faits ne constitue donc pas, sauf en cas de dénaturation, une question de droit soumise, comme telle, au contrôle de la Cour dans le cadre d’un pourvoi (voir, notamment, arrêt du 8 novembre 2016, BSH/EUIPO, C‑43/15 P, EU:C:2016:837, point 50 et jurisprudence citée).

38 The fact that Decision 93/731 has legal effects vis-à-vis third parties cannot call in question its categorization as a measure of internal organization. There is nothing to prevent rules on the internal organization of the work of an institution having such effects (see, in particular, Case C-69/89 Nakajima v Council [1991] ECR I-2069, paragraphs 49 and 50, and Case C-137/92 P Commission v BASF and Others [1994] ECR I-2555, paragraphs 75 and 76).

50 It follows that natural or legal persons may not rely on an alleged breach of those rules since they are not intended to ensure protection for individuals.

11 In its judgment in Case C-262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] ECR I-1889 ("the Barber judgment"), the Court ruled that pensions paid under a contracted-out pension scheme fall within the scope of Article 119 of the Treaty (paragraph 28), which prohibits any discrimination between men and women in relation to pay, whatever the arrangements giving rise to such inequality. Accordingly, it is contrary to Article 119 to impose an age condition which differs according to sex, even if the difference between the pensionable ages for men and women corresponds to that provided for by the national statutory scheme (paragraph 32).

31. It follows that the system established by the European Union legislature for contracts relating to services falling within the ambit of Annex II B to the Directive cannot be interpreted as precluding application of the principles deriving from Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU, in the event that such contracts are nevertheless of certain cross-border interest (see, to that effect, Commission v Ireland , paragraph 29) or, therefore, of the requirements designed to ensure transparency of procedures and equal treatment of tenderers (see, to that effect, Case C‑91/08 Wall [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 37).

37. In order to ensure transparency of procedures and equal treatment of tenderers, substantial amendments to essential provisions of a service concession contract could in certain cases require the award of a new concession contract, if they are materially different in character from the original contract and are therefore such as to demonstrate the intention of the parties to renegotiate the essential terms of that contract (see, by analogy with public contracts, Case C‑337/98 Commission v France [2000] ECR I‑8377, paragraphs 44 and 46, and Case C‑454/06 pressetext Nachrichtenagentur [2008] ECR I‑4401, paragraph 34).

42. Second, the conditions under which the State may incur liability for damage caused to individuals by a breach of Community law cannot, in the absence of particular justification, differ from those governing the liability of the Community in like circumstances. The protection of the rights which individuals derive from Community law cannot vary depending on whether a national authority or a Community authority is responsible for the damage.

26. It follows in particular that Member States are required to check taxable persons’ returns, accounts and other relevant documents, and to calculate and collect the tax due (see judgments in Commission v Italy , C‑132/06, EU:C:2008:412, paragraph 37; Profaktor Kulesza , Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski , C‑188/09, EU:C:2010:454, paragraph 21; and Enel Maritsa Iztok 3 , C‑107/10, EU:C:2011:298, paragraph 52).

37. It follows from Articles 2 and 22 of the Sixth Directive, and from Article 10 EC, that every Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory. In that regard, Member States are required to check taxable persons’ returns, accounts and other relevant documents, and to calculate and collect the tax due.

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

50. In that sense, the enacting terms of an EU act are indissociably linked to the reasons given for it, so that, when it has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption (Case C‑298/00 P Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I‑4087, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited, and Sturgeon and Others , paragraph 42).

97. In any event, it should be pointed out that, in paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance started from the general principle that the operative part of an act is indissociably linked to the statement of reasons for it, so that, when it has to be interpreted, account must be taken of the reasons which led to its adoption (see, inter alia, Case C‑355/95 P TWD v Commission [1997] ECR I‑2549, paragraph 21, and Case C‑404/97 Commission v Portugal , cited above, paragraph 41).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

15. As an exception to the general rule of jurisdiction set out in the Convention, Article 16 must not be given an interpretation broader than is required by its objective, since the article deprives the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of the domicile of any of them (see Case 73/77 Sanders [1977] ECR 2383, paragraphs 17 and 18; Case C-115/88 Reichert and Kockler [1990] ECR I-27, paragraph 9; Case C-292/93 Lieber [1994] ECR I-2535, paragraph 12; and Case C‑8/98 Dansommer [2000] ECR I-393, paragraph 21).

12 The Court has consistently held (see inter alia the judgment in Case C-115/88 Reichert and Kockler [1990] ECR I-27, paragraph 9) that Article 16 must not be given a wider interpretation than is required by its objective, since it results in depriving the parties of the choice of forum which would otherwise be theirs and, in certain cases, results in their being brought before a court which is not that of any of them.

29. On the one hand, the competent authorities must know with clarity and precision the nature of the signs of which a mark consists in order to be able to fulfil their obligations in relation to the prior examination of applications for registration and the publication and maintenance of an appropriate and precise register of trade marks.

23. Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained (OJ 1998 L 77, p. 36) concerns only lawyers who are fully qualified as such in their Member States of origin (see Morgenbesser , paragraph 45). In addition, it is apparent from the documents before the Court that the activities undertaken by legal trainees are regarded as forming the practical part of the training required to enter the legal professions in Germany. It follows that such a legal traineeship cannot be classed as a ‘regulated profession’, within the meaning of Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years’ duration (OJ 1989 L 19, p. 16), as amended by Directive 2001/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2001 (OJ 2001 L 206, p. 1), separable from the German legal professions themselves, such as the profession of lawyer (see, by analogy, Morgenbesser , paragraphs 46 to 55).

51. However, it follows from those provisions that the pursuit of those activities is designed to constitute the practical part of the training necessary for access to the profession of " avvocato" . If, at the end of those six years, the praticante-patrocinante does not pass the examination prescribed by point 6 of the first paragraph of Article 17 of Decree-Law No 1578/33, he will no longer be authorised, under those provisions, to pursue the activities which he carried on in that capacity.

19 ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THE LETTER OF TERMINATION DATED 12 MARCH 1968 FROM THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC UNION GROUP MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING ALONE GIVEN RISE TO THE CLAIM IN THE ACTION , THE EFFECT OF THE DELAY IN INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE STRICTLY APPLIED TO THE APPLICANT IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTY WHICH HE EXPERIENCED IN IDENTIFYING THE AUTHORITY COMPETENT TO RECEIVE HIS COMPLAINT AND THE UNCERTAINTY WITH REGARD TO THE PERIOD OF NOTICE WHICH RESULTED FROM THE EXTENSION REQUESTED ON HIS BEHALF BY THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC UNION GROUP AND GRANTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PARLIAMENT .

14 Taxes, duties and charges which exhibit the essential characteristics of VAT must always be considered as such even if they are not identical in every respect to VAT. As the Court has already held on more than one occasion, these characteristics are as follows: VAT applies generally to transactions relating to goods or services; it is proportional to the price of those goods and services, irrespective of the number of transactions which take place; it is charged at each stage of the production and distribution process; and, finally, it is imposed on the added value of goods and services, since the tax payable on a transaction is calculated after deducting the tax paid on the previous transaction (see, in particular, Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, paragraph 15; Joined Cases 93/88 and 94/88 Wisselink and Others [1989] ECR 2671, paragraph 18; Case C-109/90 Giant [1991] ECR I-1385, paragraphs 11 and 12; Case C-200/90 Dansk Denkavit and Poulson Trading [1992] ECR I-2217, paragraph 11, and Bozzi, cited above, paragraph 12). The Court also pointed out in Bergandi, at paragraph 8, with regard to its essential characteristics, that VAT is definitively borne by the final consumer.

11 In order to decide whether a tax can be characterized as a turnover tax it is necessary, in particular, to determine, as the Court stated in its judgment in Case 295/84 (Rousseau Wilmot v Organic [1985] ECR 3759) and in Case 252/86 (Bergandi v Directeur-général des impôts [1988] ECR 1343), whether it has the effect of compromising the functioning of the common system of value added tax by levying a charge on the movement of goods and services and on commercial transactions in a way comparable to value added tax.

9 The scope ratione personae of the Directive is determined by Article 2, according to which the Directive applies to the working population, to persons seeking employment and to workers and self-employed persons whose activity is interrupted by one of the risks set out in Article 3(1)(a ), that is to say illness, invalidity, old age, an accident at work or an occupational disease, or unemployment .

31 It follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice, in essence, that simple handling intended to make an unfinished tobacco product capable of being smoked, such as merely inserting a roll of tobacco into a cigarette tube, is not ‘industrial processing’ (see, by analogy, judgments of 24 September 1998, Brinkmann, C‑319/96, EU:C:1998:429, paragraphs 18 and 20, and of 10 November 2005, Commission v Germany, C‑197/04, EU:C:2005:672, paragraphs 31 and 32).

18 A product of the kind at issue in the main proceedings thus falls within the scope of Article 4(1) of the Second Directive, which defines smoking tobacco. The rolls of tobacco at issue here in fact consist of tobacco which has been cut and is capable of being smoked without further industrial processing.

39. The Court has also held that the requirement of legal certainty means that the binding nature of any act intended to have legal effects must be derived from a provision of Community law which prescribes the legal form to be taken by that act and which must be expressly indicated therein as its legal basis (Case C‑325/91 France v Commission [1993] ECR I-3283, paragraph 26).

41. It is settled case-law that the requirement that the General Court give reasons for its judgments cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is obliged to respond in detail to every single argument submitted by the applicant, particularly if the argument was not sufficiently clear and precise and was not adequately supported by evidence (see Case C‑274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I‑1611, paragraph 121; Case C‑197/99 P Belgium v Commission [2003] ECR I-8461, paragraph 81; and Case C‑404/04 P Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission [2007] ECR I‑1, paragraph 90).

121 As the Advocate General observed in point 61 of his Opinion, although the Court of First Instance is required to give reasons for its decisions, it is not obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by the appellant, particularly if the argument was not sufficiently clear and precise and was not adequately supported by evidence. In that regard, the appellant has not proved, or even asserted, that the arguments referred to in paragraph 119 of this judgment meet those requirements or that they were supported by evidence which was distorted by the Court of First Instance, or that in its assessment of that evidence the Court of First Instance contravened the rules of procedure or general legal principles concerning the burden of proof or the taking of evidence.

40. Furthermore, it follows from Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2003/9 that the directive provides for only one category of asylum seekers, comprising all third-country nationals or stateless persons who make an application for asylum. No provision can be found in the directive such as to suggest that an application for asylum can be regarded as having been lodged only it if is submitted to the authorities of the Member State responsible for the examination of that application.

19 According to settled case-law, Articles 48, 52 and 59 of the Treaty cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State (Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraph 37; Case C-332/90 Steen [1992] ECR I-341, paragraph 9; and Joined Cases C-29/94 to C-35/94 Aubertin and Others [1995] ECR I-301, paragraph 9).

37 It must then be pointed out that the Court has consistently held that the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement cannot be applied to activities which are confined in all respects within a single Member State and that the question whether that is the case depends on findings of fact which are for the national court to make (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 52/79 Debauve ]1980] ECR 833, paragraph 9).

31. While Directive 91/439 is to be repealed only with effect from 19 January 2013, Articles 2(1) and 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 are nonetheless applicable as from 19 January 2009, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 18 of that directive.

50. According to that case-law, in particular the judgments in France v Commission (C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraphs 71 and 76 to 83); Commission v EDF (C‑124/10 P, EU:C:2012:318, paragraphs 104 and 105); Cityflyer Express v Commission (T‑16/96, EU:T:1998:78, paragraph 76); Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Commission (T‑228/99 and T‑233/99, EU:T:2003:57, paragraph 246), and Netherlands v Commission (T‑29/10 and T‑33/10, EU:T:2012:98, paragraph 78), the examination of the existence of aid and, in particular, the private investor analysis should be based on the circumstances prevailing at the date of adoption of the measure concerned.

80 Third, the Commission concludes, in paragraph 83 of the contested decision, that [t]he failure of the financing to comply with the market economy investor principle prior to the hive-off lies in the extraordinarily high level of exposure incurred by Crédit Lyonnais, and then by CDR, in respect of Stardust, in the form of claims and off balance-sheet commitments exceeding FRF l billion, taking account of the financing granted to Stardust customers, i.e. about three times the total assets of the firm at the end of 1996.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

22. On that last point, it should be recalled that the Court has already held that, whilst the protective measures prescribed in Article 6(2) to (4) of the Habitats Directive are required only as regards sites which are placed on the list of sites selected as SCIs drawn up by the Commission, this does not mean that the Member States do not have to protect sites as soon as they propose them, under Article 4(1) of the directive, as sites eligible for identification as SCIs on the national list transmitted to the Commission (see Case C‑117/03 Dragaggi and Others [2005] ECR I‑167, paragraphs 25 and 26, and Case C‑244/05 Bund Naturschutz in Bayern and Others [2006] ECR I‑8445, paragraphs 36 and 37).

26. This does not mean that the Member States are not to protect sites as soon as they propose them, under Article 4(1) of the Directive, as sites eligible for identification as sites of Community importance on the national list transmitted to the Commission.

20 However, the Court has held that it is otherwise where the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been acquired, without prejudice to the rights held by the holding company as shareholder (Polysar, paragraph 14, and Floridienne and Berginvest, paragraph 18).

70 Citizenship of the Union confers on each Union citizen a primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and restrictions laid down by the Treaty and the measures adopted for their implementation (see, to this effect, judgments of 7 October 2010, Lassal, C‑162/09, EU:C:2010:592, paragraph 29, and of 16 October 2012, Hungary v Slovakia, C‑364/10, EU:C:2012:630, paragraph 43).

29. As a preliminary point, it must be observed that citizenship of the Union confers on each citizen a primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and restrictions laid down by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and the measures adopted for their implementation, freedom of movement for persons being, moreover, one of the fundamental freedoms of the internal market, which was also reaffirmed in Article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

31 As regards the argument put forward by ENEA and the Commission that most of the undertakings bound by the purchase obligation were public undertakings governed by private law and therefore that obligation could be regarded as being financed through State resources, it should be noted that the resources of public undertakings may be regarded as State resources where the State is capable, by exercising its dominant influence over such undertakings, of directing the use of their resources in order to finance advantages to the benefit of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 May 2002, France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 38).

31. It is clear, however, from the case‑law of the Court that, in order to determine the organisations which should be recognised as ‘charitable’ for the purposes of Article 13A(1)(g) of the Sixth Directive, it is for the national authorities, in accordance with EU law and subject to review by the national courts, to take into account, in particular, the existence of specific provisions, be they national or regional, legislative or administrative, or tax or social security provisions; the public interest nature of the activities of the taxable person concerned; the fact that other taxable persons carrying on the same activities already enjoy similar recognition; and the fact that the costs of the supplies in question may be largely met by health insurance schemes or other social security bodies (see, to that effect, Kügler , paragraphs 57 and 58; Kingscrest Associates and Montecello , paragraph 53; and, by analogy, Case C‑45/01 Dornier [2003] ECR I‑12911, paragraphs 72 and 73; L.u.P. , paragraph 53; and CopyGene , paragraphs 65 and 71).

58 In the main proceedings, the national court will thus be able to take into account the existence of specific provisions, be they national or regional, legislative or administrative, or tax or social security provisions, the fact that associations carrying on the same activities as the claimant in the main proceedings are already entitled to a similar exemption, given the public interest inherent in those activities, and the fact that the costs of the services supplied by the claimant in the main proceedings may be largely met by statutory health funds or by social security bodies with which private operators such as the claimant in the main proceedings have contractual relations.

26. It is appropriate to begin by recalling that Article 2(1) of that directive defines ‘energy products’ for the purposes of that directive by drawing up an exhaustive list of the products covered by that definition by reference to the codes of the combined nomenclature (judgment in Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems , C‑5/14, EU:C:2015:354, paragraph 47).

168. Second, even though the first paragraph of Article 4 of the Directive does not specify the actual content of the measures to be taken in order to ensure that waste is disposed of without endangering human health and without harming the environment, that provision, which contains obligations independent of those arising from the other provisions of the Directive, is none the less binding on the Member States as to the objective to be achieved, while leaving to them a margin of discretion in assessing the need for such measures ( San Rocco , paragraph 67, and Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece , cited above, paragraphs 55 and 58).

58 In addition, the obligations flowing from Article 4 of Directive 75/442 and Article 5 of Directive 78/319 were independent of the more specific obligations contained in Articles 5 to 11 of Directive 75/442 concerning the planning, organisation and supervision of waste disposal operations and Article 12 of Directive 78/319 concerning the disposal of toxic and dangerous waste. The same is true of the corresponding obligations under Directive 75/442 as amended and Directive 91/689.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

54. That conclusion contradicts the case-law of the Court of Justice, in particular the judgment in France v Commission (C‑241/94, EU:C:1996:353, paragraphs 23 and 24), in which the Court of Justice found that, by virtue of its aim and general scheme, the system at issue was liable to place certain undertakings in a more favourable situation than others since the competent authority enjoyed a degree of latitude which enabled it to adjust its financial assistance having regard to various considerations such as, in particular, the choice of the beneficiaries, the amount of financial assistance and the conditions under which it was provided. It also disregarded the judgment in P (C‑6/12, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 27), in which the Court of Justice held that, when national legislation confers a discretion on national authorities with regard to the detailed rules for the application of the measure at issue, the decisions of those authorities lack selectivity only if that discretion is limited by objective criteria, which are not connected with the system put in place by the legislation in question.

27. On the other hand, if the competent authorities have a broad discretion to determine the beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as maintaining employment, the exercise of that discretion must then be regarded as favouring ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see, to that effect, Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom , paragraph 75).

33. Although the concept of ‘direct investment’ is not defined by the Treaty, it has nevertheless been defined in the nomenclature of the capital movements set out in Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [article repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam] (OJ 1988 L 178, p. 5) ( Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation , paragraphs 177 and 178).

142. The Court has stated in this connection that where such facts and evidence have not been submitted and produced by the party concerned within the time-limit set to that end under the provisions of Regulation No 40/94, and thus not ‘in due time’ within the meaning of Article 74(2) of that regulation, that party does not enjoy an unconditional right to have such information taken into account by the Board of Appeal of OHIM. On the contrary, that board has a discretion as to whether or not to take such information into account when making the decision which it is called upon to give (see OHIM v Kaul , paragraph 63).

63. It follows from paragraphs 41 to 43 of this judgment that, where, as in the present case, such facts and evidence have not been submitted and produced by the party concerned within the time‑limit set to that end under the provisions of Regulation No 40/94, and thus not ‘in due time’ within the meaning of Article 74(2) of that regulation, that party does not enjoy an unconditional right to have such information taken into account by the Board of Appeal. On the contrary, that board has a discretion as to whether or not to take such information into account when making the decision which it is called upon to give.

13 IN THIS RESPECT IT MUST BE STRESSED THAT THESE CONCEPTS DEFINE THE FIELD OF APPLICATION OF ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS GUARANTEED BY THE TREATY AND , AS SUCH , MAY NOT BE INTERPRETED RESTRICTIVELY .

30. That interpretation is not invalidated by the fact that the effects of the Köbler judgment date back to the time at which the rule interpreted entered into force, since the effects were not temporally limited by the Court. The application of a procedural rule, such as the limitation period at issue in the main proceedings, must not be confused with a limitation on the effects of a judgment of the Court ruling on a request for interpretation of a provision of European Union law (see, to that effect, Case C‑231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I‑4951, paragraphs 17 and 18).

18 The application of those detailed rules must not therefore be confused with a limitation on the effects of a judgment of the Court ruling on a request for interpretation of a provision of Community law. The consequence of such a limitation is to deprive litigants, who would normally be in a position, under their national procedural rules, to exercise the rights conferred on them by the Community provision concerned, of the right to rely on it in support of their claims.

34. In the present case, since a charge on the registration of new motor vehicles, such as the Danish registration duty at issue in the main proceedings, is manifestly of a fiscal nature and is charged not by reason of the vehicle crossing the frontier of the Member State which introduced the charge, but upon first registration of the vehicle in the territory of that State, the charge must be regarded as part of a general system of internal dues on goods and thus examined in the light of Article 90 EC.

73. In that respect, the Court of Justice has held, in particular, that where a Member State has failed to make a type of transaction subject to VAT, contrary to the requirements of the Sixth VAT Directive, such an infringement is also liable to result in a failure by that Member State to fulfil its obligation to make available to the Commission, as VAT resources, the amounts corresponding to the tax which should have been levied on those transactions (see, in particular, Case C‑276/97 Commission v France [2000] ECR I‑6251, paragraphs 49, 56, 61 and 70; Case C‑358/97 Commission v Ireland [2000] ECR I‑6301, paragraphs 58, 65, 69 and 78; and Case C‑359/97 Commission v United Kingdom [2000] ECR I‑6355, paragraphs 70, 77 and 87).

70 However, it is necessary to consider whether the extent of Ireland's obligation to make retrospective payments where appropriate under the rules relating to the Communities' own resources is affected by the fact that over seven years elapsed between the notification of the reasoned opinion and the bringing of this action.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

42. With regard to the measures which may or must be taken to ensure this legal protection, the Court has stated that, where such a breach is invoked by individuals, national courts must take all the consequential measures, in accordance with national procedures, as regards both the validity of measures giving effect to the aid and the recovery of financial support granted in disregard of Article 88(3) EC (see Case C‑354/90 Fédération nationale du commerce extérieur des produits alimentaires and Syndicat national des négociants et transformateurs de saumon [1991] ECR I-5505, paragraph 12, and Case C-174/02 Streekgewest [2005] ECR I-85, paragraph 17).

12 In view of the foregoing considerations it must be held that the validity of measures giving effect to aid is affected if national authorities act in breach of the last sentence of Article 93(3) of the Treaty. National courts must offer to individuals in a position to rely on such breach the certain prospect that all the necessary inferences will be drawn, in accordance with their national law, as regards the validity of measures giving effect to the aid, the recovery of financial support granted in disregard of that provision and possible interim measures.

25. The system put in place by Regulation No 1408/71 is merely a system of coordination, concerning, inter alia, the determination of the legislation applicable to employed and self‑employed persons who make use, under various circumstances, of their right to freedom of movement (Case C‑493/04 Piatkowski [2006] ECR I‑2369, paragraph 20; Case C‑50/05 Nikula [2006] ECR I‑7029, paragraph 20; and Case C‑103/06 Derouin [2008] ECR I‑1853, paragraph 20).

43. Direct investments, that is to say, investments of any kind made by natural or legal persons which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the company to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity, fall within the scope of Article 56 EC on the free movement of capital. That object presupposes that the shares held by the shareholder enable the latter to participate effectively in the management or control of that company (see, inter alia, Case C‑112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I‑8995, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited; Case C‑326/07 Commission v Italy , paragraph 35; and Case C-543/08 Commission v Portugal , paragraph 42).

35. Direct investments, that is to say, investments of any kind made by natural or legal persons which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity fall within the ambit of Article 56 EC on the free movement of capital. That object presupposes that the shares held by the shareholder enable him to participate effectively in the management of that company or in its control ( Commission v Germany , paragraph 18, and case-law cited).

76. As to the argument put forward by the Danish Government to the effect that the term ‘feta’ refers to a type of cheese originating from the Balkans, it is common ground that white cheeses soaked in brine have been produced for a long time, not only in Greece but in various countries in the Balkans and the southeast of the Mediterranean basin. However, as noted in point B(a) of the scientific committee’s opinion, those cheeses are known in those countries under other names than ‘feta’.

56. However, according to the established case‑law of the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, save where a substantive inaccuracy in its findings is attributable to the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts. That appraisal thus does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see Case C‑390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I‑769, paragraph 29; Case C‑237/98 P Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I‑4549, paragraph 35; and Case C‑425/07 P AEPI v Commission [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 44).

44. It must be borne in mind at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction to find the facts, save where a substantive inaccuracy in its findings is attributable to the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts. That appraisal thus does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see Case C 390/95 P Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission [1999] ECR I-769, paragraph 29, and Case C‑237/98 P Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission [2000] ECR I‑4549, paragraph 35).

11 It must first be observed in that regard that the Netherlands rules on insurance agencies neither require nor favour the conclusion of any unlawful agreement, decision or concerted practice by insurance intermediaries, since the prohibition which they lay down is self-sufficient.

76. In that context, the Court has already held that it is legitimate for a Member State to ensure that consumers are properly informed about the products which are offered to them, thus giving them the possibility of making their choice on the basis of that information. In particular, Member States may, for the purpose of protecting consumers, require those concerned to alter the description of a foodstuff where a product offered for sale under a particular name is so different, in terms of its composition or production, from the products generally understood as falling within that description within the Community that it cannot be regarded as falling within the same category. However, where the difference is of minor importance, appropriate labelling should be sufficient to provide the purchaser or consumer with the necessary information ( Commission v Spain , paragraphs 84 to 86 and the case-law cited there).

84. In that context, the Court has already held that it is legitimate for a Member State to ensure that consumers are properly informed about the products which are offered to them, thus giving them the possibility of making their choice on the basis of that information (see, inter alia , Case 216/84 Commission v France [1988] ECR 793, paragraph 11, and Smanor , paragraph 18).

32 Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum in the initial proposal for the Regulation (COM(90) 415 final - SYN 305 of 26 October 1990) states that the criterion of proximity might justify intervention from the authorities in regard to waste for disposal. That criterion is not mentioned in regard to waste for recovery; in regard to the latter, only the criterion of environmentally sound management might be applied.

25 Second, it is important to note that freedom to provide services, as a fundamental principle of the Treaty, may be restricted only by rules which are justified by overriding reasons in the general interest and are applicable to all persons and undertakings pursuing an activity in the territory of the host Member State. Furthermore, in order to be so justified, the national legislation in question must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, to that effect, Säger, paragraph 15; Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32; Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165, paragraph 37; and Guiot, paragraphs 11 and 13).

37 It follows, however, from the Court' s case-law that national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see Case C-19/92 Kraus v Land Baden-Wuerttemberg [1993] ECR I-1663, paragraph 32).

Toutefois, les États membres sont tenus, conformément à l’article 4, paragraphe 3, TUE, de faciliter à la Commission l’accomplissement de sa mission, consistant notamment, selon l’article 17, paragraphe 1, TUE, à veiller à l’application des dispositions du traité FUE ainsi que des dispositions prises par les institutions de l’Union en vertu de celui-ci (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Italie, C‑135/05, EU:C:2007:250, point 27 et jurisprudence citée).

33. Thus, the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation or the assessment of the validity of a provision of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see Bosman , paragraph 61, and Bacardi-Martini and Cellier des Dauphins , paragraph 43).

43. Thus the Court has held that it has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious that the interpretation or the assessment of the validity of a provision of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, or where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see Bosman , paragraph 61; Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-1157, paragraph 52; and Case C-36/99 Idéal Tourisme [2000] ECR I-6049, paragraph 20).

29. The contracting authority cannot, therefore, after publication of a contract notice, amend the technical specification in respect of an element of the contract in breach of the principles of equal treatment and of non-discrimination and the obligation of transparency. It is irrelevant, in that regard, whether or not the element to which that specification refers is still in production or available on the market.

30. It is also appropriate to note that the obligation on the national court to refer to the content of the directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its national law is not unlimited, particularly where such interpretation would have the effect, on the basis of the directive and independently of legislation adopted for its implementation, of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of its provisions (see, in particular, Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13, and X , cited above, paragraph 24).

13 HOWEVER, THAT OBLIGATION ON THE NATIONAL COURT TO REFER TO THE CONTENT OF THE DIRECTIVE WHEN INTERPRETING THE RELEVANT RULES OF ITS NATIONAL LAW IS LIMITED BY THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW WHICH FORM PART OF COMMUNITY LAW AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL CERTAINTY AND NON-RETROACTIVITY . THUS THE COURT RULED IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 11 JUNE 1987 IN CASE 14/86 PRETORE DE SALO V X (( 1987 )) ECR ... THAT A DIRECTIVE CANNOT, OF ITSELF AND INDEPENDENTLY OF A NATIONAL LAW ADOPTED BY A MEMBER STATE FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, HAVE THE EFFECT OF DETERMINING OR AGGRAVATING THE LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW OF PERSONS WHO ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THAT DIRECTIVE .

79 Under those circumstances, ‘emissions into the environment’ covers emissions which are actually released into the environment at the time of the application of the product or substance in question and foreseeable emissions from that product or that substance into the environment under normal or realistic conditions of use of that product or substance corresponding to those under which the authorisation to place the product in question on the market is granted and which prevail in the area where that product is intended for use.

54 It is for the national court to establish the existence of those two elements, evidence of which must be adduced in accordance with the rules of national law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not thereby undermined (see, to that effect, in particular, Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others v Germany [1983] ECR 2633, paragraphs 17 to 25 and 35 to 39; Case 222/82 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraphs 17 to 21; and Case C-212/94 FMC and Others v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1996] ECR I-389, paragraphs 49 to 51, and Joined Cases C-418/97 and C-419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland and Others v Minister van Volkshuisvesting [2000] ECR I-4475, paragraph 41).

41 Finally, it should be noted that in the absence of Community provisions, Member States are free to chose the modes of proof of the various matters defined in the directives which they transpose, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not thereby undermined (see in particular, in that regard, Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor and Others v Germany [1983] ECR 2633, paragraphs 17 to 25 and 35 to 39; Case 222/82 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, paragraphs 17 to 21; and Case C-212/94 FMC and Others v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1996] ECR I-389, paragraphs 49 to 51).

22 CONSEQUENTLY , THE REPLY TO THE FIRST PART OF THE QUESTION MUST BE THAT A TRAINEE TEACHER WHO , UNDER THE DIRECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES , IS UNDERGOING A PERIOD OF SERVICE IN PREPARATION FOR THE TEACHING PROFESSION DURING WHICH HE PROVIDES SERVICES BY GIVING LESSONS AND RECEIVES REMUNERATION MUST BE REGARDED AS A WORKER WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 48 ( 1 ) OF THE EEC TREATY , IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP . ON THE MEANING OF ' EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE ' IN ARTICLE 48 ( 4 )

52. According to settled case-law, where, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, those detailed rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not make it impossible in practice or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment in Gruber , C‑570/13, EU:C:2015:231, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). As far as the latter principle is concerned, it should also be recalled that Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the right to an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal (see, to that effect, judgment in Unibet , C‑432/05, EU:C:2007:163, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

37. It should also be recalled that where, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law, those detailed rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment in Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen , C‑115/09, EU:C:2011:289, paragraph 43).

12. De même, la Commission fait valoir que, conformément à la jurisprudence de la Cour, le règlement nº 4055/86, qui étend au secteur du transport maritime entre États membres les règles du traité CE régissant la libre prestation des services, s’oppose à l’application de toute réglementation nationale ayant pour effet de rendre la prestation de services entre États membres plus difficile que la prestation de services purement interne à un État membre, à moins que ladite réglementation n’apparaisse justifiée par une raison impérieuse d’intérêt général et à la condition que les mesures qu’elle édicte soient nécessaires et proportionnées (arrêts du 5 octobre 1994, Commission/France, C‑381/93, Rec. p. I‑5145, points 13 et 17, ainsi que du 14 novembre 2002, Geha Naftiliaki e.a., C‑435/00, Rec. p. I‑10615, point 20).

77 Secondly, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14, the Member States are to establish a charging framework. They may also establish specific charging rules, while respecting the management independence of the infrastructure manager. Under that provision, it is for the infrastructure manager to determine the charge for the use of the infrastructure and also to collect it (see, inter alia, judgments of 28 February 2013, Commission v Spain, C‑483/10, EU:C:2013:114, paragraph 39, and of 3 October 2013, Commission v Italy, C‑369/11, EU:C:2013:636, paragraph 41).

41. Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14 provides that the Member States are to establish a framework for levying charges and may also establish specific charging rules, while respecting the management independence of the infrastructure manager. Under that provision, it is for the infrastructure manager to determine the charge for the use of the infrastructure and also to collect it (see, inter alia, Case C‑483/10 Commission v Spain [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).

50. S’agissant de la protection des travailleurs, la Cour a reconnu qu’elle figure parmi les raisons impérieuses d’intérêt général qui peuvent justifier des restrictions à la liberté d’établissement (voir, notamment, arrêt International Transport Workers’ Federation et Finnish Seamen’s Union, EU:C:2007:772, point 77 et jurisprudence citée).

59. That conclusion is also confirmed both by the first recital in the preamble to Regulation No 26 and by the Court ' s case-law, according to which the common organisations of the market are based on the concept of an open market to which every producer has free access under effective conditions of competition (see, inter alia , Case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board [1978] ECR 2347, paragraph 57, and Case C-281/87 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 4015, paragraph 16).

57WITH A VIEW TO APPLYING THAT STATEMENT IN THE CASE OF THE PIGS MARKETING SCHEME IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE COMMON ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKET IN PIGMEAT , LIKE THE OTHER COMMON ORGANIZATIONS , IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF AN OPEN MARKET TO WHICH EVERY PRODUCER HAS FREE ACCESS AND THE FUNCTIONING OF WHICH IS REGULATED SOLELY BY THE INSTRUMENTS PROVIDED FOR BY THAT ORGANIZATION .

26. He does not lose his status as worker for the purposes of Article 45 TFEU because he holds employment with an international organisation (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723, paragraph 11).

31 That is the position here. Article 8(1)(b) of Directive 92/81 imposes on the Member States, first, the clear and precise obligation not to levy the harmonised excise duty on fuel used for the purpose of air navigation other than private pleasure flying. Second, the degree of latitude afforded to Member States by the introductory wording of Article 8(1), whereby exemptions are granted by the Member States `under conditions which they shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of such exemptions and of preventing any evasion, avoidance or abuse', cannot detract from the unconditional nature of the obligation imposed by that provision to grant exemption (see, mutatis mutandis, paragraphs 32 to 35 of Becker, cited above).

33 THE ' ' CONDITIONS ' ' REFERRED TO ARE INTENDED TO ENSURE THE CORRECT AND STRAIGHTFORWARD APPLICATION OF THE EXEMPTIONS . A MEMBER STATE MAY NOT RELY , AS AGAINST A TAXPAYER WHO IS ABLE TO SHOW THAT HIS TAX POSITION ACTUALLY FALLS WITHIN ONE OF THE CATEGORIES OF EXEMPTION LAID DOWN IN THE DIRECTIVE , UPON ITS FAILURE TO ADOPT THE VERY PROVISIONS WHICH ARE INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE APPLICATION OF THAT EXEMPTION .

25 That conclusion cannot validly be called into question by the argument made by the Council based, first, on the fact that the Bulgarian language version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court is the only one to contain the ambiguity pointed out by the applicant and, second, on the case-law of the Court according to which the need to apply and interpret EU law uniformly precludes the examination of a provision in one of the language versions in isolation, but requires, on the contrary, its interpretation in the light of all the other language versions in accordance with its author’s intention (see, to that effect, the judgments of 12 November 1969, Stauder, 29/69, EU:C:1969:57, paragraph 3; of 17 July 1997, Ferriere Nord v Commission, C‑219/95 P, EU:C:1997:375, paragraph 15, and of 15 October 2015, Grupo Itevelesa and Others, C‑168/14, EU:C:2015:685, paragraph 42).

16. Furthermore, it is relevant to point out that, according to settled case-law, while direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with EU law (see, inter alia, Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477, paragraph 19; Case C-292/04 Meilicke and Others [2007] ECR I-1835, paragraph 19; Case C-157/05 Holböck [2007] ECR I-4051, paragraph 21; and Case C-451/05 ELISA [2007] ECR I-8251, paragraph 68). By the same token, that competence does not allow Member States to apply measures which are contrary to the freedoms of movement guaranteed by similar provisions of the EEA Agreement ( Établissements Rimbaud , paragraph 23).

21. As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, according to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law (Case C‑35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I‑4071, paragraph 32; Lenz , paragraph 19; and Case C‑319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I‑7477, paragraph 19).

42 The Commission' s amendments to its proposal thus did not affect the very essence of the Regulation taken as a whole, and therefore did not make it necessary for the Parliament to be consulted anew.

30. According to the actual wording of clause 2 of the framework agreement, the agreement applies to any fixed-term worker having an employment contract or relationship defined by the legislation, collective agreements or practice in force in each Member State ( Angelidaki and Others , paragraph 114).

114. According to the actual wording of clause 2 of the Framework Agreement, the agreement applies to any fixed-term worker who has an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreements or practice in each Member State.

23. When the Court is requested to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of tariff classification, its task is to provide the national court with guidance on the criteria which will enable the latter to classify the products at issue correctly in the CN, rather than to effect that classification itself, a fortiori since the Court does not necessarily have available to it all the information which is essential in that regard. In any event the national court is in a better position to do so (Joined Cases C-260/00 to C-263/00 Lohman and Medi Bayreuth [2002] ECR I-10045, paragraph 26).

42. Next, as pointed out by the tribunal administratif de Montreuil with regard to national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which seeks to prevent dividends distributed by resident companies being subject to a series of charges to tax, the situation of a resident recipient UCITS is comparable to that of a non‑resident recipient UCITS (see Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha , paragraphs 43 and 44, and Commission v Germany , paragraph 58).

44. Consequently, where a Member State has chosen to relieve resident parent companies of a series of charges to tax on the profits distributed by a resident subsidiary, it must extend that relief to non-resident parent companies which are in a comparable situation, since an imposition of that kind on those non-resident companies results from the exercise of its tax jurisdiction over them (see, to that effect, Denkavit Internationaal and Denkavit France , paragraph 37).

28 ATTENDU QU ' EN RELATION AVEC LES ECHANGES AVEC LES PAYS TIERS , LE TRAITE NE CONTIENT PAS DE DISPOSITIONS EXPLICITES ANALOGUES A CELLES QUI , DANS LES ECHANGES ENTRE LES ETATS MEMBRES , INTERDISENT LES TAXES D ' EFFET EQUIVALANT AUX DROITS DE DOUANE ;

36. According to settled case-law, Article 87(1) EC prohibits State aid ‘favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’, that is to say, selective aid (see Case C‑66/02 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I‑10901, paragraph 94, and Case C‑88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I‑7115, paragraph 52). As regards appraisal of the condition of selectivity, Article 87(1) EC requires assessment of whether, under a particular legal regime, a national measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued by that regime, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see, to that effect, Case C‑143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I‑8365, paragraph 41; Case C‑308/01 GIL Insurance and Others [2004] ECR I‑4777, paragraph 68; and Case C‑172/03 Heiser [2005] ECR I‑1627, paragraph 40). In order to determine whether a measure is selective, it is therefore appropriate to examine whether, within the context of a particular legal system, that measure constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings in comparison with others which are in a comparable factual and legal situation ( Portugal v Commission , paragraph 56).

56. It is clear from the foregoing that in order to determine whether the measure at issue is selective it is appropriate to examine whether, within the context of a particular legal system, that measure constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings in comparison with others which are in a comparable legal and factual situation. The determination of the reference framework has a particular importance in the case of tax measures, since the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation. The ‘normal’ tax rate is the rate in force in the geographical area constituting the reference framework.

21. It is true that the exporter should not be able to adapt his request for refund according to the result of any check which might take place ( Käserei Champignon Hofmeister , paragraph 28).

43. In addition, the freedom of contract includes, in particular, the freedom to choose with whom to do business (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-90/90 and C-91/90 Neu [1991] ECR I-3617, paragraph 13), and the freedom to determine the price of a service (see, to that effect, Case C-437/04 Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I-2513, paragraph 51, and Case C-213/10 F-TEX [2012] ECR, paragraph 45).

13 In that respect, it must be stated that the freedom to pursue a trade or profession, which, according to the consistent case-law of the Court (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727, paragraphs 31 to 33, and in Case 265/87 Schraeder v Hauptzollamt Gronau [1989] ECR 2237, paragraph 15), forms part of the general principles of Community law, includes, as a specific expression of that freedom, the freedom to choose whom to do business with. That freedom of choice would not be guaranteed if a change of dairy by a producer, of his own volition, were capable of leading to a reduction in his individual reference quantity as a result of the allocation of a part thereof to the national reserve, when no such reduction can be made where the producer continues to supply the same dairy. Rules to that effect would be such as to discourage producers from changing purchaser in order to supply the dairy offering them the most favourable conditions.

53. In those circumstances, the first and second questions must be considered in the light of the concept of ‘eligible hectare’ as defined in Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009 for the entire 2005-2009 period.

16. According to settled case-law, in order to determine whether the body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 EC, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, paragraph 23, and Case C-53/03 Syfait and Others [2005] ECR I-4609, paragraph 29).

23 In order to determine whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for the purposes of Article 177 of the Treaty, which is a question governed by Community law alone, the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 61/65 Vaassen (neé Göbbels) [1966] ECR 261; Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons unkown [1987] ECR 2545, paragraph 7; Case 109/88 Danfoss [1989] ECR 3199, paragraphs 7 and 8; Case C-393/92 Almelo and Others [1994] ECR I-1477; and Case C-111/94 Job Centre [1995] ECR I-3361, paragraph 9).

33. Il y a lieu de relever qu’il ressort du libellé de l’article 7, paragraphe 1, du règlement n° 207/2009 qu’il suffit que l’un des motifs absolus de refus énumérés à cette disposition s’applique pour que le signe en cause ne puisse être enregistré comme marque communautaire (voir, en ce sens, arrêt DKV/OHMI, C‑104/00 P, EU:C:2002:506, point 29).

50. As regards the proposal to amend the Meststoffenwet and adopt a regulation governing storage capacity for livestock manure, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion and the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see Case C-127/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-8305, paragraph 38, and Case C-122/02 Commission v Belgium [2003] ECR I-833, paragraph 11).

11. It is settled case-law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia , Case C-133/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2323, paragraph 17).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

27. Second, the Court has already held that it is not possible to accept an interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention according to which application of that provision is conditional on the actual occurrence of damage. Likewise it has held that the finding that the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence, is equally relevant whether the dispute concerns compensation for damage which has already occurred or relates to an action seeking to prevent the occurrence of damage (Case C-167/00 Henkel [2002] ECR I-8111, paragraphs 46 and 48).

48 It is therefore not possible to accept an interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention according to which application of that provision is conditional on the actual occurrence of damage. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent to require that an action to prevent behaviour considered to be unlawful, such as that brought in the main proceedings, whose principal aim is precisely to prevent damage, may be brought only after that damage has occurred.

52 Admittedly, the Court has already held that the categorical affirmation, in Germany's Basic Law, of the equality of men and women before the law as well as the express exclusion of all discrimination on grounds of sex and the guarantee of equal access to employment in the public service for all German nationals, in terms intended to be directly applicable, constitute, in conjunction with the existing system of judicial remedies, an adequate guarantee of the implementation, in the field of public administration, of the principle of equal treatment laid down in Directive 76/207. The Court took the view that the object of Directive 76/207 had already been achieved in Germany as regards employment in the public service and access for all German nationals to the independent professions at the time when the directive entered into force, so that no further legislative provisions were required for its implementation (see the judgment in Commission v Germany, cited above, paragraphs 18 and 19).

19. In that respect, the reference date for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU is the date of expiry of the period prescribed in the reasoned opinion issued under that provision (see judgment of 11 December 2012 in Case C‑610/10 Commission v Spain [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 67).

67. As Article 260(2) TFEU removed from infringement proceedings the stage relating to the issuing of a reasoned opinion, as has been pointed out in paragraph 43 above, the reference date which must be used for assessing whether there has been a failure to fulfil obligations is that of the expiry of the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice issued under that provision.

21 The practical difficulties which the Commission and the United Kingdom claim would preclude the implementation of a system of charging the clawback which provides for the amount of the premium to be exactly equal to that of the clawback cannot alter that conclusion.

43. However, that provision does not preclude a national of a Member State who, by virtue of Article 18 EC and the provisions adopted to implement that article, is lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State where he or she intends to start or pursue education from relying during that residence on the fundamental principle of equal treatment enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 12 EC (see, to that effect, Bidar , paragraph 46).

46. However, Article 3 of Directive 93/96 does not preclude a national of a Member State who, by virtue of Article 18 EC and Directive 90/364, is lawfully resident in the territory of another Member State where he intends to start or pursue higher education from relying during that residence on the fundamental principle of equal treatment enshrined in the first paragraph of Article 12 EC.

67. La compétence de pleine juridiction conférée au juge communautaire à l’article 91, paragraphe 1, du statut l’investit de la mission de donner aux litiges dont il est saisi une solution complète, c’est-à-dire de statuer sur l’ensemble des droits et des obligations de l’agent, sauf à renvoyer à l’institution en cause, et sous son contrôle, l’exécution de telle partie de l’arrêt dans les conditions précises qu’il fixe.

90 Third, as regards the twelfth part of the third ground of appeal, in the first place, as is clear from paragraph 69 of the present judgment, the General Court neither examined the IFS meeting of 14 November 2001 and the FSKI meetings of 23 January and 5 July 2002 nor based its findings concerning the alleged infringement on those meetings and, in the second place, as regards the argument as to the approach taken in the judgments of 16 September 2013, Villeroy & Boch Austria and Others v Commission (T‑373/10, T‑374/10, T‑382/10 and T‑402/10, not published, EU:T:2013:455), and of 16 September 2013, Keramag Keramische Werke and Others v Commission (T‑379/10 and T‑381/10, not published, EU:T:2013:457), which was raised also in the context of the seventh part of the third ground of appeal, it is settled case-law that the General Court’s obligation to state the reasons for its judgments does not in principle extend to requiring it to justify the approach taken in one case as against that taken in another case, even if the latter concerns the same decision (see judgment of 11 July 2013, Team Relocations and Others v Commission , C‑444/11 P, not published, EU:C:2013:464, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). Consequently, the twelfth part of the third ground of appeal in its entirety and the seventh part of that ground of appeal, in so far as it concerns the argument relating to the approach taken by the General Court in the judgments of 16 September 2013, Villeroy & Boch Austria and Others v Commission (T‑373/10, T‑374/10, T‑382/10 and T‑402/10, not published, EU:T:2013:455), and of 16 September 2013, Keramag Keramische Werke and Others v Commission (T‑379/10 and T‑381/10, not published, EU:T:2013:457), are unfounded.

66. In addition, the appellants cannot derive any useful argument from the judgment of the General Court in Verhuizingen Coppens v Commission , which in any case has since been set aside in Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens , in order to show that the judgment under appeal was insufficiently reasoned. The obligation on the General Court to state the reasons for its judgments cannot in principle extend to imposing on it an obligation to justify the solution arrived at in one case in the light of that found in another, even if it concerned the same decision. The Court has also held that, if an addressee of a decision decides to bring an action for annulment, the matter to be tried by the European Union judicature relates only to those aspects of the decision which concern that addressee. Unchallenged aspects concerning other addressees, on the other hand, do not form part of the matter to be tried by the Union judicature (see Case C‑310/97 P Commission v AssiDomän Kraft Products and Others [1999] ECR I‑5363, paragraph 53, and Joined Cases C‑201/09 P and C‑216/09 P ArcelorMittal Luxembourg v Commission and Commission v ArcelorMittal Luxembourg and Others [2011] ECR I‑2239, paragraph 142), without prejudice to special circumstances (see, to that effect, Case C‑286/11 Commission v Tomkins [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 43 and 49), which however are neither alleged not submitted in the present case.

39. As regards Article 15(2) of the Charter, it must be borne in mind that Article 52(2) thereof, which provides that rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is made in the treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined therein. In that vein, Article 15(2) of the Charter reiterates inter alia the free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, as confirmed by the explanations relating to that provision.

59. As Mrs Watts, the French and Belgian Governments and the Commission pointed out in their written observations, the Court gave an interpretation in paragraphs 45 and 46 of the judgment in Inizan of the time referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 22(2) of Regulation No 1408/71, adopting the interpretation it had given for the term ‘undue delay’ in Smits and Peerbooms (paragraphs 103 and 104) and Müller-Fauré and van Riet (paragraphs 89 and 90) concerning the assessment of the compatibility with Article 49 EC of a national provision making the assumption of the cost of hospital treatment planned in another Member State subject to a requirement that that treatment be necessary.

104 Furthermore, in order to determine whether equally effective treatment can be obtained without undue delay from an establishment having contractual arrangements with the insured person's fund, the national authorities are required to have regard to all the circumstances of each specific case and to take due account not only of the patient's medical condition at the time when authorisation is sought but also of his past record.

42. Constituent des restrictions à la libre prestation des services les mesures nationales qui interdisent, gênent ou rendent moins attrayant l’exercice de cette liberté (voir, notamment, arrêts Jobra, C‑330/07, EU:C:2008:685, point 19; Tankreederei I, C‑287/10, EU:C:2010:827, point 15, et X, C‑498/10, EU:C:2012:635, point 22).

47. The principle of fiscal neutrality includes the principle of elimination of distortion in competition as a result of differing treatment for VAT purposes (see, to that effect, Case C‑481/98 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-3369, paragraph 22). Therefore, distortion is established once it is found that supplies of services are in competition and are treated unequally for the purposes of VAT (see, to that effect, Case C‑404/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-2667, paragraphs 45 to 47). It is irrelevant, in that connection, whether the distortion is substantial.

22 That principle in particular precludes treating similar goods, which are thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes (see, to this effect, the eighth recital in the preamble to the First Directive and paragraphs 21 and 27 of the judgment in Case C-283/95 Fischer [1998] ECR I-3369). It follows that those products must be subject to a uniform rate. The principle of fiscal neutrality for that reason also includes the other two principles invoked by the Commission, namely the principles of VAT uniformity and of elimination of distortion in competition.

29. Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it ( Alassini and Others , paragraph 26).

30. Articles 22 to 24 of Regulation No 1257/1999 set out the general conditions for the grant of support for farming practices designed, in particular, to maintain the countryside. It follows from those provisions that agri-environmental measures are characterised by the five‑year commitment given by the farmers concerned to practise a form of agriculture which respects the environment. In return for the agri‑environmental commitments for a minimum of five years, financial support is allocated annually by the States according to the loss of revenue incurred or the resulting additional costs (Case C‑241/07 JK Otsa Talu [2009] ECR I‑4323, paragraph 36).

36. The general conditions for the grant of support for farming practices designed, in particular, to maintain the countryside are set out in Articles 22 to 24 of Regulation No 1257/1999, from which it is clear that agri-environmental measures are characterised by the five-year commitment given by the farmers concerned to use environmentally-favourable farming practices. In exchange for agri-environmental commitments, support is allocated annually by the States according to the loss of revenue incurred or the resulting additional costs.

23 It would be otherwise only in cases where either it appears that the procedure of Article 177 of the Treaty has been misused and been resorted to, in fact, in order to elicit a ruling from the Court by means of a spurious dispute or it is obvious that the provisions of Community law submitted for the interpretation of the Court cannot apply .

28. That concept must therefore be interpreted in the light of the overall scheme and objectives of the system of which it forms part (see, to that effect, Case C‑292/00 Davidoff [2003] ECR I‑389, paragraph 24), and, in particular, must take into account the context of the provision which contains it (see, to that effect, Case C‑320/12 Malaysia Dairy Industries [2013] ECR, paragraph 25).

25. In accordance with settled case-law, the need for a uniform application of European Union law and the pri nciple of equality require that the terms of a provision of European Union law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union; that interpretation must take into account the context of the provision and the objective of the relevant legislation (see, inter alia, Case C‑482/09 Budějovický Budvar [2011] ECR I-0000 paragraph 29).

35 It follows that the NRA, upon adoption of a decision by which it imposes tariff obligations on operators on the basis of Articles 8 and 13 of the Access Directive, is not bound by Recommendation 2009/396.

34. The Court of Justice has also held that, although the criteria for assessing distinctiveness are the same for the various categories of marks, it may become apparent, in applying those criteria, that the relevant public’s perception is not necessarily the same for each of those categories and that, therefore, it may prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness for some categories of mark than for others (see Joined Cases C-456/01 P and C-457/01 P Henkel v OHIM [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 38; Joined Cases C-468/01 P to C-472/01 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2004] ECR I-0000, paragraph 36; and Joined Cases C-473/01 P and C‑474/01 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2004] I‑0000, paragraph 36) .

38. The Court of First Instance was also correct in stating that the criteria for assessing the distinctive character of three-dimensional shape-of-products marks are no different from those applicable to other categories of trade mark. It none the less observed that, for the purpose of applying those criteria, the relevant public’s perception is not necessarily the same in relation to a three-dimensional mark consisting of the shape and colours of the product itself as it is in relation to a word or figurative mark consisting of a sign which is independent from the appearance of the products it denotes. Average consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of their shape or the shape of their packaging in the absence of any graphic or word element and it could therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness in relation to such a three-dimensional mark than in relation to a word or figurative mark (see, to that effect, Linde , paragraph 48, and Case C‑218/01 Henkel [2004] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 52).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

24 Where the Commission finds that aid alleged to have been made in pursuance of a previously authorised scheme of aid does not comply with the conditions laid down in its decision approving the scheme and is therefore not covered by it, that aid must be regarded as new aid (see, to that effect, Case C-47/91 Italy v Commission [1994] ECR I-4635, paragraphs 24 to 26).

25 It follows from the foregoing that the effects of the decision giving notice to the parties concerned and initiating the procedure under Article 93(2) differ depending on whether the aid in question is new aid or existing aid. In the former case the State is prevented from implementing the aid proposal submitted to the Commission; that prohibition does not, however, apply where the aid is existing aid.

Lorsqu’il s’agit, comme en l’espèce, d’un acte destiné à une application générale, la motivation peut se borner à indiquer, d’une part, la situation d’ensemble qui a conduit à son adoption et, d’autre part, les objectifs généraux qu’il se propose d’atteindre (voir, notamment, arrêt Espagne/Conseil, C‑310/04, EU:C:2006:521, point 58 et jurisprudence citée).

48. Furthermore, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the explanatory notes drawn up, as regards the CN, by the Commission and, as regards the HS, by the World Customs Organisation may be an important aid to the interpretation of the scope of the various headings but do not have legally binding force (see Case C-35/93 Develop Dr. Eisbein [1994] ECR I‑2655, paragraph 21, and Case C-400/05 B.A.S. Trucks [2007] ECR I‑311, paragraph 28). The content of those notes must therefore be in accordance with the provisions of the CN and may not alter their meaning (Case C-280/97 ROSE Elektrotechnik [1999] ECR I‑689, paragraph 23; Case C-495/03 Intermodal Transports [2005] ECR I‑8151, paragraph 48; and Case C‑445/04 Possehl Erzkontor [2005] ECR I‑10721, paragraph 20).

23 It is settled case-law that, whilst those explanatory notes may be regarded as a valuable aid to the interpretation of the CN, they do not have legally binding force, so that it is necessary, where appropriate, to examine whether their content is in accordance with the actual provisions of the Common Customs Tariff and whether they alter the meaning of those provisions (see, in particular, Case C-35/93 Develop Dr Eisbein [1994] ECR I-2655, paragraph 21, Case C-201/96 LTM, cited above, paragraph 17, and Case C-328/97 Glob-Sped, cited above, paragraph 26).

31 In that regard, first, it is clear from the order for reference that the justification put forward before the national court is derived from the fact that a more favourable tax rate is applied to non-resident financial institutions than the one which is applied to resident financial institutions.

94. According to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove that failure. It is the Commission, indeed, which must place before the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that failure, and in so doing the Commission may not rely on any presumptions (Case C‑490/09 Commission v Luxembourg [2011] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

49. With regard, in the second place, to the Commission’s action as regards Article 12 of the Statutes, it must be borne in mind from the outset that, in proceedings under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, it is for the Commission to prove the alleged failure by placing before the Court all the information needed to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled (see, in particular, Case C‑160/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 116, and Commission v France , paragraph 56).

55. Toutefois, lorsque le Tribunal a constaté ou apprécié les faits, la Cour est compétente pour exercer, en vertu de l’article 256 TFUE, un contrôle sur la qualification juridique de ces faits et les conséquences de droit qui en ont été tirées par le Tribunal (voir, notamment, arrêt du 10 juillet 2008, Bertelsmann et Sony Corporation of America/Impala, C‑413/06 P, Rec. p. I‑4951, point 29 et jurisprudence citée).

58. It is to be noted, moreover, that, according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of Union law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, and which has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, and that, under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Union law (Case C‑432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I‑2271, paragraphs 37 and 38 and case-law cited).

38. Under the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 10 EC, it is for the Member States to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law (see, to that effect, Case 33/76 Rewe , [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5; Case 45/76 Comet [1976] ECR 2043, paragraph 12; Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraphs 21 and 22; Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19; and Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12).

41 Those arguments cannot be accepted.

39. As regards the objection of inadmissibility of the Commission’s action raised by the Slovak Republic as its principal argument, it should be recalled that the purpose of the pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned the opportunity to comply with its obligations arising from EU law or to present its defence effectively against the complaints put forward by the Commission. The proper conduct of that procedure constitutes an essential guarantee not only in order to protect the rights of the Member State concerned, but also so as to ensure that any contentious procedure will have a clearly defined dispute as its subject-matter (see, inter alia, Commission v France , C‑1/00, EU:C:2001:687, paragraph 53; Commission v Germany , C‑135/01, EU:C:2003:171, paragraph 19 and 20; and Commission v Netherlands , C‑79/09, EU:C:2010:171, paragraph 21).

21. À cet égard, il convient de rappeler que le but de la procédure précontentieuse est de donner à l’État membre la possibilité de se conformer aux obligations découlant pour lui du droit de l’Union ou de faire utilement valoir ses moyens de défense à l’encontre des griefs formulés par la Commission. La régularité de la procédure précontentieuse constitue une garantie essentielle non seulement pour la protection des droits de l’État membre en cause, mais également pour assurer que la procédure contentieuse éventuelle aura pour objet un litige clairement défini (voir en ce sens, notamment, arrêt du 13 décembre 2001, Commission/France, C‑1/00, Rec. p. I‑9989, point 53).

36 As regards Article 48 of the Treaty, which it is appropriate to consider first, the Court has stated time and again that that provision implements a fundamental principle contained in Article 3(c) of the EC Treaty, under which, for the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community are to include the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons (see, in particular, Case 118/75 Watson and Belmann [1976] ECR 1185, paragraph 16, and Case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 15).

21. First of all, it should be noted that, as a general rule, the Court will refrain from considering the principle of tax neutrality with a view to ascertaining whether EU law precludes national rules which lay down time-limits within which a VAT refund must be claimed, failing which the action is time-barred (see, to that effect, Case C‑85/97 SFI [1998] ECR I‑7447, paragraphs 22 to 36; Case‑62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I‑6325, paragraphs 22 to 47; and Case C‑472/08 Alstom Power Hydro [2010] ECR I‑623, paragraphs 14 to 22).

16. First, by analogy with the situation applicable to the exercise of the right to deduct, the possibility of making an application for the refund of excess VAT without any temporal limit would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty, which requires the tax position of the taxable person, having regard to his rights and obligations vis-à-vis the tax authority, not to be open to challenge indefinitely (Joined Cases C‑95/07 and C‑96/07 Ecotrade [2008] ECR I‑3457, paragraph 44).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

31. Furthermore, the Court’s case-law makes clear that every citizen of the Union may rely on Article 18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, in all situations falling within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law, those situations including the exercise of the freedom conferred by Article 21 TFEU to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (see, to that effect, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I‑11613, paragraph 24; Case C‑209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I‑2119, paragraphs 32 and 33; and Case C‑158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I‑8507, paragraphs 36 and 37).

24. The situations falling within the scope ratione materiae of Community law include those involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as conferred by Article 18 EC (Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637, paragraphs 15 and 16, Grzelczyk , cited above, paragraph 33, and D'Hoop , paragraph 29).

22. Such a scheme can only be a ‘pyramid’ in the sense that its sustainability requires the subscription of an ever increasing number of new participants to fund the compensation paid to existing members. It also means that the most recent members are less likely to receive compensation for their participation. That scheme ceases to be viable when the growth in membership, which should theoretically tend to infinity in order for the scheme to continue, is no longer sufficient to fund the compensation promised to all participants.

22. For a trade mark to possess distinctive character for the purposes of Regulation No 207/2009, it must serve to identify the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑468/01 P to C‑472/01 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2004] ECR I‑5141, paragraph 32; Case C‑304/06 P Eurohypo v OHIM [2008] ECR I‑3297, paragraph 66; and Case C‑311/11 P Smart Technologies v OHIM [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 23).

32. For a trade mark to possess distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, it must serve to identify the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from those of other undertakings (see, in relation to Article 3(1)(b) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1), a provision which is identical to Article 7(1)(b), Joined Cases C-53/01 to C‑55/01 Linde and Others [2003] ECR I-3161, paragraph 40).

33 IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF STRICT LIABILITY , AS DESCRIBED BY THE APPLICANTS , IMPLIES THAT AN INDIVIDUAL HAS TO BEAR , IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST , A FINANCIAL BURDEN WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY FALL UPON HIM . IN THIS CASE , THE DAMAGE ALLEGEDLY SUSTAINED BY THE APPLICANTS IS MERELY THE RESULT OF THE ORDINARY RISK TAKEN BY ANY TENDERER TAKING PART IN A TENDERING PROCEDURE . ACCORDINGLY , WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER SUCH A PRINCIPLE OF STRICT LIABILITY EXISTS IN THE COMMUNITY ' S LEGAL SYSTEM , THIS SUBMISSION MUST BE REJECTED .

30. However, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it. The Court has a duty to interpret all provisions of European Union law which national courts require in order to decide the actions pending before them, even if those provisions are not expressly indicated in the questions referred to the Court of Justice by those courts (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑45/06 Campina [2007] ECR I‑2089, paragraphs 30 and 31, and Case C‑243/09 Fuß [2010] ECR I‑9849, paragraph 39).

30. In the procedure laid down by Article 234 EC providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (Case C-286/05 Haug [2006] ECR I-4121, paragraph 17 and the case‑law cited).

46. Toutefois, hormis le fait que la République hellénique semble elle-même reconnaître la participation des employés et de l’État, en tant qu’employeur, au financement du régime litigieux, il ressort en tout état de cause de la jurisprudence de la Cour que les modalités de financement et de gestion d’un régime de pension tel que celui en cause en l’espèce ne constituent pas non plus un élément décisif pour apprécier si ledit régime relève de l’article 141 CE (arrêts précités Beune, point 38; Griesmar, point 37, et Niemi, point 43).

40. It is apparent from the Commission Proposal (COM(73) 950 final) which resulted in the adoption of the Sixth Directive that the EU legislature, by adopting the second subparagraph of Article 4(4) of that directive, intended, either in the interests of simplifying administration or with a view to combating abuses such as, for example, the splitting-up of one undertaking among several taxable persons so that each might benefit from a special scheme, to ensure that Member States would not be obliged to treat as taxable persons those whose ‘independence’ is purely a legal technicality (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission v Sweden , C‑480/10, EU:C:2013:263, paragraph 37).

37. As regards the objectives pursued by Article 11 of the VAT Directive, it is apparent from the Commission Proposal which resulted in the adoption of Directive 77/388 that, by adopting the second subparagraph of Article 4(4) of the Sixth Directive, which was replaced by Article 11 of the VAT Directive, the European Union legislature intended, either in the interests of simplifying administration or with a view to combating abuses such as, for example, the splitting-up of one undertaking among several taxable persons so that each might benefit from a special scheme, to ensure that Member States would not be obliged to treat as taxable persons those whose ‘independence’ is purely a legal technicality ( Commission v Ireland , paragraph 47).

40. In the light of the entirety of that case-law, it must be observed that a data collection activity in relation to undertakings, on the basis of a statutory obligation on those undertakings to disclose the data and powers of enforcement related thereto, falls within the exercise of public powers. As a result, such an activity is not an economic activity.

64. Finally, contrary to the appellants’ submissions, the documents relating to the pre-litigation stage of an infringement procedure constitute a single category of documents for the purposes of applying the abovementioned general presumption. Firstly, the exception laid down, as regards investigations relative to possible infringements of Community law, in the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 does not draw any distinction on the basis of the type of document forming part of the file relating to such investigations or of the author of the documents in question. Secondly, with regard to documents related to State aid review procedures, the Court of Justice has held that all the documents in the administrative file relating to such a procedure form a single category to which a general presumption that disclosure of documents in the administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objectives of investigations applies ( Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau , paragraph 61).

61. It follows from the above considerations as a whole that, for the purposes of interpreting the exception laid down in Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation No 1049/2001, the General Court should, in the judgment under appeal, have taken account of the fact that interested parties other than the Member State concerned in the procedures for reviewing State aid do not have the right to consult the documents in the Commission’s administrative file, and, therefore, have acknowledged the existence of a general presumption that disclosure of documents in the administrative file in principle undermines protection of the objectives of investigation activities.

35 Secondly, in order to determine which of the two supplies the intra-Community transport must be ascribed to, it is necessary to undertake an overall assessment of all the specific circumstances of the case (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 December 2010, Euro Tyre Holding, C‑430/09, EU:C:2010:786, paragraph 27, and of 27 September 2012, VSTR, C‑587/10, EU:C:2012:592, paragraph 32).

90. However, as has already been noted in paragraphs 77 to 80 above, proof that Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337 has been infringed requires the Commission to demonstrate that a Member State has failed to adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects. That proof may effectively be furnished by demonstrating that a Member State did not take the measures necessary to ascertain whether a project which does not reach the thresholds envisaged in Article 4(2) of Directive 85/337 is nevertheless likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia of its nature, size or location. The Commission might also establish that a project likely to have significant effects on the environment was not the subject of an impact assessment although it should have been ( Commission v Portugal , paragraph 82).

82. Proof that Article 2(1) of Directive 85/337 has been infringed requires the Commission to demonstrate that a Member State has failed to adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects. That proof may effectively be furnished by demonstrating that a Member State did not take all measures necessary to ascertain whether a project which does not reach the thresholds referred to in Article 4(2) of Directive 85/337 is nevertheless likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of its nature, size or location. The Commission might also determine that a project likely to have significant effects on the environment was not the subject of an impact assessment although it should have been.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

85 In the absence of Community rules on the restitution of national charges that have been improperly levied, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, second, that they do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness) (see, in particular, Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I-4951, paragraphs 19 and 34, Case C-260/96 Spac [1998] ECR I-4997, paragraph 18, Case C-228/96 Aprile [1998] ECR I-7141, paragraph 18, and Dilexport, paragraph 25).

34 This diversity between national systems derives mainly from the lack of Community rules on the refunding of national charges levied though not due. In such circumstances, as pointed out in paragraph 19 of this judgment, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, second, that they do not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness).

84. It must be stated, first, that the measures prescribed by Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 are in themselves capable of immediately redressing some of the damage suffered by passengers in the event of cancellation of, or a long delay to, a flight and therefore enable a high level of passenger protection, sought by the regulation, to be ensured.

31. That finding is confirmed by the objectives pursued by Regulation No 2419/2001. As evidenced by recital 32 in the preamble thereto, it is aimed at adopting the measures necessary to combat irregularities and fraud in the implementation of the different aid schemes coming within the integrated system in order to protect the European Union’s financial interests effectively. In order to attain that objective, that regulation provides, as evidenced by recital 33 in the preamble thereto, for reductions and exclusions according to the gravity of the irregularity committed in the aid application, up to total exclusion from one or more aid schemes for a determined period (see, by analogy, judgment in Agrargenossenschaft Pretzsch , C‑417/00, EU:C:2002:715, paragraphs 35 to 39).

36 In the first place, in relation to a slight overestimate of the area declared, made in good faith without serious negligence, the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 3887/92 provides simply for the correction of the amount of the aid, which is to be calculated on the basis of the area actually determined by the check.

69. Il y a lieu de constater que, en incitant les opérateurs économiques désirant commercialiser en Belgique des produits de construction légalement fabriqués et/ou commercialisés dans un autre État membre à obtenir des marques de conformité belges, le Royaume de Belgique a manqué aux obligations qui lui incombent en vertu des articles 28 CE et 30 CE. Sur les dépens

22 As regards the criterion of serious difficulties, the Court also held in the Barber judgment that if any male worker concerned could, like Mr Barber, retroactively assert the right to equal treatment in cases of discrimination which, until then, could have been considered permissible in view of the exceptions provided for in Directive 86/378, the financial balance of many occupational schemes might be upset retroactively (paragraph 44).

44 In those circumstances, overriding considerations of legal certainty preclude legal situations which have exhausted all their effects in the past from being called in question where that might upset retroactively the financial balance of many contracted-out pension schemes . It is appropriate, however, to provide for an exception in favour of individuals who have taken action in good time in order to safeguard their rights . Finally, it must be pointed out that no restriction on the effects of the aforesaid interpretation can be permitted as regards the acquisition of entitlement to a pension as from the date of this judgment .

222. Like that case-law on new developments in case-law, a change in an enforcement policy, in this instance the Commission’s general competition policy in the matter of fines, especially where it comes about as a result of the adoption of rules of conduct such as the Guidelines, may have an impact from the aspect of the principle of non-retroactivity.

36 Consequently, where, at the time when the period laid down in the reasoned opinion expires, the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations, the rules laid down in Article 258 TFEU must be applied without the Commission being obliged, in principle, to act at a specific time (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 October 2010, Commission v Lithuania, C‑350/08, EU:C:2010:642, paragraphs 33 and 34 and the case-law cited, and of 16 April 2015, Commission v Germany, C‑591/13, EU:C:2015:230, paragraph 14).

33. Next, with regard to the alleged delay in bringing the proceedings under Article 258 TFEU, the rules of that provision must be applied without any obligation on the Commission to act within a specific period (Case 324/82 Commission v Belgium [1984] ECR 1861, paragraph 12, and Case C‑333/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑1025, paragraph 25) and it is for the Commission to choose when it will bring an action for failure to fulfil obligations before the Court; the considerations which determine its choice of time cannot affect the admissibility of the action (Case C‑317/92 Commission v Germany [1994] ECR I‑2039, paragraph 4, and Case C‑40/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I‑4539, paragraph 23).

181. It follows from the foregoing that the general principle of effective judicial protection does not preclude either the conclusion by the Member States whose currency is the euro of an agreement such as the ESM Treaty or their ratification of it.

19. According to the Court’s settled case-law, Article 1(2) of Directive 91/439 provides for mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States. That provision imposes on those Member States a clear and precise obligation, which leaves no room for discretion as to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with it (Case C‑321/07 Schwarz [2009] ECR I‑1113, paragraph 75 and case-law cited).

75. The Court has consistently held that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/439 provides for mutual recognition, without any formality, of driving licences issued by Member States. That provision imposes on Member States a clear and precise obligation, which leaves no room for discretion as to the measures to be adopted in order to comply with it (see, to that effect, Awoyemi , paragraphs 41 and 42; Case C‑246/00 Commission v Netherlands [2003] ECR I‑7485, paragraphs 60 and 61; Kapper , paragraph 45; Wiedemann and Funk , paragraph 50; Zerche and Others , paragraph 47; and Weber , paragraph 26; order in Case C‑227/05 Halbritter [2006] ECR I‑49, paragraph 25; order in Case C‑340/05 Kremer [2006] ECR I‑98, paragraph 27).

29. Or, force est de constater que l’article 8, paragraphe 4, de la loi relative à l’impôt sur les sociétés constitue une entrave à la liberté d’établissement étant donné qu’une société établie au Danemark, qui transfère des actifs à l’étranger, dans les Îles Féroé ou au Groenland, est imposée sur les plus-values latentes, alors qu’un transfert similaire au Danemark ne donne pas lieu à l’imposition.

34. Consequently, for the purposes of determining the existence of State aid, it is necessary to establish a sufficiently direct link between, on the one hand, the advantage given to the beneficiary and, on the other, a reduction of the State budget or a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on that budget (see, to that effect, the judgment in Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others , C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraph 109).

109. Consequently, for the purposes of establishing the existence of State aid, the Commission must establish a sufficiently direct link between, on the one hand, the advantage given to the beneficiary and, on the other, a reduction of the State budget or a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on that budget (see, to that effect, Case C-279/08 P Commission v Netherlands [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 111).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

41 In that regard, it is settled case-law that, for the purpose of applying the principle of equal pay, the situation of a male worker is not comparable to that of a female worker where the advantage granted to the female worker alone is designed to offset the occupational disadvantages, inherent in maternity leave, which arise for female workers as a result of being away from work (Abdoulaye and Others, cited above, paragraphs 18, 20 and 22).

20 As the United Kingdom Government and the Commission rightly point out, Article 119 of the Treaty does not preclude the making of a payment such as that in question in the main proceedings exclusively to female workers since it is designed to offset the occupational disadvantages, such as those mentioned by Renault. In this case, male and female workers are, in their view, in different situations, which excludes any breach of the principle of equal pay laid down in Article 119 of the Treaty.

90. Measures which restrict a fundamental freedom may be justified on public policy grounds only if they are necessary for the protection of the interests which they are intended to secure and only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by less restrictive measures (see Omega , paragraph 36, and Jipa , paragraph 29).

26. Nevertheless, the Court cannot give a preliminary ruling on a question referred where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law sought by the national court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to that question (see, to that effect, in particular, Bosman , paragraph 61; Acereda Herrera , paragraph 48, and Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25).

25. As regards Mr Cipolla’s pleas of inadmissibility, it should be recalled that questions on the interpretation of Community law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (see Case C‑300/01 Salzmann [2003] ECR I-4899, paragraphs 29 and 31). The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, paragraph 39, and Case C-466/04 Acereda Herrera [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 48).

38. Or, il convient de rappeler, à cet égard, que les déchets ont une nature particulière, si bien que leur accumulation, avant même qu’ils ne deviennent dangereux pour la santé, constitue, compte tenu notamment de la capacité limitée de chaque région ou localité à les recevoir, un danger pour l’environnement (arrêt Commission/Italie, C‑297/08, EU:C:2010:115, point 105).

65. Where aid is paid without prior notification to the Commission, so that it is unlawful under Article 93(3) of the Treaty, the recipient of the aid cannot have at that time a legitimate expectation that its grant is lawful (see Alcan Deutschland , paragraphs 30 and 31, and Joined Cases C‑183/02 P and C‑187/02 P Demesa and Territorio histórico de Álava v Commission [2004] ECR I‑10609, paragraph 45).

31 In accordance with the principle set out in paragraph 25 of this judgment, the recipient of aid could not, therefore, have had at that time a legitimate expectation that its grant was lawful.

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

35 At the outset, it should be noted that clause 5 of the framework agreement, the purpose of which is to implement one of the objectives of that agreement, namely to place limits on successive recourse to fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, requires Member States, in paragraph 1 thereof, to adopt one or more of the measures listed in a manner that is effective and binding, where domestic law does not include equivalent legal measures. The measures listed in Clause 5(1)(a) to (c), of which there are three, relate, respectively, to objective reasons justifying the renewal of such employment contracts or relationships, the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, and the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships (see, to that effect, judgments of 23 April 2009, Angelidaki and Others, C‑378/07 to C‑380/07, EU:C:2009:250, paragraphs 73 and 74; of 3 July 2014, Fiamingo and Others, C‑362/13, C‑363/13 and C‑407/13, EU:C:2014:2044, paragraphs 54 and 56, and of 26 November 2014, Mascolo and Others, C‑22/13, C‑61/13, C‑63/13 and C‑418/13, EU:C:2014:2401, paragraphs 72 and 74).

56. Thus, Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement requires Member States, in order to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, to adopt one or more of the measures listed in a manner that is effective and binding, where domestic law does not include equivalent legal measures. The measures listed in Clause 5(1)(a) to (c), of which there are three, relate, respectively, to objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships, the maximum total duration of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships, and the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships (see Angelidaki and Others , EU:C:2009:250, paragraphs 74 and 151; Kücük , EU:C:2012:39, paragraph 26; Márquez Samohano , EU:C:2014:146, paragraph 42; and the order in Papalia , C‑50/13, EU:C:2013:873, paragraphs 18 and 19).

38 It follows from all the foregoing that the Federal Supervisory Board, in the procedure which led to this reference for a preliminary ruling, is to be regarded as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 177 of the Treaty, so that the question it has referred to the Court is admissible. Substance

33. Secondly, as the Commission notes in its written observations, the fact that modules such as those at issue in the main proceedings are composed of elements which, considered in isolation, could each be classified under CN heading 8541, is not such as to call into question their classification under another heading, since, as a result of the assembly of those elements, they constitute products that are distinct from those elements (see, by analogy, judgment in Kloosterboer Services , C‑173/08, EU:C:2009:382, paragraph 29).

29. The fact that those goods are composed of two distinct elements, namely a heat sink and a fan, which, when considered separately, could each be classified under a different subheading of the CN, namely subheadings 8473 30 90 and 8414 59 30, is not such as to call that classification into question.

54 In particular, it is contrary to the first paragraph of Article 95 of the Treaty to levy a tax on imported used vehicles based on a value which is higher than the real value of the vehicle with the result that imported used vehicles are taxed more heavily than similar used vehicles which are on sale on the domestic market (see, to that effect, Commission v Denmark, paragraph 22). In taxing used vehicles, their actual depreciation must therefore be taken into account.

31. A number of methods are capable of providing prices corresponding to the market value. Those methods include sales to the highest bidder or an expert report, which are referred to in Title II, points 1 and 2, of the Communication. Likewise, it cannot be ruled out that other methods may also achieve the same result (see, to that effect, judgment in Seydaland Vereinigte Agrarbetriebe , C‑239/09, EU:C:2010:778, paragraphs 35 and 39).

35. It follows from the foregoing considerations that, where the national law establishes rules for calculating the market value of land for their sale by public authorities, the application of those rules must, in order to comply with Article 87 EC, lead in all cases to a price as close as possible to the market value. As that market value is theoretical, except in the case of sales accepting the highest bid, a margin for variation on the price obtained as compared with the theoretical price must be tolerated, as the Commission correctly states in Title II, point 2(b), of the Communication.

27 As was explained to the Court, moreover, the distinction between recyclable and non-recyclable waste is particularly difficult to apply in practice, especially with respect to controls at frontiers. That distinction is based on factors which are uncertain and liable to change in the course of time according to technical progress. Furthermore, whether waste is recyclable or not also depends on the cost of the recycling process and consequently on whether its proposed reutlization is viable, with the result that classification of waste is necessarily subjective and depends on variable factors.

70. The continuation of such an interest in bringing proceedings must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of the alleged unlawfulness and of the nature of the damage claimed to have been sustained (judgment in Abdulrahim v Council and Commission , C‑239/12 P, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 65).

65. It is apparent from that case-law that the question whether an applicant retains his interest in bringing proceedings must be assessed in the light of the specific circumstances, taking account, in particular, of the consequences of the alleged unlawfulness and of the nature of the damage claimed to have been sustained.

24. Thus, only supplies of services which have a sufficiently direct connection with immovable property come under Article 9(2)(a) of the Sixth Directive. Such a connection is moreover characteristic of all the supplies of services listed in that provision.

28. À cet égard, il y a lieu de relever, d’une part, que, par leur premier argument, les requérantes au principal, en substance, invitent la Cour à se prononcer sur la question de la portée juridique d’une note complémentaire d’un chapitre de la NC aux fins de déterminer le classement d’une marchandise dans une position à quatre chiffres de la NC. Cependant, dès lors que la juridiction de renvoi n’a posé aucune question à ce sujet, comme les requérantes au principal l’ont d’ailleurs admis à l’audience en reconnaissant que cette question sort du cadre de celles posées par cette juridiction, il n’y a pas lieu pour la Cour de se prononcer sur ce point (voir arrêt du 14 décembre 2000, AMID, C‑141/99, Rec. p. I‑11619, point 18 et jurisprudence citée).

18 In its observations the Commission has called into question whether the Belgian provisions that were applied in the case concerned in the main proceedings are in conformity with the Convention. There is, however, no need to reply on that point, since the referring court has not asked any question in that respect (see, in particular, Case C-435/97 World Wildlife Fund v Automome Provinz Bozen [1999] ECR I-5613, paragraph 29) and, in any event, the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction under Article 177 of the Treaty to rule on the interpretation of provisions other than those of Community law (see, in particular, the order of 12 November 1998 in Case C-162/98 Hartmann [1998] ECR I-7083, paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12).

28. Such legislation may give rise to the same deterrent effect as regards the failure to treat days of unemployment which have given rise to payment of an unemployment allowance pursuant to the Conditions of Employment as working days for the purpose of eligibility for unemployment benefit in that Member State, given that days of unemployment for which benefit has been paid under the legislation of that Member State are so treated.

38. It is settled case‑law that the meaning and scope of terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part (see to that effect, inter alia, Case C‑336/03 easyCar [2005] ECR I‑1947, paragraph 21 and the case‑law cited; and judgment of 5 March 2009 in Case C‑556/07 Commission v France , paragraph 50).

21. It is settled case‑law that the meaning and scope of terms for which Community law provides no definition must be determined by considering their usual meaning in everyday language, while also taking into account the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which they are part (Case C-128/94 Hönig [1995] ECR I-3389, paragraph 9, and Case C-164/98 P DIR International Film and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I-447, paragraph 26). When those terms appear, as in the main proceedings, in a provision which constitutes a derogation from a principle or, more specifically, from Community rules for the protection of consumers, they must, in addition, be interpreted strictly (Case C‑83/99 Commission v Spain [2001] ECR I-445, paragraph 19, and Case C‑481/99 Heininger [2001] ECR I-9945, paragraph 31).

67. As it is, it must be noted in that regard that the legislation at issue is capable, in various ways, of hindering — at least indirectly and potentially — imports of electricity, especially green electricity, from other Member States.

34. In such a situation, it is clear from settled case-law that, although it does not require total abolition of State monopolies of a commercial character, Article 31(1) EC requires them to be adjusted in such a way as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States (see, to that effect, Case 59/75 Manghera and Others [1976] ECR 91, paragraphs 4 and 5; Case 91/78 Hansen [1979] ECR 935, paragraph 8; Case 78/82 Commission v Italy [1983] ECR 1955, paragraph 11; Case C-387/93 Banchero [1995] ECR I-4663, paragraph 27; and Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909, paragraph 38).

5 WITHOUT REQUIRING THE ABOLITION OF THE SAID MONOPOLIES , THIS PROVISION PRESCRIBES IN MANDATORY TERMS THAT THEY MUST BE ADJUSTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD HAS ENDED SUCH DISCRIMINATION SHALL CEASE TO EXIST .

65 The Court has already held in that regard that it follows directly from the wording of point (a) of the second subparagraph of Article 15(1) of that regulation that the use of the trade mark in a form which differs from the form in which it was registered is regarded as use for the purposes of the first subparagraph of that article provided that the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered is not altered (judgment of 18 July 2013, Specsavers International Healthcare and Others, C‑252/12, EU:C:2013:497, paragraph 21).

27 As far as the Commission's complaint is concerned, it is common ground that, whilst applying without distinction to all air transport operators, the provisions at issue do differentiate between domestic or regional flights and flights destined for other Member States. Under those provisions intra-Community flights attract a passenger service tax three times higher than that charged for national flights and a security tax twice that payable in respect of regional flights. Article 59 of the Treaty precludes the application of any national legislation that, without objective justification, restricts the freedom of a service provider to provide services and, in the perspective of the single market, the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State (Commission v France, cited above, paragraphs 16 and 17).

17 In the perspective of a single market and in order to permit the realization of its objectives, that freedom likewise precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State.

26. À cet égard, il convient également de rappeler que l’existence d’un manquement doit être appréciée en fonction de la situation de l’État membre telle qu’elle se présentait au terme du délai fixé dans l’avis motivé et que les changements intervenus par la suite ne sauraient être pris en compte par la Cour (voir, notamment, arrêts du 26 avril 2007, Commission/Italie, C‑135/05, Rec. p. I‑3475, point 36, et du 25 mars 2010, Commission/Grèce, C‑169/09, point 11).

58. The interest in bringing proceedings is an essential and fundamental prerequisite for any legal proceedings (see, to that effect, order in S. v Commission , 206/89 R, EU:C:1989:333, paragraph 8, and judgment in Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission , C‑682/13 P, EU:C:2015:356, paragraph 27).

27. Il appartient au requérant d’apporter la preuve de son intérêt à agir, qui constitue la condition essentielle et première de tout recours en justice (voir, en ce sens, ordonnance du président de la deuxième chambre de la Cour, S/Commission, C‑206/89 R, EU:C:1989:333, point 8).

64. Paragraph 4(1) of the VW Law thus establishes an instrument which gives the Federal and State authorities the possibility of exercising influence which exceeds their levels of investment. As a corollary, the influence of the other shareholders may be reduced below a level commensurate with their own levels of investment.

44 The same applies where the possibility for addressees not to give effect to the Community measure is purely theoretical and their intention to act in conformity with it is not in doubt (see to that effect Case 62/70 Bock v Commission [1971] ECR 897, paragraphs 6 to 8, Case 11/82 Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 207, paragraphs 8 to 10, and Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-0000, paragraph 51).

8 IT FOLLOWS THEREFORE THAT THE MATTER WAS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE APPLICANT .

33. In those circumstances, in order to include only enterprises that are genuinely independent SMEs, it is necessary to examine the structure of SMEs which form an economic group, the power of which exceeds the power of an SME, and to ensure that the definition of SMEs is not circumvented by purely formal means (see Italy v Commission , paragraph 50).

27 That broad construction of the concept of a ‘decision’ taken by a contracting authority is confirmed by the fact that Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665 does not lay down any restriction with regard to the nature or content of the decisions it refers to. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of that concept would be incompatible with the terms of Article 2(1)(a) of that directive which requires Member States to make provision for interim relief procedures in relation to any decision taken by the contracting authorities (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 January 2005, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C‑26/03, EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).

30. That broad meaning of the concept of a decision taken by a contracting authority is confirmed by the Court’s case-law. The Court has already held that Article 1(1) of Directive 89/665 does not lay down any restriction with regard to the nature and content of the decisions it refers to (Case C‑81/98 Alcatel Austria and Others [1999] ECR I‑7671, paragraph 35). Nor may such a restriction be inferred from the wording of Article 2(1)(b) of that directive (see, to that effect, Alcatel Austria and Others , paragraph 32). Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of the concept of a decision amenable to review would be incompatible with the provision in Article 2(1)(a) of that directive which requires the Member States to make provision for interim relief procedures in relation to any decision taken by the contracting authorities ( HI , paragraph 49).

15 The judgment in Leussink and Others v Commission cannot be regarded as establishing the principle that the condition relating to fault must be examined as a matter of priority. The fact that that condition was examined first in Leussink and Others v Commission was not attributable to any legal requirement.

31. It has also repeatedly been held that the freedom to provide services includes the freedom for the recipients of services, including persons in need of medical treatment, to go to another Member State in order to receive those services there without being hampered by restrictions (see, in particular, to that effect, Watts , paragraph 87, and Commission v Spain , paragraph 49).

49. Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that the freedom to provide services involves not only the freedom of the provider to carry out services for recipients established in a Member State other than that in which the provider is established but also the freedom to receive or to benefit, as recipient, from the services carried out by a provider established in another Member State, without being hampered by restrictions (see, inter alia, Gambelli and Others , paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

31. It follows that the basis for the Commission’s obligation to pay the principal debt together with interest is not its duty to implement the contested decision but its duty to comply with the judgment of 15 April 2011 in IPK International v Commission (EU:T:2011:185) pursuant to Article 266 TFEU.

31. In that connection, it is sufficient to point out that, although the Court does not, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the compatibility of a national measure with European Union law, it does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with a ruling on the interpretation of that law so as to enable that court to determine whether such compatibility exists and to decide the case before it (Case C‑439/06 c itiworks [2008] ECR I‑3913, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).

21. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, although the Court does not, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, have jurisdiction to give a ruling on the compatibility of a national measure with Community law, it does have jurisdiction to supply the national court with a ruling on the interpretation of Community law so as to enable that court to determine whether such compatibility exists in order to decide the case before it (see, inter alia, Case C‑124/99 Borawitz [2000] ECR I‑7293, paragraph 17; Case C‑60/05 WWF Italia and Others [2006] ECR I‑5083, paragraph 18; and Case C‑257/06 Roby Profumi [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 11).

105. Furthermore, where it is necessary to grant individual rights to the use of radio frequencies, those rights must be granted, under the second subparagraph of Article 5(2) of the Authorisation Directive, ‘through open, transparent and non‑discriminatory procedures’.

108. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether, as the Belgian Government contends, those provisions of Article 17 of the fertiliser decree correctly give effect to the obligations deriving from Annex III to the Directive. As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (see, in particular, Case C‑384/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-3823, paragraph 35).

35 It is to be remembered first of all that, in accordance with settled case-law, the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by reference to the situation prevailing at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned opinion, and subsequent changes cannot be taken into account by the Court (Case C-214/96 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-7661, paragraph 25).

18 The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 330, p. 3), lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national courts.

35. From the scheme of the rules of jurisdiction put in place by the Brussels Convention, as well as the rationale of the special rules introduced by the provisions of Title II, Section 4, the Court has concluded that those provisions only cover private final consumers, not engaged in trade or professional activities, as the benefit of those provisions must not be extended to persons for whom special protection is not justified (see to that effect inter alia Bertrand , paragraph 21; Shearson Lehman Hutton , paragraphs 19 and 22; Benincasa , paragraph 15; and Gabriel , paragraph 39).

15 As far as the concept of `consumer' is concerned, the first paragraph of Article 13 of the Convention defines a `consumer' as a person acting `for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession'. According to settled case-law, it follows from the wording and the function of that provision that it affects only a private final consumer, not engaged in trade or professional activities (Shearson Lehman Hutton, paragraphs 20 and 22).

51. It is common ground, first, that the injunction requiring installation of the contested filtering system would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data because they allow those users to be precisely identified.